MFS II EVALUATIONS

Joint evaluations of the Dutch Co-Financing System 2011 - 2015

Civil Society contribution
towards achieving
the Millennium Development Goals

Country report

LIBERIA

July 2015

SGE **Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties**

NWO
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
WOTRO Science for Global Development

PREFACE

This report is one of a series of evaluation reports, consisting of ten reports in total, reflecting the results of the jointly-organised MFS II evaluation:
- eight country reports (India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Uganda, Indonesia, DR Congo, Liberia, Pakistan);
- a synthesis report (covering the eight country studies); and
- a report with the results of the international lobbying and advocacy programmes.

This series of reports assessed the 2011-2015 contribution of the Dutch Co-Financing System (MFS II) towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, strengthening international civil society, setting the international agenda and changing decision-makers' policy and practice, with the ultimate goal of reducing structural poverty. On July 2nd, 2015, the reports were approved by the independent steering committee (see below), which concluded that they meet the quality standards of validity, reliability and usefulness set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MFS II has been the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs). A total of 20 alliances of Dutch CFAs were awarded € 1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through partnerships with Southern partner organisations supporting a wide range of development activities in over 70 countries and at the global policy level.

The MFS II framework required each alliance to carry out independent external evaluations of the effective use of the available funding. These evaluations had to meet quality standards in terms of validity, reliability and usefulness. The evaluations had to focus on four categories of priority result areas, as defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and comprise baseline assessments serving as a basis for measuring subsequent progress.

Out of the 20 alliances receiving MFS II funding, 19 decided to have their MFS II-funded activities evaluated jointly. These 19 alliances formed the *Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties (SGE*)[1], which acted on their behalf in relation to the joint MFS II evaluation. The SGE was assisted by an 'Internal Reference Group', consisting of seven evaluation experts of the participating CFAs.

The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/WOTRO) managed the evaluation and selected ten research teams to carry out the joint MFS II evaluation: eight teams responsible for carrying out studies at country level, one team responsible for the synthesis of these country studies, and one team responsible for the study of international lobbying and advocacy. Each study comprises a baseline assessment (2012) and a final assessment (2014). Research teams were required to analyse the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of development interventions funded by MFS II. An independent steering committee was appointed to verify whether the studies met with the required quality standards. In its appraisal, the steering committee drew on assessments by two separate advisory committees.

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[1] *Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties can be translated as Joint Evaluation Trust.*

The evaluation has been implemented independently. The influence of the CFAs was limited to giving feedback on the first draft reports, in particular to correct inaccuracies. The contents and presentation of information in this report, including annexes and attachments, are therefore entirely the responsibility of the research team and/or NWO/WOTRO.
However, as SGE we are responsible for adding this preface, the list with parties involved and a table of contents, in the cases that the report is a compilation of several reports.
In addition we would like to note that when reference is made to individual case studies, this should be seen as illustrative examples, rather than as representative of a CFA's entire partner portfolio.

The Dutch CFAs participating in this unique joint evaluation are pleased that the evaluation process has been successfully completed, and thank all the parties involved for their contribution (see the next pages for all the parties involved). We hope that the enormous richness of the report will serve not only accountability but also learning.

Bart Romijn
Chair of the 'Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties'

c/o Partos
Ellermanstraat 18B
1114 AK Amsterdam
www.partos.nl
info@partos.nl

Participants MFSII Evaluation

The SGE[1] alliances (and their lead organisations)

Freedom from fear (PAX)
United Entrepreneurship Coalition (Spark)
Impact Alliance (Oxfam Novib)
Communities of Change (Cordaid)
WASH Alliance (Simavi)
People Unlimited 4.1 (Hivos)
Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (ZOA)
SRHR Alliance (Rutgers)
ICCO Alliance (ICCO)
Connect4Change (IICD)
Connect Now (War Child)
Woord en Daad & Red een Kind Alliance (Woord en Daad)
Together4Change (International Child Support)
Child Rights Alliance (PLAN Netherlands)
Ecosystem Alliance (IUCN)
Partners for Resilience (Nederlandse Rode Kruis)
Press Freedom 2.0 (Free Press Unlimited)
Fair Green and Global (Both ENDS)
Kind en Ontwikkeling (Terre des Hommes)

The SGE Board

Bart Romijn (Partos/chair)
Ben Witjes (Hivos)
Harry Derksen (New World Campus)
Jan Lock (Woord en Daad)
Dianda Veldman (Rutgers)
Lucia Helsloot (Partos)
Marouschka Booy (independent consultant)
Mirjam Locadia (Partos, until 09/2014)
Alexander Kohnstamm (Partos/chair, until 10/2013)

The SGE Internal Reference Group

Yvonne Es (Oxfam Novib)
Rens Rutten (Cordaid)
Karel Chambille (Hivos)
Peter Das (ZOA)
Ruth van Zorge (Rutgers)
Dieneke de Groot (ICCO)
Wouter Rijneveld (independent)

[1] Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties

NWO/WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research

Dr. Martijn Wienia
Dr. Gerrie Tuitert
Sabine Zinsmeister
Dr. Henk Molenaar (until 11/2014)
Dr. Barbara Plavcak (until 09/2013)

Steering Committee

Prof. Wiebe Bijker (chair), Maastricht University, the Netherlands
Dr. Gavin Andersson, Seriti Institute, South Africa
Prof. Anita Hardon, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Prof. John Rand, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Ms. Mallika R. Samaranayake, independent consultant, Sri Lanka
Dr. Zenda Ofir, independent consultant, South Africa (until 10/2012)

Advisory Committee for the Country Level and Synthesis studies

Prof. James Copestake (chair), University of Bath, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, UK
Prof. Arnab Acharya, OP Jindal Global University, School of Government and Public Policy, India & London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK
Prof. Bagele Chilisa, University of Botswana, Botswana
Prof. Christopher Cramer, University of London, Department of Development Studies, UK
Dr. Nathalie Holvoet, University of Antwerp, Institute of Development Policy and Management, Belgium
Dr. Janice Jiggins, Independent consultant & guest researcher Wageningen University & Research Centre, Communication Science, the Netherlands
Dr. Stefan Leiderer, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Department of Bilateral and Multilateral Development Cooperation, Germany
Prof. Desmond McNeill, University of Oslo, Centre for Development and the Environment, Norway
Dr. Howard White, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 3ie, USA
Mr. Burt Perrin, Independent consultant, France – participated in first two calls
Dr. Jim Rugh, UK – participated in first two calls
Prof. Tom Schwandt, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA – participated in first two calls

Synthesis team

Prof. Dr. J.W. Gunning
Prof. Dr. J. van der Gaag
Gerton Rongen

Principal Investigators/Evaluators (per country)

India: Prof. dr. B.W. Lensink, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Liberia: Prof. dr. ir. E.H. Bulte, University of Wageningen & Research Centre, The Netherlands
Indonesia: Prof. M.P. Pradhan, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Pakistan: J.P. Tranchant, Institute of Development Studies, UK
DRC/Uganda: Prof. dr. ir. E.H. Bulte, University of Wageningen & Research Centre, The Netherlands
Bangladesh: Dr. J. Devine, University of Bath, UK
Ethiopia: Prof. dr. B.W. Lensink, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Table of contents Liberia

WAGENINGEN UR
For quality of life

Joint MFS-II evaluation Liberia

Synthesis report

Development Economics and Centre for Development Innovation

DATE
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AUTHORS
Gonne Beekman, Erwin Bulte, Cecile Kusters, Bram Peters, Steven Trijsburg

Table of contents

Glossary

General

CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
DEC	Development Economics Group
HDI	Human Development Index
MFS-II	Medefinancieringsstelsel II
NWO	Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
SPO	Southern Partner Organization
WUR / Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre

MDG/themes studies

BPC	Business Plan Competition
BSC	Business Start-up Centre
DCR	Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation
DD	Difference-in-differences
LD	Liberian Dollars
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
RDD	Regression Discontinuity Design
PSM	Propensity Score Matching
SD	Standard Deviation
SE	Standard Errors

Organisational Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C evaluation)

5 C	Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities
Causal map	Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'.
Causal mechanisms	The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
Detailed causal map	Also 'model of change'. The representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question).
General causal map	Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception.
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
OD	Organisational Development
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Process tracing	Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms
ToC	Theory of Change

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and aim[1]

MFS-II is the 2011-2015 grant framework of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Dutch NGOs (Co-Financing Agencies, CFAs) aiming to achieve a sustainable reduction in poverty. The framework follows MFS-I that covered the period 2007-2010. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded 1.9 billion EUR as MFS-II funding. The overall aim of MFS-II is to help strengthen civil society in countries in the South for structural poverty alleviation. CFAs that receive MFS-II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organizations (SPOs) (NWO, 2011).

Each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to account for results of MFS-II funded or co-funded activities and to contribute to the improvement of future interventions. 19 out of 20 consortia agreed to have their (co)funding activities jointly evaluated. NWO hereto issued three calls for proposals in September 2011. There was one call for country level assessments of development interventions of Dutch CFAs and their Southern partners – for 8 pre-defined countries of which Liberia is one – a second call for a synthesis study and a third one for a study on international lobby and advocacy.

This report is the result of the country level impact analysis study for Liberia. The specific aims of the evaluations at the country-level are listed below:

- To assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of development interventions funded by MFS-II;
- To develop and apply innovative methodologies for the evaluations of development interventions;
- To provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions.

The studies focus on three categories of priority result areas: (i) achievement of MDGs & themes; (ii) capacity development (CD) of Southern partner organisations (SPOs), and (iii) efforts to strengthen civil society (CS). The pre-defined research questions were similar across all categories:

1. What are the changes during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. What is the relevance of these changes? (Only for the MDG/themes studies)
4. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient? (Only for the MDG/themes studies)
5. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To answer these questions an impact study has been conducted, of which the results are presented in this report. Unfortunately, the follow-up assessment for the CS result area could not be completed due to the Ebola outbreak in Liberia in June 2014. For this reason, this report only presents the results for the MDG/themes and 5C result areas.

1.2 The Liberia study

The Liberia country study was awarded to a consortium comprising of the Development Economics Group (DEC), the Disaster Studies Group and the Centre for Development Innovation (CDI) of Wageningen University, the African Studies Centre, Development Consultants Inc., Making Enterprises and the University of Liberia. The endline study was conducted only by DEC and CDI, as other organisations left the consortium or – in the case of the Disaster Studies Group – could not carry out the endline study.

[1] Summarized from the call for proposals.

A baseline study has been carried out between May-August 2012 (MGD and CD) and in January 2013 (CS). In November 2013 extra baseline observations were collected for the MDG/themes study. The follow-up assessments for the MDG and CD result areas were carried out in May-June 2014.

Since late 2013 the Western African region has been ravaged by the most severe outbreak of Ebola ever. In December the first case was reported in Guéckédou, Guinea. Due to intense human traffic and a character of open borders the disease was spread (rapidly) over Sierra Leone and Liberia. By March 2014 Liberia had reported eight suspected cases and Sierra Leone six. By June, a total number of 759 people had been reported to be infected and 467 people had died from the disease. Over the course of the year the numbers kept climbing and by January 2015 a total number of 22,092 cases and 8,810 deaths had been reported. In Liberia 8622 people were infected, and 3686 people died of the disease. (The Economist, 29 January 2015)

The Ebola outbreak disrupted many Liberian lives and SPOs swiftly changed their focus to Ebola prevention and response. The Civil Society endline study - planned for autumn 2014 - could therefore not be carried out. The SPOs were under heavy stress, trying to cope with the situation, and provided assistance wherever needed. Hosting CS researchers would have been too much of a burden for the SPOs and unsafe for the research team. Besides, the Liberian civil society has greatly suffered from the Ebola crisis, and it would hence be virtually impossible to conduct a reliable impact measurement of MFS-II. Instead, the CS research team will hopefully conduct a study to measure the impact of the Ebola crisis in Liberian Civil Society later in 2015, as a separate study.

The research team for the MDG/themes baseline survey comprised of three Dutch researchers and two Liberian counterparts. Enumerators were recruited through advertisements and the network we built up during our previous research projects in the country and trained and selected during a one-week training. During the endline phase, whenever possible, the same (best qualified) enumerators were selected again.

For the 5C evaluation, one researcher from the Netherlands visited Liberia for five weeks in June/July 2014 to collaborate with three Liberian colleagues on the implementation of the endline field work and visit the selected SPOs. This has been done after a training in the Netherlands for the 5C in-country coordinators for 4 of the countries that CDI is involved in (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) and a one-to-one training of the Dutch 5C coordinator by the overall 5C coordinator (CDI, Wageningen UR) for these 4 countries. The field work for the baseline was carried out in a similar way, during May-June 2012.

The research team for the civil society study initially included one Dutch and three Liberian researchers. They visited a limited selection of their sample of SPOs across the country during May-August 2012. They were unfortunately unable to complete their tasks. In January 2013 a new research team went into the field to redo and finalize the data collection. As mentioned, endline data were not collected due to the ebola outbreak.

Table 1.1 provides an overview of all projects and SPOs involved in the evaluation study.

1.3 Structure of the report

The report is structured as follows: Chapter 1 describes the aim and background of the Liberia impact evaluation study. In Chapter 2 we present the general context for each category of the priority result areas: (i) MDG/themes, (ii) Capacity Development of Southern partner organizations, and (iii) efforts to strengthen civil society. Chapter 3 describes the MDG/themes projects, summarizes the key features of the methodologies for the MDG/themes and Capacity Development studies and presents a more detailed description of the specific methods that were used for each study. Chapter 4 presents the main findings from the MDG/themes studies, and answers the MDG-specific evaluation questions. The main results of the capacity development study and conclusions on these findings are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents a reflection on the research and project design, and finally Chapter 7 provides a conclusion and recommendations.

There are 4 main annexes to this country report. Annexes A and B refer to the MDG/themes studies. Annex A1 is a technical paper for the Business Plan Competition (BPC) implemented by BSC, and presents a detailed description of the research methods and evaluation results. The corresponding questionnaire is included in Annex A2. Similarly, Annex B1 presents the technical paper with detailed methodologies and results for the PAMOJA project, which was carried out by the DCR. The corresponding questionnaire is included in Annex B2.

Annexes C and D refer to the 5C study. Annexes C present the technical reports for the 5C evaluation for each SPO (C1: BSC, C2: DEN-L, C3: NAWOCOL, C4: REFOUND, C5: RHRAP). Annex D provides the overview of the 5 core capabilities and related outcome domains and performance indicators.

Table 1.1 Overview of organisations included in the evaluation

SPO	Consortium	Responsible Dutch NGO	Project	MDGs/ Themes	Capacity Dev	Civil Society
Business Start-Up Centre Liberia (BSC)	United Entrepreneurship Coalition	SPARK/BID Network	Business Start-Up Centre Monrovia	x	x	x
Defence for Children International – Liberia (DCI-L)	Child Rights Alliance	Defence for Children International-ECPAT Nederland	Defence for Girls in Liberia: protection of women and girls against violence and civil society development			x
Development Education Network Liberia (DEN-L)	Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation	Save the Children/ICCO	ICCO: Giving visibility to women ingenuity DCR: PAMOJA	x	x	x
Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy (FOHRD)	Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation and ICCO	ZOA/ICCO	ICCO: Community Development and Peace DCR: PAMOJA	x		x
Inter Religious Council Liberia (IRCL)	ICCO Alliance	ICCO/Kerk in Actie	Child protection and response to violence			x
Liberia Democratic Institute (LDI)	ICCO Alliance	ICCO/Kerk in Actie	Citizens social service monitoring and advocacy initiative			x
Liberia Study Group and Community Empowerment (LSGCE)	Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation	ZOA	PAMOJA	x		x
New African Research & Development Agency (NARDA)	ICCO Alliance	ICCO/Kerk in Actie	NARDA core programme			x
National Women's Commission of Liberia (NAWOCOL)	ICCO Alliance	ICCO/Kerk in Actie	Rural women and girl's capacity's development		x	x
Rural Empowerment Foundation (REFOUND)	ICCO Alliance	ICCO/Kerk in Actie	Strengthening rural women capacity towards self-reliance		x	x
Rural Human Rights Activists Programme (RHRAP)	ICCO Alliance	ICCO/Kerk in Actie	Initiative for Human Rights Promotion		x	x
Sustainable Development Institute (SDI)	ICCO Alliance	ICCO	Community Empowerment and Forest Governance			x

2 Country background

Liberia is located in West Africa, neighbouring Sierra Leone in the northwest, Guinea in the north, and Côte d'Ivoire in the east. The country has been the stage of a brutal civil war from 1989 to 2003 which left more than 250,000 people killed and displaced not less than 70 percent of its population. As a result, Liberia's infrastructure was destroyed, its economy ruined, and its people traumatized. While the economy grew rapidly immediately after the war – rising from 2.4 percent in 2004 to more than 9 percent in 2007 – growth has been more modest in recent years (about 4 percent per annum since 2008). During this period, Liberia made significant progress on its development agenda. Yet, the legacy of the war continued to represent an extreme challenge for the country to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and its progress on achieving these goals in 2015 should be considered as mixed (Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 2010).

2.1 MDGs and themes

2.1.1 Poverty, private sector and agriculture

Some 63 percent of the population lives below the poverty line in this overwhelmingly agricultural & resource-based economy, of which 48 percent lives in extreme poverty. Per capita income in Liberia is approximately USD 500, ranking Liberia as the 225th country in the world. Poverty is on a decline since 2000 but not at a sufficient rate to achieve the MDG goals by 2015 (Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 2010).

The 2014 HDI states some 82 percent of the Liberian population lives under multidimensional poverty and 94 percent of the working poor lives of less than $2 a day.[2] Liberia's HDI value for 2013 is 0.412— which is in the low human development category—positioning the country at 175 out of 187 countries and territories. Liberia's 2013 HDI is below the average of 0.493 for countries in the low human development group and below the average of 0.502 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries close to the Liberian 2013 HDI rank and (to some extent) in population size, are the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, with HDI ranks of 185 and 177, respectively.[3]

Agriculture is the primary source of income for many Liberians yet food insecurity is still very high: more than 40 percent of the population is vulnerable to food insecurity. Imported rice (the main staple) accounts for 42 percent of total consumption.

2.1.2 Children and education

Since 2002, Liberia has made some progress towards achieving universal primary education. Yet, although the trend in gross enrolment has been positive, the net enrolment ratio (# children enrolled in primary education as a percentage of the total children of the official primary school age population) has been modest. Net enrolment increased from 32 to 37 percent between 1989 and 2007, while gross enrolment climbed from 78 to 86 percent during the same period, despite a decline prior to 2002 (IMF, 2008). In the period 2009-2013, male net enrolment ratio in primary education was 42 percent and female net enrolment 40 percent, and gross enrolment 107 and 98 percent, respectively (UNICEF, 2014).

The great disparity between gross and net enrolment rates should be attributed to the conflict. Due to physical destruction of schools and infrastructure (about 70 percent of the schools were destroyed (IMF, 2008) and the absence of sufficient qualified teachers during the war, pupils are often enrolled at lower grades than their school-going age, particularly in rural areas. School completion rates are also particularly low in Liberia (CWIQ, 2007). According to the National School Census Report (Ministry of Education, 2008) only 60 percent of pupils starting grade 1 actually reach grade 6. It is widely considered as very unlikely that Liberia will achieve the MDGs of 100 percent net primary enrolment by 2015.

2.1.3 Fragile state, good governance and civil society building

The origins of the war in Liberia lie in deep-rooted structural cleavages, social divisions, marginalization and exclusion, perpetuated by the state and by those who controlled the state (IMF, 2008). The war left people

[2] http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LBR
[3] http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/LBR.pdf

traumatized and more divided than ever, now also along tribal lines. Not only was there the more than a century old gap separating Americo-Liberians and tribal people, but now also various tribes opposed each other as a result of the atrocities committed during the war and the war alliances.

The war and the associated anguish and psycho-social trauma made it difficult for communities to function normally, emphasizing a focus on survival rather than education. Approximately 160,000 refugees have returned to Liberia since the war, adding to widely existing land disputes and threatening stability. Liberia has a young population, with a median age of 18.4 years. These youth can be powerful agents of change, but can also generate further instability when a lack of better socio-economic prospects persists.

Finally, the war caused the death of a large number of people and triggered the exodus of many of the most qualified individuals, whose formal training, skills and competencies as well as experience, would have equipped them to provide leadership. Liberia lacks the competencies to accelerate post-war reconstruction and national development.

2.2 Capacity Development of Southern Partner Organisations

Liberia's protracted civil war destroyed pre-war institutional and human capacities and blocked the development of new capacities required to kick-start and sustain the country's development. By the time the war ended, the Liberian Civil Service had become dysfunctional and disorientated. The war also severely affected the operation of institutions responsible for human capital formation in the country. The universities, polytechnics, training colleges, secondary and primary schools, kindergartens and crèches could not operate fully, were not maintained and had deteriorated.

Due in large part to the war, Liberia lacks the human competencies required to accelerate post-war reconstruction and national development. The country's severe capacity crisis manifests itself at the individual level (low learning outcomes and poor skills profiles; brain-drain); the institutional level (erosion of public systems; loss of competence, authority and effectiveness of public institutions; weak non-state institutions); and the societal level (depressed economy, low productive capacity, widespread poverty and disempowerment).

Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future. As it is with all sectors of Liberian society, this Ebola outbreak is testing the resilience of the SPOs to the highest limits. The SPOs are responding by readjusting their regular programmes by designing new strategies and realigning their resources to join the fight against the deadly Ebola virus disease. This is coming in the forms of Ebola awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for victims and survivors, provision of support to community care centres (CCCs), and procurement and distribution of sanitizing supplies to communities.

2.3 Civil society

Civil society in Liberia after the ending of the civil war was no blank slate. Besides churches and tribal societies, already in the 1970s a number of formal organisations had been established, engaging the state on issues of the uneven distribution of economic growth, human rights violations, corruption and nepotism (Liberia full proposal MFS-II). The civil wars (1989-1997, 1999-2003) strongly affected the space for civic action, as human capital became displaced or fled, organisations became divided along factional lines and space for manoeuvre was vastly restricted. There was strong persecution of members of the opposition, the press and members of civil society, especially during the 1997-2003 Charles Taylor regime (Tourne 2002: 1). Basic social infrastructure was shattered. Nevertheless, during the war a large number of new structures sprang up to address immediate humanitarian needs and human rights abuses, with some of these organisations playing a key role in brokering the 2003 peace agreement. The following political transition and first democratic elections in 2006 were a new challenge, as many members of civil society took on positions in the government. This weakened civil society human capital, and also created an uneasy and sometimes conflicting relation between the state and civil society (NDI 2004:5). At the same time, rebuilding confidence between citizens, civil society and the state was a key priority. The results of these efforts may be reflected in the two democratic elections that were held since the end of the war with few, if any, accounts of election-based violence.

After the war a number of initiatives were taken to better organise civil society, as organisations participated in scattered network structures that lacked homogeneity and sometimes overlapped each other. In 2007, the Civil Society Advisory Council was established by a joint effort of different CSOs, but it lacked legitimacy and leadership capacity. It was abolished in 2012, and replaced by the National Civil Society Council of Liberia with support from some international organisations and the Governance Commission. Whether this Council will succeed at being a representative body remains to be seen.

Peace building as a cross cutting theme receives a lot of attention. In the experience of the evaluators, and as compared to other post-conflict countries, it seems as if peace building is still high on the agenda and the process of shifting into domains that link to economic development, for example, has only recently started. Most people feel that the sustained presence of the UN mission is still needed to maintain peace and stability.

3 Methodology

3.1 Overview

We employ a wide range of methods as presented in Table 3.1. Where possible we combine quantitative and qualitative measurements to provide for a robust and complete evaluation. For both categories (MDG and CD) we collected baseline data in 2012 (and extra baseline observations for the MDG study in 2013) and endline data in 2014. The impact has been assessed based on a critical comparison between the baseline and endline data.

Detailed standardized surveys, for both selected beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, constitute the core of the evaluation for the MDG/themes studies. We combined the quantitative measurements with qualitative assessments of the impact of the projects during the follow-up study in 2014. These qualitative assessments could identify some of the underlying mechanisms that may explain changes in outcomes between base-and follow-up. We have not been able to randomize treatments (also see below for a discussion), and as a result treatment and control groups differ according to a number of observed (and perhaps unobserved) characteristics. To mitigate any bias stemming from these differences we used both difference-in-difference analysis (DD) including relevant control variables and propensity score matching (PSM). Interviews were conducted in (local) English or a local language, dependent on what the respondent preferred. We ensured that our team of enumerators was capable of conducting the interviews both in English and one of the local languages if needed. Section 3.2 describes the two projects part of the MDG/themes evaluation, and more extensively describes the methods applied.

For a comprehensive understanding of the capacity of an organisation, we combine objective and subjective measurements. Core methods are workshops (developing causal maps); staff and stakeholder interviews; self-assessment questionnaires; observation; secondary data review (project documents and organisational documents). These different types of information are subsequently used in a before-after comparison. To deal with the attribution question, the theory-based methodology 'process tracing' is used. This is a mainly qualitative methodology to test an initial theory on how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. The remainder of this chapter provides a more detailed description of the methodology and methods used per evaluation question.

The remainder of this chapter provides a more detailed description of the methods used per category of priority results areas.

Table 3.1 Overview of evaluation methods per category and project

	MDGs/themes		**Capacity Development**
	BPC/BSC	PAMOJA/DCR	
Before/after comparison		x	x
Difference-in-Differences	x	x	
Focus groups/group interviews		x	x
Individual interviews	x		x
Knowledge and achievement tests		x	x
Propensity Score Matching	x	x	
Self-reporting methods			x
Behavioral experiments		x	
Workshop			x
Review of secondary data			x
Process tracing			x
Observation			x
Causal maps			x

3.2 MDGs and themes[4]

We evaluated two projects; the Business Plan Competition implemented by the Business Start-up Centre (BSC), and the PAMOJA project implemented by DCR. Below we present a description of both project and the methodologies applied. Table 3.2 presents key information for both projects, including a time line and budget

[4] See the technical reports in Annex A1 and B1 for more elaborate descriptions about the MDG/themes studies.

information for both projects. The projects cover MDG 1 and 2 and the fragile states theme. Table 3.3 lists the outcome indicators per MDG for each project.

Table 3.2 Key information per project

Project	**Budget** EUR 11-14	**MFS-II**	**Start**	**End**	**Description**	**Objectives**	**Beneficiaries**
BSC	322,969 EUR	100 percent	2011	2016	Training/providing access to finance for young entrepreneurs	• Develop SME landscape in Liberia through capacity development and access to finance • Create employment opportunities through SME start-up support and job search, retention and enhancement trainings • Influence policy review and reform to facilitate SME development and growth in Liberia	Young (<36 yrs) graduates from Liberian Universities & vocational schools; existing entrepreneurs.
PAMOJA	4,916,238 EUR	100 percent	2011	2015	Various interventions including school (re)construction agricultural training, inputs provision, credit and loans training, advocacy and training on human rights.	• Enhance access to basic services • Improve household livelihoods • Improve community governance • Help develop functional sectoral systems	Rural households and communities in Bong, Margibi and Montserrado counties.

Table 3.3 Key indicators for achievement of MDGs/themes

MDG/theme	*Outcome indicators*	*SPARK BPC*	*DCR PAMOJA*
MDG1a Income	Income and expenditures of households	X	X
	Percent respondents with access to credit	X	X
	Average amount of credit	-	X
	Percent respondents with savings	X	X
	Average amount of savings	-	X
MDG1b Employment	Paid job	X	-
	Own business (fraction and average # hours)	X	-
	Employment creation (within household and external: # male/female employees, # hours)	X	-
	Food sold in (county) capital 6 months	-	X
	Wage labor last month (days)	-	X
	Trading goods (days per month)	-	X
MDG1c Hunger	DDS	-	X
	Rice meals adults	-	X
	Rice meals children	-	X
MDG2 Education	Literacy rates for adults and children	-	X
	Net and gross enrolment for primary education	-	X
Fragile states	Discount rate	X	-
	Planning for next week / month	X	-
Prospects / Social capital	Expected earnings gain from schooling and children’s earnings at age 25	-	X
	Group membership	-	X
	Trust in neighbours, community leaders and strangers	-	X

3.2.1 Project description

Business Plan Competition

BSC Liberia organizes an open Business Plan Competition (BPC) to support young graduates from universities and vocational schools as well as existing young entrepreneurs to start and develop businesses through employability training, training in business skills, coaching & mentoring and financing opportunities. The annual BPC constitutes a core activity of the organisation, has a clearly defined target population that can be traced over time (although this has been proven to be sometimes challenging in practise), and set beginning and end dates facilitating a relatively 'clean' design for the evaluation exercise.

Beneficiaries initially self-select by entering the BPC which is open to all people up to 35 years of age interested in setting up or expanding a business. The BPC consists of two rounds. Participants first submit a short business idea. An external jury scores and ranks each business plan according to a number of predefined criteria (including: quality of the participant; market potential; profitability and development impact) on a scale from 1-5 points. Participants who have a score of 3 points or higher are selected to take part in an 8-days training program. Also participants with a (slightly) lower score but with a promising business plan and sharp entrepreneurial skills could be invited to the training. In 2012, 35 applicants were selection for training in Monrovia. In 2013, the BPC expanded to Buchanan, the second largest city in Liberia. 20 participants were selected in Monrovia, and 15 were selected in Buchanan. Training courses include for example human resources management, customer care and marketing. Courses usually last 1-1.5 days and use an interactive learning methodology including role-plays, group discussions games and written assignments.

After the training has been completed the participants are invited to develop a full business plan during three months. During this period they receive mentoring and coaching to develop their ideas to its full potential. The office of BSC Monrovia also provides for a fully equipped conference room and the necessary ICT infrastructure including state-of-the art computer hard-and software and fast and reliable internet services. Participants can use these facilities when needed.

The second round comprises of submitting a completed business plan. A jury then selects about ten winners. These winners will be provided with soft loans, and linked to financial matchmakers who can help start-up or expand their business. To this end, BPC has contracted the Liberia Enterprise Development Finance Company that provides a start-up business oriented loan package taking into account the specific needs and general lack of resources of start-up businesses. However, no loans have been provided to winners in 2013 and 2014. As participants from previous rounds defaulted on their loans, the bank was not willing to provide new loans. The loans were ultimately provided by SPARK through an Investment Committee.

Direct beneficiaries are qualified young men and women with an interest in setting up or expanding their own business. Yet, BSC Liberia focuses primarily on facilitating business start-ups (and expansions) that have the potential to create additional jobs, providing for a wider impact than the group of direct beneficiaries alone.

Over the period 2011-2013 a sum of USD 351,053 has been allocated by MFS-II through SPARK and BiD Network. 336,822 USD was spent on project activities. Table 3.4 lists the costs on output level.

13 percent of the total budget was spent on organizing entrepreneurship and life skills training for 251 participants in Monrovia, Buchanan, Gbarngba and Maryland (USD 175 per participant). 88 business plans were approved, including evaluation of business plans by an external jury, training, lunch and workshops for entrepreneurs, elections for the best business plans and promotion (USD 665 per approved business plan, or 17 percent of the total budget). So, a total of USD 840 was spent per applicant. The largest share of the budget – 41 percent – has been spent on financing 10 most promising businesses, including costs spent on monitoring, evaluating, coaching, mentoring, business registration & licenses (USD 14,397 per successful matchmaking). The rest of the budget was spent on 26 roundtable sessions (USD 577 per session, 4 percent of total budget); advocacy strategies (USD 35,000 or 10 percent of total budget), and other expenses (4 percent of total budget).

Table 3.4: Costs on output level BPC (USD)

Output	Total # in 2013	Total costs	%	Costs per unit
(Potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate BSC Liberia *Organizing Entrepreneurship & Life skills Training in Monrovia, Buchanan, Gbarngba & Mary Land counties.*	251	44,010	13	175
Approved business plan applications BSC Liberia *Evaluating Business Plans, Jury remuneration, Cost for Training, Lunch, workshops, voting Best Business Ideas & Plans, Promotions (Radio talk show, flyers, and jingles)*	88	58,493	17	665
Attendees of network sessions BSC Liberia *Networking session with partners, stakeholders, Government & Civil society groups, in promoting BSCM & its partners.*	1140	40,345	11	35
Successful matchmaking introductions BSC Liberia *Financed 11 businesses, Student run project (Kriterion Monrovia), monitoring, evaluating, coaching, mentoring, business registration & licenses.*	10	143,974	41	14,397
Roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held BSC Liberia *Meetings with stakeholders, partners*	26	15,000	4	577
Advocacy strategies (re)formulated BSC Liberia *BSC Academy, MSME Conference, TV & Radio Show*	1	35,000	10	35,000
Uncategorized		14,231	4	
Total budget		*336,822*		

PAMOJA

The PAMOJA Partnering 4 Change Programme (hereafter: PAMOJA) is a widespread rural project, aimed at post-war reconstruction of farmers' livelihoods. The project is implemented by in three out of sixteen counties: Montserrado, Margibi and Bong. The interventions aim at MDG1 and MDG2. The projects' specific objectives are improved basic service delivery, increased agricultural production, and higher household incomes. In addition, the intervention aims to empower civil society to become well organized and work together to articulate needs and lobby on higher levels of governance for community interests. The programme is a joint effort of The Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR) that comprises of Save the Children, ZOA, CARE, and HealthNet/TPO (although the latter does not operate in Liberia) and their local partners (NGOs, CBOs, private sector organisations and local governance structures).

The programme commenced in 2011 and runs for five years until 2015, targeting about 100 communities and 5000 households. The total budget amounts EUR 4,916,238. The budget was spent on 4 broad categories: personnel (33 percent), support (including vehicles and accommodation, 14 percent), direct project activities (43 percent: EUR 2,111,631) and miscellaneous expenses (10 percent) (see Table 3.5).

The programme adopts a "holistic" approach by initiating multiple interventions simultaneously: interventions range from rehabilitating and constructing schools, curricula support, teachers' training, and functional adult literacy classes to agricultural training, provision of inputs and seeds, development of farmers' associations, credit and loan services, awareness training on nutrition and (children's) health, improving community empowerment through advocacy and training on human rights advocacy, and increasing access to public information including land rights and decentralization.

The programme formulated four distinct result areas, which together form the direct project activities. The interventions are implemented by members of the consortium (CARE, ZOA, and Save the Children) and (or) their southern partners.

- Result area 1, "access to basic services", focuses on education, by building and reconstructing educational facilities; providing educational materials like textbooks and school uniforms, organize adult literacy classes and train teachers. These interventions aim at meeting national standards for educational facilities and improve literacy rates among adults and youth.

- Result area 2 is concerned with improving household livelihoods by providing agricultural inputs, training about land rights, help developing farmers' associations, inform people about savings and loans, and help them set-up a savings-and loan association.
- Result area 3 aims at improving community governance through trainings on leadership and the establishment of community information kiosks. This is expected to improve transparency and accountability of NGO partners and promote effective participation of civil society organizations in development programmes.
- Finally, result area 4 operates at a higher administrative level and focuses on functional sectoral systems through training local government authorities. These activities aim at improving service delivery of local governments and increasing cooperation between governmental authorities, civil society organizations and the private sector.

The activities are implemented in different combinations in different villages. The most important project activities are:

1. VDC (village development committees)
2. VSLA (village saving and loan associations)
3. FAL (functional adult literacy classes, level I and II)
4. Primary school reconstruction (implemented by CARE)
5. Agricultural training
6. Marketing training
7. Land rights training

Table 3.5: Costs per result area DCR (EUR)

Output	**Costs (EUR)**	**Percentage of key activities budget**	**Percentage of total budget**
Personnel	**1,636,929**		**33**
Support	**674,558**		**14**
Direct key activities	**2,101,631**		**43**
Result area 1: Access to basic services	*819,934*	*39*	*17*
Result area 2: Household improved livelihoods	*621,562*	*30*	*13*
Result area 3: Community governance	*566,138*	*27*	*12*
Result area 4: Functional sectoral systems	*93,997*	*4*	*2*
Miscellaneous	**503,120**		**10**
Total budget	**4,916,238**		

3.2.2 Methodology

Business Plan Competition

In the case of the BPC, people self-select into the programme: only young university graduates (below age 36) and who have a genuine interest in entrepreneurship can apply. While participation in any intervention is voluntary, thus even in randomized designs there is likely to be some sort of selection bias (only those who are sufficiently motivated will participate) this is likely to be more true for the BSC programme: participants have to develop a business plan to be considered for selection. We can thus only estimate a "local average treatment effect": effects for those who comply. The BPC consists of two rounds. Participants first submit a short business idea. An external jury scores and ranks each business plan according to a number of predefined criteria (including: quality of the participant; market potential; profitability and development impact) on a scale from 1-5 points. Participants who have a score of 3 points or higher are selected to take part in an 8-days training program. Also participants with a (slightly) lower score but with a promising business plan and sharp entrepreneurial skills could be invited to the training.

In the 2012 baseline phase, 66 applicants were interviewed. Half of the applicants were selected by the BSC Liberia to participate in the training and form the treatment group. The other half was not selected and forms the control group. In 2013, 71 additional respondents were interviewed (of which half was selected for the training). This time data was not only collected in Monrovia (46 respondents) but also in Buchanan (25 respondents). In total the baseline survey covers 137 observations. Attrition was high, especially in the control group (27 percent, versus 22 percent in the treatment group). Respondents in the control group had often lost contact with the organisation, changed phone numbers, or moved. Hence, the final sample for the analysis amounts 103 observations. For the data analysis, we use difference-in-differences (DD) (see Annex A1 for a more detailed description), complemented with qualitative data from in-depth interviews with 16 randomly selected BPC participants.

PAMOJA

For the PAMOJA programme target communities had already been selected on the basis of a number of explicit criteria: (i) accessible by motorbike; (ii) >25 households per community; (iii) located in one of the DCR operational counties and districts. Control communities were selected according to these same criteria. We hereto obtained the 2008 National Census data from the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS) from which we constructed our sampling frame. We randomly selected 64 treatment, and 68 control communities.

We conducted detailed household and community surveys in both treatment and control communities. School achievement tests were conducted only during the follow-up round in 2014 as schools were closed during the period in which the baseline data collection took place (hence, we only perform a cross-section analysis for these types of school performance indicators). We use a combination of difference-in-differences (DD) and propensity score matching (PSM) to assess the impact of the PAMOJA programme, complemented with qualitative data from focus group discussions FGDs – also see Annex B3). Focus group discussions were held among a randomly selected, representative group of beneficiaries in 19 communities during the endline phase to unravel the mechanisms the projects may have set in motion or the constraints that have prevented the projects from doing so.

Table 3.6: Sampling frames and sizes of the surveys

Project	MDG	Data collection methods	Sampling method	Sampling frame	Sample		
					Treatment (baseline)	Controls (baseline)	Attrition
BSC	1, Fragile states	• Survey • Hypothetical game • Individual interviews	Entire population	List from BSC with names, phone numbers and email addresses of all 2012 and 2013 BPC applicants	60	77	22% (treatment group) 27% (control group)
PAMOJA DEN-L	1, 2	• Surveys (hh/comm) • Achievement tests • Behavioral experiments • Focus group discussions	Treatment: all communities selected for treatment Control: two-stage cluster random sampling	2008 National Census Data from LISGIS to select clusters Household lists from community chief to select households	1315 households 64 villages (20 hhs per village)	1272 households 68 villages (20 hhs per village)	22% 2%

3.3 Capacity development[5]

The overall evaluation approach for evaluating capacity development of the SPOs is a participatory, theory-based approach using theories of change, impact pathways and process tracing[67], in a before-after comparison. Mainly qualitative methods have been used as organisational capacity is characterised by complexity and uncertainty.

The overall evaluation design is centred around the 4 evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?

2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?

4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described in more detail in Annex D1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see Annex D3) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software programme for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.

- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Theory-based evaluation can help to understand why a programme works or fails to work and they attend to not only what a programmes do but also to how participants respond[8]. The theory based approach also allows space for the evaluation to reflect the complex nature of the development process, particularly when focusing on changes in organisational capacity. To deal with the attribution question (2), the theory-based approach '(outcome explaining) process tracing' is used.

This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their

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[5] A more elaborate description of the sampling strategy, methodology, indicators used and limitations can be found in Annex C.

[6] In Stern et al, 2012: Evaluation and IE in particular, is an opportunity to test a programme's theory through the links in the causal chain. In terms of method, this tendency is close to 'process tracing' (George and McKeown, 1985, Collier 2011), defined by Aminzade (1993) as: 'theoretically explicit narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequences of events constituting the process…'. These causal chains are represented graphically as causal maps or neural networks.

[7] Stern et al. (2012) say there are 'three main designs that show promise to reinforce existing IE practice when dealing with complex programmes – theory-based; case-based and participatory'.

[8] Carol H. Weiss (2007).

relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

The evaluators have considered the internationally agreed upon evaluation standards as useful guidelines for their work, and ranked in order or importance: 1. Utility, 2. Feasibility, 3. Propriety, 4. Accuracy, 5. Evaluation Accountability, which are ranked in order of importance. Within the boundaries of the conditions set for this evaluation, the evaluators have as much as possible adhered to these standards, particularly utility, whilst the setup of the evaluation seems to focus more on the accuracy standard.

Organizational capacity is complex and seen as an outcome of an open system. Within a complex system, multiple processes operate simultaneously and by no means in isolation. Interactions between these processes can result in unpredictable and evolving results. According to Stern et al. (2012), there are "three main designs that show promise to reinforce existing IE practice when dealing with complex programmes – theory-based; case-based and participatory". In order to understand changes in organisation capacity, it is important to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect organisational change of organisations. Simple linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issue like organisational capacity.

The evaluation is participatory in that SPO staff and stakeholders are engaged in a process of self-reflection, learning and validation of findings. Having interactive workshops with staff is part of this.

The evaluation process is also participatory in terms of design and analysis. The overall methodology, including standard indicators and a Likert scale, has been designed by the Centre for Development Innovation (CDI), Wageningen University and Research centre (WUR; Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia), in collaboration with ETC Foundation (Uganda) and Disaster Studies (WUR; DRC), covering in total 6 out of 8 countries. For the endline process CDI has also taken a lead in methodological development, especially in terms of process tracing, for all the 8 countries in the MFS II evaluation. CDI is involved in 4 out of the 8 countries for the 5C evaluation. Due to the nature of the evaluation (multiple countries, with multiple institutions carrying out the evaluation), all possible efforts were made to design a standard methodology to be used across countries. This included a set of common indicators (32); and data collection tools for six countries[9]. The 5 capabilities were reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. The methodology has been shared with the country based evaluation teams, the country project leaders, the synthesis team, and MFS-II organisations for feedback. Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for the baseline and endline, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in, in line with training the in-country team. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data is done with the assistance of the NVivo software programme. The qualitative data analysis software allows for a transparent and systematic analytical process across an international team. During data collection, analysis and sense-making, the overall 5C coordinator (CDI) provided training, coaching and mentoring and carried out quality checks for each of the 4 5C country teams that CDI is involved in (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia).

Details specific to the SPOs are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO reports in Annex C1-5.

[9] DRC, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Uganda

4 Results MDG studies

4.1 Business Start-Up Centre Liberia (BSC)

This section answers the pre-defined evaluation questions for the PAMOJA project. Table 4.2 provides an overall assessment of the BPC project.

4.1.1 EQ1: Role of the intervention

We find that some changes in outcome indicators for MDG1 since baseline measurement at target group level. Access to credit seems to have increased, but the share of respondents with a paid job decreased. People work more hours in their own business, but at the same time, business owners seem to cut on their external employees. Finally, people report they make less plans for the coming few weeks.

4.1.2 EQ2: Role of the intervention

Table 4.1 presents the treatment estimators for the BCP training. With respect to the project intervention, we find weak evidence that discount rates increase after the training, which indicates that people who participated in the BPC training are less patient. This may be caused by the fact that participants expected that the winners would receive a significant start-up loan. The anticipation of winning the competition and receiving the loan, may have affected the financial planning and hence the discount rate of participants: they may prefer to spend money now, rather than to save for future use, as they expect to receive a loan to be used for future use.

For any of the other outcome variables, we find not effects that can be attributed to the intervention. We are cautious about attributing the lack of effects to the treatment, given the selection bias of the treatment group which we could not solve for, and the low number of observations which results in low power. Unfortunately, the current research set up did not allow us to further increase the number of observations. Therefore, given the current impact analysis framework, we cannot conclude that the project has no impact (nor that it has).

Table 4.1: Results from the quantitative analysis on BPC

MDG1a: Income	**DD (SE)**	***MDG1b: Employment***	**DD (SE)**
Income (USD)	1313.28 (1027.39)	Paid job (d)	0.16 (0.13)
Expenditures on consumption (last week, USD)	-9.44 (17.90)	Own business (d)	-0.00 (0.13)
Infrequent expenditures (last month, USD)	281.94 (254.18)	Hours per week	-16.78* (10.06)
Credit (d)	-0.00 (0.11)	Household members employed (d)	0.17 (0.17)
Savings (d)	0.08 (0.07)	Other employees (d)	-0.26 (0.16)
Fragile states	**DD (SE)**	Employees days per month	-3.73 (2.97)
Discount rate	0.69* (0.36)	Number of external employees	1.31 (1.77)
Detailed plan next week	0.10 (0.14)	Employees male	0.90 (1.25)
Detailed plan next month	0.21 (0.16)	Employees female	0.41 (0.77)

* indicates significance at 10% level.

4.1.3 EQ3: Relevancy

Even though we find no impact, we believe that the project is very relevant in the context of urban Liberia. There are many qualified, ambitious young people who are eager to work hard and to develop their own business ideas. However, finding start-up capital is a true challenge, and a big constraint for starting a business. If BSC can stimulate matchmakings between these your entrepreneurs and financial funders, this would be highly relevant. Second, unemployment is high and if these young entrepreneurs can indeed hire external workers, this could be a welcome opportunity for currently unemployed workers.

In qualitative interviews, participants of the BPC told us they appreciated the trainings of the BSCM a lot. Mostly participants learned about financial management, marketing, customer relations, and businesses plan development. In addition, the interviewed people mention they gained skills in time management, professionalism, business management and having a positive approach towards business as assets of participating in the BPC.

4.1.4 EQ4: Efficiency

The project is operating on a relatively small budget, and compared to benchmark figures from a 2012 World Bank study on skills training for girls in India (estimated costs are USD 2427 - 3336 per girl), costs on output level are low (840 per applicant in the BPC project, compared to USD 2427 to 3336 per girl in the Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women (EPAG) project in India). Costs of matchmaking, on the other hand, are very high. Initially, a bank would provide start-up loans for the best business initiatives, but unfortunately this did not work out for business competitions after 2012. As participants from earlier rounds defaulted on their loans, the bank was no longer willing to cooperate. Ultimately, loans were reported to be paid by the BPC project, which would then explain the high unit costs for successful matchmaking.

4.1.5 Concluding remarks

<u>EQ5: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?</u>

The difficult context for young entrepreneurs in Liberian cities is the major reason why the business plan competition was established. The aim of the project was to ease some of the major obstacles to starting or expanding a business, namely skills and credit. At the same time, the challenging conditions the entrepreneurs face are probably one of the reasons why generating impact is difficult. Often times, even basic skills are low, even among university graduates. For example, many highly educated young Liberians still have very poor writing skills. In addition, few people have access to credit—a mandatory need for starting or expanding a business. Unfortunately, it seems that the project failed in its ambition to give the most promising young entrepreneurs access to the much needed credit, or at least during the period under evaluation.

For these reasons, we rate the project design highly as such type of project seems to be highly relevant in the Liberian context. Unfortunately, the project could not be completely be implemented as designed, as—due to issues with the financial institute providing the loans—the winners of the BPC did not receive their start-up loans. The (evident) risk that winners of the BPC would default on paying back their loans, should have been taken into account in the project design. Apart from this, as far as we can observe, the project was implemented as designed and therefore we rate project implementation fairly good.

It seems that the project did not reach all (if any) of its objectives in terms of employment creation and access to credit. Lack of credit is a serious constraint to business startups, and the failure of provision of start-up capital for the most promising business initiatives may have contributed to the lack of impact. However, we also underline the limited scope of our study given the small sample size. We deem it likely that the project has more impact than the current study suggests. Probably, more impact will be generated after the competition winners actually received their start-up loans. For this reason, we rate both the observed short term project impact as well as attribution of the results to the project intervention low, with the remark that the project seems to have potential to generate more impact over a longer time period.

Finally, even though we failed to find results, we believe that this project is highly relevant to project participants. Receiving business training hopefully increases their professional skills and their chances on the Liberian job market—be it as an entrepreneur, or as employee in wage labor.

Table 4.2: Overall assessment BPC

	Rating	Comment
The project was well designed	8	Good design, but the propensity of defaulting on repaying loans should have been taken into account.
The project was implemented as designed	7	The training was carried out as planned, but winners from the competition did not receive their start-up loan.
The project reached all its objectives	5	Quantitative analysis did not yield results – possibly due to failure to provide start-up loans. However, the interviews show some potential impact.
The observed results are attributable to the project interventions	5	The small sample size results in low power. Due to selection criteria of project participants, intervention and control groups are different by nature.
The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries	8	Basic (writing) skills of university graduates are poor. Receiving business training could improve their professional skills and their chances on the Liberian job market.
The project was implemented efficiently	7	Training provision per participant seems to be relatively cheap. However, the provision of start-up loans comes at high costs.

4.2 DCR – PAMOJA

This section answers the pre-defined evaluation questions for the PAMOJA project. Table 4.5 provides an overall assessment of the project.

4.2.1 EQ1: Observed changes

Table 4.3 shows that nearly all outcome indicators for MDG1 (poverty reduction) and 2 (education) decreased since baseline measurement (in the period between 2012 and 2014). The only exceptions to this observation are increases in (1) the share of people with savings (increased of 18 percent), (2) the number of meals consumed by adults (increased of 5 percent) and (3) trust in strangers (increased of 3 percent). Four outcome variables did not change since baseline measurement (expenses on agricultural inputs, amount of credit and savings obtained, and gross enrolment. All other outcome variables decreased since baseline measurement by 17 percent on average.

This overall downward change is surprising. It either means that living standards and education performance decreased since 2012 due to a change in certain external conditions (such as an observed decline in food prices – see below), or that there has been a consistent negative reporting bias, which we don't deem likely, as we observe the decrease both in treatment and control groups.

In the months before the endline survey (October-April), average cassava retail prices declined by 36 percent compared to (almost) the same period before the baseline survey (October-June). Over the same period the average retail price of imported rice declined by 10 percent. This could indicate that incomes from farming declined in that period, and explain why less food was sold in the (county) capital. Also, it could explain why expenditures on food decreased. If the price declines were general, then this could perhaps also explain why external earnings, the share of people with credit, and wage labour decreased. We cannot readily explain, however, why other outcome variables—such as literacy and enrolment rates—also declined.

4.2.2 EQ2: Role of the intervention

The second column in Table 4.3 shows the role of the intervention in the observed changes. In order to get a better idea of the absolute sizes of these changes, Table 4.4 presents the difference-in-differences estimators (after propensity score matching) for the three core activities part of PAMOJA (FAL, VDC, and VSLA). We find that the PAMOJA project as a whole increases the share of villagers with credit. We find no effects of individual activities on credit, so the effect is most likely caused by an interaction between various activities that are part of PAMOJA.

With respect to separate activities, we find that external earnings are positively affected by functional adult literacy training (FAL). In fact, the observed negative change is undone by the positive impact caused by FAL. Perhaps, FAL strengthens financial transaction skills, which may increase external income. It is also possible that FAL has a positive impact combined with other PAMOJA activities. VDC leads to an increase of time spent on wage labour. Possibly, a combination of more transparency and villager-participation due to strengthened

VDCs activates villagers which could explain the increased number of days spent on wage labour. This effect is probably not one-to-one related to the VDC, and may rather be the effect of an interplay between various PAMOJA related activities in the village.

Finally, we find negative impacts of the school reconstruction project project on food-expenses in the past 2 weeks and on trust in strangers, and of land rights training on trust in community leaders. We cannot readily explain these negative impacts, nor are these interventions part of the core PAMOJA activities. Therefore, we deem these negative impacts less relevant than the positive impacts of the core PAMOJA impacts (PAMOJA in general, and VDC and FAL separately).

Note that for all other outcome variables, we find no effects from the intervention. For example, for none of our education-related outcome indicators we find any effect. For a detailed overview of impacts of each of the activities part of the PAMOJA intervention, we refer to the technical paper in Annex B1.

Table 4.3: Change of outcome indicators and effect size of treatment

Outcome variable	**% Change 2012-2014**	**% Change due to treatment**	**Activity causing change**
Food expenses	-24	-26	School reconstruction
Agricultural inputs farming season			
External earnings	-43	+43	FAL
Credit (d)	-24	+12	PAMOJA
Credit amount			
Savings (d)	+18		
Saving amount			
Sold food in country capital	-38		
Wage labor (days)	-18	+37	VDC
DDS	-6		
Rice meals adults	+5		
Rice meals children	-18		
Literacy adults	-7		
Literacy children	-7		
Net enrolment	-15		
Gross enrolment			
Earnings gain from schooling	-18		
Expected earnings at age 25	-13		
Trust neighbours	-4		
Trust leaders	-4	-10	Land rights
Trust strangers	+3	-15	School reconstruction

Table 4.4: DD estimators (after PSM)

	(1) **PAMOJA**	(2) **VDC**	(3) **VSLA**	(4) **FAL**
MDG 1a: Income				
Infrequent spending last 6 months (LD)			-35038^{+}	
			(23708)	
External earnings		1340.96**	-1035.62**	1079.87*
		(609.75)	(443.46)	(737.67)
Credit (d)	0.12**			
	(0.05)			
MDG 1b: Exployment				
Wage labor (days)		3.41**		
		(1.57)		
Trade (times)			-0.76**	1.26***
			(0.38)	(0.45)
MDG 1c: Hunger				
# rice meals adults		0.20***		
		(0.06)		
Prospects and social capital				
Expected earnings gain from schooling		1253.92^{+}		
		(835.18)		
Expected earnings at age 25		4475.13***	-1504.56*	
		(1260.04)	(772.54)	

$^{+}$ indicates significance at 15%, * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% level.

4.2.3 EQ3: Relevancy

We find positive effects from the interventions on access to credit, external earnings and wage labour. These are all (potential) sources of income, which could eventually lead to poverty relief and higher enrolment rates in education. The effect size of each of these results is quite large (12 – 43 percent). On the other hand, for a large number of outcome variables we find no impact at all. Hence, the relevancy of the results we do find is high, but the overall relevancy of the impact, taking all outcome variables into account, is less clear.

4.2.4 EQ4: Efficiency

PAMOJA is an integrated project with a large budget. The total budget for PAMOJA amounts nearly 5 million Euro. 43 percent of this budget was spent on direct key activities in the field, and the remainder was spent on personnel (including expatriate staff), support (vehicles etc.), and miscellaneous expenses. Only for Functional Adult Literacy Classes both output-level costs and benchmark costs are available. ZOA aimed to establish 80 FAL classes by 2015. FAL costs EUR 8,812 per class and about EUR 440 per participant (on average, classes have 20 participants). This amount is much more than the benchmark costs that vary between 46 and 92 USD (42-85 EUR) per person (based on Carr-Hill, 2007 and Raupp & Ramos-Mattoussi, 2012). Even if we only include direct key activity costs (EUR 198 per person), per-participant costs still largely exceed the benchmark costs. One explanation for these much higher costs could be that ZOA is implementing many follow-up activities in their project villages, or that extra FAL groups were established, beyond the initial target amount.

Although we cannot make a similar benchmark comparison for other activities, it seems that the high costs of FAL are no exception: all activities seem to be very expensive.

It is difficult to assess whether the project was carried out efficiently, as not all information is up-to-date. Based on the current budget information as well as the structure and implementation of the project (involving a huge number of different project activities, three different international project partners, as well as a large number of local partners), we believe that conditions for efficient project implementation are at least challenging.

4.2.5 Concluding remarks

<u>Context</u>

The Liberian context is a challenging context to operate in. The country is still suffering from the legacy of the civil war, which affected the entire Liberian population. Poverty rates are high, enrolment rates are very low and the quality of (local) institutions, trust levels and community sense remain issues that are likely to hamper development and growth. These are exactly the themes the current evaluation is focussing on. The aim to improve poverty and education outcomes may be called ambitious, especially given the brief period under evaluation. The recent outbreak of the Ebola disease illustrates how extremely vulnerable the Liberian society is. We could hardly expect to find large impacts within these result areas within only two years.

<u>Project design</u>

Overall, PAMOJA is characterized by an ambitious and challenging project design (operating within a challenging context). PAMOJA consists of are large number of activities that are implemented in various combinations by different CFAs and SPOs that are united under DCR. The large budget of 5 million euros to be spent on these activities is shared among these many partners, who each implement their own share of the work. Some organisations are responsible for a single type of activities (for example, Save the Children only implements education activities for children), but other activities are jointly implemented by different partners in different communities. On the one hand, the current set up makes project implementation very flexible and perfectly malleable to the local condition in each of the villages. Based on careful field assessment an appropriate set of activities could be selected for each village. However, we have no clear overview of the selection procedure of activities for each village, and whether activities indeed fit in the local context. Qualitative answers suggest that although PAMOJA was welcomed, activities mostly seen as useful for the actual recipients, and not so much for the community as a whole (see Annex B3).

The drawback of the flexible project design is that it results in a wide range of activities and objectives that makes it difficult to keep a clear overview of what has been done, by which partner in which villages. It was a challenging job for DCR to keep a clear overview of the project activities of all partners, including the budget shares allocated to the projects by each of the partners. Many communities received a different set of project activities. It is not always clear why the exact set of activities was chosen as it was, and we are not aware of clear criteria for allocation of project activities to villages and individual recipients.

Despite the complex project design it seems that implementation went according to the plan in terms of realization of targets: nearly all targets for 2015 had been realized or even exceeded in 2014 (see Table A1).

Recommendations

We fear that the great ambition of the integrated PAMOJA project may have compromised on efficiency and transparency of project implementation, and perhaps also on observed impact of the intervention in the current study. In order to increase the effectivity of the project as well as improving avenues for learning about project impact, we would advise the following:

1. Reduce the number of activities, and focus on the most promising core activities instead (in this case probably VDC, VSLA and FAL).
2. Develop clear allocation criteria for activities to villages to increase transparency, and the possibility for learning which types of activities are best implemented in which types of villages. Alternatively, let villagers choose their own set of activities, so that needs and supply are best matched.
3. It would be interesting to experiment in a more systematically way with different combinations of activities: some activities may function quite well as stand-alone interventions, whereas other activities could perhaps best be jointly implemented, as they might re-enforce one another. This could provide interesting lessons for future implementation of the PAMOJA project.

Table 4.5: Overall assessment PAMOJA

	Rating	**Comment**
The project was well designed	6	Very ambitious design; highly fragmented intervention.
The project was implemented as designed	9	As far as we can observe implementation went according to plan. Nearly all initial targets for 2015 were already realized or even exceeded in 2014.
The project reached all its objectives	6	If objectives are translated as 'outputs', then they are reached.
The observed results are attributable to the project interventions	7	The baseline survey was implemented one year after the start of the implementation, and is therefore no true baseline. We solved this through DD and PSM, but results may still not be perfectly attributable to the intervention.
The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries	8	Due to the project, more people obtained credit. This could be very relevant for farmers' households. Qualitative answers suggest that although PAMOJA was welcomed, activities are mostly seen as useful for the actual recipients, but not so much for the community as a whole.
The project was implemented efficiently	6	The project budget if very high, and despite the many project activities, costs on output level are higher than benchmark costs.

5 Capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs)

This chapter includes brief descriptions for each SPO included in this capacity development (5C) evaluation, and provides main findings and conclusions of the evaluation, in relation to the 4 core evaluation questions that were formulated for this study:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?

2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?

4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Note: It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study.

5.1 Key information on the Southern Partner Organisation

BSC

The independent local NGO Business Start-up Centre Monrovia (BSC) was established in 2009 in a pilot project initiated by the Association of Liberian Universities (ALU) and SPARK. BSC shares with its MFS-II partners the vision for pro-poor sustainable economic growth, particularly through (1) strengthening relevant local partners, (2) facilitating entrepreneurship; and (3) creating an enabling environment for private sector development, which is essential for creating self-reliance and thereby poverty alleviation in least developed countries and fragile states. BSC aims to develop and spur both entrepreneurship and education, empowering young Liberians to lead their society into prosperity. BSC organises workshops, business skills trainings, employability trainings, business plan competitions with an access to finance, seminars, business linkage or supply chain activities, radio shows, teacher training, coaching and mentoring services.

DEN-L

Development Education Network Liberia (DEN-L) was founded in 1999 and incorporated in 2000 when the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) ended its assistance to the repatriation and resettlement programme for Liberian refugees. DEN-L is an offspring of this relief programme that operated in Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Liberia during the war years, which was before 1999. DEN-L's vision is "Liberia at peace with itself and its neighbours". The mission of DEN-L is to build a constituency of people-to-people formations in pursuit of grassroots empowerment, economic justice, democratic development and gender equity for a just and peaceful Liberia. DEN-L aims to contribute to the building of a peaceful Liberia through an empowered society at all levels; to contribute to the empowerment, human rights and equality of women and girls as Liberia citizens in all aspects of their lives; and to strengthen and maintain DEN-L as an effective, efficient organisation committed to a Liberia at peace with itself and its neighbours.

NAWOCOL

National Women's Commission of Liberia (NAWOCOL) was founded in 1991 at the peak of the civil crisis in Liberia. Its intent was to rescue women and girls from the scourge of rape and distress caused by the ravages of war and the loss of their husbands and breadwinners. NAWOCOL initially provided psychosocial counselling, micro-finance and empowerment programmes to abused women and girls. Skills training, medical aid, adult literacy programmes, agriculture, legal aid, trust building programmes, HIV/AIDS components, and relief activities were later added. NAWOCOL's vision is a peaceful Liberia with tenets such as equality, fair play and justice, where women and girls have access to political and economic opportunities and are robustly visible. NAWOCOL's mission is to advocate and ensure that women are brought into the decision-making processes. NAWOCOL is an umbrella of member organisations. At its peak, it had 102 member organisations; NAWOCOL now has about 32 member organisations. NAWOCOL's operational strategy consists of mobilising resources at national level based on needs from member organisations, in order to implement projects, technical and financial support, and support them from the donor.

REFOUND
Rural Empowerment Foundation (REFOUND) was founded in 2002 and accredited as NGO in 2003. The organization first started in Gbarnga, Bong County to address the plight of street children. The mission changed from helping only street kids to helping the wider community. The mission of REFOUND is to "empower local communities through sustainable economic initiatives". The focus areas of REFOUND were: promoting peace and conflict-resolution activities; and self-help initiatives for economic development of women and youth to reduce poverty. REFOUND seeks to develop and empower young people and local communities as a basis for promoting self-initiatives through training, peace building and poverty reduction.

RHRAP
The non-profitable, non-governmental and non-political organisation Rural Human Rights Activists Programme (RHRAP) was established in 1997 to educate the rural inhabitants on issues of human rights, peace and social developments. In 2002 RHRAP added peace building and conflict transformation, focusing on ethnic tribal discrimination and religious intolerance to its regular human rights protection programme and started to work on reducing harmful traditional practices that are connected with the Poro and Sande secret societies, e.g. female genital mutilation (FGM). RHRAP is cluster lead for the Democratisation cluster of the Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme coalition, supported by ICCO. RHRAP envisages Liberia as a place where there is rule of law, lasting peace, stability amongst its people. Its mission is to build an environment where human rights and democratic principles will take firm roots and flourish at all levels within the Liberian society. For the last couple of years, RHRAP education and advocacy work has focused on promoting the criminal justice system, accountability in the extractive sector, as well as peace building and conflict transformation in rural communities.

5.2 Main findings and conclusions

This section summarizes the main findings for the capacity development evaluation, by first addressing evaluation question 1 and 4 (changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change) and then addressing evaluation question 2 and 4 (attribution question).

5.2.1 Changes in partner organisation's capacity and reasons for change

This section describes the main findings for the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

These questions are mainly addressed by reviewing standard indicators that have been developed for each of the five core capabilities, which make up the capacity of an organisation. Through a mix of methods (self-assessments – SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation), data have been selected on whether and what changes have taken place in these indicators since the baseline in 2012. The main findings and conclusions are described below. In addition to reviewing standard 5C indicators, the evaluation team facilitated a discussion on what the organisation perceived as the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, and how these changes have come about. Key findings are also explained below.

Changes in terms of the five core capabilities

Below we described how each of the SPOs changed since the baseline in terms of their average capability and specific indicators.

BSC

BSC has been developing steadily in the past two years, with improvements along all 5 capabilities. Positive developments within the capability to act and commit related to organisational leadership, maintaining staff, developing staff skills and diversifying funding sources. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew, improvements were seen in M&E application, the implementation of a new monitoring system and a more designated role focused on monitoring. On the capability to deliver on development objectives only a slight increase was seen due to the combination of more project locations while planned outputs are occasionally not reached. The capability to relate improved further due to increased networking and participation in more varied partnerships and projects. The capability to achieve coherence was enhanced due to the further development of operational and strategic documents.



DEN-L

DEN-L has encountered many changes and developments in the last two years, and has largely maintained capabilities as described in the baseline. Within the capability to act and commit it was seen that leadership has remained solid and participatory, staff capacity was built on through cooperation with the multiple partners of DEN-L, and staff motivation was noted to be good. The capability to adapt and self-renew slightly changed due to increased competencies on M&E and slightly better monitoring of projects. Within the capability to deliver on development objectives improvements were seen through more attention to quality reporting, efficient implementation and cost-effective resource use. The capability to relate was slightly enhanced due to the expanded participation in various partnerships and networks. The capability to achieve coherence did not change significantly, though the organisation has emphasised further development of their social enterprise business model for the future.



NAWOCOL

NAWOCOL was somewhat recovered from a difficult time during the baseline, and has seen slight positive changes along the five organisational capabilities. The capability to act and commit showed progress due to positive developments regarding the presence of the active director and the reconstitution of the Board. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew positive developments were that NAWOCOL has hired a consultant to help with setting up an M&E system and writing the new M&E protocol. Regarding the capability to deliver on development objectives, changes were that it was now possible to get a better idea of the operational plans at NAWOCOL, and to see what outputs have been delivered. This is only slightly better than in the baseline though: NAWOCOL has an issue with providing reports and plans. The capabilities to relate and to achieve coherence have improved a bit - especially within the latter capability a development is that NAWOCOL is seeking to explore a new strategic direction and has put a number of operational documents in place.



REFOUND

REFOUND has had limited improvements in organisational capacity since the baseline. Within the capability to act and commit, very little change was seen: in the areas of leadership, staff capacity, funding possibilities, little progress has been made and the fragility of the staff situation and incentives make this even more uncertain. The capability to adapt and self-renew has not changed. Slight deterioration was witnessed within the capability to deliver on development objectives because it was unclear how cost-effectively resources were monitored and how programme outputs were implemented. Some improvement was seen in the capability to relate, as networking within Bong County has increased and some small projects have come forth through these attempts. The capability to achieve coherence was slightly improved through the drafting of a new strategic direction.



RHRAP

RHRAP has been maintaining its capabilities largely at the same levels as during the baseline. Within the capability to act and commit, enhanced factors were improved staff training and attention to skills transfer, but these positive factors were somewhat offset by a fragile staff situation. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew, steps were made regarding the engagement with target groups and gathering information from the project environment. The capability to relate has slightly improved due to more engagement within the Liberian development environment in search for funds and new partnerships. However, engagement within current partnerships has not significantly changed the way in which organisational policies and strategies are developed. The capability to deliver on development objectives and the capability to achieve coherence have not changed, though within the latter capability a new strategic plan is currently being developed.



All in all, changes took place in all the five capabilities, for all the SPOs, as can also be seen in the table below. Most of these changes have been improvements. For the average capability improvements have taken place for all the SPOs, except RHRAP in relation to the capability to deliver on development objectives, and DEN-L and RHRAP, in relation to the capability to achieve coherence. Please also see the table below. It must be noted that within these capabilities, and related to the specific indicators, mainly improvements but also some deteriorations have taken place. This is very much specific to the organisation. The biggest improvements can be seen with BSC in terms of the capability to act and commit, which is mainly related to a lot of the support that they have received through MFS II in enhancing their staff capacity and being able to become more independent from SPARK. Many of these changes are specific to the organisation and therefore reasons for change cannot be generalised. For specific details about each organisation, we refer to the specific 5C reports.

Changes in terms of average capabilities	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Capability to act and commit	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1
Capability to adapt and self-renew	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.3
Capability to deliver on development objectives	0.25	0.4	0.2	0.4	0
Capability to relate	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1
Capability to achieve coherence	0.4	0	0.5	0.2	0

Key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO - general causal map

For each organisation, a discussion with staff was facilitated, so as to understand what they perceived as the key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, and how these changes have come about. It was expected that this would provide a comprehensive story for the SPO on what they perceived as the most important changes as well as providing reasons for change, which were difficult to surface from the 33 standard indicators. It must be noted that this information has not been verified with other sources of information, as has been done with the process tracing as explained in the next paragraph. Below you find the results per SPO. What can be noted is that the staff development, networking and diversification have been perceived as important changes in the organisations. The fact that ICCO is withdrawing funding also has a big impact on changes in the organisation since the baseline. Particularly in terms of BSC, the organisation realised that there has been an important influence by MFS II funded capacity development interventions. Whilst there was some influence by ICCO funded capacity development interventions, was not mentioned by RHRAP staff, where internal factors played a more important role. On the whole, a mix of internal external factors was perceived to be important in the key organisational capacity changes, as experienced by the SPO staff. For more details about the specific findings please see the 5C reports for the SPOs.

BSC

SPO staff members noted key changes in the organisation to be surrounding the development of training and facilitation competencies, increased networking skills and practices, and a slightly more effective monitoring system. Other developments were surrounding the expansion of BSC offices and programmes, improvement of strategy and organisational procedures, and improved team relations and communication. Important underlying factors that played an important role in these aspects were the support of MFS II funds, support by SPARK and BiD-Network in the form of a wide range of trainings, and the need to strive for sustainability through the diversification of funds and networks.

DEN-L

SPO staff members noted key changes at the organisation to be that DEN-L has increased diversification of funding sources, has increasingly project-based staff, and has improved staff capacity. Driving factors that influenced the attention to diversity of funds and a more project-based staff were that the reduced funding from long-term funders such as ICCO, Trocaire and Irish Aid has led DEN-L to seek other more short-term ad-hoc projects in different areas in Liberia; and the strategy of developing the organisation as a sustainable development study centre. The efforts to build staff capacity came from various angles: support from existing partnerships and donors for capacity development, the organisational need for well-educated staff, and a good connection with various Irish partners. ICCO supported the development of staff capacity through funding to hold Annual General Meetings and funding for university/college education for DEN-L staff members. The DCR coalition was also visible in this aspect, through training in M&E for example.

NAWOCOL

SPO staff members noted key changes at the organisation to be that a new organisational paradigm shift has been authored, search for more diverse funding is ongoing, and there is a management team that is better at multi-tasking. The new organisational paradigm development followed from a few key driving factors: that funding has been quite low (especially funding from main donor ICCO (MFS II)), discussions with ICCO on how to develop a new strategy, and ICCO flexible funding to hold an Annual General Meeting. A parallel development was that the context for post-conflict development in Liberia was changing (moving from relief to reconstruction, changing the nature of development goals and orientation). As such, the role of NAWOCOL has changed. This is related to NAWOCOL being an umbrella organisation for women groups in Liberia with various 'constituencies' in the different Liberian counties. In recent years these women groups have increasingly been decentralising operations and focusing on their own counties leading to less efforts to maintain NAWOCOL. The diversification of funding stemmed from discussions with ICCO and the other LCDGP members, and a successful subsidy negotiation with the government of Liberia. The last key change at NAWOCOL meant that the management was becoming better in multi-tasking, and this was steered by necessity due to high staff turnover, and a number of trainings organised by the LCDGP coalition. As such the role of the MFSII partner in the capacity changes at NAWOCOL have been influential. However, it was noted that these issues were fragile, and depend much on the participation of the current director in the future. This is a highly uncertain factor as it became clear later that the director found another job for a different organisation.

REFOUND

SPO staff members noted key changes at the organisation to be that staff capacity was worked on (but challenges are there), the development of a new strategic direction and programmatic approach, and active networking in Bong County. A key driving factor that influenced many changes at REFOUND was noted to be that decreasing funding from ICCO has impacted the organisation heavily. A high staff turnover was seen as a main negative result of that. The new ICCO-funded LCDGP coalition has meant that less funding is available, but some trainings and learning sessions have been organised that have led to more attention to staff capacity. A need to find other projects followed from active networking in Bong County and engagements with other smaller projects in the area. These new projects have influenced the development of a new strategic direction for REFOUND. As such, the MFSII funded interventions were present, but less influential in the current organisational changes.

RHRAP

SPO staff members noted key changes in the organisation to be that programme implementation capacity was better through improved staff skills and knowledge and better field monitoring, that network and coalition participation had increased, and that fundraising capacity had improved. Important underlying factors that played a role in these development were that RHRAP management were motivated to work on staff capacity for future sustainability, a reduction in funds from ICCO, the director's completion of a Master-study in Conflict Transformation and Peace-building in the United States, and maintenance of ties with other (potential) network partners.

It should be noted that this endline assessment was carried out just before the Ebola virus epidemic and crisis hit Liberia as of July 2014. The effects of the epidemic have heavily impacted the staff and operations of all assessed organisations, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. As such the evaluation team acknowledges that the assessment described in this endline may not fully resemble the current situation in early 2015.

5.2.2 Attribution of changes in partner organisation’s capacity and reasons for change

This section describes the main findings and conclusions for the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** And the fourth evaluation question: **“What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”**

Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. Furthermore, since ‘process tracing’ is used for this purpose, and this is a very intensive process, not all capabilities could be focused on. BSC and RHRAP where the two SPOs selected for process tracing. Below the key findings are discussed. But for more detailed information please see the 5C reports for the SPOs. It can be concluded that the identified key organisational capacity changes that were selected for process tracing can to a large extent be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions for the case of BSC. However, for the case of RHRAP, the identified key organisational capacity changes can only partially be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, but can also be attributed to internal factors such as previous experience and external factors like reduce funding by ICCO.

BSC

The two organisational capacity changes that were focused on through process tracing, were 'Enhanced training and facilitation competencies' (within the capability to act and commit) and 'Slightly improved capacity for programme management' (within the capability to adapt and self-renew). Within the first organisational capacity change, the evaluation team identified that both competencies and entrepreneurship and business knowledge had improved through a wide range of trainings (both local and international) supported by MFS II funds and through the participation in a new programme with Chevron and International Youth Foundation. Within the second organisational capacity change, on programme management, slight developments were seen along the line of programme management competencies, organisational management, and reporting standards. Key factors were that BSC seeks to be an independent organisation after 2015, but also that the organisational structure is open and flexible. Support was given by SPARK (MFS II) in the form of funding for local trainings related to programme management, and a new monitoring system was introduced by SPARK. As such, both the identified organisational capacity changes can to a large extent be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions.

RHRAP

The two organisational capacity changes that were focused on through process tracing, were 'Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector' (within the capability to act and commit) and 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising' (within the capability to act and commit). The first organisational capacity change was improved due to a combination of a collaborative approach for human rights -based monitoring and improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector. Key underlying factors that led to these improvements were the training of trainers on this topic in 2012 funded by ICCO (MFS II), a realisation that more dialogue is needed to achieve goals, but also previous experience with human rights monitoring and instruments through trainings and projects before the baseline. The improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring can to a considerable extent be attributed to MFS II capacity development support by ICCO, though it was seen that RHRAP staff had previous experience and knowledge on this topic as well, which also played an important role. The second organisational capacity change, on slightly improved fundraising capacity, involved improved capacity to write proposals, becoming more visible, and increased awareness surrounding issues of sound strategy and programme documents, building credible relationships with donors, and getting involved in more networking and partnerships. Important driving factors for these developments were reduced funding from ICCO and the institution of the LCDGP coalition in 2013. The slightly improved capacity for fundraising can only be partly attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions by ICCO: these were mostly reflected in improving the visibility of RHRAP, knowledge on proposal writing and awareness on building credible relationships with donors.

6 Reflections and discussion

6.1 Reflections on the MDG/themes evaluation

Liberia is still recovering from its civil war and is performing poorly on many development indicators. The Ebola-crisis that broke out just after the endline data-collection set back the country in terms of development performance. For example, all schools have been closed since the start of the outbreak, and children lost another year of education.

Given the limited time span in which the impact evaluation has been conducted, it is questionable how much impact could be expected. Furthermore, the impact evaluation framework was far from perfect, and we should interpret the (lack of) results from these studies with caution.

<u>Evaluation design</u>

With respect to the BPC study, a major point of caution is that we are dealing with a small number of observations. This has two reasons. First, the BPC population is limited. The competition is focussing on young (university) graduates with a business idea. We sampled the entire population of BPC applicants, and returned a year later to include the 2013 applicants in the research as well (in the meantime the BPC had expanded to Buchanan). Our sample at baseline was 137 observations. Attrition at endline measurement further decreased our sample: we were not able to retrieve 34 of our initial respondents. People change phone numbers regularly, have no official address, frequently move in search of new opportunities, and lost contact with the BSC, especially those who were not selected for training. The fact that we are unable to find significant effects of the BPC might be due to our small sample and resulting lack of power.

In addition, and related to the previous point, even though balance tests suggest that the sample of selected and non-selected applicants do not differ with respect to observables, they do differ based on one major characteristic: the quality of their business plan. Selected applicants are more skilled at formulating a promising business plan than those who were not selected. An RD design, comparing those applicants with business plans just above the selection threshold, with those just below, would be a solution, were the sample large enough. This is, obviously, not the case. A DD design should remove most of the selection bias (with respect to observable variables), but we should nevertheless interpret our (lack of) results with caution.

With respect to the PAMOJA study, there are some critical points to be made as well. First, the timelines of the PAMOJA project and the impact evaluation do not completely overlap. The PAMOJA project started in 2011 and lasts until 2015, whereas the baseline measurement was conducted in 2012 and the endline measurement in 2014. This has two implications. In the first place, we could not perform a randomized impact evaluation, and treated and control groups were likely to be different from each other from the onset. Our baseline data confirm this: many variables significantly differ between treatment and control groups. Even though we tried to correct for this using standard econometric methods, the bias likely has not completely been removed: treatment and control groups likely continue to differ based on other (unobservable) variables. In the second place, interventions were still ongoing during the endline measurement. Hence, our impact measurement should rather be considered a mid-term evaluation, as the project activities have not been completed yet.

Second, a more generic comment about the chosen time frame for the impact evaluation is that 2 years is a very short period to generate meaningful impact. On the one hand, it is questionable whether observed effects within this time frame are lasting. On the other hand, observing no effects does not necessarily mean that the project activities have no impact. Some activities may need more time to resonate in the communities. Possibly, meaningful (and lasting) changes as result of the project activities start to happen only when the research team and NGO staff have left the communities.

Third, we measured project impact on villagers living in PAMOJA-targeted villages, but not necessarily on targeted individuals. The reason is twofold. First, selecting suitable control villages is less complicated than selecting suitable control individuals. Second, and perhaps more important, even though PAMOJA targets specific individuals for many activities (e.g. women or youth), in the end the aim is to contribute to development on the community level. Nevertheless, in the focus group discussions many people stated that they believe that the project probably is beneficial for directly targeted individuals, but not for those individuals not part of the project activities. This indicates that the effects we measure are diluted and would probably be stronger had we only sampled direct project beneficiaries.

Despite these critical notes, we believe the results from the impact analysis are valuable, as they at least indicate in which direction change is to be expected, and which interventions seem to be most successful in generating (short term) impact.

<u>Project design</u>

With respect to the BPC study, a commonly mentioned critique by project participants is the fact that the start-up loans that were promised to winners of the competition (of the 2012 and 2013 rounds), were not paid out. Unfortunately, the bank that was contracted for issuing the loans was not willing to pay, as previous project participants defaulted on paying back their loans. BSC mentioned that these loans were paid later, but during the period under evaluation none of the participants who were part of the current impact evaluation received a start-up fee (although some managed to receive loans via other channels). This is problematic for two reasons.

First, nearly all respondents mention that access to capital is the greatest obstacle from expanding (or starting) a business. In fact, this is one of the major reasons why the business competition training was called into life in the first place: to increase access to capital for young entrepreneurs in order to be able to start or expand their businesses. The lack of start-up capital could be part of the reason why we find so few results in the current impact evaluation study: although participants may have learned more skills (which were not measured), they were unable to expand their businesses and to contract labourers.

Second, the failure of paying out the promised start-up capital is problematic because participants expected that the winners would receive a significant start-up loan. The anticipation of winning the competition and receiving the loan, may have affected the financial planning and hence the discount rate of participants. Indeed, we observe that project participants are less patient than non-participants.

The PAMOJA project consists of many different activities, and different combinations of activities are implemented in each village, while the implementation of some activities is shared by different organisations. This made our impact analysis rather complex. To keep the econometric analysis simple and understandable, we measured the general impact of the PAMOJA project (on those villages that were selected for intervention), and the impact of each separate activity. Although we realize that different activities possibly complement (or weaken) each other, we did not take these interactions into account: the large number of possible combinations would make the interpretation of a multitude of interaction terms rather messy.

The integrated structure of the PAMOJA project could be either a strength or a weakness. We fear that the great ambition of the integrated PAMOJA project may have compromised on efficiency and transparency of project implementation, and perhaps also on observed impact of the intervention in the current study.

6.2 Reflections on the organisational capacity of Southern Partner Organisations evaluation

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to be a very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, which have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map (based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff during the endline workshop) has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, which provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.

- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:

    - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs. In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. There were difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.

    - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors, rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome. Staff turnover may have seriously affected institutional memory, which is an important factor, next to the difficulty of recall when describing a chain of events, in qualitative information. These factors are important to take into account.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

<u>Design</u> – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

<u>Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:</u> many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

<u>5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:</u> The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or

not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation. For future evaluation purposes, it is important to keep 'utility' in mind since this is the first and most important evaluation standard. Helping to think through how evaluation can be useful for primary intended users is crucial. Ensuring a process whereby stakeholders involved are engaged in a learning process can support utility. However, it must be noted that, with qualitative information, respondents may suffer from recall bias if they describe a chain of events. Particularly when attrition is high, learning becomes limited since it is hard to find institutional memory.

7 Conclusion and recommendations

7.1 Conclusion

This report presented an overview of the backgrounds, methodologies, and findings from the Joint MFS-II evaluation for Liberia. We evaluated the impact of MFS-II on reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and on Capacity Development, using the Five Capabilities (5C) framework. Impact on Civil Society has not been measured, unfortunately, due to the recent outbreak of the Ebola virus in Liberia.

With respect to the MDG study, we evaluated the impact of two different projects; one rural, focussing on poverty reduction and education, and one urban, focussing on employment. Both studies were evaluated using difference-in-differences design, implying that we compared the treatment group with a comparable control group after project implementation, compared with the situation at baseline measurement (before project implementation). Baseline data were collected in 2012 and 2013, and endline data were collected in 2014. Unfortunately, in both studies the evaluation design diverted somewhat from an ideal DD set-up. In case of the rural project, we cannot speak of a true baseline study, as the project activities were already implemented a year before the baseline study was conducted. In case of the urban project, we could not ensure that the control group is truly comparable to the intervention group due to selection effects and a small sample. The latter also leads to low power of the econometric models. We complemented our findings from the quantitative analyses with qualitative focus group discussions and individual interviews among a randomly selected subsample of our respondents.

With respect to the 5C study, we evaluated five Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) according to the 5C framework, to uncover progress being made with respect to five core capabilities. Included SPOs are BSC, DEN-L, NAWOCOL, REFOUND, and RHRAP. During the endline workshop, we used general causal maps to uncover which changes are perceived most important by the SPOs themselves. From these five organisations, we subjected two SPOs to a detailed process tracing analysis, to sort out eventual causal effects from MFS-II funding on organisational capabilities (for BSC and RHRAP).

With respect to the MDG studies, we found little effect of the interventions. For the urban intervention (Business Plan Competition, implemented by the Business Startup Centre) we find no results from the quantitative analysis, although qualitative analysis shows there may be a positive effect on professional skills of project participants. Two issues are at stake. First, the evaluation design is far from perfect, as explained above, and second, impact on employment (MDG2) may be too ambitious within the evaluation timeframe. Our evaluation framework did not measure effects on skills, whereas potential impact on skills may be too big of a leap from actual employment generation. For the rural intervention (PAMOJA, coordinated by DCR), we find some positive effects (on access to credit, for example). However, for most other outcome variables we find no effect. Conclusions derived from qualitative analysis of focus group discussions are mixed: although project activities are welcomed, they do not always meet local needs. Also this evaluation design comes with some flaws, mainly due to timing of the impact evaluation exercise as well as due to the complex nature of the PAMOJA project.

With respect to the 5C studies, for most SPOs we find overall progress (but also some deterioration) in terms of all capabilities. We observe the biggest improvements in BSC in terms of the capability to act and commit. This is related to the support they received through MFS-II in enhancing their staff capacity and becoming more independent from the CFA (SPARK). Based on the general causal maps exercise during the endline workshop, we conclude that staff development, networking, and diversification are seen as the most important changes. The process tracing exercise shows that for BSC, key organisational capacity changes can to a large extent be attributed to MFS-II funded capacity development interventions. For RHRAP, the identified key organisational capacity changes can also be partly attributed to internal factors such as previous experience and external factors like reduced funding by the CFA (ICCO).

Overall, we conclude that under the MFS-II funding cycle, little short-term impact has been found. However, we are aware of the many flaws in the impact evaluation design, and suspect that actual (or potential) impact may be larger than could be detected within the current evaluation design.

Finally, we need to stress that Liberia is still recovering from its civil war and is performing poorly with respect to many development indicators and with respect to institutional quality in general. In addition, the Ebola-crisis that broke out just after the endline data-collection set back the country in terms of general development performance. All schools have been closed since the start of the outbreak for 6 months, depriving all children from education during this period. The World Bank reports negative impact from Ebola on all sectors of employment (predominantly among wage workers in urban areas), on harvests (as farmers are having difficulties organizing themselves due to the Ebola virus) and on food security. Hence, the results found in this study may unfortunately not well represent the current situation in Liberia.

7.2 Recommendations

We believe that impact evaluation studies, such as the current Joint MFS-II Evaluation, combining different methodologies to measure eventual impacts on a wide set of outcome variables of various levels, could potentially be very useful and provide a rich source for learning. However, the research design should be designed carefully, in order to make sure that relevant impacts can be picked up and research funds are spent effectively. This means that it would probably have been more useful to only evaluate those projects using quantitative impact analysis that are 'evaluable' in terms of standard quantitative techniques, and to be more flexible in the selection of outcome indicators. The current evaluation framework was rather strict (e.g. using fixed research timeline and sample of SPOs) and did not allow for much input from the evaluation teams. For a next evaluation exercise, recommend to allow for more flexibility on selection of projects, and to run fewer, but better designed evaluations instead of more evaluation while compromising on methodologies.

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ANNEX A1

Technical Paper SPARK – Business Plan Competition (BPC)

Gonne Beekman

Development Economics Group

Wageningen University

1 Introduction

This paper presents the impact evaluation of the Business Plan Competition (BPC), which was coordinated by BSC Liberia and financed by SPARK/Bid Network within the MFSII framework for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this evaluation, we seek to answer the following research questions.

1. During the 2012-2014 period, what are the changes under
    a) MDG1a—to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day
    b) MDG1b—to achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people?
    c) The theme "fragile states?"
2. To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the BCP project (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. What is the relevance of these changes?
4. Was the BCP project efficient?
5. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

We collected data among the entire population of 137 BPC applicants in Monrovia and Buchanan—the two largest cities in Liberia. Data were collected at 3 points in time. The first round of data collection was conducted in 2012 among BPC applicants in Monrovia. In 2013, an second round of data collection was conducted in 2013 among applicants in Monrovia and Buchanan—as the project has in the meantime expanded to Liberia's second-largest city. In 2014, endline data were collected among all applicants of the 2012 and 2013 competition rounds. To assess the impact of the BPC training, we compare the changes of the most relevant outcome indicators between applicants selected for training, and non-selected applicants while controlling for the baseline situation of each group. We find little impact. The lack of impact may, unfortunately, be due to the small number of observations available for this impact study.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the context of entrepreneurship and employment in post-war Liberia and Section 3 describes the intervention. Section 4 presents the research methodology and data and in Section 5 we present our results. Finally, Sections 6 provides reflections on the analyses and Section 7 concludes.

2 Context

Liberia has suffered 14 years of civil conflict that brought devastation and destruction to many lives and property, and disrupted the country's economic and social sectors. The country's top institution for advanced studies, the University of Liberia, lacked the capacity and human capital to resuscitate the economy.

84 percent of the population is living under the poverty line of 1.25 USD a day (UNICEF 2014).[1] According to estimates of the UN Population division, 70 percent of the Liberian population was under the age of 35, and 53 percent under the age of 20 in 2010.[2] The youthfulness of Liberia's population is even more pronounced in the capital Monrovia, a city of 1.5 million people. After years of civil war Liberia's economy is recovering but employment is scarce. Young people yearn to work, but lack the opportunities and often also the skills.

The Liberian statistical bureau LISGIS estimates that 50 percent of the population of Greater Monrovia is employed, although most employment is classified as 'vulnerable' (own account worker or contributing family member). Only 15 percent of the population of Monrovia has a paid job.[3]

The combination of youthfulness, unemployment and poverty can be an explosive combination, especially in the Liberian post-conflict situation. As Liberia moves on the road of recovery and development, there's a huge demand to promote economic development. SPARK is contributing to this by developing and running activities for their target group—young and ambitious Liberian (university) graduates aged between 18 and 35. For these (aspiring or already existing) entrepreneurs SPARK and its local partner BSC Liberia organise Business Plan Competitions, Business Development Services and workshops.[4]

1 http://www.data.unicef.org/resources/the-state-of-the-world-s-children-report-2015-statistical-tables

2 http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm

3 LISGIS 2011, Report on the Liberia Labour Force Survey 2010.

4 http://www.spark-online.org/region/Liberia/

3 Project description

3.1 Technical details

The Business Start-Up Centre Monrovia was borne out of an initiative of MFS-I funding of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2009 SPARK started working in Monrovia and organised the Liberia Faculty Enrichment Program (in cooperation with the Association of Liberian Universities (ALU) to build capacity among senior undergraduates and teachers through intensive summer courses on writing, teaching and business and development skills. In addition, in August 2009 a pilot project “Business Start-Up Centre Monrovia (BSC Monrovia)” was launched following earlier similar (successful) initiatives in South Eastern Europe, leading to an official registration of BSC Monrovia in January 2010. SPARK has been heavily involved in developing and implementing BSC Monrovia activities until the end of 2010 when BSC Liberia became independent from SPARK. In 2013 and 2014, new BSC offices opened in Buchanan (capital of Grand Bassa County on the coast) and Gbarnga (capital of Bong County, not far from Guinea. Since January 2011 BSC Liberia acts as a local partner in a large international programme in five countries, including Liberia, headed by the United Entrepreneurship Coalition (SPARK and BID Network).

The main objective of BSC Liberia is to reduce poverty through the creation of employment opportunities through training and the provision of access to finance for young entrepreneurs. This objective is related to MDG1 and the fragile states theme. Specifically, the BSC Liberia has been set up to serve three goals:

1. Develop SME landscape in Liberia through capacity development and access to finance
2. Create employment opportunities through SME start-up support and job search, retention and enhancement trainings
3. Influence policy review and reform to facilitate SME development and growth in Liberia

In the 2011-2013 competition rounds, BSC Liberia trained 88 entrepreneurs from universities and vocational school (18–35 years) in Monrovia and Buchanan. The budget for that period amounts 351,053 USD.

3.2 Project activities and objectives

BSC Liberia organizes an open Business Plan Competition (BPC) to support young graduates from universities and vocational schools as well as existing young entrepreneurs to start and develop businesses through employability training, training in business skills, coaching & mentoring and financing opportunities. The annual BPC constitutes a core activity of the organisation, has a clearly defined target population that can be traced over time (although this has been proven to be sometimes challenging in practise), and set beginning and end dates facilitating a relatively ‘clean’ design for the evaluation exercise.

Beneficiaries initially self-select by entering the BPC which is open to all people up to 35 years of age interested in setting up or expanding a business. The BPC consists of two rounds. Participants first submit a short business idea. An external jury scores and ranks each business plan according to a number of predefined criteria (including: quality of the participant; market potential; profitability and development impact) on a scale from 1-5 points. Participants who have a score of 3 points or higher are selected to take part in an 8-days training program. Also participants with a (slightly) lower score but with a promising business plan and sharp entrepreneurial skills could be invited to the training. In 2012, 35 applicants were selection for training in Monrovia. In 2013, the BPC expanded to Buchanan, the second largest city in Liberia. 20 participants were selected in Monrovia, and 15 were selected in Buchanan. Training courses include for example human resources management, customer care and marketing. Courses usually last 1-1.5 days and use an interactive learning methodology including role-plays, group discussions games and written assignments.

After the training has been completed the participants are invited to develop a full business plan during three months. During this period they receive mentoring and coaching to develop their ideas to its full potential. The office of BSC Monrovia also provides for a fully equipped conference room and the necessary ICT infrastructure including state-of-the art computer hard-and software and fast and reliable internet services. Participants can use these facilities when needed.

The second round comprises of submitting a completed business plan. A jury then selects about ten winners. These winners will be provided with soft loans, and linked to financial matchmakers who can help start-up or expand their business. To this end, BPC has contracted the Liberia Enterprise Development Finance Company that provides a start-up business oriented loan package taking into account the specific needs and general lack of resources of start-up businesses. However, no loans have been provided to winners in 2013 and 2014. As participants from previous rounds defaulted on their loans, the bank was not willing to provide new loans. The loans were ultimately provided by SPARK through an Investment Committee.

Direct beneficiaries are qualified young men and women with an interest in setting up or expanding their own business. Yet, BSC Liberia focuses primarily on facilitating business start-ups (and expansions) that have the potential to create additional jobs, providing for a wider impact than the group of direct beneficiaries alone.

Table 1 gives an overview of the inputs, actions, outputs and (intended) outcomes of the BPC.

Table 1: Inputs, actions, outputs and outcomes

Objectives	Inputs	Actions	Outputs	Outcomes
Develop SME landscape in Liberia through capacity development and access to finance Create employment opportunities through SME start-up support and through job search, retention and enhancement trainings Influence policy review and reform to facilitate SMEs development and growth in Liberia	1.5 FTE UEC staff 3 FTE BSC LIBERIA staff Trainers ICT and training facilities	Training and coaching on: - Incubator and business development - Business development - Lobby and advocacy - ICT infrastructure Organizing business plan competitions and award events for potential entrepreneurs Implementing entrepreneur coaching and training programs Matchmaking for businesses with finance and export	88 Approved business plans 175 Entrepreneurs certificated 10 Matchmaking between entrepreneurs and financiers	Development of strong business plans, linked successfully to financial matchmakers. Start-up of new businesses Job creation

3.3 Theory of change

The theory of change, as formulated by BSC Liberia is as follows: "BSC Liberia provides training, coaching, mentoring, soft loans, links to finance opportunities as well as much needed ICT infrastructure (state-of-the art computer hard-and software, fast and reliable internet etc.) to start-up or expand small and medium enterprises. The annual Business Plan Competition (BPC) helps them to select the most promising and ambitious individuals to realize or expand their own enterprise. BSC Liberia supports business ideas that have the potential to grow and create additional jobs, providing for a much wider impact than the group of direct beneficiaries. It is thus expected that this will lead to improved skills (e.g. computer, writing, marketing, and organisation), higher monthly revenues, and better access to finance and additional jobs creation within their own business" (BSC Liberia, 2014).

The challenging conditions in post-war Liberia create many obstacles for young (prospect) entrepreneurs to start up or to expand their business. Quality of education is low and access to credit is difficult. Hence, good skills training could be a large added-value for young university graduates and is likely to improve their business plans. Improved access to capital will probably increase their chances of turning their quality-business plans into reality. The effects of this will then be two-fold: first, project participants are likely to become better at financial planning (discount rates will probably decrease), businesses will be more viable, and therefore earnings will stabilize and increase. Second, newly established or expanded businesses are likely to generate both direct and indirect employment opportunities: direct in the form of employment generated within the businesses, and indirect in the form of more demand from goods and services from supplying firms and individuals. Hence, the increase in the number and size of viable businesses will ultimately not only benefit entrepreneurs themselves, but society at large.

3.4 Budget and efficiency

We analyse the expenditures of the BPC project on the output level. Over the period 2011-2013 a sum of USD 351,053 has been allocated by MFS-II through SPARK and BiD Network. 336,822 USD was spent on project activities. Table 2 lists the costs on output level.

13 percent of the total budget was spent on organizing entrepreneurship and life skills training for 251 participants in Monrovia, Buchanan, Gbarngba and Maryland (USD 175 per participant). 88 business plans were approved, including evaluation of business plans by an external jury, training, lunch and workshops for entrepreneurs, elections for the best business plans and promotion (USD 665 per approved business plan, or 17 percent of the total budget). So, a total of USD 840 was spent per applicant. The largest share of the budget – 41 percent – has been spent on financing 10 most promising businesses, including costs spent on monitoring, evaluating, coaching, mentoring, business registration & licenses (USD 14,397 per successful matchmaking). The rest of the budget was spent on 26 roundtable sessions (USD 577 per session, 4 percent of total budget); advocacy strategies (USD 35,000 or 10 percent of total budget), and other expenses (4 percent of total budget).

The project is operating on a relatively small budget, and compared to benchmark figures from a 2012 World Bank study on skills training for girls in India (estimated costs are USD 2427 - 3336 per girl), costs on output level are low (840 per applicant in the BPC project, compared to USD 2427 to 3336 per girl in the Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women (EPAG) project in India). Costs of matchmaking, on the other hand, are very high. Initially, a bank would provide start-up loans for the best business initiatives, but unfortunately this did not work out for business competitions after 2012. As participants from earlier rounds defaulted on their loans, the bank was no longer willing to cooperate. Ultimately, loans were reported to be paid by the BPC project, which would then explain the high unit costs for successful matchmaking.

Table 2: Costs on output level (USD)

Output	Total # in 2013	Total costs	%	Costs per unit
(Potential) entrepreneurs trained / awarded certificate BSC Liberia *Organizing Entrepreneurship & Life skills Training in Monrovia, Buchanan, Gbarngba & Mary Land counties.*	251	44,010	13	175
Approved business plan applications BSC Liberia *Evaluating Business Plans, Jury remuneration, Cost for Training, Lunch, workshops, voting Best Business Ideas & Plans, Promotions (Radio talk show, flyers, and jingles)*	88	58,493	17	665
Attendees of network sessions BSC Liberia *Networking session with partners, stakeholders, Government & Civil society groups, in promoting BSCM & its partners.*	1140	40,345	11	35
Successful matchmaking introductions BSC Liberia *Financed 11 businesses, Student run project (Kriterion Monrovia), monitoring, evaluating, coaching, mentoring, business registration & licenses.*	10	143,974	41	14,397
Roundtable sessions and multi-stakeholder dialogues held BSC Liberia *Meetings with stakeholders, partners*	26	15,000	4	577
Advocacy strategies (re)formulated BSC Liberia *BSC Academy, MSME Conference, TV & Radio Show*	1	35,000	10	35,000
Uncategorized		14,231	4	
Total budget		*336,822*		

4 Data

4.1 Description of baseline and follow-up surveys

The baseline survey in 2012 aimed to lay out a profile of the various participants in the Business Plan Competition and to map their characteristics. The focus was on variables such as demographics, economic situation, employment history and income sources, owned businesses, accessibility to credit, savings, expenditures, consumptions and aspirations. The endline survey in 2014 consisted of an identical survey, covering the same variables (see Annex A2).

In addition to the survey information, during the follow-up phase in 2014 we also conducted interviews with a random selection of BPC participants to qualitatively assess the impact of the programme among a randomly selected group of beneficiaries, in order to qualitatively assess the effects of the intervention (see the discussion in section 6).

Data were collected by a small team of 3 Liberian enumerators and a supervisor from Wageningen UR who were trained for this purpose during a 3-day training. The 2012 baseline data collection was using paper surveys; the 2013 baseline and the follow-up survey in 2014 were performed using tablets.

4.2 Sampling design, sample sizes and attrition

In the 2012 baseline phase, 66 respondents were interviewed. Half of them were selected by the BSC LIBERIA to participate in the training and form the treatment group. The other half was not selected and forms the control group. In 2013, 71 additional respondents were interviewed (of which half was selected for the training). This time data was not only collected in Monrovia (46 respondents) but also in Buchanan (25 respondents). In total the baseline survey covers 137 observations.

The sample in the endline survey amounts 103 respondents. In addition, sixteen of the 2012 and 2013 BPC participants were selected for an in-depth interview to describe their experiences in further detail.

Table 3 reports the sample framework. Unfortunately, attrition in the follow-up survey is high (25 percent). 34 respondents could not be retrieved despite great effort of our enumerators in the field. Many respondents changed location and phone number, or they were not interested in taking part in the follow-up survey, as they had not been selected for the BPC, and had not been in contact ever since (attrition in the control group is higher than in the treated group 27 vs. 22 percent).

Table 3: Sample framework of data used in the analysis

	Control	**Treatment**	**Total**
Baseline	77	60	137
Endline	56	47	103
Difference	*21*	*13*	*34*
Attrition	*0.27*	*0.22*	*0.25*

4.3 Key variables

We test the effects of the BPC project on MDG1a, and b (income and employment) and on the theme “fragile states”. For each category, we defined a set of outcome variables, which are described below.

We use 4 indicators for income: average income, expenditures, the fraction of respondents who have savings, and the fraction of respondents with a credit.

With respect to employment (MDG1b), we use 3 indicators measuring direct employment creation: the fraction of respondents with a paid job, the fraction of respondents with an own business and the average number of hours entrepreneurs work in their business. In addition, we use 4 indicators for indirect employment creation: the fraction of business owners who employed family members, the fraction of business owners who employed people from outside the household, the number of external employees (disaggregated by sex), and amount of hours these employees work are employed.

Finally, in the fragile states theme, we include 3 indicators concerning time preferences and planning for the (near) future. In order to estimate respondents’ discount rate (a measure for money-related patience, or the premium that is needed to let people wait for 2 weeks to receive a sum of money), all respondents were asked to state their preference between receiving 300 LD on the next day, and 6 incrementing sums of money in two weeks time (300, 360, 420, 480, 560 and 600 LD). We define the discount rate ∂ as the lowest amount people are willing to receive in two weeks time, divided by the sum of money they could receive tomorrow $[(300+\partial)/300]$. If people switch back and forth between receiving amounts tomorrow or in two weeks, they probably did not understand the game, and these (few) observations were disregarded. Some respondents never switch, indicating that even a 100 percent premium is too little to let them wait for 2 weeks. We set their discount rate on 200 percent; assuming they would probably switch later, if an even higher premium would be offered. In addition, we asked respondents whether they made (financial) plans for the near future (for next week and for next month).

Table 4 reports descriptive outcome variables for control group and treated group at baseline measurement. Most of the 17 outcome indicators are well balanced across treatment and control groups. Yet, for 3 variables this is not the case. Owning a business, and hiring in external employees for more days per week, increases the chances of being selected into the BPC training. Using these baseline-level variables as selection variables for the matching strategy should mitigate the potential bias in the results.

MDG1a – Income

The average income earned seems to differ a lot between control and treated groups (1616 versus 360 USD) but the difference is not significant, due to the large standard error in both the control and the treated group. The large standard errors indicate there is a wide spread in the amounts of incomes earned among the respondents, and reflect the huge fluctuations in earnings. Weekly expenses on daily consumption items, such as transportation and communication amount about 30 USD and monthly expenditures on education, clothing, rent, etc. amount nearly 400 USD. On average, respondents spend about 550 USD per month on these items. 15 percent of the applicants contracted a credit in the past 12 months, and the majority (85 percent) has savings.

MDG1b – Employment

Nearly 60 percent of the applicants have a paid job. 55 percent of non-selected and 70 percent of selected applicants own a business.

With respect to those respondents who have an own business, entrepreneurs work for 36 hours per week in their business. About half of them employed one or more family members. Business owners who employ people from outside the household have a higher chance of being selected into the training that business owners who do not (74 percent of selected and 48 percent of unselected business owners have external employees), and their employees work more for days per week (16 versus 11 days). On average, business owners employ 3.4 external employees, of which 2.4 male and 1.1 female.

Fragile states

The average discount rate is 50 percent (meaning that respondents request a premium of 50 percent in order to be willing to wait for two weeks). Figure presents frequencies for each of the different choices. At the baseline measurement, about 50 percent of the respondents prefer to have 300 LD in two weeks, rather than tomorrow, suggesting that they perceive us as an alternative bank and trust us better to keep the money safe than themselves. These respondents have a zero discount rate. On the other extreme, about 17 percent of the respondents always prefer to receive the money on the next day, regardless of the amount offered. We set their discount rate on 200 percent. At endline measurement, the percentage of zero-discounters is higher among the non-selected than among the selected applicants (75 versus 50 percent), and the percentage of maximal-discounters is lower (14 versus 20 percent). This suggests that discount rates increase (people become less patient) due to the BPC training.

Many respondents make (financial) plans for the near future. More than 40 percent of the respondents have a detailed plan for next week, and over 50 percent have a detailed plan for next month.

Household controls

Table 5 reports a selection of descriptive covariates for control group and treated group at baseline measurement. Nearly all variables are balanced across control and treated group, with the exception that respondents who own a desktop computer are more likely to be selected into treatment.

The average household of BPC applicants consists of 5-6 members, and 80 percent of households are male-headed. Nearly all applicants own a cell phone and about 40 percent own a laptop. 12 percent of unselected applicants and 27 percent of selected applicants own a desktop computer. Finally, the average applicant consumes 1.5 rice meals, and 1.3 meals with fish per day.

Table 4: Descriptive outcome indicators BPC (baseline)

Variables	N	Mean control (SE)	N	Mean treatment (SE)	P-value (t-test)
MDG1a: Income					
Paid job (d)	75	0.56 (0.06)	59	0.59 (0.06)	0.70
Own business (d)	76	0.55 (0.06)	60	0.70 (0.06)	0.08
Income (USD)	77	1615.67 (743.64)	60	359.86 (80.97)	0.14
Expenditures on consumption (last week, USD)	77	27.21 (3.64)	60	39.33 (10.54)	0.24
Infrequent expenditures (last month, USD)	77	355.22 (52.50)	60	409.21 (63.27)	0.51
Credit (d)	76	0.14 (0.04)	59	0.19 (0.05)	0.52
Savings (d)	77	0.88 (0.04)	60	0.83 (0.05)	0.41
MDG1b: Employment					
Hours per week	42	35.48 (4.09)	42	36.76 (5.04)	0.84
Household members employed (d)	42	0.55 (0.08)	42	0.48 (0.08)	0.52
Other employees (d)	42	0.48 (0.08)	42	0.74 (0.07)	0.01
Employees days per month	42	10.93 (1.87)	42	16.31 (1.87)	0.05
Number of external employees	42	3.86 (1.28)	42	2.95 (0.60)	0.52
Employees male	42	2.67 (0.89)	42	2.10 (0.41)	0.56
Employees female	42	1.19 (0.53)	42	0.93 (0.36)	0.69
Fragile states					
Discount rate	77	0.51 (0.09)	60	0.50 (0.09)	0.94
Detailed plan next week	77	0.45 (0.06)	60	0.42 (0.06)	0.66
Detailed plan next month	77	0.56 (0.06)	60	0.52 (0.07)	0.63



Figure 1: Discount rates by survey round and treatment

Table 5: Descriptive covariates BPC (baseline)

Variables	N	Mean control (SE)	N	Mean treatment (SE)	P-value (t-test / Chi-squared)
Household size	75	5.31 (0.25)	56	5.89 (0.33)	0.16
Male (d)	77	0.84 (0.04)	60	0.80 (0.05)	0.50
Cell phone (d)	77	1 (0)	60	0.97 (0.02)	0.11
Laptop (d)	77	0.43 (0.06)	60	0.35 (0.06)	0.35
Computer (d)	77	0.12 (0.04)	60	0.27 (0.06)	0.02
Rice meals	77	1.55 (0.07)	59	1.56 (0.12)	0.92
Fish meals	76	1.24 (0.07)	59	1.37 (0.13)	0.71

5 Analyses and results

5.1 Methodology

For the data analysis, we use difference-in-differences (DD), complemented with qualitative data from in-depth interviews (see Section 6).[5] We estimate the following regression model, using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) for continuous outcome variables, and probit regression for binary outcome variables (in which case we report marginal effects):

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Endline_t + \beta_2 Treat_j^T + \beta_3 Endline_t Treat_j^T + \gamma X_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

where Y_{ijt} denotes an outcome variable for respondent i in group j at time t, $Treat_j^T$ is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent was selected for the treatment, $Endline_t$ is a binary variable that takes the value one if the observation corresponds to the endline measurement, X_{ijt} is a set of controls,[6] and ε_{ijt} denotes the error term. Our variable of interest is denoted by β_3, which is the treatment estimate of the impact of the intervention on the outcome variable Y. That is, β_3 measures the difference between the treatment and control group in the growth of outcome Y, and is an unbiased estimate of the average impact on the dependent variable Y of being assigned to the treatment group provided there is only selection on the observed variables.

Two comments need to be made. First, treatment and control groups differ based on the quality of their business plan. Although DD can solve some potential bias in the data, some bias may remain. DD helps picking up time-invariant heterogeneity, but bias can still remain due to variables that changed over time. Yet, a positive significant effect in the DD model is a strong indication of an influential intervention. An insignificant effect—or even a significant negative effect—however, does not necessarily imply that the intervention does not work—or even does harm—as in our analysis we only measure short-term effects. Second, the number of observations is small, and therefore the current analysis framework has little power. Only large effect sizes could possibly be detected, whereas smaller changes would remain unnoticed in the current framework.

5.2 Quantitative results

Table 6 gives an overview of the overall change of major outcome indicators between baseline and endline measurements (also see the tables in Annex 1). The share of respondents with credit increased by 10 percent, whereas the share of respondents with a paid job decreased by 20 percent. Although the share of people with an own business did not change, the amount people work in their business increased by 16 hours per month. At the same time, business owners cut on their external employees; the share of business owners hiring external employees decreased by 14 percent, and they work fewer hours (decrease of 1.7 hours per month). Finally, people report they make less plans on the short term (decrease of about 13 percent).

Table 7 gives an overview of the impact of the treatment on our outcome variables (see tables A3-A5 for complete results). None of the changes we observed in the period 2012-2014 can be attributed to the project intervention. If anything, we find weak evidence that the intervention undoes the increase of working hours in people own business: project participants seem to work 16 hours less in their own business after the training. Furthermore, we find weak evidence that discount rates increase after the training, which indicates that people who participated in the BPC training are less patient. This may be caused by the fact that participants expected that the winners would receive a significant start-up loan. The anticipation of winning the competition and receiving the loan, may have affected the financial planning and hence the discount rate of participants: they may prefer to spend money now, rather than to save for future use, as they expect to receive a loan to be used for future use.

5.3 Qualitative responses

To complement our quantitative results, we held in-depth interviews with a random selection of sixteen applicants who submitted business plans in 2012 and 2013 were selected for an interview. Fourteen out of the sixteen interviewees were eventually selected for the training. Four of the interviewees won the competition. We have interviewed four BPC winners, two won in 2012 and the other two in 2013. Topics raised during the interviews were skills training, start-up loans that were not paid out, viability of businesses, obstacles to

[5] Because of the limited number of observations, we did not to apply regression discontinuity design (RDD).

[6] Additional covariates are included to control for various characteristics of the households. This not only helps with the precision of the estimates, but also reduces the problem of omitted variable bias. This is necessary to obtain unbiased measures of the treatment effects.

expansion, and employment generation.

Skills

Participants of the BPC told us they appreciated the trainings of the BSCM a lot. Mostly participants learned about financial management, marketing, customer relations, and businesses plan development. In addition, the interviewed people mention they gained skills in time management, professionalism, business management and having a positive approach towards business as assets of participating in the BPC.

In contrast, according to the interviewees, a vast majority did not receive much help besides the trainings. One individual stated she could use the computer once. Two others said they were connected to people in BSCM's network. None of the interviewees said they were connected to financial institutions that made it possible to receive a loan.

Start-up loans

Out of sixteen interviewees, four won the competition. None of them received the loan in the end. Apparently, the loan issuing party had problems enabling the loans to the BSCM. Not receiving the money has been troubling for all of them in terms of making investments and expanding their businesses. Ultimately, three of them did manage to sustain their businesses. Some expand despite the absence of the loans by investing personal savings. One was, at the time of the interview, starting up a different company with financial help of friends.

One winner complained that the BSCM did not pay attention on fundraising at different sources during their trainings. Some interviewees are angry for not winning the competition and they disagree with the verdict of the BSCM. Others, a vast majority, don't worry about it. In the end “no one received money, so no worries.”

Six people did manage to find a loan through other ways. Three managed to get a loan via friends and families. One received micro-credit, another one got a loan at the bank and one found support at a different NGO that connected him to a international firm.

Viability of businesses

Thirteen out of the sixteen interviewed participants sustained their businesses and three choose for an office job instead. Of the remaining thirteen entrepreneurs eleven succeeded to expand their business in the past years, and two have not increased but sustain. The entrepreneurs that expanded their business gave various reasons. Three of them attribute their expansion to the trainings they received from the BSCM. Three indicate they expand through loans from different sources. Two expanded their business by saving incomes and making investments. One increased his business through a loan in combination with an increment in sales. One increased his business by diversifying his services what led and the last entrepreneur did not explained how he expanded his business.

Obstacles to expansion

Subsequently we asked the entrepreneurs what they perceive as their biggest obstacle to expand their business. Four entrepreneurs don't have any obstacles at all. The most commonly mentioned reason for not being able to expand the business is a lack of access to finance. All of these entrepreneurs wish to make investments. Some wish to build warehouses, others wish to buy more machines to increase production; in essence six entrepreneurs have steady going businesses and they could increase their sales by increasing their production our storing capacity in other areas. Other obstacles mentioned are high prices of inputs (import taxes on second hand cars) and a challenging market (agribusiness).

Employment generation

Entrepreneurs who expand their business often hire old school friends or family members. In general, the entrepreneurs have two or three people on the payroll. Often apprentices are also working in the company. Trustworthiness is often more important than skills since many jobs are not too complicated by nature. For the entrepreneurs it is very important to work with people that are reliable to handle money for example. And even when skills are important, in a timber logging company for example, people are usually recruited on common origin and secondly on capability.

The entrepreneurs also create indirect employment. Their growing businesses create a bigger demand for suppliers, but also at customs, for example. Since one of the entrepreneurs imports two to three cars a week these days he says it is a lot busier now than before.

Table 6: Changes in outcome variables 2012-2014

Outcome variable	Pre-treatment Mean (SD)	Post-treatment Mean (SD)	Change 2012-2014
MDG1a: Income			
Income (USD)	1065.68	446.57	0
	(4935.27)	1579.59)	
Expenditures on consumption	32.52	38.39	0
(last week, USD)	(59.13)	(72.76)	
Infrequent expenditures	378.87	445.64	0
(last month, USD)	(472.81)	(1312.99)	
Credit (d)	0.16	0.26	0.10*
	(0.37)	(0.44)	
Savings (d)	0.86	0.85	0
	(0.35)	(0.35)	
MDG1b: Employment			
Paid job (d)	0.57	0.38	-0.20**
	(0.50)	(0.49)	
Own business (d)	0.62	0.68	0
	(0.49)	(0.47)	
Hours per week	36.12	52.33	16.21**
	(29.60)	(31.60)	
Household members employed (d)	0.51	0.41	0
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Other employees (d)	0.61	0.47	-0.14*
	(0.49)	(0.50)	
Number of external employees	3.40	1.67	-1.73**
	(6.46)	(2.96)	
Fragile states			
Discount rate	0.51	0.45	0
	(0.73)	(0.75)	
Detailed plan next week	0.44	0.30	-0.14**
	(0.50)	(0.46)	
Detailed plan next month	0.54	0.42	-0.12*
	(0.50)	(0.50)	

Table 7: Project impact on outcome indicators

MDG1a: Income	DD (SE)	*MDG1b: Employment*	DD (SE)
Income (USD)	1313.28 (1027.39)	Paid job (d)	0.16 (0.13)
Expenditures on consumption (last week, USD)	-9.44 (17.90)	Own business (d)	-0.00 (0.13)
Infrequent expenditures (last month, USD)	281.94 (254.18)	Hours per week	-16.78* (10.06)
Credit (d)	-0.00 (0.11)	Household members employed (d)	0.17 (0.17)
Savings (d)	0.08 (0.07)	Other employees (d)	-0.26+ (0.16)
Fragile states		Employees days per month	-3.73 (2.97)
Discount rate	0.69* (0.36)	Number of external employees	1.31 (1.77)
Detailed plan next week	0.10 (0.14)	Employees male	0.90 (1.25)
Detailed plan next month	0.21 (0.16)	Employees female	0.41 (0.77)

6 Discussion and reflections

6.1 Evaluation design

A major point of caution is that we are dealing with a small number of observations. This has two reasons. First, the BPC population is limited. The competition is focussing on young (university) graduates with a business idea. We sampled the entire population of BPC applicants, and returned a year later to include the 2013 applicants in the research as well (in the meantime the BPC had expanded to Buchanan). Our sample at baseline was 137 observations. Attrition at endline measurement further decreased our sample: we were not able to retrieve 34 of our initial respondents. People change phone numbers regularly, have no official address, frequently move in search of new opportunities, and lost contact with the BSC, especially those who were not selected for training. The fact that we are unable to find significant effects of the BPC might be due to our small sample and resulting lack of power.

In addition, and related to the previous point, even though balance tests suggest that the sample of selected and non-selected applicants do not differ with respect to observables, they do differ based on one major characteristic: the quality of their business plan. Selected applicants are more skilled at formulating a promising business plan than those who were not selected. An RD design, comparing those applicants with business plans just above the selection threshold, with those just below, would be a solution, were the sample large enough. This is, obviously, not the case. A DD design should remove most of the selection bias (with respect to observable variables), but we should nevertheless interpret our (lack of) results with caution.

6.2 Project design

A commonly mentioned critique by project participants is the fact that the start-up loans that were promised to winners of the competition (of the 2012 and 2013 rounds), were not paid out. Unfortunately, the bank that was contracted for issuing the loans was not willing to pay, as previous project participants defaulted on paying back their loans. BSC mentioned that these loans were paid later, but during the period under evaluation none of the participants who were part of the current impact evaluation received a start-up fee (although some managed to receive loans via other channels). This is problematic for two reasons.

First, nearly all respondents mention that access to capital is the greatest obstacle from expanding (or starting) a business. In fact, this is one of the major reasons why the business competition training was called into life in the first place: to increase access to capital for young entrepreneurs in order to be able to start or expand their businesses. The lack of start-up capital could be part of the reason why we find so few results in the current impact evaluation study: although participants may have learned more skills (which were not measured), they were unable to expand their businesses and to contract labourers.

Second, the failure of paying out the promised start-up capital is problematic because participants expected that the winners would receive a significant start-up loan. The anticipation of winning the competition and receiving the loan, may have affected the financial planning and hence the discount rate of participants. Indeed, we observe that project participants are less patient than non-participants.

7 Conclusion

It this study we presented the impact of yearly business plan competitions for young entrepreneurs initiated by SPARK/Bid Network and implemented by BSC Liberia in Monrovia and Buchanan. We assessed the effects of the project on reaching the Millennium Development Goals, over the period 2012-1014. Specifically, we measured the impact of the BPC training on MDG1 (poverty) and on the fragile states theme. To this end we collected baseline data among all 137 people who applied for the competition rounds in 2012 and 2013 and endline data in 2014. We compared the changes of the most relevant outcome indicators between applicants who were selected for the training, and applicants who were not selected. With respect to MDG1, we measure impact on incomes and expenditures, credit and savings, and direct and indirect employment. With respect to the fragile states theme, we measure time preferences and future planning.

Below, we answer each of our initial research questions, and give a general assessment of the project design and implementations. Table 8 summarizes our assessment of the project and the evaluation exercise with a rating on a scale from 1 to 10.

7.1 Evaluation questions

EQ1: During the 2012-2014 period, what are the changes under MDG1 and MDG2?

We find some changes in outcome indicators for MDG1 since baseline measurement at target group level. Access to credit seems to have increased, but the share of respondents with a paid job decreased. People work more hours in their own business, but at the same time, business owners seem to cut on their external employees. Finally, people report they make fewer detailed plans for the coming weeks.

EQ2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the BPC training (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

With respect to the project intervention, we find weak evidence that discount rates increase after the training, which indicates that people who participated in the BPC training are less patient. This may be caused by the fact that participants expected that the winners would receive a significant start-up loan. The anticipation of winning the competition and receiving the loan, may have affected the financial planning and hence the discount rate of participants: they may prefer to spend money now, rather than to save for future use, as they expect to receive a loan to be used for future use.

For any of the other outcome variables, we find not effects that can be attributed to the intervention. We are cautious about attributing the lack of effects to the treatment, given the selection bias of the treatment group which we could not solve for, and the low number of observations which results in low power. Unfortunately, the current research set up did not allow us to further increase the number of observations. Therefore, given the current impact analysis framework, we cannot conclude that the project has no impact (nor that it has).

EQ3: What is the relevance of these changes?

Even though we find no impact, we believe that the project is very relevant in the context of urban Liberia. There are many qualified, ambitious young people who are eager to work hard and to develop their own business ideas. However, finding start-up capital is a true challenge, and a big constraint for starting a business. If BSC can stimulate matchmakings between these your entrepreneurs and financial funders, this would be highly relevant. Second, unemployment is high and if these young entrepreneurs can indeed hire external workers, this could be a welcome opportunity for currently unemployed workers.

In qualitative interviews, participants of the BPC told us they appreciated the trainings of the BSCM a lot. Mostly participants learned about financial management, marketing, customer relations, and businesses plan development. In addition, the interviewed people mention they gained skills in time management, professionalism, business management and having a positive approach towards business as assets of participating in the BPC.

EQ4: Was the PAMOJA project efficient?

The project is operating on a relatively small budget, and compared to benchmark figures from a 2012 World Bank study on skills training for girls in India (estimated costs are USD 2427 - 3336 per girl), costs on output level are low (840 per applicant in the BPC project, compared to USD 2427 to 3336 per girl in the Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women (EPAG) project in India). Costs of matchmaking, on the other hand, are very high. Initially, a bank would provide start-up loans for the best business initiatives, but unfortunately this did not work out for business competitions after 2012. As participants from earlier rounds defaulted on their loans, the bank was no longer willing to cooperate. Ultimately, loans were reported to be paid by the BPC project, which would then explain the high unit costs for successful matchmaking.

7.2 Lessons learned

<u>EQ5: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?</u>

The difficult context for young entrepreneurs in Liberian cities is the major reason why the business plan competition was established. The aim of the project was to ease some of the major obstacles to starting or expanding a business, namely skills and credit. At the same time, the challenging conditions the entrepreneurs face are probably one of the reasons why generating impact is difficult. Often times, even basic skills are low, even among university graduates. For example, many highly educated young Liberians still have very poor writing skills. In addition, few people have access to credit—a mandatory need for starting or expanding a business. Unfortunately, it seems that the project failed in its ambition to give the most promising young entrepreneurs access to the much needed credit, or at least during the period under evaluation.

For these reasons, we rate the project design highly as such type of project seems to be highly relevant in the Liberian context. Unfortunately, the project could not be completely be implemented as designed, as—due to issues with the financial institute providing the loans—the winners of the BPC did not receive their start-up loans. The (evident) risk that winners of the BPC would default on paying back their loans, should have been taken into account in the project design. Apart from this, as far as we can observe, the project was implemented as designed and therefore we rate project implementation fairly good.

It seems that the project did not reach all (if any) of its objectives in terms of employment creation and access to credit. Lack of credit is a serious constraint to business startups, and the failure of provision of start-up capital for the most promising business initiatives may have contributed to the lack of impact. However, we also underline the limited scope of our study given the small sample size. We deem it likely that the project has more impact than the current study suggests. Probably, more impact will be generated after the competition winners actually received their start-up loans. For this reason, we rate both the observed short term project impact as well as attribution of the results to the project intervention low, with the remark that the project seems to have potential to generate more impact over a longer time period.

Finally, even though we failed to find results, we believe that this project is highly relevant to project participants. Receiving business training hopefully increases their professional skills and their chances on the Liberian job market—be it as an entrepreneur, or as employee in wage labor.

Table 8: Statements

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
The project was well designed								●		
The project was implemented as designed							●			
The project reached all its objectives					●					
The observed results are attributable to the project interventions					●					
The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries								●		
The project was implemented efficiently							●			

* On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “not at all” and 10 being “completely”, for this project, how much do you agree with the following statements?

Annex 1: Tables

Table A1: MDG 1a - Poverty[7]

	(1) Income	(2) Daily Consumption USD	(3) Irregular Consumption USD	(4) Education Expenses USD	(5) Credit (d)	(6) Savings (d)
DD	1313.28	-9.44	281.94	139.27	-0.00	0.08
	(1027.39)	(17.90)	(254.18)	(86.31)	(0.11)	(0.07)
Treat	-1773.86**	9.40	86.23	23.57	0.04	-0.07
	(695.96)	(12.12)	(172.18)	(58.47)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Post	-1346.68*	10.01	-65.44	-54.79	0.11	-0.03
	(692.66)	(12.07)	(171.37)	(58.19)	(0.08)	(0.06)
N	234	234	234	234	232	232
R^2	0.092	0.026	0.032	0.035		
pseudo R^2					0.031	0.027

Table A2: MDG 1b - Employment

	(1) Paid job (d)	(2) Own business (d)	(3) Hours business	(4) HH members employed (d)	(5) External employees (d)	(6) Employees total #	(7) Employees male #	(8) Employees female #
DD	0.16	-0.00	-16.78*	0.17	-0.26	1.31	0.90	0.41
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(10.06)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(1.77)	(1.25)	(0.77)
Treat	0.04	0.11	0.63	-0.16	0.19*	-0.91	-0.69	-0.17
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(7.02)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(1.24)	(0.88)	(0.54)
Post	-0.26***	0.06	23.10***	-0.15	0.00	-2.65**	-1.59*	-1.05*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(7.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(1.24)	(0.88)	(0.54)
N	231	233	149	148	148	149	149	149
R^2			0.139			0.045	0.038	0.042
pseudo R^2	0.049	0.063		0.088	0.041			

Table A3: Theme - Fragile states

	(1) Discount rate	(2) Detailed plan next week	(3) Detailed plan next month
DD	0.69*	0.10	0.21
	(0.36)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Treat	0.05	-0.04	-0.19
	(0.24)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Post	-0.72***	-0.16*	-0.28**
	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.12)
N	223	234	149
R^2			0.066
pseudo R^2	0.069	0.030	

[7] All tables report marginal effects for discrete changes from 0 to 1 (d); Standard errors in parentheses. All models include controls for location (Monrovia or Buchanan), household size, sex, and ownership of a cell phone and computer. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

0.1. To be completed by Interviewer *Please complete before the Interview*		
0.11	________________________ *Interviewer name*	└─┴─┘ *Interviewer ID*
0.12	**Date:** └─┴─┘ **/** └─┴─┘ **/ 2014 (dd/mm)**	
	Name interviewee	
0.13	**City**	└─┘ 1=Monrovia; 2=Buchanan
0.15	**Respondent code:** └─┴─┘	

Introduction to household members:

- "My name is________. We are here to collect information about the participants of the Business Plan Competitition, for a study of a university in The Netherlands. We will interview all former participants to the BPC 2012 and 2013 in Monrovia and Buchanan."
- "The researchers will keep your responses confidential. Your name will never be used anywhere to ensure confidentiality."
- "You are not obliged to answer questions if you do not want to and you are free to stop the interview at all times."
- "We hope that the research will benefit Liberia by assisting us to better understand the factors that help a person to be a successful entrepreneur."
- You will receive 200 LD transport cost
- "Do you have any questions for me? You may ask questions about this study at any time."
- "The survey will take approximately one hour. Are you willing to participate?"

Signature of Interviewee:

0.2. To be completed by Data Entry	
I confirm that the data is correctly entered and checked. **Date of entry:** └─┴─┘ **/** └─┴─┘ **/ 2014 (dd/mm)**	
________________________ *Name of data entry operator*	└─┴─┘ *Data entry ID*
________________________ *Name of controller*	└─┴─┘ *Controller ID*

Signature of data entry operator:

Signature of controller:

		Yes	No	If no, why not?
0.17	Is the interviewee willing to participate?	1	2	________________________
0.18	Interview language			
0.19	Starting time	_ _ : _ _ (hh:mm)		

Space for remarks:

____

____

SECTION 0 – BUSINESS PLAN COMPETITION (BPC)

"I would like to start by asking some questions about the BPC you entered in 2012 or in 2013."

0.1	In which round did you enter the BPC? *Circle all that apply*	1	Monrovia 2012
		2	Monrovia 2013
		3	Buchanan 2013
		4	Other, specify:
0.1.3	Have you entered other competitions since BPC 2012 (or BPC 2013)?	1	Yes
		2	No → **Skip to 0.1.5**

0.1.4	Please list the names and year of all other competitions you entered since BPC 2012 (or BPC 2013)	1.	|__|__|__|__| (Year)
		2.	|__|__|__|__| (Year)
		3.	|__|__|__|__| (Year)
		4.	|__|__|__|__| (Year)

0.1.5	Have you participated in any business training courses outside of university?	1	Yes	2	No → **Skip to 0.2**

0.1.6	Please list the organization(s) (maximum 3) that provided the training, the year in which the training took place and the number of days you were trained	**0.1.6.1** Name organization	**0.1.6.2** Year	**0.1.6.3** Duration (#days)
		1.	|__|__|__|__|	|__|__|
		2.	|__|__|__|__|	|__|__|
		3.	|__|__|__|__|	|__|__|

0.2	What was the outcome of the BPC you entered in 2012 or 2013?	1	I was not selected for the training
		2	I was selected for the training, but I didn't win the competition
		3	I was selected for the training, and I won the competition **--> continue with question 0.3**
0.3	If you won the competition: did you receive a start-up fee (please specify amount in USD)?	1	Yes, |__|__|__|__| USD
		2	No; specify why not:

SECTION 1 – DEMOGRAPHICS Read - "I would now like to ask you a few questions on the composition of your household"

1.1 **What is the number of persons living in your household?** └─┴─┘

Please list below by first name. Start with the head of the HH, then the spouse and complete the table for any other member.
*A household is defined as a group of people **currently** eating from the same pot "under the same roof". If the participant still lives with his/her parents WITHOUT having HIS/HER own household, write down the information about his/her parents household.*

HH Member Code	1.2 Name	1.3 Sex		1.4 Literate?		1.5.1 Age (*age <1, write zero (0)*)	1.6 Relation to Head → SEE CODES	1.9 Current schooling status 2011/ 2012 → SEE CODES
01		M	F	Y	N			
02		M	F	Y	N			
03		M	F	Y	N			
04		M	F	Y	N			
05		M	F	Y	N			
06		M	F	Y	N			
07		M	F	Y	N			
08		M	F	Y	N			
09		M	F	Y	N			
10		M	F	Y	N			

Codes 1.6	Codes 1.9
1=Head 2=Spouse 3=Child 4=Parent 5=Sibling 6=Grand-child 7=Grand-parent 8=Orphan taken care of 9=Other relative 10=Foster child (no orphan) 11=No relation 12= Other, Specify________	1=Attend kindergarten 2=Attend elementary school 3=Attend high school 4=Attend university 5=Attend vocational or other training program 6=Currently not attending any type of school

SECTION 2 – ECONOMIC SITUATION

2.1	Do you or your household own or rent the dwelling/building you live in?			1	Own		
				2	Don't own but live for free		
				3	Rent		
2.2	What is the major construction material of the outside walls?			1	Earth / mud		
				2	Mud bricks / blocks		
				3	Cement / Concrete		
				4	Other, specify ______________________		
2.3	What is the major material of the roof?			1	Straw / thatch		
				2	Zinc / metal sheet		
				3	Plastic sheet (tarpaulin)		
				4	Other, specify ______________________		
2.4	What is the major material of the floor?			1	Earth/stones		
				2	Wood		
				3	Cement		
				4	Other, specify ______________________		
2.5.1	What is your main source of drinking water?	1	Pipe borne water in the compound	4	Unprotected well/borehole	7	Rain water
		2	Public tap	5	Spring	8	Vendor / tank
		3	Protected well/borehole	6	Stream/lake	9	Other, specify___
2.5.2	What is the distance to source of water used (in minutes)?			|_|_|_| minutes			
2.6	Do you own any of the following assets?	1	Computer	8	Radio/Tape		
		2	Laptop	9	Cell phone		
		3	Car	10	Sewing machine		
		4	Chairs	11	Bicycle/Motorbike		
		5	Mattress	12	Mosquito net		
		6	Coal pot	13	Other, specify_____________________		
		7	Generator	14	Other, specify_____________________		

Section 3 Employment history and income sources							
3.1	Since you participated in the BPC, have you had a paid job? (excluding your own business)	1	Yes → CONTINUE WITH 3.2		2	No → CONTINUE WITH 3.3	
3.2	Please shortly describe each job (type, activities etc.)	**3.2.1 Description**		**3.2.2 Start (mm/yy)**	**3.2.3 End (mm/yy) >> if ongoing**	**3.2.4 Daily Wage**	**3.2.5 Currentcy (US$ or LD)**
				⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__|__⌋	
				⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__|__⌋	
				⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__|__⌋	
				⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__⌋ / ⌊__|__⌋	⌊__|__|__⌋	

3.3 Earnings from external income sources *(Ask EXPLICIT whether amounts are in LD or US$ and write amount in the appropriate box)*		**Amount (LD)**	**Amount (US$)**	**3.3.4 Period** *(Circle the period that applies)*
3.3.1	Trade (not of own goods, only profit from purchase and re-sale)	⌊__|__|__⌋ ⌊__|__|__⌋	⌊__|__|__⌋	Daily/ Weekly / Monthly
3.3.2	Income from renting out land / house	⌊__|__|__⌋ ⌊__|__|__⌋	⌊__|__|__⌋	Daily/ Weekly / Monthly
3.3.3	Remittances received	⌊__|__|__⌋ ⌊__|__|__⌋	⌊__|__|__⌋	Daily/ Weekly / Monthly

Section 4 Own business

4.1	Do you have your own business? (up and running, not just a plan)	1	Yes	2	No → **SKIP TO SECTION 5**
4.2	Please describe the type of business you have				
4.3.1	When did you start your own business? Please fill in month and year	___/___ mm/yy			
4.3.2	How many days per month does this business operate?	___ days per month			
4.4	Who provided the capital to start the business? **See codes on the right**	__	1=Self 2=Family 3=Friends 4=Micro-finance institute	5=Bank 6=Moneylender 7=SUSU or other savings association 8=Cooperative	9=NGO 10=Other, specify:
4.5	Could you please estimate the monthly revenue of your business? (in US$ or LD; revenue, not profit)	____ US$		___ ___ ___ LD	
4.6.1	How many hours per week do you work for your own business?	___ hours per week			
4.6.2	Do any of your OTHER household members work in your business?	1	Yes	2	No → **SKIP TO Q 4.7**
4.6.3	If yes, how many days per month do OTHER household members work in your business? How much do they earn per day? *Please fill in the table below using* **HH ID codes from section 1.1**				

4.6.3.1	HH ID 1	___ days per month	____ LD per day	**4.6.3.6**	HH ID 6	___ days per month	____ LD per day
4.6.3.2	HH ID 2	___ days per month	____ LD per day	**4.6.3.7**	HH ID 7	___ days per month	____ LD per day
4.6.3.3	HH ID 3	___ days per month	____ LD per day	**4.6.3.8**	HH ID 8	___ days per month	____ LD per day
4.6.3.4	HH ID 4	___ days per month	____ LD per day	**4.6.3.9**	HH ID 9	___ days per month	____ LD per day
4.6.3.5	HH ID 5	___ days per month	____ LD per day	**4.6.3.10**	HH ID 10	___ days per month	____ LD per day

4.7	Do you have employees (excluding own household members)?	1	Yes	2	No → **SKIP TO SECTION 5**
4.8	If yes, how many people? How many male? How many female?	**4.8.1** ___ persons; **4.8.2** of which ___ male **4.8.3** and ___ female			

4.9 How many days per month do your employees work in your business? How much do they earn per day? *Please fill in the table below*

	Person	Type of work	Days per month	LD per day		Person	Type of work	Days per month	LD per day
4.9.1	#1		___	____	**4.9.5**	#5		___	____
4.9.2	#2		___	____	**4.9.6**	#6		___	____
4.9.3	#3		___	____	**4.9.7**	#7		___	____
4.9.4	#4		___	____	**4.9.8**	#8		___	____

SECTION 5 – CREDIT

5.1 Did anyone from your household contract a loan the past 12 months?	1	Yes	2	NO → **MOVE TO SECTION 6**

5.2 Please list all the loans that your household contracted in the past 12 months (provide a description)

Nr of loan.	Description	**5.3** Who was the primal borrower of the household? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**5.4** From whom did your household obtain the loan? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**5.5** For what purpose did your household obtain the loan? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**5.6** How much did your household borrow? **In LD, if one borrowed products, fill it in words**
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

Nr of loan.	**5.7** What is/was the interest or interest rate on the loan? **Fill out in accordance with how the respondent answers (LD or percentage)**					**5.8** When is/was the borrower scheduled to finish the loan? **Fill in a date**		**5.9** Has the borrower finished repaying the loan? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**5.10** How much in total has been repaid on the loan?		**5.11** What collateral did the lender lend against? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**
	Fill in LD or percent			**Per how many**							
	LD	USD	Percent	months	years	Month	Year		LD	USD	
1.											
2.											
3.											
4.											
5.											

Codes 5.3 Who was the primal borrower of the household?		**Codes 5.4 From whom did you obtain the loan?**	**5.5 For what purpose did you obtain the loan?**	**5.9 Has the borrower finished repaying the loan?**	**5.11 What collateral did the lender lend against?**
1=Head 2=Spouse 3=Child 4=Parent 5=Sibling 6=Grand-child 7=Grand-parent	8=Orphan taken care of 9=Other relative 10=Foster child (no orphan) 11= Son/ daughter in law 12=No relation 13= Other, specify_____	1=Family 2=Friends 3=Micro Finance Institution 4=Bank 5=Moneylender 6=Kuu or other savings association 7=Cooperative 8=Other, specify ____________	1=Food 2=Family events (marriage, funeral etc.) 3=School fees/materials 4=investment in own business, please specify 5= Purchase of land 6= Investment in house 7= Other, specify___________	1= Fully paid 2= Partly paid 3= Not paid at all > **SKIP TO Q5.11**3=Not paid at all	1= Agricultural land 2= Building or other property 3= Gold or silver 4= Property documents 5= Personal guarantee 6= Past borrowing record 7= Other specify____________ 8= No collateral

SECTION 6 – SAVINGS

		1. Micro-finance Institute	2. Saving club (SUSU)	3. Saving club (VSLA)	4.Bank	5.Cash at home	6.Buying gold	7.Crops in storage	8.Other (specify) ______
6.1	Have you or your household had any kinds of the following savings ? 1 = Yes, 0 = No **Always NO? GO TO Q6.7**	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘
6.2	Which household member holds the account? **Use codes below**	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘
6.3	What is the main source of this saving? **Use codes below**	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘
6.4.1	How much have you deposited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
6.4.2	How much has your spouse / husband deposited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
6.5.1	How much have you withdrawn or credited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
6.5.2	How much has your spouse / husband withdrawn or credited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
6.6	What amount do you have saved as of today? **(LD)**								

Codes 6.2 Which household member holds the account?		**Codes 6.3** What is the source of this saving?	
1=Head 2=Spouse 3=Child 4=Parent 5=Sibling 6=Grand-child 7=Grand-parent	8=Orphan taken care of 9=Other relative 10=Foster child (no orphan) 11= Son/ daughter in law 12=No relation 13= Other specify)____________________	1= Save up small amounts for a long time 2= From selling land 3= From selling livestock 4= From selling other assets 5= From inheritance	6= Profits from business 7= From selling agricultural products 8= From salary or wages 9= Other (specify)____________________

6.7 In your opinion, what are the three most important reasons that you save? Rank them starting with the most important. **(READ THE OPTIONS BELOW)**

1. Most important reason to save: └─┘ 2. Second most important reason to save: └─┘ 3. Third most important reason to save: └─┘

A	To pay for children's education expenses	**D**	To buy farm equipment or farm inputs (e.g. fertilizer)	**G**	To provide for old age
B	To (re)build house	**E**	To buy livestock	**H**	Celebrations (marriages, funerals, birth, etc.)
C	To buy land	**F**	To buy assets (e.g. radio, TV, mobile phone, furniture)	**I**	Other (specify)___________________

SECTION 7.1 – EXPENDITURES							
IN THE **LAST MONTH** HOW MUCH DID YOU YOURSELF SPEND ON:		**(LD)**	**(USD)**			**(LD)**	**(USD)**
7.1.1	Insurance, please specify type___________________________			**7.1.7**	Rent for house		
7.1.2	Medicines			**7.1.8**	Remittances		
7.1.3	Education/training			**7.1.9**	Electricity		
7.1.4	Clothing, shoes			**7.1.10**	Drinking water		
7.1.5	Celebration, social event, funeral, wedding			**7.1.11**	Group/associational membership fees		
7.1.6	Fines / Taxes			**7.1.12**	Sports		

SECTION – 7.2 CONSUMPTION						
IN THE LAST **7 DAYS** HOW MUCH DID YOU YOURSELF SPEND ON:		**(LD)**	**(USD)**	**YESTERDAY** HOW MANY TIMES DID YOU EAT:		
7.2.1	Scratch card			**7.2.7**	Meat	⌊_⌋ times
7.2.2	Phone charge			**7.2.8**	Fish	⌊_⌋ times
7.2.3	Internet use			**7.2.9**	Rice	⌊_⌋ times
7.2.4	Transportation					
7.2.5	Coal for cooking					
7.2.6	Soft drinks					

SECTION 8 – EMPOWERMENT AND ASPIRATIONS					
8.1	**Empowerment** (read statements aloud and circle 1 option)	Agree	Disagree	Do not know	Refuses to answer
8.1.1	Some of those things you do or some of the choices you make are what make your future.	1	2	3	4
8.1.2	You have small control over the things that happen in your life.	1	2	3	4
8.1.3	Success comes from hard work	1	2	3	4
8.1.4	When you make your plans, you can usually make them work	1	2	3	4
8.2	**Aspirations**				
8.2.1	Do you usually have a good plan of activities for the week ahead. **IF NO SKIP TO Q8.2.3**	1 Yes	2 No	3 Do not know	4 Refuses to answer
8.2.2	If yes: Can you tell me about your plan for the next week?	1 No plan	2 Small plan	3 Detailed plan	4 Refuses to answer
8.2.3	Can you tell me about your plan for spending money the next month?	1 No plan	2 Small plan	3 Detailed plan	4 Refuses to answer
8.2.4	Do you have a plan for the next six months? If yes, can you tell me about it?				

Activity 1

We would now like you to make a **hypothetical** choice between receiving a sum of money tomorrow or after two weeks.

1. Tell the participant:
   a. There are 6 questions.
   b. For each question you will have to make a choice "do I want _____LD tomorrow" or "do I want _____LD in two weeks"?
   c. I will now go through each of the 6 questions, and you tell me if you want option A or option B for each question.
2. Go through the chart with the participant and record which option he or she prefers in each case by circling the preferred option.

Activity #1

	Please choose between the following two options:	
	Option A: Get this tomorrow:	**Option B: Get this in two weeks:**
1	300 LD	300 LD
2	300 LD	360 LD
3	300 LD	420 LD
4	300 LD	480 LD
5	300 LD	540 LD
6	300 LD	600 LD

Note for interviewers: ***don't forget to fill in the conclusion!***

CONCLUSION

Thank you very much for participating.

The results of this questionnaire will help us to better understand the socio-economic environment of BPC participants, in order to advice NGOs and policy makers about policies that could lead to further improvements in future BPCs.

Do you have any questions for me before I leave? → ***Take the time to answer any questions.***

Observations of the enumerator. Do not read the following questions. Simply record your impressions!

A	Ending time	_ _ : _ _ (hh:mm)	
B	How would you judge the respondent's understanding of the questions during the survey?	1	Displayed no problems
		2	Displayed a little difficulty
		3	Displayed moderate difficulty
		4	Displayed serious problems
C	How did the thought process of the respondent appear to you during the survey?	1	Logical and sensible
		2	Somewhat Unclear
		3	Unclear, insensible
		4	Totally disoriented
D	Remarks about respondent / spouse (e.g. physical disabilities, mental disease)		

Space for additional remarks

ANNEX B1

Technical Paper DCR – PAMOJA

Gonne Beekman

Development Economics Group

Wageningen University

1 Introduction

This paper presents the impact evaluation of the PAMOJA project, which was coordinated and financed by the Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR) within the MFSII framework for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this evaluation, we seek to answer the following research questions:

In this paper, we seek to answer the following research questions.

1. During the 2012-2014 period, what are the changes under:
    a. MDG1a - to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day?
    b. MDG1b - to achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people?
    c. MDG1c - to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people of people who suffer from hunger?
    d. MDG2a - to ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling?
2. To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the PAMOJA project (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. What is the relevance of these changes?
4. Was the PAMOJA project efficient?
5. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

We collected data among 130 communities and nearly 2600 households in the counties Bong, Margibi and Montserrado to collect information on a range of uniform and specific outcome indicators and potential confounding factors. Control communities were selected ex-post, as the intervention started a year before the baseline study. Baseline data were collected in July 2012—one year after the project activities commenced—and endline data were collected in May-June 2014—a year before the end of the project activities. To assess the impact of the PAMOJA project, we compare the changes of the most relevant outcome indicators between villagers in communities selected for PAMOJA, and villagers in non-selected communities. We find that, overall, all outcome indicators decreased since baseline measurement. This means either that living standards decreased since 2012, or that there has been a reporting bias. We find that the share of people with credit increased due to the general PAMOJA project. In addition, we find some positive effects from separate activities part of the PAMOJA project on the size of (external) earnings and on the number of days people are employed in wage labour. Results need to be interpreted with caution, however, as the beneficiaries were not randomly assigned to the intervention, and the research timeline does not fully concur with the project timeline.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the context of rural development in post-war Liberia and Section 3 describes the intervention. Section 4 presents the surveys, sampling design, and descriptive statistics, including tests for differences between treatment and control groups at baseline measurement. Section 5 describes the research methodology and results from the analysis. Section 6 provides reflections on the analyses and Section 7 concludes.

2 Context

Social structures in Liberian communities have been severely disrupted after the civil war that lasted for 14 years. A whole generation of children never went to school, and unemployment rates are high. A great deal of farming expertise was lost as a result of the prolonged war, conflicts around land ownership are common, and food prices rose. Consequently, many people have difficulties supporting themselves.

An increasing number of social organizations stepped up in Liberia over the past few years, and many communities have now gained experience with rehabilitation activities. The DCR focuses on strengthening these civilian initiatives and the collaboration with the local authorities and local social organizations. The DCR focus is on following activities: creating educational facilities for children and agricultural training courses for adults, setting up a credit system so that people can start their own small business and assisting the communities in the areas of local government and management.

Conflict-affected communities are exposed to high risks of recurring violence long after a war has officially come to an end. Furthermore, when assets are destroyed, institutions weakened, and social cleavages widened, the prospects for human development are limited. The DCR therefore aims to support these communities, in particular their most vulnerable members. The vision of the DCR is: "Peaceful, stable and well-governed societies where all people have sustainable livelihoods and equal access to basic services".

The intended effect of the DCR mission is formulated as follows:

> *"The Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation has the mission to contribute to recovery of post-conflict societies in Africa by rehabilitating physical, societal and economic infrastructure in conflict-affected communities and assisting civil society actors to become stronger stakeholders in the creation of a sustainable peace dividend."*

Based on the DCR's experience in fragile states, the DCR is convinced that this multi-layered and multi-sectoral approach will bring a much-needed lasting change in these conflict-ridden societies.

The DCR PAMOJA programme – subject of this evaluation – is active in rural areas in Bong, Margibi, and Montserrado counties.[1] These counties are located in the proximity of capital city Monrovia, but characterized by weak infrastructure (no access to electricity, poor road quality), high poverty and low school-attendance rates.

[1] Pamoja is the Swahili word for "together," referring to the essential role of cooperation (between Consortium members, Southern partners, individuals in target communities, and local authorities) in the programme.

3 Project description

3.1 Technical details

The PAMOJA Partnering 4 Change Programme (hereafter: PAMOJA) aims to support rural households in conflict-affected communities in three counties in Liberia (Montserrado, Margibi and Bong. The programme's specific objectives are improved basic service delivery, increased agricultural production, and higher household incomes. In addition, the intervention aims to empower civil society to become well organized and work together to articulate needs and lobby on higher levels of governance for community interests. The programme is a joint effort of The Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR) that comprises of Save the Children, ZOA , CARE, and HealthNet/TPO (although the latter does not operate in Liberia) and their local partners (NGOs, CBOs, private sector organisations and local governance structures).

The programme commenced in 2011 and runs for five years until 2015, targeting about 100 communities and 5000 households. The total budget amounts EUR 2,111,631.

3.2 Result areas, output and budget

3.2.1 Result areas

PAMOJA is an integrated program that exists of a large number of activities, aimed at four result areas: access to basic services, household livelihoods, community governance and functional sectoral systems (see below) fxc. In the medium to long run, these activities are aimed at improving incomes, employment opportunities, food security, education, and quality of local institutions.

The programme adopts a "holistic" approach by initiating multiple interventions simultaneously: interventions range from rehabilitating and constructing schools, curricula support, teachers' training, and functional adult literacy classes to agricultural training, provision of inputs and seeds, development of farmers' associations, credit and loan services, awareness training on nutrition and (children's) health, improving community empowerment through advocacy and training on human rights advocacy, and increasing access to public information including land rights and decentralization. The activities are aimed to contribute to MGD1 (poverty alleviation) and MDG2 (education) for rural households in war-affected communities.

Over the period 2011-2015 the total budget for PAMOJA granted by MFS-II was EUR 4,916,000. The budget was spent on 4 broad categories: personnel (33 percent), support (including vehicles and accommodation, 14 percent), direct project activities (43 percent) and miscellaneous expenses (10 percent).

The programme formulated four distinct result areas, which together form the direct project activities. Nearly half of the total budget (EUR 2,102,000) has been spent on direct project activities in these four result areas. Below, we describe the result areas including the share of the total budget devoted to each result area (output-level budget information is not available for DCR as a whole). The interventions are implemented by members of the consortium (CARE, ZOA, and Save the Children) and (or) their southern partners. 21 percent of the budget was allocated to the consortium, and 79 percent to local partners. The budget information below distinguishes between budget shares allocated to consortium members and local partners per result area (see Table 1 for an overview).

- Result area 1, "access to basic services", focuses on education, by building and reconstructing educational facilities; providing educational materials like textbooks and school uniforms, organize adult literacy classes and train teachers. These interventions aim at meeting national standards for educational facilities and improve literacy rates among adults and youth. 39 percent of the budget for direct project activities was spent on this result area: EUR 820,000 (EUR 236,000 via consortium members, and EUR 584,000 via local partners).
- Result area 2 is concerned with improving household livelihoods by providing agricultural inputs, training about land rights, help developing farmers' associations, inform people about savings and loans, and help them set-up a savings-and loan association. Relevant outcome indicators here include household consumption and household income. 30 percent of the budget for direct project activities was spent on this result area: EUR 632,000 (EUR 127,000 via consortium members, and EUR 495,000 via local partners).
- Result area 3 aims at improving community governance through trainings on leadership and the establishment of community information kiosks. This is expected to improve transparency and accountability of NGO partners and promote effective participation of civil society organizations in

development programmes. 27 percent of the budget for direct project activities was spent on this result area: EUR 566,000 (EUR 62,000 via consortium members, and EUR 505,000 via local partners).

- Finally, result area 4 operates at a higher administrative level and focuses on functional sectoral systems through training local government authorities. These activities aim at improving service delivery of local governments and increasing cooperation between governmental authorities, civil society organizations and the private sector. 4 percent of the budget for direct project activities was spent on this result area: EUR 94,000 (EUR 21,000 via consortium members, and EUR 73,000 via local partners).

Each result area has its own set and type of inputs (if applicable), activities, outputs and outcomes. These are further specified in Table A 1 in the annex of this technical paper. Key activities are in the fields of education, livelihoods and community governance.

Table 1: Costs per result area DCR

Output	Costs (EUR)	Percentage of key activities budget	Percentage of total budget
Personnel	**1,636,929**		**33**
Support	**674,558**		**14**
Direct key activities	**2,101,631**		**43**
Result area 1: Access to basic services	*819,934*	*39*	*17*
Consortium	236,360	11	5
Local Partners	583,574	28	12
Result area 2: Household improved livelihoods	*621,562*	*30*	*13*
Consortium	126,681	6	3
Local Partners	494,881	24	10
Result area 3: Community governance	*566,138*	*27*	*12*
Consortium	61,629	3	1
Local Partners	504,509	24	10
Result area 4: Functional sectoral systems	*93,997*	*4*	*2*
Consortium	20,908	1	0
Local Partners	73,089	3	1
Miscellaneous	**503,120**		**10**
Total budget	**4,916,238**		

3.2.2 Output ZOA

As mentioned, individual activities are carried out by the three consortium members and their local partners. We received output-level budget information from ZOA (but not from the other two consortium members). Table 2 below summarizes budget information on output level for ZOA.[2]

The total PAMOJA budget of ZOA is EUR 2,517,634, of which EUR 1,120,884 (45 percent) was spent on direct key activities.

- The largest share (28 percent) of the ZOA budget was spent on FAL classes. ZOA (targets to) establish 80 FAL classes by 2015, and the total budget allocated to FAL amounts about EUR 705,000, equalling nearly EUR 9,000 per FAL class (including costs for personnel etc.; only taking into account direct project costs, FAL classes costs EUR 4,000 per class).

[2] For some core activities, we cannot assess the costs on output level, as these activities were implemented by the two other consortium members. For example, all activities concerning child education were implemented by Save the Children for which no figures were provided.

- 13 percent of the budget (EUR 327,292) is allocated to agriculture activities. 1,250 households received access to inputs, 500 households received extension training, 3 new farmers associations (FAs) were established and 25 existing FAs received training. Due to the many different sub-activities for agriculture, we cannot provide output-level budget information.
- 20 percent of the budget (EUR 503,527) is allocated to 'farming as a business', which provides training to FAs about marketing in order to link farmers to markets. 8 FAs were trained, indicating that training a single FA costs nearly EUR 63,000 in terms of total budget, or EUR 28,000 in terms of direct project budget).
- 7 percent of the budget was allocated to the establishment of 50 VLSAs in 25 communities. This activity started in 2013 and continues until the end of 2015. Total costs of supporting a VLSA is EUR 3,525, or EUR 1,586 when only including direct project costs.
- 7 percent of the budget was allocated to capacity building. ZOA provided training about educational and livelihoods activities to two local implementing partners, and organisational development support to four local partners. We count these activities as six separate trainings, even though organisations may overlap, and support may be an ongoing practise. On average, support to a partner costs EUR 19,372 per 'training'.
- 12 percent of the budget was allocated to the support to 40 Village Development Committees (VDCs, the other 40 VDCs were supported by CARE). Supporting a single VDC hence costs EUR 4,406 (or nearly EUR 2,000 in terms of direct project activity costs)
- Finally, ZOA established a pilot of 10 socio-therapy groups in VDC communities. The total costs of a socio-therapy group amounts just over EUR 15,000 (or EUR 6,798 in terms of direct project activity costs).

Table 2: Costs on output level (ZOA)

Activities	**ZOA target 2015**	**Share 2013-2014**	**Total budget 2011-2015 EUR**	**Costs per unit EUR**	**Costs per unit EUR (45%)**
FAL classes	80 groups	28%	704,938	8,812	3,965
Agriculture (access to inputs, training, new farmers associations)	1250 HHs (inputs) 500 HHs (training) 3+25 newly trained FAs	13%	327,292		
Farming as a business	8 FAs	20%	503,527	62,941	28,323
VSLA	50 groups (in 25 communities)	7%	176,234	3,525	1,586
Capacity building	2 partners (education/livelihood act.) 4 partners (organisational dev't)	7%	176,234	29,372	13,217
VDC	40 VDCs	12%	302,116	7,553	3,399
Land Rights	40 CBOs	7%	176,234	4,406	1,983
Socio-therapy	10 groups	6%	151,058	15,106	6,798
Total		*100%*	*2,517,634*		

3.3 Key activities and theory of change

Overall, PAMOJA is aiming at generating change in rural communities through (1) better access to educational facilities, both for children and adults; (2) better livelihood opportunities through the provision of village-level training and support mainly regarding finances (credit and savings) and farming practises; and (3) stimulating transparent, inclusive governance at the village level, by providing governance training and encouraging active participation of villagers—building on existing institutional structures. The combination of these activities should ultimately lead to better informed intra-household decision making (for example with respect to family planning and consumption), better economic opportunities for households and more resilience to shocks, fewer conflicts—both within the household and on community level—and more development on the village level (due to more transparency and more active participation).

Below, we present a theory of change for the three key-activities part of the PAMOJA project and list other activities that are implemented as part of the program.

3.3.1 *Functional Adult Literacy (Education)*

One of the core activities that are part of PAMOJA are Functional Adult Literacy (FAL) classes. Through attendance of literacy classes, previously illiterate adults learn how to read or write. This is especially relevant in a society with low primary school enrolment rates, and high illiteracy rates, which is a reality in the post-war Liberian countryside. FAL is a more encompassing concept than literacy alone. Kagitcibasi *et al.* (2005) write that: "Functional literacy is an emancipatory practice that requires people to read, speak, and understand a language. In this sense, functional literacy is a competence that goes beyond grammar and semantics rooted in everyday exchanges. Such conceptualization emphasizes the linkages between reading, writing, culture, economy, and political system." (pp. 472-3)

Although the level of reading and writing skills after attending the training is often very low, and speed of take up can be very slow, all participants can (at least) write their own name after taking part in the classes. This is an enormous boost for their self-esteem, and participants are often extremely proud of their newly acquired skills. Indeed, literacy is believed to be empowering, especially for women, among whom illiteracy is most prevalent in Liberia. A number of scientific studies have pointed out the effects of literacy on economic, demographic and health outcomes. For example, female literacy empowers women in intra-household decision making (e.g. with respect to family planning and savings and expenditures) and is related with better child health (Kagitcibasi *et al.* 2005). Also, it is expected that literacy in increasing the ability of villagers to keep track of financial transactions, and to keep their leaders accountable, for example by keeping written records of village meetings.

3.3.2 *Village Savings and Loans Associations (Livelihoods)*

A Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) is a group of people who save together and take small loans from those savings. The activities of the group run in cycles of one year, after which the accumulated savings and the loan profits are distributed back to members. The purpose of is to provide simple savings and loan facilities in communities without easy access to formal financial services.

The main difference with other informal savings groups is that a VSLA is better organised and more accountable. There are yearly elections to encourage the participation of all members and to protect the group from being dominated by a single individual. Also, other than most regular micro-finance organisations, VSLAs are accessible even for the poorest households.

Generally, groups are composed of 15 to 25 self-selected individuals who meet weekly. Members save through the purchase of shares, which price is decided by the group and fixed for the entire cycle. At each meeting, every member must purchase between 1 and 5 shares. Members do not have to save the same amount as each other; and they do not have to save the same amount at each meeting. By saving more frequently in very small amounts, even the poorest households can build their savings more easily (VSL Associates, 2015).[3]

Micro-savings and micro-credits are contributing to more security on household level, for example by making households better able to respond to economic shocks, less vulnerable for risks, and improving the assets base of households. Access to savings and credit may also lead to better health and education outcomes, through better organization of household expenditures and investments (e.g. see Cameron and Ananga, 2015).

3.3.3 *Village Development Committees (Community governance)*

Village Development Committees (VDCs) are based on existing leadership structures in the communities, including the chief, leader of women's groups, youth groups and elders. The goal is to create more transparency and accountability in decision making, with several trainings and regular coaching visits.

DCR has established VDCs in Sudan as well, which appeared to be very successful: "Communities showed interest in the community participation approach, especially in construction and rehabilitation activities. Communities collected bricks, gravel, sand and water and paid for transportation cost of building materials to the project site. Also, traditional village leaders (Sheiks and Umdai's) reported that the VDC structure led to better relations within communities, which improved peoples capacity to come together, plan and solve problems (whereas previously they would bring more problems before the Umdai's and Sheiks). Improved community welfare relations are shown as well, for example between farmers and surrounding pastoralist who are traditionally competing over resources. We also received reports of community leaders being more able to source local funding from philanthropists and authorities." (DCR, 2015)[4]

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[3] The model was developed by CARE International in Niger in 1991 and has spread to at least 61 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, with over 6 million active participants worldwide. See http://www.vsla.net/aboutus/vslmodel

[4] See http://dcr-africa.org/en/Story/7/129/

Through making use of existing leadership structures, leadership roles are defined more clearly in the village, and through regular town meetings decision making becomes more transparent and leaders are more accountable. The town meetings also increase participation of community members, along with an increasing willingness to cooperate, raise money for community projects—such as building palava huts (town hall)—and trust in community members. As community members together write constitution for the community, conflicts decrease, and eventual arising conflicts can be solved within the VDC before they escalate.

3.3.4 Other activities

Education

- School reconstruction: Save the Children has supported Primary Schools in 15 communities in Liberia. Buildings have been rehabilitated, classrooms built and wells constructed. The schools have been equipped and teachers received training. This activity is aimed at increasing enrolment rates. As classrooms are being improved and teachers received training, it is expected that more children (and teachers) will attend school.
- Early Childhood Development: ECD centres are a new concept in Liberia. With advocacy activities ECDs have been put on the agenda of the government. Furthermore, ECD centres have been built and equipped and caretakers are supported.
- Parent-Teacher Association support: PTAs have been supported in all target schools.

Livelihoods

- Land rights: Land is an issue in Liberia and a potential for future conflicts. The first step to address this at community level is to inform people about the legal structures around land rights and land acquisition. Communities received a 2-day training followed by regular follow up meetings in which people could additional questions related to land.
- Agriculture/farming: training on agricultural methods, and provision of agricultural inputs with the aim to increase agricultural production.
- Farming as business / marketing: groups of farmers have received training on marketing of agricultural produce. The aim is to get better prices for the produce, by getting to know the market and explore opportunities to sell together.

Community Governance

- Community-based socio-therapy: a pilot has started in Margibi county with this methodology, aiming at building trust and safety in communities.

4 Data Collection

4.1 Description of baseline and follow-up surveys

We conducted standardized community and household surveys among 129 communities and nearly 2600 households to collect information on a range of uniform and specific outcome indicators and potential confounding factors (see Table 5 and Table 6 below for a selection of key indicators). Baseline data were collected in July 2012, and follow-up data were collected in May and June 2014. See Annex B2 for the endline survey on household level.

During the follow-up phase in 2014, we conducted focus group discussions to qualitatively assess the impact of the programme among a randomly selected group of beneficiaries (Annex B3). In addition, during the follow-up phase in 2014 we conducted school achievement tests (schools were closed during the period in which the baseline data collection took place) (see the survey instrument and descriptive analyses in Annex B4).

The same field protocol was followed during baseline and follow-up phases. Baseline data were collected by a team of 50 Liberian enumerators who were trained for this purpose during a 7-day training. The 30 best-performing enumerators from the baseline phase were invited to take part in the endline data collection again. Teams of enumerators (6 enumerators per team) were sent out into the field during six weeks (teams would return to Monrovia in weekends to debrief, rest, and pick up new materials for the week after). It took maximally 1 day to collect all survey information in each community.

The only difference between the baseline and endline phase is that during the baseline we worked with paper surveys, and during the follow-up survey we used tablets for data collection.

4.2 Sampling design and sample sizes

Prior to the start of the baseline study in July 2012, the PAMOJA programme target communities had been selected on the basis of a number of explicit criteria: (i) accessible by motorbike; (ii) >25 households per community; (iii) located in one of the DCR operational counties and districts. Control communities were selected according to these same criteria, using a two-stage clustered sampling design. We hereto obtained the 2008 National Census data from the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS) from which we constructed our sampling frame. We then drew a random sample of 60 communities. Within each community the research team would visit the chief, present an official letter that explained the purpose of the research and ask for permission to conduct the surveys. Together with the chief a census of the village would be executed, listing every household in the community. At least one representative of each household was subsequently invited to a public space where a child from the community would randomly pick 20 slips from the bowl. These households were invited to participate in the research.

4.3 Attrition and power

Average attrition in the sample is 22 percent. Part of the attrition can be explained by the fact that 2 of the sampled communities have not been visited during the follow-up study. One of these communities ceased to exist, as due to religious violence, people were reported to have abandoned the community. The other community could not be located by the field teams. This amounts for 40 missing observations in the follow-up survey. Remaining attrition is 20 percent, or about 3 households per community. Table 3 reports the sample framework, including attrition. For the majority of the missing households, reasons for attrition were reported (listed in Table 4).

Table 3 shows that the number of observations per group is well balanced. It must be noted, however, that intervention villages received different combinations of activities as part of the PAMOJA project. This means that the intervention is not the same in the project villages.

Power calculations indicate that for all outcome variables, our sample is large enough to measure impact with a significance level of 90 percent and power of 80 percent, when difference of means is at least 20 percent. This means that the current framework would not pick up differences between means smaller than 20 percent.

Table 3: Sample framework of data used in the analysis

	Control		**Treatment**		**Total**	
	Villages	*Households*	*Villages*	*Households*	*Villages*	*Households*
Baseline	68	1315	64	1272	130	2587
Endline	66	1006	64	1011	128	2017
Difference	*2*	*309*	*0*	*261*	*2*	*570*
Attrition	*0.03*	*0.23*	*0*	*0.21*	*0.02*	*0.22*

Table 4: Reasons for attrition

Reasons for attrition	**Count**	**Percentage**
Village dropped from sample	40	7
Respondent is absent	98	17
Respondent moved	147	26
Respondent died	19	3
Illness	14	2
Respondent is on the farm	7	1
Respondent is not available	24	4
Respondent could not be located	11	2
Respondent refused to participate	4	1
Wrong ID code	5	1
Not reported	193	34
Total	*562*	*100*

4.4 Key variables

We test the effects of the PAMOJA project on MDG1a, b, and c (income, employment and hunger) and on MDG2 (education). In addition, we measure the effect of the programme on future prospects and on social capital (membership of organizations and trust). For each category, we defined a set of outcome variables, which are described below.

We use four indicators for income: expenses (on food items in the past 14 days, on agricultural inputs in the past farming season, and infrequent spending in the past 6 months), external earnings (from wage labor, trade, and rental earnings from housing or land), savings and credits.

With respect to employment (MDG1b), we use three indicators: whether the household sold agricultural produce in the (county) capital in the last 6 months, days of wage labour per month, and the number of times per month the household is involved in trading goods.

To measure food security (MDG1c), we use three indicators: the main indicator is a dietary diversity score, based on a two-week consumption pattern, to measure dietary quality. In addition, we include the daily number of meals consumed by adults and children, as a rough measure of dietary quantity.

With respect to education (MDG2), we use four direct indicators: adult literacy rate (above of 20 years and above), child literacy rate (under 20 years of age), and net and gross enrolment in primary education.

Finally, in the future prospects and social capital category, we include parent's expectations gains from schooling for Liberian youth, expected earnings of their own children at age 25, number of group memberships, and trust (on a scale of 1 to 5, in neighbours, community leaders and strangers).

Table 5 shows summary statistics of outcome variables at baseline measurement, and tests for differences between treatment and control villages. Most of the 28 outcome indicators are well balanced across treatment and control groups. Yet, for 6 variables this is not the case. At time of baseline measurement, villages targeted for PAMOJA are characterized by larger expenses on agricultural inputs, more households that obtained credit or holding savings (yet holding lower amounts of savings), more involvement in trade, and lower dietary diversity scores. This either suggests "selection into treatment" effects (villages with these characteristics are more likely to be selected for the project) or it indicates that the project already had an impact on the treated villages, as the project had been running for a year before the baseline study was implemented. Using these variables as selection variables for the matching strategy should mitigate the potential bias in the results.

MDG1 – Poverty

Expenses on food items in 2 weeks amount about 2650 LD. In the past farming season, households spend 410 LD on agricultural inputs (only 205 LD in control villages). Infrequent spending (on house rental, education, celebrations, etc.) over the last 6 months amounts about 8000 LD. Average monthly expenditures on all these items amount 7750 LD (110 USD).

Respondents earn about 3000 LD (43 LD) per month from external income sources (wage labour, trade and rental incomes. Including income from agricultural production should reduce the gap between total expenditures and income.[5]

27 percent of the households obtained a credit in the past year (24 percent in control villages)—about 7,500 LD on average. 42 percent of the households hold savings—more than 10,000 LD on average. In control villages, fewer people hold savings, but average savings are higher.

About one third of the respondents sold agricultural produce in the (county) capital in the past 6 months. In the past month, respondents were involved in wage labour for nearly 7 days and traded goods 1.3 times (once in control villages).

Dietary diversity score over the past 14 days is 6.5 (6.7 in control villages), indicating that households consumed food items from 6.5 different food groups in the past 2 weeks. Adults consume 1.3 rice meals per day, and children 1 rice meal.

MDG2 – Education

Literacy rates are 45 and 44 percent for adults and children, respectively. There is great divergence between net and gross enrolment rates in primary education.[6] Net enrolment rate amounts 26 percent and gross enrolment 73 percent, which indicates that many youth older than 11 are attending primary school. Note that these rates are far below the country averages of 42 and 107 percent, as estimated by UNICEF.[7]

Prospects and social capital

With respect to our selection of future prospects and social capital variables we observe the following. People are member of 1.7 groups. On a scale of 1 to 5, trust in neighbours and community leaders is quite high (3.6 and 3.8), while strangers are trusted much less (2.2).

Household controls

Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for relevant covariates at the household level (measured at baseline). Unfortunately there is some imbalance here too. Villages with larger households, more female-headed households, younger household heads, more households owning a cell phone, and larger farms are more likely to be selected into treatment.

The average household consist of 5 members and 77 percent have a male head (81 percent in control villages). 53 percent of household heads is literate. Heads are on average 42 years of age. 54 percent of household heads were born in the village, other migrated from elsewhere. 37 percent of the households endured an attack during the civil war. 43 percent of the households own a cell phone (38 percent in control villages). On average, households farm about 4-5 acres of land (there is quite some variation in land size). Although land size seems to be larger in treatment villages (the difference is insignificant, though) in control villages more farmers indicate to be involved in farming activities (62 percent, compared to 57 percent in treatment villages). Finally, 60 percent of the households are involved in farming. The average farm size is 11 acres (compared to 6 acres in control villages).

[5] Unfortunately, no information was collected on earnings from sale of own agricultural production. It would be possible to derive this from information about quantities sold, but this causes large measurement error (first and foremost because various local units should be transferred to kilograms, second because incomes should be calculated from local market prices which varies seasonally and across markets).

[6] Net enrolment rate is the number of children of the official primary school age (6-11 years) enrolled in school divided by the total number of children of official school age. Gross enrolment rate is the total number of children enrolled in school divided by the total number of children of official school age.

[7] State of the World's Children Report 2015: http://www.data.unicef.org/resources/the-state-of-the-world-s-children-report-2015-statistical-tables

Table 5: Descriptive outcome indicators PAMOJA (Baseline)

Variables	N	Mean control (SE)	N	Mean treatment (SE)	P-value (t-test)
MDG1a: Income					
Food expenses 2 weeks (LD)	1315	2671.84 (53.53)	1272	2617.69 (56.26)	0.49
Agricultural inputs (LD)	1315	205.18 (34.46)	1272	409.64 (60.14)	0.00
Infrequent spending 6 months (LD)	1315	7776.83 (349.63)	1272	8324.77 (490.45)	0.36
Monthly external income (LD)	1315	3380.43 (192.82)	1272	2991.34 (171.91)	0.13
Credit obtained (d)	1315	0.24 (0.01)	1272	0.27 (0.01)	0.09
Credit amount (LD)	311	7097.70 (720.98)	338	7648.98 (1099.85)	0.68
Savings held (d)	1486	0.36 (0.01)	1380	0.42 (0.01)	0.00
Savings amount (LD)	472	15547.96 (2276.18)	543	10848.61 (832.95)	0.04
MDG1b: Employment					
Food sold (county) capital 6 months (d)	1343	0.34 (0.01)	1278	0.32 (0. 01)	0.27
Wage labor last month (days)	1273	7.05 (0.34)	1203	6.43 (0.34)	0.20
Trading goods (days per month)	1343	1.01 (0.09)	1278	1.31 (0.12)	0.04
MDG1c: Hunger					
DDS	1315	6.66 (0.06)	1272	6.50 (0.06)	0.05
Rice meals adults	1304	1.33 (0.01)	1258	1.32 (0.01)	0.53
Rice meals children	1278	1.04 (0.02)	1226	1.04 (0.02)	0.81
MDG2: Education					
Literacy adults	1257	0.42 (0.01)	1220	0.45 (0.01)	0.19
Literacy children	1096	0.44 (0.01)	1035	0.44 (0.01)	0.86
Net enrolment rate	831	0.27 (0.01)	769	0.26 (0.01)	0.98
Gross enrolment rate	831	0.71 (0.03)	769	0.76 (0.03)	0.28
Prospects and Social capital					
Earning gain from schooling	1240	2194.33 (220.37)	1188	1879.81 (129.47)	0.22
Children’s earnings at age 25	1239	5707.34 (203.07)	1184	6028.92 (515.73)	0.56
Group membership #	1343	1.68 (0.08)	1278	1.70 (0.06)	0.82
Meetings per month	1343	2.33 (0.08)	1278	2.49 (0.08)	0.16
Trust in neighbours	1300	3.59 (0.03)	1257	3.61 (0.03)	0.72
Trust in leaders	1297	3.76 (0.03)	1251	3.81 (0.03)	0.27
Trust in strangers	1251	2.21 (0.03)	1217	2.23 (0.03)	0.68

Table 6: Descriptive covariates PAMOJA (baseline)

Variables	N	Mean control (SE)	N	Mean treatment (SE/SD)	P-value (t-test / Chi-squared)
Household size	1291	4.99 (0.06)	1255	5.16 (0.06)	0.09
Head male (d)	1297	0.81 (0.01)	1256	0.77 (0.01)	0.02
Head literate (d)	1264	0.52 (0.01)	1230	0.52 (0.01)	0.93
Head age	1305	43.12 (0.37)	1256	42.55 (0.39)	0.32
Head born in village (d)	1308	0.51 (0.01)	1268	0.53 (0.01)	0.39
War attack (d)	1295	0.37 (0.01)	1251	0.37 (0.01)	0.96
Cell phone (d)	1315	0.39 (0.01)	1272	0.43 (0.01)	0.03
Farming (d)	1315	0.56 (0.01)	1272	0.59 (0.01)	0.13
Land size (acres)	740	5.59 (0.62)	753	10.47 (1.85)	0.01

5 Analyses and results

5.1 Methodology

We use a combination of difference-in-differences (DD) analysis and propensity score matching (PSM) to assess the impact of the PAMOJA programme, complemented with qualitative data from focus group discussions FGDs – also see Annex B3). We chose to employ DD analysis as the project beneficiaries had already been chosen prior to the start of the evaluation. Of course the validity of the DD hinges upon the assumption that time-variant factors accrue to both treatment and control groups. We believe that our matched control villages are sufficiently close and share very similar features to the treatment communities, so there is no a priori reason to expect that time-varying processes have differential impacts on treatment and controls respectively. We combine DD with Nearest Neighbor Matching (NN) using standard econometric techniques, including all household covariates and outcome variables that were unbalanced at baseline measurement.

As the programme includes many different activities that were implemented in different combinations in different villages, we not only assess the impact of being targeted for PAMOJA, but we also assess the impact of each separate activity. Included activities are:

1. VDC (village development committees)
2. Agriculture (implemented by DCR)
3. Agriculture (all activities, not only those funded by DCR)
4. VSLA (village saving and loan associations)
5. Marketing
6. FAL (functional adult literacy)
7. Land rights
8. Primary school reconstruction (implemented by CARE)

We estimate the following regression model, using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) for continuous outcome variables, and probit regression for binary outcome variables (reporting marginal effects):

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Post_t + \beta_2 Treat_j^T + \beta_3 Post_t Treat_j^T + \gamma X_{ijt} + k_d + \varepsilon_{ijt} \qquad ,$$

where Y_{ijt} denotes an outcome variable for respondent i in group j at time t, $Treat_j^T$ is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent was selected for the treatment, $Post_t$ is a binary variable that takes the value one if the observation corresponds to the endline measurement, X_{ijt} is a set of controls,[8] k_d are district fixed effects (to capture regional geographic effects, where d takes values 1, 2 and 3 for Montserrado, Margibi and Bong counties), and ε_{ijt} denotes the error term (clustered on village level). Our variable of interest is denoted by β_3, which is the treatment estimate of the impact of the intervention on the outcome variable Y. That is, β_3 measures the difference between the treatment and control group in the growth of outcome Y, and is an unbiased estimate of the average impact on the dependent variable Y of being assigned to the treatment group (provided there is only selection on the observed variables). We measure the effect of each activity separately in separate regression models, and all activities together in a single regression model. All models are estimated twice: once using only DD and once using a combination of DD and PSM.

We used nearest neighbour matching with replacement. In NN matching, for each treated individual i, the closest control individual is selected with respect to a selected set of variables that predict selection into treatment. This strategy could decrease bias, as control observations that are very similar to treatment observations, can be used multiple times (replacement), whereas control observations very different from treatment observations are dropped. We control for the fact that some observations are used multiple times by adding frequency weights in the DD+PSM regression models.[9]

[8] Additional covariates are included to control for various characteristics of the households. This not only helps with the precision of the estimates, but also reduces the problem of omitted variable bias. This is necessary to obtain unbiased measures of the treatment effects.

[9] See for example: Stuart, Elizabeth, 2010. Matching methods for causal inference: A review and a look forward. Statistical Science 25(1): 1–21.

Table 7 presents the set of selection-into-treatment controls used for PSM. The set consists of a number of household controls (household size, male head, cell phone ownership, land size) and outcome variables (value of agricultural inputs, credit and saving and dietary diversity score) for which treatment and control groups differed at baseline. In the PSM strategy, 30 percent of the control observations are disregarded, 58 percent are selected once, and 12 percent are selected multiple times. The table shows that after PSM, the selection-into-treatment bias is removed for this set of observables.

Table 7: Selection-into-treatment variables after PSM (baseline)

Variables	**N**	**Mean control (SE)**	**N**	**Mean treatment (SE/SD)**	**P-value (t-test / Chi-squared)**
Household size	603	5.14 (0.09)	1239	5.13 (0.07)	0.96
Head male	603	0.77 (0.02)	1239	0.77 (0.01)	0.92
Cell phone	603	0.43 (0.02)	1239	0.44 (0.01)	0.98
Land size	603	3.79 (0.66)	1239	5.99 (1.09)	0.17
Agricultural inputs (LD)	603	315.59 (70.36)	1239	409.58 (61.42)	0.35
Credit	603	0.28 (0.02)	1239	0.27 (0.01)	0.44
Savings	603	0.40 (0.02)	1239	0.43 (0.01)	0.28
DDS	603	6.48 (0.09)	1239	6.50 (0.06)	0.80

Although a combination of PSM and DD can solve many potential biases in the data, some bias may remain. PSM assumes selection-into-treatment based on observable variables, but bias can still be caused by selection on unobservable variables. Adding DD to PSM helps picking up time-invariant heterogeneity, but bias can still remain due to unobservable variables that changed over time. Yet, a positive significant effect in the DD model is a strong indication of an influential intervention. An insignificant effect—or even a significant negative effect—however, does not necessarily imply that the intervention does not work—or even does harm—as in our analysis we only measure short-term effects.

During the follow-up round in 2014 we also selected representative groups of beneficiaries for focus group discussions (FDGs) to qualitatively assess if and how PAMOJA has contributed to any (measurable) changes in outcome indicators to complement our quantitative analyses. The FGDs were conducted among 15 villagers in 20 randomly selected intervention villages. The participants were randomly selected, stratified on sex. Results from the FDGs are mixed. Annex B3 provides an extensive description of the FGDs and an analysis of the results.

5.2 Results

Table 9 gives an overview of the change of major outcome indicators between baseline and endline measurements, and the effect size of the treatment on these indicators. One notable observation is that nearly all outcome indicators in this table decreased since baseline measurement. Three exceptions are the share of people with savings (increase of 18 percent), the number of meals consumed by adults (increase of 5 percent) and trust in strangers (increase of 3 percent). Four outcome variables did not change since baseline measurement (expenses on agricultural inputs, amount of credit and savings obtained, and gross enrolment. All other outcome variables decreased since baseline measurement, by 17 percent on average. The changes in outcome variables are similar for treatment and control groups separately, so this is an overall trend, which we control for in our DD analysis. In Section 6 we speculate about reasons for this overall decrease.

Table 10 gives an overview of the impact of treatment and activities on our outcome variables. The table indicates whether we found robust positive or negative results for the DD and DD+PSM analyses, for PAMJOA in general and for each separate activity. We only discuss the findings that are robust across specifications (+/+ or -/-); bold and marked green in the table (see Table A 2 for the coefficients of the significant DD+PSM estimators).

MDG1: Poverty

We find a negative impact from the school reconstruction project on food-expenses in the past 2 weeks (reduction of 25 percent). Perhaps, parents cut spending on food in order to invest more in their children's education (although our data does not support this hypothesis). External earnings are positively affected by FAL (increase of 43 percent). Perhaps, the FAL training makes people more skilled with respect to financial transactions, which may increase external income.

We find that PAMOJA increases the share of villagers with credit by 10 percent. We find no effects of individual activities, so the effect is probably caused by an interaction between activities.

VDC leads to an increase of about 2 days of wage labour per month, which corresponds to an increase of 37 percent compared to households in villages not targeted for VDC.

MDG2 – Education

On literacy or enrolment we find no clear impact from PAMOJA (or from separate activities). W School tests

One of the objectives of the Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR) in Liberia is to improve education. To this end, DCR builds or improves school buildings, provides materials, trains teachers and hires staff to work in schools.

To measure the impact of the DCR's educational projects we developed a school test to measure the reading and mathematics skills of students in third and sixth grade in DCR project areas. There is no baseline study on this part of the MFS II evaluation and results of this study are thus descriptive.

We compare reading and mathematical skills at 8 schools (132 students) that were set up and supported by the DCR and at 7 control schools (96 students). We collected data among 138 students in grade 3 and 69 students in grade 6.

The school test include various reading and mathematical assignments. The final test scores were scaled to a 1 to 100 range. Each student was given an individual test score for their reading and their mathematical skills.

The average age of the students in our sample is high. In third grade students are on average nearly 14 years old. The youngest student was 9, the oldest 21 years old. In sixth grade students are on average 17 years old. The youngest student was 12, the oldest 30. As comparison: in the United States students in grade three are usually 8-9 years old and in grade six 11-12 years old.

In third grade students scored on average 69 for the reading assignments and 55 for the mathematical exercises. In grade six the score were higher, 79 for reading and 64 for mathematics. So students in the higher classes score, as one expects, better for reading and mathematics.

Table 8 shows test scores for grade 3 and 6 and for all grades combined. We find that students on project schools score less well for reading tasks than students on control schools (71 vs. 76 on average). Mathematics scores are not significantly different between project and control schools.

Table 8: Test scores schools

	Grade 3 (N=138)			Grade 6 (N=69)			All grades (N=228)		
	Treat	Control	*Sig?*	Treat	Control	*Sig?*	Treat	Control	*Sig?*
Reading	65.2	71.7	*	75.3	86.1	***	70.5	76.0	**
Mathematics	55.1	55.0	*No*	61.8	66.8	*	59.3	58.4	*No*

"Sig?" provides information on statistical significance of differences between treatment and control groups. * indicates a significance level of 10%, ** a significance level of 5%, and *** a significance level of 1%.

Since there is no data for the reading and mathematics level of the students prior to the DCR intervention in those schools we cannot measure what the impact is of the DCR projects. Probably DCR selected the weakest schools, which could explain why DCR schools score less well than control schools.

Prospects and Social Capital

We find negative impact of land rights training on trust in community leaders (decrease of 10 percent) and of the school-reconstruction activities on trust in strangers (decrease of 15 percent).

Table 9: Change of outcome indicators and effect size of treatment

Outcome variable	Pre-treatment Mean (SD)	Post-treatment Mean (SD)	Change 2012-2014	% Change due to treatment
Food expenses	2645.21 (1973.44)	2000.18 (1435.28)	-24%	-26% (School reconstruction)
Agricultural inputs farming season (LD)	305.71 (1750.78)	241.13 (1420.14)	0	
External earnings	3189.12 (6584.57)	1821.16 (4102.75)	-43%	+43% (FAL)
Credit (d)	0.25 (0.43)	0.19 (0.39)	-24%	+12% (PAMOJA)
Credit amount	1853.32 (9104.73)	1784.49 (28007.95)	0	0
Savings (d)	0.39 (0.49)	0.46 (0.01)	+18%	0
Saving amount	5113.81 (23812.41)	2449.03 (18486.94)	0	0
Sold food in country capital	0.33 (0.47)	0.20 (0.40)	-38%	0
Wage labor (days)	6.75 (12.05)	5.56 (9.81)	-18%	+37% (VDC)
DDS	6.58 (2.17)	6.16 (2.95)	-6%	0
Rice meals adults	1.32 (0.51)	1.39 (0.54)	+5%	0
Rice meals children	1.04 (0.57)	0.85 (0.66)	-18%	0
Literacy adults	0.44 (0.39)	0.41 (0.38)	-7%	0
Literacy children	0.44 (0.41)	0.41 (0.39)	-7%	0
Net enrolment	0.27 (0.39)	0.23 (0.37)	-15%	0
Gross enrolment	0.74 (0.88)	0.79 (0.89)	0	0
Earnings gain from schooling	2040.44 (6364.41)	1679.27 (2880.53)	-18%	0
Expected earnings at age 25	5864.48 (13414.91)	5109.56 (4727.14)	-13%	0
Trust neighbours	3.60 (1.13)	3.45 (1.28)	-4%	0
Trust leaders	3.78 (1.12)	3.64 (1.38)	-4%	-10% (Land rights training)
Trust strangers	2.22 (1.16)	2.29 (1.23)	+3%	-15% (School reconstruction)

Table 10: Impact of PAMOJA project and separate activities

	(1) Treatment	(2) VDC	(3) Agriculture (DCR)	(4) VSLA	(5) Marketing	(6) FAL	(7) Agriculture (all act.)	(8) Landrights	(9) School
MDG 1a: Income									
Food expenses 2 weeks (LD)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**- / -**
Agricultural inputs farming season (LD)	0	0	0	0	0	0	(+) / (+)	0	0
Infrequent spending last 6 months (LD)	0	0	0	(-) / (-)	0	0	0	0	0
External earnings	0	+ / (+)	0	(-) / (-)	0	**+ / +**	0	(-) / (-)	0 / (+)
Credit (d)	**+ / +**	0 / (+)	(-) / (-)	0 / (+)	0	0 / (+)	0	(+) / (+)	0
Credit amount	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Savings (d)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Savings amount	0	(+) / 0	0	0	0	(+) / 0	0	(-) / 0	+ / (+)
MDG 1b: Exployment									
Sold food in (county) capital	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wage labor (days)	0	**+ / +**	0	0	0 / +	0 / (+)	0	0	- / (-)
Trade (times)	0	0	0	- / (-)	0	(+) / (+)	0	0	0
MDG 1c: Hunger									
2-weeks dietary diversity score	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
# rice meals adults	0	(+) / (+)	(-) / 0	0	(-) / 0	0	(-) / 0	0	- / 0
# rice meals children	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 / (+)	0	0
MDG 2: Education									
Literacy adults	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Literacy children	0	0	(+) / (+)	0	0	0	0	0	(+) / (+)
Net enrolment rate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gross enrolment rate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prospects and social capital									
Expected earnings gain from schooling	0	(+) / (+)	0	0	(-) / (-)	0	0	(-) / (-)	0
Expected earnings at age 25	0	(+) / (+)	0	(-) / (-)	0	0	0	(-) / (-)	0
Group membership (count)	0	0	0	0	(+) / (+)	0	0	0	0
Trust neighbours	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trust community leaders	0	0	0 / (+)	0	0	0	0	**- / -**	0
Trust strangers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**- / -**
Postive, robust	**1**	**1**				**1**			
Positive, non-robust		4	1		1	1	1	1	2
Negative, non-robust			1	4	1			3	1
Negative, robust								**1**	**2**

+ / . Robust positive impact DD
. / + Robust positive impact PSM
(+) / . Non-robust positive impact DD
. / (+) Non-robust positive impact PSM
- / . Robust negative impact DD
. / - Robust negative impact PSM
(-) / . Non-robust negative impact DD
. / (-) Non-robust negative impact PSM

6 Discussion

6.1 Decreasing trend in outcome variables over time

A general surprising observation is the fact that nearly all outcome indicators decreased since the baseline surveys in 2012. We can only speculate why. One possibility is a change of external factors, such as covariate shock, affecting all respondents alike. Perhaps, the harvest before the endline survey was worse than before baseline measurement, or market prices increased, or perhaps other conditions changed that negatively affected nearly many outcome variables.

Figure 1 below shows the nominal retail prices for parboiled (imported) rice—the most widely consumed staple food in Liberia (solid blue line), and cassava—the second-major staple crop and produced by most farmer households (dashed red line). The vertical rectangles indicate the periods of baseline and endline data collection. The figure shows that cassava prices were low in the period between baseline and endline data collection. Average cassava retail prices declined by 36 percent in the months before the endline survey (October-April) compared to (almost) the same period before the baseline survey (October-June), and over the same period average retail price of imported rice declined by 10 percent. This could indicate that incomes from farming declined in that period, and explain why less food was sold in the (county) capital. Also, it could explain why expenditures on food decreased. If the price declines were general, then this could perhaps also explain why external earnings, the share of people with credit, and wage labour decreased. We cannot readily explain, however, why other outcome variables—such as literacy and enrolment rates— also declined. Another possibility would be a different reporting bias during baseline and endline data collection. Perhaps, people reported differently when interviewed using pen and paper (at baseline) or electronic devices (at endline), although it seems unlikely that this would generate such large bias. All enumerators present during endline data collection team were part of the baseline data collection team as well. Either way, as we use a DD framework, and similar shifts apply for treatment and control groups, there should be no reason for concern about an eventual overall reporting bias.



Figure 1: Nominal retail prices for main food crops in Monrovia[10]

6.2 Evaluation design

About the impact analysis, few critical notes should be made. First, the timelines of the PAMOJA project and the impact evaluation do not completely overlap. The PAMOJA project started in 2011 and lasts until 2015, whereas the baseline measurement was conducted in 2012 and the endline measurement in 2014. This has two implications. In the first place, we could not perform a randomized impact evaluation, and treated and control groups were likely to be different from each other from the onset. Our baseline data confirm this: many variables significantly differ between treatment and control groups. Even though we tried to correct for this using standard econometric methods, the bias likely has not completely been removed: treatment and control groups likely continue to differ based on other (unobservable) variables. In the second place, interventions were still ongoing during the endline measurement. Hence, our impact measurement should rather be considered a mid-term evaluation, as the project activities have not been completed yet.

Second, a more generic comment about the chosen time frame for the impact evaluation is that 2 years is a very short period to generate meaningful impact. On the one hand, it is questionable whether observed effects

[10] Source: Famine Early Warning System Network (www.fews.net)

within this time frame are lasting. On the other hand, observing no effects does not necessarily mean that the project activities have no impact. Some activities may need more time to resonate in the communities. Possibly, meaningful (and lasting) changes as result of the project activities start to happen only when the research team and NGO staff have left the communities.

Third, we measured project impact on villagers living in PAMOJA-targeted villages, but not necessarily on targeted individuals. The reason is twofold. First, selecting suitable control villages is less complicated than selecting suitable control individuals. Second, and perhaps more important, even though PAMOJA targets specific individuals for many activities (e.g. women or youth), in the end the aim is to contribute to development on the community level. Nevertheless, in the focus group discussions many people stated that they believe that the project probably is beneficial for directly targeted individuals, but not for those individuals not part of the project activities. This indicates that the effects we measure are diluted and would probably be stronger had we only sampled direct project beneficiaries.

6.3 Project design

The PAMOJA project consists of many different activities, and different combinations of activities are implemented in each village, while the implementation of some activities is shared by different organisations. This made our impact analysis rather complex. To keep the econometric analysis simple and understandable, we measured the general impact of the PAMOJA project (on those villages that were selected for intervention), and the impact of each separate activity. Although we realize that different activities possibly complement (or weaken) each other, we did not take these interactions into account: the large number of possible combinations would make the interpretation of a multitude of interaction terms rather messy.

The integrated structure of the PAMOJA project could be a strength or a weakness. We fear that the great ambition of the integrated PAMOJA project may have compromised on efficiency and transparency of project implementation, and perhaps also on observed impact of the intervention in the current study.

Despite these critical notes, we believe the results from the impact analysis are valuable, as they at least indicate in which direction change is to be expected, and which activities seem to be most successful in generating (short term) impact.

7 Conclusions

In this paper we presented the impact evaluation of the PAMOJA project coordinated and financed by the Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR). We assessed the effects of the project on reaching the Millennium Development Goals, over the period 2012-1014. Specifically, we measured the impact of the PAMOJA project activities on MDG1 (poverty) and MDG2 (education).

To this end, we collected survey data among 130 communities and nearly 2600 households in the counties Bong, Margibi and Montserrado focussing on a range of uniform and specific outcome indicators, both in 2012 (baseline) and 2014 (endline). We compared the changes of the most relevant outcome indicators between villagers in communities selected for PAMOJA, and villagers in non-selected communities.

Below, we answer each of our initial research questions, and give a general assessment of the project design and implementations. Table 11 summarizes our assessments with a rating on a scale from 1 to 10.

7.1 Evaluation questions

EQ1: During the 2012-2014 period, what are the changes under MDG1 and MDG2?

We find that nearly all outcome indicators for MDG1 and 2 decreased since baseline measurement. This either means that living standards and education performance decreased since 2012 due to a change in certain external conditions (such as an observed decline in food prices), or that there has been a (consistent) reporting bias.

With respect to the project interventions, we find that the share of people with credit increased due to the general PAMOJA project. In addition, we find some positive effects from separate activities part of the PAMOJA project on the size of (external) earnings and on the number of days people are employed in wage labour. Results need to be interpreted with caution, however, as the beneficiaries were not randomly assigned to the intervention, and the research timeline does not fully concur with the project timeline.

EQ2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the PAMOJA project?

Unfortunately, we could not conduct a clean impact analysis with randomization to treatment, or even with a true baseline study (as the project was implemented a year before the baseline study was conducted). However, as we used a DD+PSM framework, we removed (most of the observable) bias and we trust that the few positive results we find are indeed attributable to the project interventions.

It seems that out of the activities analysed, VDC and FAL are most successful. VDC not only has a positive impact on days of employment in wage labour, but also seems to have positive effect on size of external earning, food security (for adults) and on prospects about the future. Our data suggest that people in VDC-targeted villages expect that income gains from primary education are higher, and that people expect that their children will earn higher incomes at age 25. FAL not only positively impacts the size of external earnings, but also seems to have a positive impact on people's involvement in trade activities. The fact that these results are not always significant across all specifications could be due to the fact that our framework only picks up large enough differences (of around 20 percent), whereas the time-frame is short. Perhaps, change needs more time, or is simply smaller than we are able to observe based on our data analysis. On the other hand, VLSAs, land rights training and school reconstruction seem to have a negative impact on some of our outcome indicators, which we cannot readily explain.

EQ3: What is the relevance of these changes?

We find positive effects from the interventions on access to credit, external earnings and wage labour. These are all (potential) sources of income, which could eventually lead to poverty relief and higher enrolment rates in education. The effect size of each of these results is quite large (12 – 43 percent). On the other hand, for a large number of outcome variables we find no impact at all. Hence, the relevancy of the results we do find is high, but the overall relevancy of the impact, taking all outcome variables into account, is less clear.

EQ4: Was the PAMOJA project efficient?

PAMOJA is an integrated project with a large budget. The total budget for PAMOJA amounts nearly 5 million Euro. 43 percent of this budget was spent on direct key activities in the field, and the remainder was spent on personnel (including expatriate staff), support (vehicles etc.), and miscellaneous expenses. Only for Functional Adult Literacy Classes both output-level costs and benchmark costs are available. ZOA aimed to establish 80 FAL classes by 2015. FAL costs EUR 8,812 per class and about EUR 440 per participant (on average, classes have 20 participants). This amount is much more than the benchmark costs that vary between 46 and 92 USD (42-85 EUR) per person (based on Carr-Hill, 2007 and Raupp & Ramos-Mattoussi, 2012). Even if we only include direct key activity costs (EUR 198 per person), per-participant costs still largely exceed the benchmark costs. One explanation for these much higher costs could be that ZOA is implementing many follow-up activities in their project villages, or that extra FAL groups were established, beyond the initial target amount.

Although we cannot make a similar benchmark comparison for other activities, it seems that the high costs of FAL are no exception: all activities seem to be very expensive.

It is difficult to assess whether the project was carried out efficiently, as not all information is up-to-date. Based on the current budget information as well as the structure and implementation of the project (involving a huge number of different project activities, three different international project partners, as well as a large number of local partners), we believe that conditions for efficient project implementation are at least challenging.

7.2 Lessons learned

<u>EQ5: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?</u>

Context

The Liberian context is a challenging context to operate in. The country is still suffering from the legacy of the civil war, which affected the entire Liberian population. Poverty rates are high, enrolment rates are very low and the quality of (local) institutions, trust levels and community sense remain issues that are likely to hamper development and growth. These are exactly the themes the current evaluation is focussing on. The aim to improve poverty and education outcomes may be called ambitious, especially given the brief period under evaluation. The recent outbreak of the Ebola disease illustrates how extremely vulnerable the Liberian society is. We could hardly expect to find large impacts within these result areas within only two years.

Project design

Overall, PAMOJA is characterized by an ambitious and challenging project design (operating within a challenging context). PAMOJA consists of are large number of activities that are implemented in various combinations by different CFAs and SPOs that are united under DCR. The large budget of 5 million euros to be spent on these activities is shared among these many partners, who each implement their own share of the work. Some organisations are responsible for a single type of activities (for example, Save the Children only implements education activities for children), but other activities are jointly implemented by different partners in different communities. On the one hand, the current set up makes project implementation very flexible and perfectly malleable to the local condition in each of the villages. Based on careful field assessment an appropriate set of activities could be selected for each village. However, we have no clear overview of the selection procedure of activities for each village, and whether activities indeed fit in the local context. Qualitative answers suggest that although PAMOJA was welcomed, activities mostly seen as useful for the actual recipients, and not so much for the community as a whole (see Annex B3).

The drawback of the flexible design is that it results in a wide range of activities and objectives that makes it difficult to keep a clear overview of what has been done, by which partner in which villages. It was a challenging job for DCR to keep a clear overview of the project activities of all partners, including the budget shares allocated to the projects by each of the partners. Many communities received a different set of project activities. It is not always clear why the exact set of activities was chosen as it was, and we are not aware of clear criteria for allocation of project activities to villages and individual recipients.

Despite the complex project design it seems that implementation went according to the plan in terms of realization of targets: nearly all targets for 2015 had been realized or even exceeded in 2014 (see Table A1).

We suspect that the great ambition of the integrated PAMOJA project may have compromised on efficiency and transparency of project implementation, and perhaps also on observed impact of the intervention in the current study. In order to increase the effectivity of the project as well as improving avenues for learning about project impact, we would recommend the following:

1. Reduce the number of activities, and focus on the most promising core activities instead (in this case probably VDC, VSLA and FAL).
2. Develop clear allocation criteria for activities to villages to increase transparency, and the possibility for learning which types of activities are best implemented in which types of villages. Alternatively, let villagers choose their own set of activities, so that needs and supply are best matched.
3. It would be interesting to experiment in a more systematically way with different combinations of activities: some activities may function quite well as stand-alone interventions, whereas other activities could perhaps best be jointly implemented, as they might re-enforce one another. This could provide interesting lessons for future implementation of the PAMOJA project.

Table 11: Statements

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
The project was well designed						•				
The project was implemented as designed									•	
The project reached all its objectives						(•)				
The observed results are attributable to the project interventions							•			
The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries								•		
The project was implemented efficiently						•				

* On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely", for this project, how much do you agree with the following statements?

Appendix

Table A 1: Actions and budget per result area

Result area	Activities	Target 2015	Status 2014
1. Access to basic Services EUR 819,934	(Re)construction educational facilities	7 Schools, 5 ECD Centres	6 Schools, 4 ECD Centres 4 water points , 2 latrines
	Schools equipped according to national standards	15 schools 5 ECD Centres	15 schools 5 ECD Centres
	Functional Adult Literacy Classes	80 FAL classes	70 FAL classes
	Training teachers	150 Teaches trained 24 ECD Caregivers	177 Teachers trained 24 ECD Caregivers
	Provision educational & recreational material	15 Schools 5 ECD Centres	15 Schools 5 ECD Centres
	Consultative meetings and mobilization	2 Counties	2 Counties
	Lobby meetings with budget development stakeholders	2 Meetings	2 Meetings
	Other advocacy	6 Radio discussions 24 Radio spots	3 Radio discussions 10 Radio
2. Household livelihoods EUR 621,562	Advocacy training and linking to national level	80 CBOs	70 CBOs
	Training in land rights	70 communities (including VDCs, women's groups, and community leaders and members)	80 communities (including VDCs, women's groups, and community leaders and members)
	Training in sustainable agriculture	2500 HHs	2500 HHs
	Providing access to inputs	Infrastructure: 1250 HHs Inputs: 2500 HHs	Infrastructure: 1250 HHs Inputs: 2500 HHs
	Establishment and training of Farmer Associations	63 FAs	68 FAs
	Sensitization in farming as a business Farming as a business training	63 FA 25 FA	43 FA 8 FA
	Establishment and training of VSLAs	200 VSLAs	205 VSLAs
3. Community Governance EUR 566,138	Train partner organizations	7 POs capacity building	7 POs capacity building
	Establishment, training and follow up of VDCs Strengthening VDCs Support implementation of VDCs Networking VDCs for funds, strengthening leadership Decentralization process Linking VDCs to government Linking VDCs to local government Follow up and support of PTA's and children's clubs Strengthening child protection mechanisms	80 VDCs 80 VDCs 80 VDCs 40 VDCs 40 VDCs 80 VDCs 80 VDCs 15 Communities 8 Communities	80 VDCs 3 VDCs 6 VDCs 0 VDCs 40 VDCs 40 VDCs 14 VDCs 15 Communities 8 Communities
	Initiation of information kiosks, provision of materials, support in hiring process local staff. Support to conflict resolution activities and peace building Hardware and software support Socio-therapy and peace building activities Follow up on peace building	80 Communities 80 Communities 20 Groups 40 Groups	80 Communities 50 Communities 0 Groups 0 Groups
4. Functional Sectoral Systems EUR 93,997	Feedback mechanisms	25 Communities	16 Communities
	Accountability mechanisms	10 Communities	8 Communities
	Success stories mechanisms	15 Communities	0 Communities
	Strengthen county department education and agriculture	3 Counties	3 Counties

Table A 2: DD+PSM estimators

	(1) PAMOJA	(2) VDC	(3) Agriculture (DCR)	(4) VSLA	(5) Marketing	(6) FAL	(7) Agriculture (all act.)	(8) Landrights	(9) School
MDG 1a: Income									
Food expenses 2 weeks (LD)									-449.25** (206.26)
Agricultural inputs farming season (LD)							346.20* (185.86)		
Infrequent spending last 6 months (LD)				-35038.39^{+} (23708.03)					
External earnings		1340.96** (609.75)		-1035.62** (443.46)		1079.87* (737.67)		-1700.45*** (631.33)	
Credit (d)	0.12** (0.05)		-0.11* (0.06)					0.09 (0.08)	
Savings amount									4698.92* (2620.26)
MDG 1b: Exployment									
Wage labor (days)		3.41** (1.57)							-2.50** (1.25)
Trade (times)				-0.76** (0.38)		1.26*** (0.45)			
MDG 1c: Hunger									
# rice meals adults		0.20*** (0.06)							
MDG 2: Education									
Literacy rate children			0.15* (0.09)						0.18* (0.11)
Prospects and social capital									
Expected earnings gain from schooling		1253.92^{+} (835.18)			-1322.15** (656.69)			-1486.92* (808.15)	
Expected earnings at age 25		4475.13*** (1260.04)		-1504.56* (772.54)				-2213.23** (980.25)	
Trust community leaders								-0.74*** (0.23)	
Trust strangers									-0.38** (0.15)

Coefficients are reported for DD+PSM models containing the 1 single treatment dummy (PAMOJA) or all 8 activity-dummies. $^{+}$ indicates significance at 15%, * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% level. Dark cells: Significant across all specifications. Light cells: Not significant across all specifications. If no coëfficiënt is reported, we found no results. Outcome variables for which no results were found at all are left out. All models include a set of controls for household size, sex household head, literate head, age head, head born in the village, war attacks, cell phone, farmed last farming season, and plot size. For discrete change from 0 to 1 (d), marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are clustered on community level. Tables with complete results are available upon request.

0.11	____________________________ *Interviewer name*	└─┴─┘ *Interviewer ID*	**0.21**	____________________ *Team leader name*	└─┴─┘ *Team leader ID*
0.12	**Date:** └─┴─┘ **/** └─┴─┘ **/ 2014 (dd/mm)**		**Remarks:**		
0.13	**County:** 1=Montserrado; 2=Margibi; 3=Bong	└─┘ *Code*			
0.14	*a. District:* __________________ *b. Clan:* ___________________ *c. Village:* ___________________	└─┴─┘ *Code* └─┴─┘ *Code* └─┴─┘ *Code*	**I confirm that the questionnaire is fully and correctly completed.** **Date:** └─┴─┘ **/** └─┴─┘ **/ 2014 (dd/mm)**		
0.15	**Household code:** └─┴─┴─┘		***Signature of team leader:***		

Introduction to household members:

"My name is_______. We are here to collect information about the living conditions of people in the country, for a study of a university in The Netherlands. Your household was selected to be part of this survey. I would like to speak to you (and your spouse/partner)."

"The researchers will keep your responses confidential. Your full name will never be used anywhere to ensure confidentiality."

"You are not obliged to answer questions if you do not want to and you are free to stop the interview at all times."

"We hope that the research will benefit Liberia by assisting us to understand better the needs of the people to improve the situation in the future."

"You will not receive any direct benefit if you join this study, your participation is voluntary."

"Do you have any questions for me? You may ask questions about this study at any time.

"The survey will take approximately one hour. Are you willing to participate?"

0.3. To be completed by Data Entry

I confirm that the data is correctly entered and checked.

Date of entry: └─┴─┘ **/** └─┴─┘ **/ 2014 (dd/mm)**

____________________________ *Name of data entry operator*	└─┴─┘ *Data entry ID*
____________________________ *Name of controller*	└─┴─┘ *Controller ID*

Signature of data entry operator:

Signature of controller:

0.16	Who is the respondent? *(Circle)*	1	Household head	
		2	Spouse	
		3	Other, specify ___________________	
0.17	Is the interviewee willing to participate? *(Circle)*	Yes	No	If no, why not? (*Explain below*)
		1	2	
0.18	Interview language			
0.19	Starting time	_ _ : _ _ (hh:mm)		

Space for remarks:

SECTION 1 – DEMOGRAPHICS Read - "I would now like to ask you a few questions on the composition of your household"

1.1 **What is the number of people living in your household?** └┴┘

Please list below by first name. Start with the head of the HH, then the spouse and complete the table for any other member.
*A household is defined as a group of people **currently** eating from the same pot "under the same roof" (or in same compound if the HH has 2 structures)*

HH Member Code	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.10
	Name	Sex 1=Male; 2=Female	Literate? 1=Yes; 2=No	Age *If younger than 1 year, write 0*	Relation to the HH head → **SEE CODES**	Current schooling status 2013/ 2014 → **SEE CODES**	Highest completed education → **SEE CODES**

Codes 1.6	Codes 1.9	Codes 1.10
1=Head 2=Spouse 3=Child 4=Parent 5=Sibling 6=Grand-child 7=Grand-parent 8=Orphan taken care of 9=Other relative 10=Foster child (no orphan) 11=No relation	1=Attend kindergarten 2=Attend elementary school 3=Attend high school 4=Attend university 5=Attend vocational or other training program 6=Currently not attending any type of school/training	0= Kindergarten 1= Grade 1 2= Grade 2 3= Grade 3 4= Grade 4 5= Grade 5 6= Grade 6 7= Grade 7 8= Grade 8 9= Grade 9 10= Grade 10 11= Grade 11 12= Grade 12 13=University 14= Vocational 99=No schooling

SECTION 3 – ECONOMIC SITUATION

3.1	Do you or your household own or rent this dwelling/building?	1	Own → **Skip to 3.3**
		2	Don't own but live for free → **Skip to 3.3**
		3	Rent
3.2	How much do you pay per month for rent?	LD	└─┴─┴─┴─┘
3.3	What is the major construction material of the outside walls? **OBSERVE IF YOU ARE AT THE PARTICIPANTS HOUSE**	1	Earth / mud
		2	Mud bricks / blocks
		3	Cement / Concrete
		4	Other, specify ____________________
3.4	What is the major material of the roof?	1	Straw / thatch
		2	Zinc / metal sheet
		3	Plastic sheet (tarpaulin)
		4	Other, specify ____________________
3.5	What is the major material of the floor?	1	Earth/stones
		2	Wood
		3	Cement
		4	Other, specify ____________________

3.6.1	What is your main source of water?	1	Tap in the compound	4	Unprotected well/borehole	7	Rain water
		2	Public tap	5	Spring	8	Vendor / tank
		3	Protected well/borehole	6	Stream/lake	9	Other, specify____

3.6.2	What is the distance to source of water used (in walking minutes)?	└─┴─┴─┘ minutes

3.7	Do you and your household members **<u>own</u>** any of the following assets? **CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY. WHILE ASKING, ALSO OBSERVE IF POSSIBLE.**	1	Chairs	7	Sewing machine	13	Hoe
		2	Mattress	8	Bicycle/Motorbike	14	Ax
		3	Coal pot	9	Canoe	15	Shovel
		4	Generator	10	Fishing utensils	16	Spade
		5	Radio/Tape	11	Tapping knife	17	Mosquito net
		6	Cell phone	12	Cutlass		

SECTION 4 – EDUCATION

4.0	Are there children of school-going age in this household? [1=yes; 2=no] *(Children aged between 6 and 20 years)*	└─┘ *If no, skip to section 5.*	
4.1	Please estimate the average monthly earnings of current 25 year-old Liberians **who have not** finished primary school	LD	└─┴─┴─┴─┘
4.2	Please estimate the average monthly earnings of current 25 year-old Liberians **who have** finished primary school	LD	└─┴─┴─┴─┘
4.3	If your child would **drop out** of primary school and would not complete any more schooling. What types of work do you think he/she would engage in when he/she is 25 years old?	Type of work : ______________________________	
4.4	How much do you think he/she will earn per month at the age of 25?	LD	└─┴─┴─┴─┘

SECTION 5– LAND TENURE AND AGRICULTURE

5.1.1	Did you use farmland or a garden **last season (2013-2014)?**	1	YES	2	NO → **MOVE TO SECTION 5.6**		
5.1.2	How many plots do you use for agriculture?	└─┘					
5.1.2	If yes, is most of that land private or communal?	1	Private land	2	Private plot on communal land	3	Communal land
5.1.3	If yes, what is the size of the plot(s) you used last season (2013-2014) compared to the plot(s) **you had in 2011 – 2012**?	1	Larger than in 2011–2012	3	About the same size as in 2011–2012		
		2	Smaller than in 2011–2012	99	Did not farm in 2011–2012		

For each plot you use, please specify…

5.2	5.2.1	5.2.2	5.2.3	5.2.4	5.2.5		5.2.6	5.2.7	5.2.8
Plot code	Size Acres	Ownership → **CODES**	How acquired? → **CODES**	Since when? (year)	**ONLY If rented**, how much, and how, did you pay last season (2013-2014)?		How far is the plot from your home? **walking minutes**	Land use → **CODES**	Land type → **CODES**
					a. How? → **CODES**	b. How much?			
1		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘			└─┴─┴─┘	└─┘	└─┘
2		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘			└─┴─┴─┘	└─┘	└─┘
3		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘			└─┴─┴─┘	└─┘	└─┘
4		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘			└─┴─┴─┘	└─┘	└─┘
5		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘			└─┴─┴─┘	└─┘	└─┘

Codes 5.2.2	5.2.3	5.2.5.a	5.2.7	5.2.8
1=Personal/family plot with deed 2=Personal/family plot without deed 3=Rented/leased land 4=Squatter agreement 5=Community land 6=Other, specify _______________	1=Bought 2=Rented 3=Inherited 4=Family land 5=In temporary use 6=Gifted 7=Other, specify _____________	1=in LD 2=in kind 3=in labor	1=Cultivated by household 2=Shared 3=In use by an association 4=Grazing land 5=Trees 6=Barren 7=Leased out 8=Other, specify _____________	1=upland 2=swampland 3 = both upland and swampland

SECTION 5 (CONT'D) – LAND TENURE AND AGRICULTURE

5.3		A. Did you use any of the following techniques last year (2013-2014)?	B. How much did you use? Also write down the unit		C. How did you get it?	D. How much did you spend?
		1. Yes **2. No** >> *move to next line*	Quantity	Unit *[See codes on the right]*	*[See codes on the right]*	Amount LD
5.3.01	Chemical fertilizer	└─┘		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.02	Organic fertilizer	└─┘		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.03	Improved seeds	└─┘		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.04	Pesticides/ herbicides	└─┘		└─┘	└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.05	Irrigation	└─┘			└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.06	Wheelbarrow	└─┘			└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.07	Tractor	└─┘			└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.08	Cart	└─┘			└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.09	Drying floor	└─┘			└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD
5.3.10	Other : ___________	└─┘			└─┘	└─┴─┴─┴─┘ LD

Codes 5.3.B :
1=Packets
2=Cups
4=Snaps
6=Kg
8=Other:__________

Codes 5.3.C :
1=Bought from savings
2=Bought from credit
3=Donated by NGO
4=Received from farmers' organisation
5=Other :______________

SECTION 5.5 – HARVEST

Fill in table below for all crops, in order of importance (in terms of quantity harvested) **(SEE CODES BELOW)**

01-		**Main**	**Second**	**Third**	**Fourth**	**Fifth**	**Sixth**	**Seventh**	**Eighth**	**Ninth**	**Tenth**
	Crop **(SEE CODES BELOW)**										
B2	Quantity of the yield in 2013-2014										
		Fill in relative contribution of each type of usage (D-J). **(SEE CODES BELOW)**									
D	Used/preserved for own consumption										
E	Sold										
F	Gifts										
G	Payments										
H	Spoilt/wasted										
I	Preserved for reproduction										
J	Not yet harvested										

5.5 A: CROP/TREE CODES ***MAKE SURE YOU USE THE CODES THAT ARE PROVIDED IN BRACKETS!***		**5.5 D-J: SHARE**
1=Upland rice (bundles) 2=Swamp rice (bundles) 3=Cassava (50 kg bag) 4=Sweet potatoes / eddies (50 kg bag) 5=Plantain / banana (bunch) 6=Maize (corn) (50 kg bag) 7=Vegetables (bucket)	8=Peanuts (50 kg bag) 10=Pulses / beans (50 kg bag) 11=Oil palm (gallon) 12=Rubber (kg) 13=Other crops, specify ____________________ 14=Other tree crops: _____________________	0= Nothing 1= Almost nothing 2= Less than half 3= Half 4= More than half 5= Almost all 6= All

SECTION 5 (CONT'D) – FARM ANIMALS, MARKETING, WAGE LABOR & TRADE

5.6	Are there any farm-animals owned within your household?	1	Yes	2	No → **SKIP TO 5.7**		
5.6.1	**If yes**, how many of each of the following animals?	1	Cattle ⌊_⌊_⌋	3	Sheep ⌊_⌊_⌋	5	Poultry ⌊_⌊_⌋
	CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY AND NOTE NUMBER OF EACH ANIMAL	2	Goats ⌊_⌊_⌋	4	Pigs ⌊_⌊_⌋	6	Other ⌊_⌊_⌋

5.7 Agricultural marketing

5.7.1	Has your household sold food items in Monrovia during the past 6 months?	1	Yes	2	No
5.7.2	Has your household sold food items in your county capital during the past 6 months?	1	Yes	2	No

5.8 Wage labor and trade

5.8.1	Did you work in **wage labor** in the last month?	1	Yes, ⌊_⌊_⌋ days → **CONTINUE WITH 5.8.2**	2	No → **CONTINUE WITH 5.8.3**

Monthly earnings from external income sources		**Amount (LD) per month**
5.8.2	How much do you earn from wage labor?	
5.8.3	Trade (not of own goods, only profit from purchase and re-sale)	
5.8.4	Income from renting out land / house	
5.8.5	How many times have you engaged in trading goods in the last month? *(Trading is buying goods with the intent to resell them)*	⌊_⌊_⌋ Times

5.9	**Hired labor**				
5.9.1	Did you hire-in labor during the past 12 months?	1	Yes	2	No → **MOVE TO SECTION 6**
5.9.2	If yes, how many people did you hire?	└─┴─┘ persons			
5.9.3	For how many days (in the last 12 months) did you hire these people? *(average number of days per person)*	└─┴─┴─┘ days			
5.9.4	How much did you pay per hired person per day?	└─┴─┴─┘ LD per person per day			
5.9.5	Where do these hired laborers usually come from? → **CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY**	1	Unemployed youth within the village		
		2	Unemployed youth from outside the village		
		3	Other individual laborers, specify: ________________		
		4	Labor clubs / Kuu		
		5	Other, specify: ____________________		
5.9.6	For what purpose did you hire labor? → **CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY**	1	Work on own plot:	1	Brushing / clearing
				2	Planting
				3	Harvesting
				4	Other job on plot: ______________________________
		2	Work on communal plot:	1	Brushing / clearing
				2	Planting
				3	Harvesting
				4	Other job on plot: ______________________________
		3	Work on rubber plantation		
		4	Other, specify: ____		
		5	Other, specify: ____		

SECTION 6 – CREDIT

6.1 Did anyone from your household contract a loan the past 12 months? 1= yes; 2=no >> *If no, skip to section 7.*	└─┘

6.2 Please list all the loans that your household contracted in the past 12 months (provide a description)	**6.3** Who was the primal borrower of the household? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**6.4** From whom did your household obtain the loan? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**6.5** For what purpose did your household obtain the loan? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**6.6** How much did your household borrow? **In LD. If one borrowed products, fill it in words**
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				

6.7 What is/was the interest or interest rate on the loan? **Fill in in the way the villager answers**					**6.8** When is/was the borrower scheduled to finish the loan? **Fill in a date**		**6.9** Has the borrower finished repaying the loan? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**	**6.10** How much in total has been repaid on the loan? **In LD**	**6.11** What collateral did the lender lend against? **(SEE CODES BELOW)**
Nr of loan.	**Fill in LD or percent**		**Per how many**						
	In LD	Percent	months	years	Month	Year			
1.									
2.									
3.									
4.									
5.									

SECTION 7 – SAVINGS

		1. Micro-finance Institute	2. Saving club (SUSU)	3. Saving club (VSLA)	4.Bank	5.Cash at home	6.Buying gold	7.Crops in storage	8.Other (specify) ________
7.1	Have you or your household had any kinds of the following savings ? 1 = Yes, 0 = No **Always NO? GO TO** → 7.7	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘
7.2	Which household member holds the account? **Use codes below**	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘
7.3	What is the main source of this saving? **Use codes below**	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘	└─┘
7.4.1	How much have you deposited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
7.4.2	How much has your spouse / husband deposited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
7.5.1	How much have you withdrawn or credited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
7.5.2	How much has your spouse / husband withdrawn or credited in the last 6 months? **(LD)**								
7.6	What amount do you have saved as of today? **(LD)**								

Codes 7.2 Which household member holds the account?		**Codes 7.3** What is the source of this saving?	
1=Head 2=Spouse 3=Child 4=Parent 5=Sibling 6=Grand-child 7=Grand-parent	8=Orphan taken care of 9=Other relative 10=Foster child (no orphan) 11= Son/ daughter in law 12=No relation 13= Other specify)___________________	1= Save up small amounts for a long time 2= From selling land 3= From selling livestock 4= From selling other assets 5= From inheritance	6= Profits from business 7= From selling agricultural products 8= From salary or wages 9= Other (specify)___________________

7.7 In your opinion, what are the three most important reasons that you save? Rank them starting with the most important. **(READ THE OPTIONS BELOW)**

1. Most important reason to save: └─┘ 2. Second most important reason to save: └─┘ 3. Third most important reason to save: └─┘

A	To pay for children's education expenses	**D**	To buy farm equipment or farm inputs (e.g. fertilizer)	**G**	To provide for old age
B	To (re)build house	**E**	To buy livestock	**H**	Celebrations (marriages, funerals, birth, etc.)
C	To buy land	**F**	To buy assets (e.g. radio, TV, mobile phone, furniture)	**I**	Other (specify)___________________

SECTION 8 – TIME USE

Note for enumerators: Try to reconstruct the **most recent regular day** of the respondent. You may use the time reference page if the respondent is unaware of exact hours. Make sure you finish **the full 24-hours cycle**. Hence, the first activity starts at 4 a.m., and the last activity ends at 4 a.m.
Repeat these steps for BOTH THE **HOUSEHOLD HEAD** AND THE **SPOUSE!**

HERE RECONSTRUCT THE REGULAR DAY FOR THE **HOUSEHOLD HEAD**

#1	1. Principal activity: what were **you** doing? Weekday: ______________	2. Start time	3. End time	4. In case the activity is work on the farm, who's farm land was this? → **Use codes**
1		4:00		
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

Codes 8.1 Principal activity: what were you doing?	
1. Farming / gardening (own farm)	11. Home maintenance
2. Mining	12. Care of household members
3. Rubber tapping	13. Helping people (outside household)
4. Coal burning	14. Community activities
5. Work on plantation (sugar cane, oil palm)	15. Learning / going to school
6. Other production or work activities	16. Social, cultural and recreational activities
7. Travel to farm / other work	17. Personal care and maintenance
8. Preparing food	18. Sleeping / resting
9. Cleaning / washing	19. Eating / drinking
10. Shopping / going to the market	20. Religion

Codes 8.4 Who's farm land did you work on?
1=Own land, 2=Someone else's land 3=Communal land

SECTION 8 – TIME USE

Note for enumerators: Try to reconstruct the **most recent regular day** of the respondent. You may use the time reference page if the respondent is unaware of exact hours. Make sure you finish **the full 24-hours cycle**. Hence, the first activity starts at 4 a.m., and the last activity ends at 4 a.m.
Repeat these steps for BOTH THE **HOUSEHOLD HEAD** AND THE **SPOUSE!**

HERE RECONSTRUCT THE REGULAR DAY FOR THE **SPOUSE**

#1	1. Principal activity: what were **you** doing? Weekday: ______________	2. Start time	3. End time	4. In case the activity is work on the farm, who's farm land was this? → **Use codes**
1		4:00		
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

Codes 8.1 Principal activity: what were you doing?	
1. Farming / gardening (own farm)	11. Home maintenance
2. Mining	12. Care of household members
3. Rubber tapping	13. Helping people (outside household)
4. Coal burning	14. Community activities
5. Work on plantation (sugar cane, oil palm)	15. Learning / going to school
6. Other production or work activities	16. Social, cultural and recreational activities
7. Travel to farm / other work	17. Personal care and maintenance
8. Preparing food	18. Sleeping / resting
9. Cleaning / washing	19. Eating / drinking
10. Shopping / going to the market	20. Religion

Codes 8.4 Who's farm land did you work on?
1=Own land,
2=Someone else's land
3=Communal land

SECTION 9 – HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES AND CONSUMPTION

In the Past **2 WEEKS**, how much money have you spent on / how much did you eat of each of the following items or service? *Use the table below; write 0 if no expenditure.*		A – Consumed previous 2 weeks **(cash, credit, or both)** 1=YES; 2=NO	B – Estimated Expenditure in ***cash and credit*** **in the previous 2 weeks (LD)**	C - Total quantity **CONSUMED** In the previous 2 weeks					
				Bought (not from own production) Cash & Credit		**From own production** (not bought)		**Received as gift / support**	
				Qty	**Unit** →SEE CODES	**Qty**	**Unit** → SEE CODES	**Qty**	**Unit** → SEE CODES
9.1.01	Rice (cup or bag)	└─┘							
9.1.02	Cassava (including products) (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.03	Bulgur wheat (cup or bag)	└─┘							
9.1.04	White flour (cup)	└─┘							
9.1.05	Corn (or cornmeal) (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.06	Potatoes, eddoes, yams, pumpkin, plantain (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.07	Beans, peas, lentils (cup)	└─┘							
9.1.08	Fresh vegetables (pile)	└─┘							
9.1.8.1	Greens (bundle)								
9.1.09	Fresh fruits/nuts (including Kola) (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.10	Eggs (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.11	Fish (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.12	Chicken/poultry (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.13	Bush meat (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.14	Other meat (pork, sheep, goat) (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.15	Oil / Butter (snaps)	└─┘							
9.1.16	Sugar (cups)	└─┘							
9.1.17	Salt (sac)	└─┘							
9.1.18	Maggi (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.19	Soap / soap powder / detergents (pieces)	└─┘							
9.1.20	Transport (LD)	└─┘							
9.1.21	Firewood (bundle)	└─┘							
9.1.21.1	charcoal (bag)								
9.1.22	Kerosene (snap)	└─┘							
9.1.23	Batteries (pieces)	└─┘							

6-C: UNIT CODES (PLEASE USE THE SUGGESTED UNIT CODES MENTIONED BEHIND EACH ITEM)
1=cups; 2=pieces; 3=bundles; 4=bags; 5=packages/cubes; 6=gallon; 7=snaps; 8=other__________

In the past **6 months**, how much money have you spent on each of the following items or service? *(both cash and on credit)*

		(LD)			(LD)
9.2.01	Fishing tools		**9.2.07**	Repayment of debts (e.g. susu-club)	
9.2.02	Medical expenses, health care		**9.2.08**	Construction, house repair	
9.2.03	Education: school fee, uniform, copy books		**9.2.09**	Savings (e.g. susu-club)	
9.2.04	Clothing, shoes (except for school uniform)		**9.2.10**	Other, ______________________	
9.2.05	Celebration, social event, funeral, wedding		**9.2.11**	Other, ______________________	
9.2.06	Fines / Taxes				

SECTION 9.3 – MEALS

How many meals did your household eat yesterday? *(meals per person)*		
9.3.1	Number of **rice** meals (per adult)	└┘
9.3.2	Number of meals **without rice** (per adult)	└┘
9.3.3	Number of **rice** meals (per child)	└┘
9.3.4	Number of meals **without rice** (per child)	└┘

SECTION 10 – MEMBERSHIP, TRUST AND COOPERATION

10.1 ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

10.1.1	How many groups are you a member of?	└┴┘	
10.1.2	In the last 12 months, have you been an active member of any of the following types of groups in your community? *(N.B. Active means that the member spends time on the organization / interacts with its members)* **CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY**	1 = farmers group / Kuu	6 = youth group
		2 = traders / prof. association	7 = religious group
		3 = credit/funeral association	8 = political organization
		4 = women's group	9 = sports group
		5 = poro/sande community	10 = other: specify ____________
		99 = NO	
10.1.3	Total number of meetings per month	└┘	

10.2 COOPERATION AND TRUST

			Not at all	A little bit	A bit	Pretty much	Very much
10.2.1	**In general, how much do you think people can be trusted?**						
	How much do you trust…						
10.2.2	Your neighbors?		1	2	3	4	5
10.2.3	Community leaders?		1	2	3	4	5
10.2.4	Strangers?	If There are no strangers circle: 99	1	2	3	4	5

		Own family member		Neighbor	
10.2.5	If________ *(see categories)* would offer you to sell to some of your produce at the market would you accept this offer?	Yes	No	Yes	No

		Own family member	Neighbor
10.2.6	In case the person agreed to pay you some of the revenue in advance, which part would ________ *(see categories)* have to pay you in advance for you to accept the offer? → **SEE CODES BELOW**	└┘	└┘

*__CODES 10.2.6:__
0= Nothing; 1= Almost nothing; 2= Less than half; 3= Half ; 4= More than half; 5= Almost all; 6= All

SECTION 11–COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

11.1	The chief is chief in this village because he is **CIRCLE ONE**	1	Appointed by government officials
		2	Elected by adult community members
		3	Appointed by group of elders
		4	Inherited
		5	The owner of the bush
		6	Other, specify:
11.10	In case this village would need a new chief, what would be the procedure? **CIRCLE ONE**	1	the new chief would be appointed by government officials
		2	We would organize a general election to elect the new chief
		3	the new chief would be appointed by a group of village elders
		4	the chief assistant would replace the chief
		5	the chiefs son or daughter would replace the chief
		6	other, specify

11.10.1	How many families in this village could provide a chief? *(Indicate the number of chief families in the village)*	

11.1.4	Overall, how satisfied are you with your chief?	1 Very satisfied	2 Fairly satisfied	3 Neutral	4 Not very satisfied	5 Not satisfied at all

11.1.5	Imagine these 10 stones represent resources that flow to the community (e.g. food or funds distributed by NGOs). Could you indicate how many stones you believe the chief is allowed to confiscate as tax?	1	2	3	4	5
		6	7	8	9	10

Imagine that funds are made available to the village. Who has the biggest and 2nd biggest role in making the decision how the money will be spent?

11.2	Biggest role → **CIRCLE ONLY ONE**	1 Villagers	2 Community leaders	3 District officials	4 County official	5 National government	6 NGOs	7Other:
11.36	2nd biggest role → **CIRCLE ONLY ONE**	1 Villagers	2 Community leaders	3 District officials	4 County official	5 National government	6 NGOs	7Other:

11.4	Overall, how satisfied are you with the way that decisions that affect all community members are made in your village?	1 Very satisfied	2 Fairly satisfied	3 Neutral	4 Not very satisfied	5 Not satisfied at all

11.5	When decisions are made on issues that affect all villagers, do you feel that you can influence the outcome, for example when you speak at village meetings or trying to persuade others?	1 Never influential	2 Sometimes influential	3 Usually influential	4 Always influential

		Categories			
11.6	Generally speaking, what is your opinion of the likelihood of corruption when involving _______ (*see categories*) →**SEE CODES BELOW**	The President of Liberia	The district commissioner	The village chief	The village elders
		|__|	|__|	|__|	|__|

CODES 11.6: 0=None; 1=Low; 2= Medium; 3=High; 4=Very high

11.7	How often do people in this community criticize the behavior of the village leader during community meetings? **CIRCLE ONE**	1	Monthly
		2	A couple of times per year
		3	Once per year
		4	Never
11.8	How often do government officials (general town chief, clan chief, district commissioner) visit this village to evaluate the leaders in your community? **CIRCLE ONE**	1	Monthly
		2	A couple of times per year
		3	Once per year
		4	Never
11.9	In case your village leader would misbehave, what would you do? **CIRCLE ONE**	1	I would talk to the village leaders
		2	I would talk to other villagers
		3	I would complain to higher government officials (general town chief, clan chief, district commissioner)
		4	I would not do anything
		5	Other, specify

Section A is only to be asked in <u>Project Communities</u>. Skip this section in Control Communities!

SECTION A. DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES?			
A1 *Circle all that apply*		**A2** Start year (yyyy)	**A3** End year (yyyy) *Put 99 if ongoing*
1	VSLA (village savings and loans)		
2	Land rights (training about land issues)		
3	Sociotherapy		
4	Adult literacy (literacy classes/group)		
5	Agriculture/farming (people from ZOA or Care who come to talk about agriculture)		
6	Farming as business / marketing (How to make business / How to sell)		

FOR ALL RESPONDENTS:

"This is the end of the interview. Thank you very much for participating and for your time. If you have children under five, we will measure and weigh them when all participants have been interviewed.

Are there any children younger than 5 years old in the household? _____"

CODES
1=yes
2=yes, but absent
3=no

Note for interviewers: ***don't forget to fill in the conclusion!***

SECTION 13 – CHILD HEALTH AND NUTRITION				
Read: Now I would like to ask you some questions about the children under 5 in your household *(Continue the interview with individual mothers, fathers or caretakers of under-fives in the household. Take anthropometric measurements for all under-fives in the household.)*				
THIS SECTION REFERS TO ALL UNDER-FIVE YEAR CHILDREN IN THE HOUSEHOLD AND THEIR MOTHERS				
13.1.1	How many children have you had in the last 5 years **(since June 2007)?** *[total number of children from all mothers]*	⌊__⌋ children in the last 5 years		
13.1.2	How many children aged 0-59 months are currently in the household? **(since June 2007)?** *[total number of children from all mothers]*	⌊__⌋ children in the last 5 years		
*Starting with the youngest child, ask the following question for each child: (**If 4 children, add a column: Refers only to all children < 5 years**)*		**Last living child (1)**	**Second last living Child (2)**	**Third last living child (3)**
13.1.3	Who is the respondent?	1= Mother 2 = Father 3= Caretaker	1= Mother 2 = Father 3= Caretaker	1= Mother 2 = Father 3= Caretaker
13.2	First name	________________	________________	________________
13.3	Birth month	⌊__⌊__⌋	⌊__⌊__⌋	⌊__⌊__⌋
13.4	Birth year	⌊__⌊__⌊__⌊__⌋	⌊__⌊__⌊__⌊__⌋	⌊__⌊__⌊__⌊__⌋
13.6	Child's sex	1= male 2= female	1= male 2= female	1= male 2= female
Measurements: children 6-59 months		(1)	(2)	(3)
13.7	**Child height/length** *(in centimeters, with 1 decimal place)*	⌊__⌊__⌊__⌋.⌊__⌋ cm	⌊__⌊__⌊__⌋.⌊__⌋ cm	⌊__⌊__⌊__⌋.⌊__⌋ cm
13.8	Child measurement made lying or standing? **(If < 24 months, must be measured lying down)**	1 Lying / 2 Standing	1 Lying / 2 Standing	1 Lying / 2 Standing
13.9	**Child weight** – *Enter weight in kilograms, with one decimal place.*	⌊__⌊__⌋.⌊__⌋ kg	⌊__⌊__⌋.⌊__⌋ kg	⌊__⌊__⌋.⌊__⌋ kg

CONCLUSION

Thank you very much for participating.

The results of this questionnaire will help us to better understand the situation in your villages, in order to advice NGOs and policy makers about policies that could lead to further improvements in this region.

Do you have any questions for me before I leave? → ***Take the time to answer any questions.***

Observations of the enumerator. Do not read the following questions. Simply record your impressions!

A	Ending time	_ _ : _ _ (hh:mm)	
B	How would you judge the respondent's understanding of the questions during the survey?	1	Displayed no problems
		2	Displayed a little difficulty
		3	Displayed moderate difficulty
		4	Displayed serious problems
C	How did the thought process of the respondent appear to you during the survey?	1	Logical and sensible
		2	Somewhat Unclear
		3	Unclear, insensible
		4	Totally disoriented
D	Remarks about respondent / spouse (e.g. physical disabilities, mental disease)		

Space for additional remarks

ANNEX B3

Focus group discussions DCR – PAMOJA

1 Introduction

This document presents an overview of the focus group discussions (FDGs) that were conducted in a subsample of communities that are part of the PAMOJA project from the Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR). The primary objective of the FDGs was to learn how communities experience the projects. The narratives that were collected during the discussions complement the findings of the quantitative part of the research.

An FDG is a carefully prepared and planned conversation. Beneficiaries of the DCR's development projects engage in an open and safe conversation under supervision of the research team leader, a local professional who was trained by Wageningen University. The interviews were conducted in local English or local languages.

2 Methodology

For the FGDs, 20 communities were drawn from our sample of treatment communities. Later it turned out that 1 village was actually not treated and therefore the sample was reduced to 19. In each village, 15 villagers were randomly selected to take part in the FGD, stratified on sex. FGDs were led by the (Liberian) team leaders of the field research teams, who were for this purpose trained during the general training week prior to the data collection activities. The aim of the FGDs was to discover whether villagers believe the projects affected their lives in the communities and how they would judge eventual impact. In addition, the FDGs were aimed at assessing the needs of the people living in the by the DCR targeted areas and to determine to what extend the DCR's activities serve the beneficiaries these needs.

The FGD consisted of three parts. In the first part of the discussion general questions about the village and its inhabitants were asked. In this part, the team leader could determine who of the respondents were eager to talk and who tended to be more reticent. The team leader would then split the group in a silent, and a more outspoken group, in order to ensure that each of participants was encouraged to speak freely. In the second part, the two smaller groups discussed the impact of the DCR's projects and to what extent the projects served their needs. After this round all participants gathered for the last round. In this final stage perspectives of all participants where discussed. The interviewers verified whether individual perspectives represented general opinions. They asked questions for clarification and they compared the different views of the participants.

Below, we present opinions voiced during the FGDs, organized by theme.

3 Results & analysis

3.1 Demographics

In a vast majority of the communities (17 out of 19), people assess their life in the village as quite comfortable. Villagers attribute this to free access to available land that provides for a living, unity amongst community members, accessibility to transportation, freedom, education, peace and security, a low crime rate and living on ancestral land.

In only 2 communities, people regard living in their village uncomfortable. Primary motivations are a lack of safe drinking water and facilities for sanitation. Other hazards people encounter are weather conditions, speeding cars, large amounts of insects and insufficient medical facilities.

(Our quantitative data show that only 2 out of these 19 villages do have medical facilities. In 5 villages people had to walk 30 minutes up to one hour to reach a facility for medical treatment. In 6 of the villages people had to walk two hours up to a half day to reach medical facilities. In one village people even state that it took them more than a day to reach a medical facility.)

3.2 Development projects in the community

Villagers mention 25 NGOs that are active in their region. People mention Care, ZOA and Save the Children – the organizations that are united in the DCR – most frequent. The respondents mention 21 different projects. Agriculture, education and saving and loan projects, conflict resolution and projects aiming on cattle breeding are most frequently mentioned.

People participate in development projects since they "have a hunger for knowledge", as a way to increase their living standards and to improve the community livelihood. People also participate in projects since it usually offers them free materials.

Respondents would, if they would be in charge of the development projects in their community, be most proud of the impact projects have in general. More specifically, respondents mention the increase of food production and the effect of literacy projects. In addition, respondents would be proud on the facts that knowledge is being shared, a significant number of people are involved and the way projects are managed. Other reasons for being proud of the projects are the facts that materials are provided, communities get organised, initiatives are promoted, focus is drawn to gender balance and credibility is stimulated.

However, respondents suggest that NGOs should provide more materials and services, focus more on water and sanitation, should involve more people in planning, train more people, and select participants differently. Secondly, respondents suggest that NGOs should test seeds before providing them. In addition, respondents think projects should last longer, meetings should be more frequent, there should be a focus on agriculture and management should be improved.

3.3 Perception towards projects within the community

3.3.1 General perceptions on community level

The table below shows the distribution of general opinions towards the DCR's project on county level. In 58 percent of the villages participants in the focus group express a positive attitude towards the projects in their village. 26 percent of the participating communities are negative and in 16 percent of the villages the opinion of the participants is ambiguous.

Village	County	District	General perception
Laworta	Bong	Kpaai	Positive
Sarworlor	Bong	Kpaai	Positive
Yarkpai	Bong	Kpaai	Positive
Gbarnga Siaquelleh I	Bong	Kpaai	Positive
Kayata	Bong	Suakoko	Positive
Jimmy Korkollie-Ta	Bong	Suakoko	Negative
Baila	Bong	Panta	Negative
Nana-Ta	Margibi	Gibi	Positive
Konola Vai	Margibi	Kakata	Positive
Barmelen Kollie (B.K.T.)	Margibi	Kakata	Positive
Vanyema (Bong mine road)	Margibi	Kakata	Negative
Cinta I	Margibi	Kakata	Ambigious
King's Farm	Montserrado	Careysburg	Positive
J. Haggan	Montserrado	Careysburg	Negative
Mar-Kollie Hill	Montserrado	Careysburg	Negative
Dekegar (Tarpoline Camp)	Montserrado	Todee	Positive
Koon	Montserrado	Todee	Positive
Larmie	Montserrado	Todee	Ambigious
Woodee	Montserrado	Todee	Ambigious

3.3.2 Impact

In the small groups 43 percent of the respondents indicate that the projects have a positive impact on their community. Improved farming, which include greater harvests through applying new techniques and knowledge and improved living conditions in general are the main indicators for positive judges.

29 percent of the respondents judge the impact of development projects negative and 27 percent of the respondents call the impact of development projects ambiguous. These respondents tend to have a feeling that NGOs make false promises, take not lasting initiatives, provide materials of poor quality and that projects are often unfinished.

On the other hand, 22 percent of the respondents who doubt the impact of the projects are pleased with the efforts NGOs make although they remain sceptical about the results.

When the impact of the project was discussed in the re-gathered groups, respondents are more positive. A majority of 58 percent now believes development projects have a positive impact. They attribute this to the fact that more people are farming and they see an increment in production. Respondents also sense an improvement in their livelihood and development in the wider community. Respondents believe that the projects brought unity within the village, women are empowered, new skills are learned and access to credit is provided. Lastly, the attention of NGOs made the communities feel proud of who they are and gave them a feeling of being recognized by the international community.

"The peace hut was built, and it brought unity among the village and likewise the adult learning program that was introduced by the NGO. The people are very proud of what is happening to them." [Baila]

"The activities had a lot of positive impact in Nana-ta. Unity amongst the people. Farming as a business with great saving ability among saving group members." [Nana-ta village]

"The positive impact of the activities is the change we experience in our environment and ourselves. We now have a group that save our money. We are able to write our names, calculate and on the overall manage our faming activities." [King's Farm village]

"We see changes in the sense that those activities are improving our living standard and enable us to produce more out of the little we have. It also gives us great insight over our responsibility as a community." [Konola Vai]

"The positive impact of these activities is that the village dweller gained knowledge and got tools that some are still using. The lives of people have improved over others that did not partake in the activities. There are now activities left in the village to show that people conducted activities here" [Yarkpai]

17 percent of the respondents mention negative impact of the projects. Despite the relevance of their critic most answers do not indicate a complete rejection of the development projects. Only 7 percent of this group with negative attitudes state that the projects have no impact at all. Most respondents criticise the projects and made recommendations for improvement. Most heard complaint is that local people are not involved in needs assessments and decision making. Secondly, the fact that not everybody can participate and the quantity and quality of materials are points of criticism. Other complaints are that projects are never completed, projects last not long enough, false promises are being made, a lack of attention of NGOs, a lack of involvement of local people, low awareness and a lack of coordination by the communities, incompetence of trainers and lack or low quality of materials.

"The local people were not fully part of the decision making process. They were not part of the purchasing of the material to build the peace hut. They did not know how much money was allocated for the project." [Baila]

"Some negative impact that the projects have on our community member/town, was that other people wanted to be part but could not and because of that they feel discouraged." [Gbarnga Siaquelle I]

"The negative impact is that you get less people to gain knowledge with this high level of curiosity on their part. The activities are not continuous and the materials spoil due to their quality of supply." [Vanyema]

"Normally projects in the rural areas are imposed on the village people. NGO activities are judged poorly because the local people are not fully part of the activities." [Baila]

25 percent of the respondents make no judgement whether the projects have a positive or negative impact. It seems that people are uncomfortable complaining about NGOs that are trying to help.

"The community could not judge the activities right or wrong due to the fact they were assisted by the implementers. As such, they were very happy and content with the level of assistances." [Larmie]

The overview below lists the most frequently mentioned statements regarding the impact DCR's projects have.

Positive impact	**Negative impact**
More farmers / increment of production	Not all people are involved
Realized development / improvement livelihood	Seeds do not breed
Literacy improved	Projects have no impact
Community development	Projects are never completed
Brought unity in the community	Projects are too short
Women empowerment	Not enough materials and materials of bad quality
Financial village organisation	NGO makes false promises
Learned new skills	Local people are not involved
Improved environment	Materials are not installed correctly
Felt recognized by the international community	Community felt abandoned by NGO
Received tools	NGO has little awareness for local circumstances
Made people proud	Projects do not fulfil the needs of the people

3.3.3 Changes

We also asked whether project beneficiaries see changes within their communities since the projects started. 76 percent of the perspectives ventilated during the focus groups indicate that the project brought many changes. The remaining 24 percent of the answers indicate that the projects brought little change.

People who state that the projects brought many changes say they now enjoy general improved living standards, an increment in farming production through agriculture training, and improved literacy amongst adults and children. Training in conflict resolution results in a sense of more unity and a loan and savings program resulted in an increment in business opportunities.

"Students can now boost of being literate. Others lives immensely improved because of the VLSA thereby being able to get credit and do business. The community dwellers no longer sit by and wait for government to provide food and other subsidies before making a living." [Dekegar]

"It helps us to resolve conflict for ourselves and teaches us new things. It brought change in living standards, it helps develop others people's ways of thinking and activities. One of the changes we see is the drying floor and the seeds to help us grow more food. Others communities have different NGOs visiting them and they have different types of development." [Kayata]

"Some of the changes we have experienced since the start of the activities are: We are able to resolve minor issues with each other without taking it to court. At least, I have gained some knowledge on how to resolve palava (conflicts). Some of the changes we see in our community are that NGOs can visit us sometime in a month, above all our community is improving." [Kayata]

"We change in our decision for farming, methods and the level of production. We see changes in individual income and saving. We see changes in others. We see changes in the community at large." [King's Farm]

"We changed, improved in our level of production. Today some farmers can spell their names and managed their farm correctly. We see change in our farming methods and improved our production. The changes we see for other are increase in income and personal development. The changes we see in this community are villages now are saving cash to enable them buy other things." [Konola Vai]

"Lots have changed since those activities. I see changes in my level of productivity, it has increased. Others have also benefited of the changes that effect our community and other villagers' lives have improved. They see lot of changes, changes such as development, the building of toilets helped us. It also helps nearby villages; they come here for safe drinking water." [Laworta]

"So many things have changed since the start of these activities. For example: the time in farming season when we start farming when it is best to plant your crops. Another is how we save the little that we earn from the sale of our crops. In our community everybody wants to be a part of such a change." [Nana-ta]

Other people argue that not much has changed or that other communities are doing better (24 percent).

> *"Some changes have taken place but at the very low level. Since they started the activities. For myself I see a bit of change in life style. As for others, I see great changes due to what they got from the activities conducted. As for the community we have gone to level two. In other community I see great improvement in most and all that they got from the NGOs." [Baila]*
>
> *"Nothing much has changed since the activities started. However, some of the people that partake in the activities lives can be seen somewhat improved. Our population is the only with difference since we are on the main road. The changes we see in our community are: the structures that we have and the less quality of all that was ever given. As for other communities, we can't say much because of what we have. Ours is fair if not poor so we think theirs poor." [Vanyema]*

The overview below lists the most frequently mentioned statements regarding the changes people see in their communities due to DCR's projects.

Changes	No changes
• New farm skills and more production • Livelihood and living standards improved • Literacy improved • Self-sufficiency improved - Less dependent on the government • Conflict resolution skills • Loans helps people to do business • More income and saving • Brought unity to the communities • Sanitation facilities	• Other communities are doing better • We receive little since we are too close to the road

3.4 Comparison with projects in other communities

We wonder how participants in the focus groups perceive the projects themselves, how they perceive the project activities, their participation and the influence of the programs compared to similar activities in nearby villages.

According to the respondents, projects in nearby villages focus on similar areas of development. The areas are agriculture, toilet and hand pumps, cattle, conservation of crops, loans and savings, literacy, sociotherapy, skills training and land rights.

Respondents list more than twice as many projects in their own community as in nearby villages. More visible projects such as a hand pump and toilet facilities are regarded to happen more often in other villages.

When we divided the respondents in smaller groups 41 percent of the respondents argue that the projects in *other* communities are more successful than the projects in their own community. Respondents motivate this by referring to geographical, societal, NGO and project related circumstances.

> *"... will judge them more successful because, they have better roads condition, population and unity among them" [Sarworlor]*
>
> *"... can judge the activities of our friends to be more successful than ours. The reasons are that, our friends are blessed to have more NGOs than us due to their location or population and better road condition". [Yarkpai]*
>
> *" Others are more successful, because they started before us and they have storage and drying floors and we don't have them yet" [Barmelen Kollie Town]*
>
> *"... can judge the other more successful than ours. Reason for this is the population, the interest of the NGOs personnel on the field, and the way the activities are conducted." [Baila]*

33 percent of the respondents think the projects in their *own* communities as more successful because of similar criteria, related to society, geography, and/or NGOs:

> *"... would judge those [the others] less successful. Because the people are lacking coordination and credibility as well as less support from other organization NGO)" [Koon]*
>
> *" [others] less successful, because they don't continue, they usually start projects or activities and leave it incomplete and they also complain on our bad road condition" [Kayata]*
>
> *" We will judge them less successful. The reasons are some of the activities like the hand pump cannot provide the quantity of water needed. The seeds rice was not enough for every farmer to receive for this reason, it improved some and it affected other, and the tools are sometimes insufficient." [Laworta]*

21 percent of the respondents see similar success of development projects in their community and the ones in the nearby area. 4 percent of the respondents do not want to make a judgement; they feel not entitled to do so.

<table>
<tr><th>Other project more successful</th><th>Own project more successful</th></tr>
<tr><td>Geographical and societal arguments
• better infrastructure
• better location
• more unity in their population</td><td>Societal and NGO related
• we have better coordination and credibility
• we have more support from the NGO</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Project implementation
• started earlier
• have better facilities
• more interest of the NGO
• projects are better conducted</td><td>Societal and geographical
• others don't continue
• other complain about road conditions</td></tr>
<tr><td>NGO related arguments
• materials supply insufficient
• seeds did not germinate
• supplied tools insufficient</td></tr>
</table>

When we gathered all the respondents together again and discussed with the whole group their opinions towards development in their community compared to development in other communities we see a change in perception. In bigger groups self-perception is more positive. In the combined group the majority of respondents (72 percent) consider themselves doing better than other communities. Respondents consider themselves luckier, they feel the projects are working and the respondents are proud of the projects and the accomplishments they made.

A minority of the respondents (17 percent) feel they are doing worse than other communities, and 11 percent of the respondents feel they are doing similar.

Upon asking respondents why development in their villages was better or worse than in other communities, 55 percent of the answers stress the fact that villages are not well comparable. When perceptions favour their own community, respondents attribute it to luck and better cooperation. When respondents have the impression other villages are more successful they regard it to more involvement in planning and decision making of that community.

3.5 Are community needs and NGO projects complementary?

As we are interested in whether the beneficiaries of development projects believe that NGO interventions are meeting their needs, we asked what needs people have, what activity there is in the village, whether the projects suit the needs, what new projects should aim for and how the respondents would like to see their village in 10 years from now.

The top needs in the communities are safe drinking water, sanitation facilities and improvements in healthcare. Secondly, respondents list roads, a community building, a guest house for visitors, tools for agriculture, materials for home improvements, and vocational education.

Meanwhile, according to the respondents in the focus groups, most of the projects focus on agriculture, savings and loans, education and conflict resolution. Only in one focus group projects on safe drinking water, roads and sanitation facilities are mentioned.

In the smaller groups, 53 percent of the answers of the respondents state that the projects in their communities do not fulfil the needs of the residents. According to 28 percent of the answers the projects fulfil a need but more should be done. Only 19 percent of the response state that projects fulfil their needs.

When we gathered all the respondents together again and let the discussion evolve among the respondents the tendency is even more critical. 96 percent of the respondents believe the projects do not meet the needs of the people and only 4 percent admit projects fulfil a need, although the projects are inadequate and should be expanded. This is a remarkable observation. First of all, of course, that projects do not fulfil the primary needs. Secondly, that the tendency in the large group changed to a more critical attitude towards the need the projects server whereas the tendency in the larger group usually is more positive.

"Yes! Activities fulfil these by our own unity and not mainly of the NGOs. These are always our needs that activities fulfil." [Laworta village]

"These activities only fulfil the needs of the farmers and the ones of school going age." [Kayata village]

"Yes these activities fulfil some of our needs, they fulfil the need of women and children" [Konola Vai village]

"These activities do meet some of the needs. Take for example one cutlass [a short sword with a slightly curved blade – used for farming] *is given to you, you farm this year and the next, you will not have the same tools to work with the following year. They only fulfil the needs of those who receive them." [Nana-ta village]*

With respect to what focus new development projects should aim for, not surprisingly - given the needs the respondents state the communities have, most mentioned are projects aiming for safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, medical facilities, followed by tools for agriculture and materials for home improvement, roads, community building and vocational education.

When we asked how communities see their villages in ten years, many people mention that they hope for good medical facilities. Secondly, people emphasize the wish for better infrastructure. Proper sanitation facilities and access to safe and clean drinking water are followed by hope for electricity and improved educational facilities. A small portion of the respondents talks about the need for a decent telephone network.

People believe that the population will increase and simultaneously respondents mention a wish for more skilful people and a better workforce. Lastly respondents mention visible elements that indicate development; all houses with zinc roofs, more people having the luxury of owning a car, more stores, a market, a guesthouse or pipe born water. Some people mention security and improvements in people's behaviour in drawing a vision for the future.

"In the next 10 years, I can see a modern health facility. I would like to see national electricity passing through. And we have a town and not a village. Better income of the people wages, transport and a workforce from every sector of employment with skill and training that is needed for them. I would finally like to have a more modern school equiped for children to help to make learning easy." [Gbarnga Siaquelleh I village]

"In the next 10 years to come we see a growing and well taken care for town. We hope to come close to the towns that are developing. There will be pipe bond water, modern homes, skilled men and women, stores and better sanitation." [J. Haggan village]

"In the next 10 years we would love to see this village improve in terms of communication, medical facilities and all other life necessities. That it can be compared to other urban communities." [Kemah village]

"In the next 10 years we expect to have good road network, a good educational system, a hand pump, and additional buildings and an increment in population." [Larmie village]

"We believe that there will be extension in the size and shape of this community. Also development will come with the help of NGO. And our dweller, we think that if sufficient training are giving to the local villagers in term of medical, vocational training we will be able to meet our own development objectives by using the available resources. In the next year we believe that water and toilet improvements for the school will not be a problem." [Laworta village]

"This village seems to be moving forward on a very slow pace. In 10 years from now, children will grow up and see our life as the same lives as the parents. The population is growing on a faster pace with so little done. There is a need for good living conditions, electricity, safe drinking water and good health facilities. Which seem like a dream world." [Nana-ta village]

"A modern police station , many persons owning cars in the town. Pipe borne water, better sanitation , national power (electricity) and health centre for the population and a paved road. There has been a little impact of the activities in the area because agriculture had a bad harvest and the adult school did not last a long time. The monitoring by these NGOs are very poor." [Woodee village]

3.6 Material inputs

A vast majority (85 percent) of the respondents receives materials from the NGOs. Most provided items are agriculture tools, seeds, school uniforms, school materials and fees, training, cattle and items such as soap boxes.

Despite the fact that most of the respondents state they receive materials they unanimously declare it unfair that some people don't receive any inputs from NGOs. Respondents balance between two emotions with respect to receiving inputs; they feel happy for the ones who receive but they feel bad and disappointed for not receiving themselves.

"Feel good, because they were selected and we believe that others will benefit in the future." [Dekegar (Tarpoline camp) village]

"We are happy for them but we feel bad when we are left out." [Kayata village]

4 Overall observations

The size of the groups in which issues are discussed seems to matter. In sessions with a larger number of people, respondents are more positive towards the (the impact of) projects in their community. However, in the large group, respondents are far more critical about whether the projects served their needs.

Nearly half of the smaller groups judge projects in other communities as more successful. When this issue was brought back to the bigger group though, a vast majority of the respondents feels better about the projects in their own community.

In general we can conclude that respondents judge the impact of the projects in their community as positive and that projects result in many changes in livelihoods and living conditions.

Regarding the question whether the projects meet the needs of the people, the answer is clearly negative. The vast majority states that the project does not meet the needs in the communities. Although the projects serve some of the needs in the communities, but not the needs they judge as being most urgent: improved medical facilities, safe drinking water and better sanitation facilities. A minority of people say projects do meet some of the needs but more should be done and only a very small portion of the respondents argue that the projects meet their needs without making further complains.

Most of the project villages received some material inputs. These inputs are very welcome but according to the respondents, more is necessary for development. Respondents see a lack or low quality of inputs as a reason for failure of development projects.

Focus Group Reporting Tool

Introduction

Part of the end line study for the MFS II activities are focus groups with beneficiaries of the activities. With a focus group discussion we want to learn how a community has experienced certain activities in their village. This data can support our quantitative survey data. The focus groups only have to be conducted in selected villages.

A focus group is a carefully prepared and planned conversation. Beneficiaries of the activities will engage in an open and safe conversation under supervision of the team leader. He or she will lead the conversation and ensures that the topics of the focus group will be covered. Another team member will help take notes during the discussions. The team leader must gain insight of ideas, motives, interests and thoughts of reason that fuel people's attitudes towards the activities. So, make sure that all points of discussion are clearly recorded. It is important that the team leader gathers all the required information to fill out the reporting format at the end of this document.

The following format helps the team leader to effectively lead a focus group and helps the team leader to gain all the required information. Use your own judgment; you can be flexible with the questions.

Aim

The aim of the focus group is to find out how people see the PAMOJA activities. We would like to know whether they think the project have made an impact in their lives and communities. We would like to find out whether they think the activities are successful, moreover we would like to learn how people would describe their needs and their opinion whether the activities serve them in their needs.

Method

The team leader gathers up to 8 people to participate in the focus group, these will be randomly selected from the households that are surveyed. If some of the people are not available you can use other households as replacement.

PART 1: Introduction and Group Discussion (10 minutes)

After forming the focus group and having a comfortable place to sit the team leader will introduce him or herself, explain the purpose of the focus group and elaborate on what is expected from the participants.

After the introduction the team leader will start a short group discussion. This part will provide required general information and it will enable the team leader to find out which people talk easily and who seem to remain quiet and let others do the talking. This is relevant for dividing the group into two smaller groups later. This section should mostly be used as a brief warm-up and is not the main part of this Focus Group.

<u>Topics</u>

1.1 How long ago was this village founded? Who was the founder?

1.2 Who is the chief?

1.3 Who and where do you go for medical treatment? Is there a medical center nearby?

1.4 How many schools are there?

- Until what grade?
- Is there a preschool?

1.5 What do people do in this village?

- Trade: what products, with whom?
- Farming: what crops, for own consumption or for business?
- Do people farm together on communal land?
- Anything else? (Continue asking, make sure to involve everyone.)

1.6 Is it comfortable living here? Why?

1.7 What are the pleasant things of this area?

1.8 Are there any hazards?

PART 2: Discussions in subgroups (30 minutes)

The team leader will bring the people who seem to talk easily together in one group and the more silent people in the second group. This is to stimulate that all people get involved and are able to express their opinions. So, make sure that everyone is able to ventilate his or her thoughts. The two groups separate and discuss a second set of questions. The team leader and his assistant will supervise one group each. At the start of this session the group appoints a spokesperson. During the discussions make sure you make a distinction between the different activities people are talking about.

Topics

2.1 Which organizations are active in this area?

2.2 Are there activities in this village?
- What do the activities focus on? What was the activity for?
- Which NGO/organization ran this activity? Did people come to the village to help with the activities (e.g. agronomists).

2.3 How do people judge the NGO activities in their community?

2.4 Do people in this community participate in these activities?
- What is their motivation? (e.g. curiosity, gain knowledge, receive products)

2.5 If you were in charge of the activity, what would you be most proud of?

2.6 If you were in charge of the activity, what would you do differently?

2.7 Are there activities in other nearby villages? What kind of activities?

2.8 Would you judge those more successful, less successful or the same?
- What are the reasons for that choice?

2.9 Have people received goods from NGOs?
- What did they receive?
- Why did they receive it?
- Is it fair that some people receive goods and others not?
- How do you feel about people who receive goods from NGOs?

2.10 What has changed since the activities started?
- What changes do you see for yourself?
- What changes do you see for others?
- What changes do you see in your community? In other communities?

2.11 What needs do people have in this village? Who has these needs?

2.12 Do activities fulfill those needs? Who’s needs do they fulfill?

2.13 If you could start a new activity here, what should it aim for?

2.14 How do you see this village in the next 10 years?

Part Three: Final Discussion Lead by Spokespersons (20 minutes)

In the final stage of the focus group the two groups gather together again and discuss their findings. Spokespersons can take the lead in the discussion but the team leader and his or her assistance must involve other group members. The idea is to learn from the discussion and find out the opinions towards the topics in the village. You can ask some questions to stimulate a discussion. However, try to make sure that you do not lead the discussion to a particular direction. Have a feel for what the group members find important and what they want to discuss here. The following questions can guide you in this discussion:

- What has changed since the activities started? For yourself, for others, for your community, for other communities?
- What has changed in other communities compared to this community? What do you think about it?
- How do you judge these activities?
- How do these activities compare to activities in other communities?
- What needs do people have in this community? Who has these needs?
- Do the activities fulfill these needs?
- What activities would you like to see (more of) in your village?

Try to keep the whole focus group around one hour. When you have finished make sure to thank everyone for his or her participation.

Cover all discussed points. Describe what people say about the impact of the project. What has changed?

<u>Topics</u>

3.1 Positive impact of the activity

3.2 Negative impact of the activity

3.3 No effect of the activity, why/why not?

3.4 Describe how people see themselves and activities in their village compared to other activities and villages:

3.5 How do people judge activities in general?

3.6 How do people compare the activities in their communities to activities in other communities?

3.7 Describe the needs of the people. Do current activities meet the needs of the people?

Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

1.1 Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

1.2 Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[1] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

[1] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?

What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?

List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: …… .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: …. .

- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ....
- o **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ....
- o Don't know.

Step 2. ***Review*** *the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

Step 3. ***Send the formats*** *adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

Step 4. ***Collect, upload & code the documents*** *from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;

- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

Step 5. ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

> General causal map
>
> During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

Step 6. ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

Step 7. ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

Step 8. ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

Step 9. ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

Step 10. ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

Step 11. ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

Step 12. Provide the ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

Step 13. ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

Step 14. ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

Step 15. ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

1.3 Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which ‘theories’ are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of ‘explaining outcome process tracing’, since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on

17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

ETHIOPIA

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia

Capability to:	AMREF	CARE	ECFA	FSCE	HOA-REC	HUNDEE	NVEA	OSRA	TTCA
Act and commit	5	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	3
Deliver on development objectives	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	4	2	3	4	2	5	3	3	3
Relate	3	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
Achieve coherence	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia

Ethiopia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
AMREF	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	AMREF NL	Yes
CARE	Dec 31, 2015	Partly	Yes	Yes	Yes – slightly	CARE Netherlands	No - not fully matching
ECFA	Jan 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Child Helpline International	Yes
FSCE	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands	Yes
HOA-REC	Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes - slightly	ICCO	No - not fully matching
HUNDEE	Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Yes
NVEA	Dec 2015 (both)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN)	Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE
OSRA	C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE
TTCA	June 2015	Partly	Yes	No	Yes	Edukans Foundation	No - not fully matching

INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India[2]

Capability to:	BVHA	COUNT	DRISTI	FFID	Jana Vikas	Samarthak Samiti	SMILE	SDS	VTRC
Act and commit	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	5
Deliver on development objectives	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	1	4
Relate	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

SPOs selected for process tracing – India

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BVHA	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simavi	Yes; both capabilities
COUNT	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Woord en Daad	Yes; both capabilities
DRISTI	31-03-2012	Yes	Yes	No	no	Hivos	No - closed in 2012
FFID	30-09-2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

2 RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Jana Vikas	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF							No – delayed baseline
RGVN							No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS)	2013 possibly longer	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Hivos	No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS)	Dec 2013 intention 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - not fully matching focus
Smile	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Wilde Ganzen	Yes; first capability only
VTRC	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Red een Kind	Yes; both capabilities

INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia

Capability to:	ASB	Daya kologi	ECPAT	GSS	Lem baga Kita	Pt. PPMA	Rifka Annisa	WIIP	Yad upa	Yayasan Kelola	YPI	YRBI
Act and commit	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	5	4
Deliver on development objectives	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	3	1	2	4	2	3	4	4	1	1	4	3
Relate	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
ASB	February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hivos	Yes
Dayakologi	2013; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No: contract ended early and not matching enough
ECPAT	August 2013; Extension Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	Yes
GSS	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No: contract ended early
Lembaga Kita	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No - contract ended early
Pt.PPMA	May 2015	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	IUCN	Yes, capability to act and commit only
Rifka Annisa	Dec, 31 2015	No	Yes	No	Yes	Rutgers WPF	No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO
WIIP	Dec 2015	Yes	Not MFS II	Yes	Not MFS II	Red Cross	No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Yayasan Kelola	Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)	Yes	Not really	Yes	Not really	Hivos	No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos
YPI	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rutgers WPF	Yes
YRBI	Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes
Yadupa	Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now	Yes	Nothing committed	Yes	Nothing committed	IUCN	No, since nothing was committed by CFA

LIBERIA

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia

Capability to:	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Act and commit	5	1	1	1	3
Deliver on development objectives	3	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	2	2	2
Relate	1	2	2	2	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia

Liberia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BSC	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	SPARK	Yes
DEN-L	2014	No	No	Unknown	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
NAWOCOL	2014	Yes	No	No	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
REFOUND	At least until 2013 (2015?)	Yes	No	Yes	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
RHRAP	At least until 2013 (2014?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the ‘Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective’ for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

Step 3. Identify ***initial changes/ outcome areas*** *in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for coding documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- 5C Indicators: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

Step 4. Construct the ***detailed, initial causal map*** *(theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).



Figure 1 *An imaginary example of a model of change*

Step 5. Identify ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *“What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?”*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9
Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)

Part of the model of change	Key questions	Type of evidence needed	Source of information
Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change	Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related	Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?	Describe where you can find this information
Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding	Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?	Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training Content evidence: what the training was about	Example: Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

Step 6. ***Collect data*** *to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

Step 7. ***Assess the quality*** *of data and* ***analyse data****, and develop the* ***final detailed causal map*** *(model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included) **Description of causal relation**	**Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)**	**Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation**	**Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak**	**Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected**
e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice	e.g. Confirmed	e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training		

Step 8. ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

1.4 Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

1.5 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick’s model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people

change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

Appendix 1 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

Capacity is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

Capabilities are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

Competencies are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

1. The capability to act and commit;
2. The capability to deliver on development objectives;
3. The capability to adapt and self-renew;
4. The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
5. The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

Annex .... Overview of capabilities, and related outcome domains and performance indicators

Capabilities	Outcome domains	Performance indicators
Capability to act and commit	Level of Effective Leadership	1.1.Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'
		1.2.Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'
		1.3.Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'
	Level of realistic strategic planning	1.4.Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'
		1.5.Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'
	Level of translation of strategy into operations	1.6.Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'
	Level of Staff Capacity and Motivation	1.7.Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'
		1.8.Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'
		1.9.1.Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'
	Level of Financial Resource Security	1.9.2.Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'
		1.9.3.Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'
Capability to adapt and self-renew	Level of effective application of M&E	2.1.M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'
		2.2.M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'
	Level of strategic use of M&E	2.3.M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'
	Level of openness to strategic learning	2.4.Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'
		2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives
	Level of context awareness	2.6.System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'
		2.7.Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'
Capability to deliver on development objectives	Extent to which organisation delivers on planned products and services	3.1.Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

Capabilities	Outcome domains	Performance indicators
		3.2.Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'
		3.3.Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'
	Extent to which delivered products and services are relevant for target population in terms of the effect they have	3.4.Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'
	Level of work efficiency	3.5.Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'
		3.6.Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'
Capability to relate	**Level of involving external parties in internal policy/strategy development**	4.1.Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'
	Level of engagement of organisation in networks, alliances and collaborative efforts	4.2.Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'
	Extent to which organisation is actively engaging with target groups	4.3.Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'
	Level of effective relationships within the organisation	4.3.Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'
Capability to achieve coherence	**Existence of mechanisms for coherence**	5.1.Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'
		5.2.Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'
	Level of coherence of various efforts of organisation	5.3.Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'
		5.4.Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

Endline report – Liberia, BSC
MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Sam Gotomo [2]
Bram Peters [1]
Cecile Kusters [1]
Stanford Peabody [2]
Musu Washington Gopeya [2]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 Making Enterprises

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, January 2015

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WAGENINGEN UR
For quality of life

Kusters, C.S.L., Gotomo, S., Peters, B., Gopeya, M.W., Peabody, S., 2015. *Endline report (Liberia, BCS). Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5c) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre). Report CDI-15-011. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Liberia, BSC. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Keywords: Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

Report CDI-15-011

Contents

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The Liberia 5C evaluation team

List of abbreviations and acronyms

5 C	Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities
AfT	Agenda for Transformation
ALU	Association of Liberian Universities
BPC	Business Plan Competitions
BYB	Build Your Business
Causal map	Map with cause-effect relationships. See also ‘detailed causal map’.
Causal mechanisms	The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre, the Netherlands
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
Detailed causal map	Also ‘model of change’. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question)
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
IBEX	Investing in Business Expansion (programme)
IREX	International Research & Exchanges Board
IYF	International Youth Foundation
LIPA	Liberia Institute of Public Administration
LTEP	Literacy and Training for Employment (programme)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDF	Management for Development Foundation Training and Consultancy
MFS	Dutch co-financing system
MIS	Management Information System
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OD	Organisational Development
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Process tracing	Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SPO	Southern Partner Organisation
ToC	Theory of Change
ToT	Training of Trainers
UEC	United Entrepreneurship Coalition
UNESCO	United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre

1 Introduction & summary

1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: BSC in Liberia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

This report contains the organisational capacity component of the MFSII endline study in Liberia, concerning the Business Start-Up Centre Monrovia (BSC). The endline discovered that the BSC has been developing steadily in the past two years, with improvements along all 5 capabilities. Positive developments within the capability to act and commit related to organisational leadership, maintaining staff, developing staff skills and diversifying funding sources. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew, improvements were seen in M&E application, the implementation of a new monitoring system and a more designated role focused on monitoring. On the capability to deliver on development objectives only a slight increase was seen due to the combination of more project locations while planned outputs are occasionally not reached. The capability to relate improved further due to increased networking and participation in more varied partnerships and projects. The capability to achieve coherence was enhanced due to the further development of operational and strategic documents.

The evaluators considered it important to note down the SPO's perspective on what they experienced as the most important changes in the organisation since the baseline. SPO staff members noted key changes in the organisation to be surrounding the development of training and facilitation competencies, increased networking skills and practices, and a slightly more effective monitoring system. Other developments were surrounding the expansion of BSC offices and programmes, improvement of strategy and organisational procedures, and improved team relations and communication. Important underlying factors that played an important role in these aspects were the support of MFSII funds, support by SPARK and BiD-Network in the form of a wide range of trainings, and the need to strive for sustainability through the diversification of funds and networks.

The two organisational capacity changes that were focused on through process tracing, were 'Enhanced training and facilitation competencies' (within the capability to act and commit) and 'Slightly improved capacity for programme management' (within the capability to adapt and self-renew). Within the first organisation capacity change the evaluation team identified that both competencies and entrepreneurship and business knowledge had improved through a wide range of trainings (both local and international) supported by MFSII funds and through the participation in a new programme with Chevron and International Youth Foundation. Within the second organisational capacity change, on programme management, slight developments were seen along the line of programme management competencies, organisational management, and reporting standards. Key factors were that BSC seeks to be an independent organisation after 2015, but also that the organisational structure is open and flexible. Support was given by SPARK (MFS II) in the form of funding for local trainings related to programme management, and a new monitoring system was introduced by SPARK. As such, both the identified organisational capacity changes can to a large extent be attributed to MFSII-funded capacity development interventions.

It should be noted that this endline assessment was carried out just before the Ebola virus epidemic and crisis hit Liberia as of July 2014. The effects of the epidemic have heavily impacted the staff and operations of all assessed organisations, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. As such the evaluation team acknowledges that the assessment described in this endline may not fully resemble the current situation in early 2015.

2 Context and General Information about the SPO – BSC

2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

Country	Liberia
Consortium	United Entrepreneurship Coalition (UEC)
Responsible Dutch NGO	SPARK
Project (if applicable)	BSC Monrovia has been set up with the goal to develop an Entrepreneurship Centre / an incubator that will offer trainings, technical assistance through coaching and mentoring, facilities rental, business plan competition, access to finance and services relevant to SME development and growth. In addition, BSC focuses on developing employable skills required by the job market for youths in search of jobs.
Southern partner organisation	Business Start-up Centre (BSC) Monrovia

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation components:

Achievement of MDGs and themes	x
Capacity development of Southern partner organisations	x
Efforts to strengthen civil society	

2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The history of Liberia is a turbulent history. Settled by freed slaves from the United States around 1822, the newly formed state proclaimed independence in 1846. The Liberian state slowly expanded from the coast into the hinterlands and, though the state was founded on principles of freed slaves, the upholding of settler rights increasingly led to the suppression of indigenous peoples. In 1980 a coup d'état took place which ended the more than 100 year rule of the settler party (Pajibo, 2012; Richards et al., 2005). The military government, led by former sergeant Samuel K. Doe, suspended the constitution and instituted a repressive political system. In 1989 the invasion of Charles Taylor triggered the civil war in Liberia which lasted on and off between 1989 and 2003. The war, which was characterized by great terror and gruesome atrocities, counted many different fighting groups and changing alliances. Eventually the war ended with the departure of Charles Taylor, the institution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 (Pugel, 2009). After the war ended in 2003, with the intervention of a 15,000 man UN force, a peace-building process started and is still ongoing (Richards et al., 2005).

Since the end of the civil war, the Liberian government has formulated the 'Agenda for Transformation' (AfT) as a five-year development strategy from 2012 to 2017. It followed the three–year (2008-2011) Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which transitioned Liberia from post-conflict emergency reconstruction to economic recovery. The AfT was considered a first step toward achieving the goals set out in Liberia RISING 2030, Liberia's long-term vision of socio-economic transformation and development. The AfT articulates precise goals and objectives and corresponding interventions that should move Liberia closer toward structural economic transformation, prosperity and inclusive growth.

Perhaps one of the most critical achievements, of both the Liberian government and UNMIL, has been the maintenance of peace and security. Though Liberia continues to rely on the support the United Nations peacekeepers, it is hoped that the government will gradually assume full responsibility for maintenance of security for the coming years. This fragile peace has allowed Liberians to return to their farms, start businesses, return to their country from abroad, and witness an increase in flows of Foreign Direct Investment to Liberia. To revitalize the economy, the three-pronged economic strategy of the PRS focused on (i) rebuilding critical infrastructure; (ii) reviving traditional resource sectors; and (iii) establishing a competitive business environment.

The challenges Liberia is facing are daunting however. Starting from a state of post-conflict instability, extremely weak state institutions, and an economy left in shambles by nearly two decades of violence, further issues relate to minimal reconciliation efforts, high unemployment levels, low levels of education and limited access to healthcare. Within the field of governance and justice Liberia has much work to do. In the post-conflict period reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts have mostly been steered by international initiatives and forces such as the United Nations (Pajibo, 2012). The Truth and Reconciliation Committee, instituted to move on the path towards reconciliation rather than justice, has noted that those who committed war crimes in the civil war should be held accountable. This has not been the case, and the current political establishment has not acted on this view. The security and police sector are currently undergoing training and reform to take over the role of maintaining peace in the country. This is a difficult process, as for instance the police are often considered as predators rather than protectors. Access to justice is limited and trails often take long as only a limited number of cases are concluded each year (Human Rights Watch Liberia country chapters 2014).

Liberia is currently still receiving large amounts of international aid and budget support, and the transition to strengthen the main productive sector, agriculture, is still very much in a preliminary stage (Solà-Martin, 2012). According to the African Economic Outlook 2014, more than 70% of households in Liberia are engaged in rice production. However, since 1980 yields have not increased substantially and more than half of the country's rice is imported. Economic growth has thus far been heavily dependent on the natural resource sector, including goods such as ores, lumber, rubber and palm oil exports. In recent years the services sector has also been growing significantly, even though it is noted that the slow withdrawal of the UNMIL forces in 2015 will affect the demand for these services. It was reported that the informal economy, which reflects a large proportion of Liberian economic activity, has grown even though this has not translated into a decrease in poverty (African Economic Outlook 2014).

Major economic constraining factors include the lack of electricity and basic infrastructure. Until now infrastructure and basic services saw more than US$500 million of direct investment, with key components of infrastructure (including airports, seaports, and roads) renovated or reconstructed. Plans are made to build a large hydropower dam to improve access to electricity. However, these investments alone will not be sufficient to diversify the Liberian economy, nor create jobs for the roughly 500,000 Liberians who will graduate from secondary and post secondary institutions in the next 5 to 10 years. The Liberian government has worked out a plan to establish a competitive business environment for firms in Liberia. It has reformed the Tax Code and the Investment Code, making them more competitive and beneficial to growth. It has streamlined business registration processes; established a one-stop-shop for customs clearing; and started implementing proactive industrial policies as a way of facilitating the growth of local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES). The Government also made it a priority to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment, which is necessary for growth. Further, it maintained a cash-based balanced budget; significantly increased government revenue; moved toward multi-year financial planning; and achieved US$4.9 billion of cumulative debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. These and follow-up actions are creating the right incentives for further growth in employment, GDP, and public and private investment.

Ebola outbreak

West Africa is currently experiencing the largest outbreak of Ebola ever recorded. In Liberia, the disease was reported in Lofa and Nimba counties in late March 2014. In July, the health ministry implemented measures to improve the country's response. On 27 July, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberian president, announced that Liberia would close its borders, with the exception of a few crossing points such as the airport, where screening centres would be established. Public gatherings were banned, schools and universities were closed, and the worst affected areas in the country were placed under quarantine.

In August, President Sirleaf declared a national state of emergency, noting that it might require the "suspensions of certain rights and privileges". The National Elections Commission announced that it would be unable to conduct the scheduled October 2014 senatorial election and requested postponement, one week after the leaders of various opposition parties had publicly taken different sides on the issue. In late August, Liberia's Port Authority cancelled all "shore passes" for sailors from ships coming into the country's four seaports. As of 8 September, Ebola had been identified in 14 of Liberia's 15 counties.

Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future. UN agencies such as the World Bank and international NGOs like Plan International, etc., have begun thinking post-Ebola, and have, therefore, embarked on conducting research and studies on the impact of Ebola on communities and the country, resilience of communities and the health care system, weaknesses in the health care system, etc.

As of January 2015 the Ebola epidemic seemed to be stabilising in Liberia. According to Medecins sans Frontieres the count is now around 8,157 cases and 3,496 deaths registered during the entire epidemic in Liberia (MSF Ebola crisis update 13-01-2015). This stabilisation means that the amount of new cases coming in has decreased significantly to around one case per week in Monrovia, but it is essential to not let the epidemic resurge. Not only Ebola patients have faced difficult times: the crisis has meant that general access to healthcare is even worse than before, As the Special Representative of the UN Secretariat in Liberia noted: rebuilding the country after the Ebola crisis will mean that the factors that caused the virus to spread so quickly need to be urgently addressed. This includes weak trust among the Liberian people, badly functioning basic services such as healthcare and education, lack of accountability and an over-centralized government (UN Special Representative Karen Landgren, 20-01-2015).

As it is with all sectors of Liberian society, this Ebola outbreak is testing the resilience of the SPOs to the highest limits. The SPOs are responding by readjusting their regular programmes by designing new strategies and realigning their resources to join the fight against the deadly Ebola virus disease. This is coming in the forms of Ebola awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for victims and survivors, provision of support to community care centres (CCCs), and procurement and distribution of sanitizing supplies to communities.

BSC

The BSC Monrovia has slowed down its classroom and training activities since the onset of the Ebola pandemic in Liberia and the declaration of the state of emergency by the Government of Liberia. In several announcements related to the gathering and assembling of persons, the government announced a ban on classes and many other gatherings. This ban has greatly affected the work of the organisation.

The organisation states though that it continues to monitor its beneficiaries using phone calls and email, but have not held any new training courses or activities during this time.

Plans are underway though for the SPO to provide training and expertise for entrepreneurs planning to engage in the fight against the deadly Ebola pandemic, and they are engaging with some of the stakeholders on funding and planning a way forward.

There are plans to resume once the government lifts the ban on holding of classes, and lifts the current curfew.

2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2009

What is the MFS II contracting period: January 2011 - December 2015

Did cooperation with this partner end? NO

If yes, when did it finish? N/A

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: N/A

If not, is there an expected end date for the collaboration? N/A

2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

History
Since January 2011 the BSC is a partner of the United Entrepreneurship Coalition to implement the MFS II programme in Liberia. This programme, led by SPARK and supported by BiD-Network, has three objectives i) Direct poverty alleviation (through SME/entrepreneurship Development and therefore job creation) ii) Capacity Building of the local partners and their networks (LEAP/ LBBF/ ALU/ BSC Monrovia) iii) Policy Making & Advocacy.

BSC strives to be a sustainable small and medium enterprises (SME) support organisation. The goal was to be that in 2015, with sufficient capacity to attract resources in order to build SME capacity in Liberia.

Vision
The BSC vision is to create an enabling environment for private sector development, which is essential for creating self-reliance and thereby poverty alleviation in least developed countries and fragile states. The partners share the vision of the consortium partners, and are united in their vision for pro-poor sustainable economic growth, particularly through (1) strengthening relevant local partners, (2) facilitating entrepreneurship; and (3) creating an enabling environment for private sector development, which is essential for creating self-reliance and thereby poverty alleviation in least developed countries and fragile states.

Mission
BSC Monrovia aims to develop and spur both entrepreneurship and education, empowering young Liberians to lead their society into prosperity.

Strategies
The strategy of BSC is to empower young and ambitious Liberian youths through small and medium enterprise development support, entrepreneurship support, building the capacity of universities, technical and vocational graduates and would be graduates through business and employable skills trainings to establish their enterprises and also preparing them for the job market. Job placements and BSC certified systems provide for the establishment of a supply chain where target groups are link to prospective employers (organisations, institutions). This is done through organising workshops, business skills trainings, employability trainings, business plan competitions, seminars, business linkage or supply chain activities, radio shows, coaching and mentoring services. BSC Monrovia maintains its mission and vision as was spelled out during the baseline. The strategies have remained focused on working with university graduates and persons entering into new businesses. The BSC Monrovia has added satellite hubs in several regions and new business managers who offer business training and development to man those hubs.

3 Methodological approach and reflection

3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[1].

[1] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change.

Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II

supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design: mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the

Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

4 Results

4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the BSC that have taken place since the baseline are described. The information is based on the information provided by the CFA.

Table 1
Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline in 2012

Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention	Objectives	Timing and duration	Budget
Training in Facilitation skills and Business Development Services by Triodos Facet	Knowledge and skills about training and facilitation, and BDS positioning of BSC	May 2012, November 2012 October 2013	Euro 20.030,- Ca. Euro 20.000,- Ca. Euro 30.000
Training & Facilitation Skills MDF-West Africa (Ghana)	Training and facilitation skills	September 2012 September 2013	Euro 8.005,- Euro 8.451,-
MDF Support mission	Strategy plan development and follow-up	September 2012 and January 2013	Euro 18.827,- Euro 23.153,-
International Entrepreneurship training in the Netherlands (Tilburg) for the programme coordinator	Understanding of international entrepreneurship	June/July 2013	Euro 4.250.00,-
InfoDev training on Business Incubation Management	Managing Incubator and financing options for Incubator.	August 2013	Euro 30.000,-
BiD Network - Ready4Finance: Business & Financial Planning - Pitching - Investment Process - Establishing a Business Angel Network - Build Your Team - Advisory Services: - BiD Platform - Business Plan Manager on BiD Website	BiD Networks regular trainings focused on improving the overall knowledge and skill set of the BSC Monrovia. Topics such as finance, business support, access to finance, training, coaching, investment and providing services to the entrepreneurs were taken up.	Throughout 2012, 2013, 2014	Euro 42.000 (2012) Euro 35.000 (2013) Ca. Euro 30.000 (2014)
Monitoring & Evaluation - Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA)	Better understanding of Monitoring and Evaluation	August 2012	US$600.00
Development Management - LIPA	Better understanding of Development management	September 2012 until March 2013	US$600.00
Teambuilding and stress management - Hanson-Alp	Teambuilding and stress management	January 2014	US$750
Quickbooks training - LIPA	Financial reporting and accounting	January 2014	US$500

Sources: CFA Support to capacity development sheet, training questionnaires BSC staff, endline workshop

4.2 Changes in capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities (4.2.1). This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also appendix 3. In addition to this staff present at the endline workshop was asked to indicate what the key changes in the organisation were since the baseline. The most important is key organisational capacity changes have been identified, as well as the reasons for these changes to come about. This is described in a general causal map, both as a visual as well as a narrative. The summary results are described in 4.2.2 whilst the detailed general map is described in appendix 4.

4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

Capability to act and commit



BSC Monrovia has grown since the baseline in 2012. The organisation has added more hubs and employed people to lead those hubs. It has also provided training and is seemingly good at the programme side of the business. This is evident in the ability of the current leadership to continue the vision and the mission of the organisation with diminishing funding from SPARK. The leadership of the organisation has been taken up quite well by the current programme coordinator, who has been noted to have professionally stimulated, inspired, and guided staff of the BSC. SPARK has been increasingly withdrawing from operational management and giving the BSC a chance at the steering wheel. SPARK does keep an eye on new projects and gives advice. The current organisational structure now also better reflects staff roles and responsibilities since the involvement of SPARK in strategic and operational guidance has reduced since the baseline.

Every staff member at BSC Monrovia has learned to do trainings and can now carryout trainings. It's now a policy at BSC Monrovia for each staff to have the capacity to do training. SPARK and BiD-Network have trained them in Liberia (and offered the possibility for individual trainings at other institutes), the Netherlands, Rwanda, and Ghana. This has led to a strong capacity building focus in the organisation. The continuous coaching and the relatively low staff turnover have also helped the staff capacity development of the BSC Monrovia. The overall enthusiasm for entrepreneurship in the UEC and at the SPARK head office also contributed to the staff capacity development. The training opportunities still are the main incentives for staff, since staff salaries are still not in line with the market. Furthermore, staff salaries have not been paid for seven months at the time of the endline due to inadequate proposals and financial reporting of BSC to SPARK, which delayed funding.

BSC Monrovia has got multiple funding sources, most notably via Chevron for expanding the number of Entrepreneurship Centres. However, it should be noted that SPARK has also been a key factor in the sourcing of these networks and funding. SPARK often links the BSC Monrovia up with most of these opportunities by sharing information and invitations to network events, and guiding in the partnership engagement processes. A funding procedure has not been developed yet but BSC, is planning to do that, with the support of related documents from SPARK. Strategic independency and organisational sustainability has been a main issue, particularly since it is trying to become more independent from SPARK.

Score: from 2.8 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

Capability to adapt and self-renew



The BSC currently uses two different approaches aimed at different kinds of monitoring and evaluation: the balanced scorecard, and the recently introduced software Salesforce. Especially the use of Salesforce seems to have improved ways in which entrepreneurs are monitored and guided. The additional designation of a business coach/monitoring officer to focus on this process has contributed to improved progress reporting on entrepreneurs. In the past two years some M&E skills have been gained through LIPA training and SPARK guidance. BSC Monrovia is at this stage still far from having a comprehensive M&E system in place that can help to make informed strategic and operational decisions.

BSC Monrovia has developed a practice of holding meetings weekly at the beginning of the week, not only to discuss critical issues, but also to discuss the entire operations in terms of new plans, new ideas, and new ways of approaching targets geared towards consistently improving overall performance. Staff members feel they are able to contribute ideas and are encouraged to take responsibility. The relatively flat and open hierarchical structure stimulates this. When it comes to being in touch with trends within development environment the BSC has made steps may in terms of networking in relation to MSME development, and collecting information on the external environment from different stakeholders.

Score: from 2.6 to 3.1 (slight improvement)

Capability to deliver on development objectives



In the last two years the BSC has seen an expansion in the number of programmes and projects as well as number of staff and operation areas. As such, more projects and Business Plan Competitions were held. On the whole it seems that according to BSC management 75% of planned outputs have been achieved over the past fiscal years. Funding transfers have affected cost-effective use of resources and efficiency of the work, but the BSC has managed to keep operations going through good communication and rapport with the main funders, and has been able to balance quality with efficiency of the work. Quality and efficiency are being monitored especially through the Salesforce software. Having operational plans in place has helped staff to deliver the outputs. But delays in funding and many visits and unexpected events from donors and partners, in addition to the many trainings, does keep staff distracted from their work.

Score: from 2.8 to 3.0 (very slight improvement)

Capability to relate



During the endline assessment it was clear that the BSC was working on increasing their connections, networks and partners. The past two years have seen the development of a local investor network, co-organisation of MSME conferences in cooperation with large donors and the Liberian government and expansion of current partnerships. Though the BSC still relies on SPARK and BiD-Network for support in finding and operating new programmes, developments show that the BSC is increasingly able to access local and national networks and opportunities. Interaction with stakeholders and beneficiaries has improved somewhat due to having regional centres, communicating by phone to clients, and by having regular field visits. Being a young organisation and the flexible and open organisational structure gives staff members space to share new ideas.

Score: from 4 to 4.4 (slight improvement)

Capability to achieve coherence



Since the baseline the BSC has greatly tried to build systems and strategies in order to operate in post 2015. Efforts were supported by SPARK and BiD-Network to develop services and build organisational capacity. Strategising sessions were held, new services and products are being thought up, and a strategic document is currently being developed. In line with this process, operations manuals (including issues like HRM, finances, administration and programme management) have been updated and elaborated upon.

Whilst projects, strategies and associated operations are aligned with the vision and mission of the organisation, there are opportunities for projects funded by new donors that are not completely in line with the vision and mission. BSC is considering revising the vision and mission in line with a broadened scope of work. Different donors contribute resources to similar project activities and as such project activities are mutually supportive. Different donors contribute resources to similar project activities in order to address the bigger picture. Funding from different donors impact the development of entrepreneurial competencies amongst new entries and also strengthen those of current business practitioners. An example of this is very clear in the work with Chevron, as the initiation of three regional offices enables the BSC to offer similar projects and services in those areas. As such, Business Plan Competitions, basic business training modules and life skills training have been offered there.

Score: from 3.3 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

During the endline workshop at the SPO, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the main changes in organisational capacity since the baseline and why these changes have taken place. The discussion was visualised in a general causal map as can be seen below. The narrative for the general causal map is also described below. It gives a more general picture of what were seen as important changes in the organisation since the baseline, and how these changes have come about. It tells the more general story about the organisational changes in the SPO. Please refer to the Appendix 3 for further details and descriptions. Whilst the general causal map is mainly based on discussions during the endline workshop, additional information is added from additional sources. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.

According to BSC staff present at the endline workshop, a lot has happened in the organisation since the baseline:

- Increased training possibilities given to staff;
- Increased number of training modules offered;
- Training and facilitation skills developed and enhanced for many staff;
- Staff number was increased;
- BSC becoming better known in central Liberia;
- Number of centres increased: now the BSC is located in Gbarnga, Buchanan, Harper;
- More partners and clients working with the BSC;
- More synergy and teambuilding within the BSC team.

Many of the issues noted were related to the training of staff: many staff members are now able to give trainings and facilitate sessions. Since 2012 these *training and facilitation skills* had been enhanced for the programme coordinator, the business coach/monitoring officer and the finance/administrative officer who had already been there for a while. The other, newer staff, had developed training and facilitation skills since they joined the organisation in 2013 and 2014. The programme coordinator stressed that if the BSC becomes very good at giving trainings, at facilitating and helping entrepreneurs, then the BSC also becomes better able to go out and market itself, and get possibilities for funding and income (see section 4.3). The discussion around general changes in the organisation was focused on this key organisational capacity: improved networking skills & practices [1] and a slightly more effective monitoring system [2]; expansion of BSC offices and programmes [3], improvement of strategy and operational documentation [4], and improved team relations and internal communication [5].

The main influencing factors and causes of changes in BSCs organisational capacity are related to the efforts made with the MFS II funding support [14]. From the beginning of the MFS II period SPARK and BiD-Network have strongly put focus on developing the BSC as an organisation, but also to develop the competencies of staff members. Parts of the key incentives to motivate staff were the many trainings planned from the beginning and the various opportunities that BSC staff members were stimulated to take. Both SPARK and, to a lesser extent, BiD-Network played important and influential roles in this. An important motivation that has guided the BSC since the baseline has been the expected need to become sustainable as an organisation (especially after 2015) and in relation to that to diversify funding sources [37]. For instance, in the yearly contracts with the United Entrepreneurship Coalition (UEC) the BSC is expected to contribute own funding and to work on independent strategic plans.


Increased funding possibilities [8]
BSC staff is resourceful and updated on newest developments and trends [9]
New ideas for programmes and collaborations [10]
Increased connections [7]
Increased networking skills and practices (Mostly core staff) [1]
Knowledge on how to network and negotiate [11]
Knowledge and practice in social networking and marketing [15]
Training and facilitation competencies developed and enhanced [6]
Other factors and more details in the Process tracing causal map
Better progress reporting towards donors [25]
Direct communication and coaching with entrepreneurs [26]
Slightly more effective monitoring system [2]
Expansion of BSC offices and programmes [3]
Improvement of strategy and concretising organsational procedures [4]
Improved team relations and internal communication [5]
Salesforce used since March 2013 [27]
Designated business coach role since end of 2013 [28]
Better understanding of monitoring processes [31]
Buchanan office (opened 2013) and Harper and Bong offices (April 2014) financed [33]
BSC strategic plan, operationl manual developed Finance and HR protocols adapted [38]
More synergy and better communication among the staff of BSC [40]
Opportunities to network in SA [20]
Business coach learned how to manage and engage relations with entrepreneurs [21]
Slow performance in loan repayment of BPC winners Hesitancy of banks to provide new ones [29]
Need for a proper monitoring system Before: balance scorecard did not seem to be working [30]
Chevron funding to expand operations to build SME capacity since April 2013 [34]
MDF Strategic planning workshop in September 2012 [39]
Teambuilding workshop By Hanson Alp Jan. 2014 [41]
Training in networking and negotiation skills BiD Network (April 2013) [12]
International entrepreneurship University summer course in Tilburg Programme coordinator (June-July 2013) [16]
Programme coordinator attended Expert Panel Forum conference on Entrepreneurship in Post-conflict settings in the Netherlands (Sept 2013) [18]
Visit of Office Manager to Dakar, Senegal for a regional meeting to present a project with ILAB 2014 [19]
Advanced entrepreneurship training for 17 entrepreneurs in South Africa Business coach attends 2014 [22]
General attendance of many meetings, events, informal interactions with stakeholders (programme coordinator but also other staff) [24]
LIPA training in Monitoring and Evaluation January 2013 Programme coordinator and business coach [32]
Members of staff were stressed due to workload [42]
BiD network Support [13]
Need to get ideas on what Liberians need to have or know to transact globally [17]
Branson Scholarship Programme launched through SPARK networking with Humanity United and Virgin Unite 2013 [23]
Bid/contact by SPARK and International Youth Foundation [35]
Need to engage in new partnerships to access funding and become competitive [36]
MFSII Coalition partners build capacity of local partners [14]
Striving for sustainability - Need to diversify revenue [37]

The members of the BSC said that the monitoring system has been improved to a certain extent [2]. The programme coordinator noted that the reporting towards donors has improved: the BSC has more up to date and accurate information on their entrepreneurs, and is better able to show to potential donors what they are doing and what progress is made [25]. By having constant and direct engagement with entrepreneurs and by focusing on this designated task the business coach/monitoring officer has increased her monitoring experience and practices [26]. This discussion mainly circled around the introduction of the Salesforce software programme [27] and the specific designation of the BSC business coach since 2013 [28]. Salesforce is a software programme that makes it easier and quicker to share information on business indicators. These two developments were introduced due to the discovery that the BSC and SPARK needed to be better able to see how the Business Plan Competition grant and loan winners were managing their businesses and repaying their loans to the bank. The business coach was assigned to actively focus on this monitoring. She said that one of the advantages of Salesforce software is that it is also accessible for SPARK staff. The business coach said that in addition to the previous aspects she also somewhat increased her knowledge of monitoring processes in the last years since the baseline [31].

The expansion of the BSC offices, staff and programmes since the baseline was an important improvement since the baseline according to the participants of the workshop [3]. The BSC was able to open three new offices in Gbarnga in Bong, Buchanan in Grand Bassa and Harper, Maryland [33]. The office in Buchanan was opened in 2013, and the other offices opened in April 2014. This was made possible due to funding from Chevron through SPARK and IYF [34]. The SME Entrepreneurship Centres were able to be brought to these areas through a bid by SPARK and IYF in which the BSC was a sub-contractor [35]. Additional motivation to enter in this project was that it was possible to upscale activities and diversify funding [36].

The BSC worked on improving its own organisational strategy and concretising organisational procedures [4]. The BSC also amended the Policy Procedures manual: operational guidance, human resources, and finance protocols [38]. In the manual, chapters such as the role of the Board of Directors, organisational structure, asset management, financial management and human resources have been taken up. One of the key reasons they mentioned why this was important was that if the BSC is going to be fully independent in the future, key policy and strategy documents are needed [37].

Communication has improved within the BSC as well [5]. The staff members felt that this was important for the development of the organisation. The team collaboration and synergy has improved a lot, especially in 2014 with improved coordination, a more relaxed work atmosphere, and staff members being more open towards each other [40]. A lot of effort was put into building the relationships within the team, growing their confidence as an organization and with different types of stakeholders, in negotiating proposals and improving internal systems.

4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs have been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. The following outcome areas have been identified under the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. Also the MFS II capacity development interventions that could possibly be linked to these outcome areas are described in the table below.

Table 2

Information on selected capabilities, outcome areas and MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline

Capability	Outcome area	MFS II supported capacity development interventions (2)
Capability to act and commit	Enhanced training and facilitation competencies	– Training in facilitation skills by Triodos Facet - in 2012 and in 2013 – Training in Business Development Services by Triodos Facet in November 2012 – Training in facilitation skills by MDF in Accra Ghana - September 2012 – BiD-Network advisory support trainings: Business pitching and match-making in 2014, Ready to Finance (ToT); 2012, 2013, 2014 – International Entrepreneurship training in the Netherlands (Tilburg) for the programme coordinator - June/July 2013 – Expert panel forum conference on entrepreneurship in post-conflict settings, attended by programme coordinator, September 2013 – InfoDev training on Business Incubation - August 2013 – Visit of assistant project coordinator/office manager to Dakar (Senegal) with ILAB conference on business incubation 2014
Capability to adapt and self-renew	Slightly improved capacity for programme management	– Monitoring & Evaluation course by Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA) - August 2012 – Development Management course with LIPA - September 2012 until March 2013 – Teambuilding and stress management by Hanson-Alp - January 2014 – Quickbooks training by LIPA - January 2014 – Informal advice and support visits from SPARK and BiD-Network members - throughout 2012, 2013, 2014

The next sections will describe the results of process tracing for each of the outcome areas, and will describe to what extent these outcome areas have taken place as a result of MFS II supported capacity development interventions and/or other related factors and actors. For the process tracing related causal maps details are provided in terms of references which are described in appendix 5. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.

4.3.1 Enhanced training and facilitation competencies

The desire to be sustainable was one of the main underlying reasons for many of the trainings that were given to the BSC, both from the perspective of BSC and SPARK. The project coordinator explained that funding currently comes from the Dutch government, but it is important for the BSC to ask itself: "how can we also bring something to the table"? He explained that one of the skills needed to get income is to become great trainers and facilitators. As such the overall training and facilitation skills were enhanced in the past two years [1], through a wide range of capacity interventions and trainings in this field (see table above and visual map below). "If we become good in that, we become able to offer our services to earn income". Examples of this are the contracts with the National Tailor Union of Liberia (currently ongoing since 2013 with support of Chevron), and Literacy and Training for Employment (LTEP) programme (negotiated just before the endline) to provide services to entrepreneurs and work on development of SME. With that in mind the Dutch CFA SPARK has set its objective to build the capacity of the local partners. It was also mentioned earlier that the BSC needs to contribute independent funding as the MFS II period ends. Due to the role which BSC seeks to play as a training and supporting centre for entrepreneurship development in Liberia the improved competencies for business skills training and coaching has led to more context-specific and direct coaching, with more entrepreneurs reached [2]. This was noted as a consequence of better training and facilitation skills in order to give high level business skills training, but also by the CFA who mentioned that the BSC are providing more services to the entrepreneurs they support. On investment, the BiD-network advisor wrote that the trainings related to investment enabled BSC to be prepared to work together with entrepreneurs and SMEs with more growth potential. The CFA felt that the active participation and cooperation of SPARK and BSC have made the services that the BSC offers more context-specific and therefore more effective. The main underlying reasons for these changes include the fact that MFS II coalition partners done a lot of capacity development of BSC [11] in terms of trainings for all staff, whilst at the same time, there was a need to strive for sustainability, since MFS funding will reduce [18].

According to BSC staff, results of the improved training and facilitation competencies were that during the past years more programmes had been organised. As an example Business Plan competitions have been organised frequently since 2011, and now also in the three other counties BSC is also active. In addition different theme BPCs are planned - general, but also agricultural and IT-themed BPCs together with partners [3]. More coaching and training has been done: for example, SPARK wrote in its Annual Report of 2013 that through the YES programme with the World Bank, together with the BSC 250 SMEs in Liberia were shortly trained in Business Development Services. Furthermore, the experience and the fact that the team has expanded had given the BSC the opportunity to search for more programmes and funding within their field. They can now refer to their credentials to gain new opportunities. The CFA noted that BSC is now a more active and knowledgeable partner in the SME landscape in Liberia [4]. He stated that that BSC has been invited to be a member of the MSME working group with the Ministry of Commerce. The increased competence to deliver training and coaching to entrepreneurs has significantly improved their position amongst stakeholders.

The issue of leadership in the workshop was not mentioned very much, even though the evaluation team did notice that the core staff (programme coordinator; finance administrative officer; business coach) was those that had grown most. Noticeably, the programme coordinator was the most present during the workshop and the most knowledgeable in the discussion. The more senior staff, including the office manager (who joined in 2013), attended almost all of the trainings as well. At the end it was noted that the amount of trainings was very high, which sometimes distracted staff from their work, and the topics could be a bit repetitive. In the future, as BSC tries to find its own way, it might be more important to base the training programme on the articulated BSC staff needs. This will hopefully increase effectiveness of trainings and sharpen the skills of BSC staff more.

The training and facilitation skills are separated into two main categories: process (improved training and facilitation competencies [5]) and content (improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge [6]). How each of these changes came about is further explained below.


More context-specific trainings and direct coaching of entrepreneurs [2]
Able to provide Business Plan competitions, coach more entrepreneurs [3]
Build networks and expand into more programme areas [4]
Enhanced training and facilitation competencies [1]
Improved training and facilitation competencies [5]
Improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge [6]
Recognizing group energy levels and responses [7]
New professional training methodologies - more of a facilitation approach [8]
Ideas on material development and localizing training modules [12]
Entrepreneurship development knowledge [21]
Ideas on business incubation at BSC Letting SME people use facilities, testing the possibilities for incubation [31]
Business coach learned how to manage and engage relations with entrepreneurs [35]
BSC staff is resourceful and updated on newest developments and trends within the SME landscape [37]
Attention to local needs and getting feedback from participants [13]
Market study questionnaires for entrepreneurial training needs assessment [14]
Development of business training modules [15]
Knowledge on international corporate entrepreneurship, social networking and marketing [28]
Knowledge of business incubation [32]
Experience coaching entrepreneurs with the Branson Scholarship programme 2013-2014 [36]
Increased networking skills (Mostly core staff) [38]
Triodos Facet training in facilitation skills and Business Development Services November 2012 October 2013 [9]
MDF training in facilitation skills in Ghana September 2012 Programme coordinator and finance officer [10]
IBEX-USAID technical assistance training Business coach 2013 [16]
BiD Network Pitching and Matchmaking trainings [19]
Build your Business training For the whole BSC team 2013 [22]
Passport to Success Training Whole team 2013 [23]
Bid Network ToT Ready to finance 2012,2013,2014 [26]
International entrepreneurship University summer course in Tilburg Programme coordinator June-July 2013 [29]
Programme coordinator attended an Expert Panel Forum conference on Entrepreneurship in Post-conflict settings Sept 2013 [30]
InfoDev Incubation training Aug 2013 [33]
Visit of Office Manager to Dakar, Senegal with ILAB, and also received training in incubation 2014 [34]
Need to engage in new partnerships to access funding and become competitive [17]
BiD network Capacity support [20]
Programme with IYF and the Chevron CSR fund Since April 2013 For the building of SME capacity in Liberia [24]
Need to know what investors like to see in an entrepreneur [27]
MFSII Coalition partners build capacity of local partners [11]
Striving for sustainability Need to reduce funding from Dutch MFS [18]
Bid/contact by SPARK and International Youth Foundation 2013 [25]

A key component of this outcome area was the **improved training and facilitation competencies**. The BiD-Network advisor said that she observed that during trainings delivered by the BSC staff they not only applied some of the methodologies and examples practiced during training sessions, but also made them their own and complementary to other trainings. SPARK noted that the programme coordinator of the BSC had become a better trainer as well. In relation to training and facilitation competencies, all the members of the BSC, including the three county project coordinators, are able to give trainings and facilitate sessions to the same standards. Some of the skills and practices they picked up as part of facilitation competencies included being able to recognize and read their participants, able to see their energy levels [7]; being able to apply facilitation techniques rather than maintaining too much of a lecturing style [8]; being able to adapt to participant levels and needs and yet remain in control of the session. The BSC staff has worked more with different methods and modules to address the needs of almost every sort of participant [12]. The BSC staff mentioned that they also try to customize material and locally adapt their trainings [9]. This is aided by the use of a combination of knowledge from international trainings and getting feedback from their participants to learn about their weaknesses and strengths [13]. The BSC staff members gained insight in the need to make training material demand driven through the necessity of feedback sessions, careful development of training techniques (audio, visual, activity), and the SMART formulation of training objectives. BSC staff now understood that it is also important to do research before the trainings are given, to explore the backgrounds and beginning situations of the participants. Two examples were shared with the evaluation team: an interview form to receive feedback on trainings and a market survey questionnaire that tries to find out from businesses what kind of recruitment needs they have. The participants of the endline evaluation workshop said that regarding the understanding of local training needs they also had some practice in the development of business training modules [15].

The BSC staff members said that they had broadened their **entrepreneurship and business knowledge** [6]. This category is built up of issues related to entrepreneurship development knowledge [21]; ideas on business incubation [31]; learning to manage relations with entrepreneurs [35]; and being resourceful and up to date on relevant trends and developments [37].This is clearly linked to the development of business training modules [15]. On entrepreneurship development the programme coordinator found it especially valuable to be able to tell Liberian entrepreneurs what they need to know on international corporate entrepreneurship [28]: how Liberian businesses can use technology, social media, but also talk the language of international business. A specific component of business knowledge has been the focus on business incubation. This served to give the BSC staff ideas on how to provide these services [31]. Business incubator services are seen as a strategically valuable service for young and beginning entrepreneurs, and a financially interesting direction for the BSC. Due to the challenging context of Liberia it is currently not possible to offer full incubation services yet. In the past two years the BSC staff has gained knowledge and ideas on this topic however [32]. Currently experiments with these ideas are ongoing with potential entrepreneurs and BSC is learning from them. Two final personal topics were addressed within the subject of improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge. The first was that the business coach said she had become much better in managing, and engaging in, relations with high level entrepreneurs [35]. The second point was grasped as resourcefulness and being updated on the relevant trends and developments related to SME in the country [37]. The programme coordinator said that as the combination of the trainings, with experience and the multiple projects ongoing the staff members were learning more and more every day. This was supplemented with almost every staff member often having a networking role in their daily work [38]. SPARK wrote that the ongoing trainings and coaching have increased the ability of the BSC to network and gain a substantial position amongst their peers and stakeholders.

4.3.2 Slightly improved capacity for programme management

The organisational change focused on with process tracing circled around exploring the improved capacity for programme management within the 'capability to adapt and self-renew'. This outcome area was explored due to the interest of the evaluation team in a number of MFS II funded trainings, such as monitoring and evaluation trainings or programme and results-based management courses. Most of the discussions that took place during this session were with the core staff of the BSC Monrovia rather than field staff.

Some of the main issues that underlie the attention that has been paid to programme management in the past years relate to the goal the BSC has to become a sustainable SME development organisation [27]. This has also been stimulated by SPARK, through yearly contracts and co-financing goals. The BSC wants to become independent as an individual organisation. In relation to this SPARK reflected that the deviation between donor contracts and the strategic plan seems to impact the strategic direction of the BSC. The way in which contract between SPARK, BiD-Network and BSC is organised hampers the full development of an independent strategy. Furthermore, SPARK explained that: "the role of SPARK is in this sense - [to] help with the set-up of personnel roles, and organisational policies, but also say that sometimes these can change, showing BSC that flexibility is possible sometimes". The programme coordinator said that in the past years the BSC has become much stronger in programme management [1]. He mentioned that this was demonstrated by the fact that the BSC has so many projects and programmes that need to be managed [2]. He said that the BSC "managed the Yes programme (with SPARK). [...] Part of the goal was to identify the existing companies to work with and train them. For the Chevron programme (since April 2013-2014), the Corporate Lead project, the BSC was the sub-contractor for SPARK for 1 year. For this project the BSC set up entrepreneurship centres and trained 150 people in different business models such as the Passport to Success". The underlying expectation is that the positive and successful management of various projects will lead to new projects in the future.

The efforts to improve on programme management stem from the opportunities offered by SPARK and BiD-Network [11], and that the BSC has been set up to have a flexible organisational structure [20]. As part of this focus on becoming independent and sustainable after 2015 the programme coordinator really wanted to get across that the BSC operates separately from SPARK, even though SPARK is still located in the same office for the time being. SPARK tried to tell the evaluation team the same: in the future this might be more emphasized due to the fact that SPARK wanted to move to a different office in July 2014. In addition to that, another aspect that helps with an increased ability to function autonomously is that the SPARK Country Manager currently resides in Ivory Coast and visits the operations in Liberia every 1-2 months. The CFA said: "SPARK no longer provides operational procedures. Activities are reviewed on their procedures but the BSC itself guards them in the first place. Only with newly developed interventions and activities SPARK offers support in developing the procedures". Many of the MFS II supported activities for improved included trainings for BSC staff, especially the programme coordinator, the finance and administrative staff member and the business coach.

The discussion on improved programme management capacity was guided by three main components: improved project management competencies [3]; improved organisational management [14]; and improved organisational reporting standards [32].


Better able to manage multiple projects [2]
Slightly improved capacity for programme management [1]
Improved programme management competencies [3]
Improved organisational management [14]
Improved organisational reporting standards (towards external partners) [32]
Project management knowledge and skills - supervisory skills - communication skills - input – output method for result-based management [4]
Improved knowledge on public sector finance and budgeting [9]
Slightly improved knowledge on Monitoring and Evaluation [12]
Improved organisational leadership [15]
Strengthened coordination and collaboration (teamwork) [18]
BSC adapts to situations and makes key decisions on how to manage projects [24]
Improved policies and procedures for managing various projects [29]
Different funding sources have different reporting requirements [33]
Financial reporting [35]
Salesforce helps to manage and makes reporting easier [38]
Result-based management training – 2011 MDF Programme coordinator [5]
LIPA 2013 Development Management training for the business coach and programme coordinator [6]
Office manager has an academic background in Human Resources [7]
Financial officer with personal experience and various trainings in financial management [10]
Solid leadership of programme coordinator [16]
Each staff members is involved in programme management roles alternatively [19]
Access to a network of certified trainers that can fill in [21]
Good human relations within team, effective use of language [22]
New ideas for getting projects and models for sustainability [25]
Strategic Planning Matrix developed, however, lack of Final Strategic Plan [30]
Quickbooks training for financial officer in January 2014 by LIPA [36]
Financial officer had a training in financial management with SPARK and BiD-Network in 2013 [37]
Introduction of Salesforce by SPARK in 2013, by way of pilot [39]
IBEX technical training Business coach 2013 [8]
LIPA training in Monitoring and Evaluation Programme coordinator and business coach [13]
Personal growth of programme coordinator; financial officer and business coach [17]
Teambuilding training 2014 [23]
Networking opportunities of the programme coordinator [26]
Difficulties in transfering funds between projects and programmes causes some logistical and financial issues [28]
Strategic Planning Workshop with MDF in September 2012 [31]
Training/briefings on reporting from SPARK, IYF and BiD-Network [34]
BPC winners were repaying loans too slowly according to Liberian banks [40]
MFSII Funding [11]
Open and flexible structure and culture of the BSC [20]
Striving for sustainability – SPARK moving to a separate office in 2014 [27]

Programme management competencies were said to have improved in the past years since 2012 [3]. The aspects mentioned under programme management skills were related to supervisory skills, communication skills, and knowledge on input and output methods [4]. The programme coordinator said that he had gained skills in project cycle management, proposal writing and communication skills. The most valuable knowledge he still uses was the input-output method for results based management. Project management competencies also included the financial officers' knowledge on public sector finance and budgeting [9]. The financial and administrative officer said she had various trainings in financial management in the past years before and after the baseline. Knowledge on monitoring and evaluation was slightly improved. The business coach said that she somewhat increased her knowledge of monitoring processes [12].

Organisational management was said to have been improved [14]. An important component that has been mentioned mostly by SPARK and BiD-Network relates to organisational leadership [15]. Some issues that may have contributed to the leadership of the BSC are the positive developments related to the programme coordinator [16]. After the previous programme coordinator left, he has been able to fill in and both SPARK and BiD-Network have been very positive about him. SPARK said: "the programme coordinator has shown potential and more capacity in being inspiring, responsive and smart leadership". SPARK CFA mentioned another component that might have improved leadership was the personal growth of the business coach and finance officer [17]. Coordination and collaboration has been strengthened in the past two years [18]. This is partly due to having different projects being managed by different officers [19]. The office manager mentioned that an aspect which makes the BSC better at programme management is that there is a flexible structure, which allows staff to contribute ideas freely and the management is mostly busy with steering. However, as such there are no dedicated staff roles for M&E for instance. Collaboration and coordination also involves other contacts that can help out with projects. Another aspect that helps the BSC with regard to its internal management is that the BSC staff has become better at making decisions and adapting to situations that arise in order to manage projects [24]. The programme coordinator described that troubles and differences between SPARK and BiD-Network financing sometimes also led to challenges. He said that, in 2014, due to delays in reports, proposal and contracts the BSC did not receive funds from SPARK yet. This has been a major issue with SPARK for the past months as operational activities are jeopardized and staff members are paid less for the time being. The programme coordinator noted that with regard to organisational policies there have been some improvements [29]. There has been a greater need to have the procedures and know-how to manage the different projects and follow the needed steps. As a result of that, the operational procedures manual has been updated. In the past years also attention was given to improving and working on the BSC strategic plans. Though BSC has been operating with a clear idea of the focus they have and how they want to achieve it, a concrete, final strategy plan was lacking. A strategic planning matrix was developed in 2012 to guide the objectives of the BSC [30].

The final key component of programme management that the BSC staff uncovered is that **organisational reporting is improved** in the last years. Both narrative and financial reporting standards are better [32]. There are still some challenges in these areas however: an example is when the BSC is working with informal companies in various towns in Liberia. In these cases many entrepreneurs are working in the informal sector and do not work actively with receipts, even though these entrepreneurs might have a venue or a thriving business, and the knowledge to match it. But when you also have to report to donors and funders these financial reports are quite important [33]. Fortunately the BSC seems to have good arrangements and mechanisms with SPARK and other organisations on how to report financial support and transfers. Financial reporting competencies had improved according to staff members [35], and the financial administrative officer seemed to be the main financial person at the BSC. The BSC staff felt that the use of Salesforce increased the standards of reporting: it helped to manage information better and the information is much more up to date and organised [38]. This made it easier for the staff working with Salesforce, such as the business coach, to write reports. The evaluation team asked about monitoring and evaluation systems at BSC. The staff explained that there is accurate monitoring taking place, mostly through the Salesforce software with regard to the Business Plan Competitions.

5 Discussion and conclusion

5.1 Methodological issues

Prior to conducting the fieldwork of the endline process, the Liberia 5C evaluation team requested and received some documents from BSC Monrovia, including the Support to capacity sheet, training and capacity building reports, project proposal and budgets, audited financial reports, strategic plan, etc. These documents were uploaded to NVivo 10 software, coded and analyzed, and the initial ‘causal map’ and narrative description of capacity changes and ‘outcome areas’ were identified.

The Liberia 5C evaluation team conducted three one-day workshops with three subgroups of the staffs of BSC Monrovia including management, finance, and business incubation. The staffs of BSC Monrovia were prepared and ready for the MFS II endline process.

The four subgroups of staffs of BSC Monrovia – management, finance, programme officers, and field officers (from other counties) – actively participated in the activities of the workshops, which included individually reflecting on the key changes in the capacities of BSC Monrovia since the baseline and writing the changes down on sticky notes for posting on the wall; reviewing and discussing the stick-on notes and agreeing on the ‘outcome areas’ under the sticky notes were to be listed, identifying the ‘causes and effects’ of the changes identified, attributing the changes to specific interventions and other factors, and linking these to specific funding support. This process provided the material for description of changes in organisational capacity, and the attribution of changes in capacity of BSC Monrovia to specific factors and (MFS II and non-MFS II funded) interventions.

The evaluation team did document review and interviewed individual staff members of BSC Monrovia to gather more detailed data on the capacity indicators, to complement and/or triangulate the data gathered from the workshops.

The Liberia 5C evaluation further interviewed the focal person of SPARK, the CFA, and the NL-based organization development consultants using questionnaires based on the capacity indicators, and gathered data that complemented the data provided by the various subgroups of the staffs of BSC Monrovia.

The plan of the evaluation team to also conduct interviews with three of BSC Monrovia’s partners – Association of Liberian Universities (ALU), Chevron, and International Finance Corporation (IFC) unfortunately did not materialize due to the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

On the whole, there has been a lot of information available to be able to do adequate data analysis. This sometimes made it difficult trying to dive into specific details - especially concerning the large amount of trainings and events at the BSC.

5.2 Changes in organisational capacity

This section attempts to answer the following evaluation questions (1 & 4):

- *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
- *What factors explain the findings drawn from the question above?*

In the baseline in 2012 it became clear that the BSC wanted to become the number 1 centre for Business Development Services with trained, experienced and capacitated staff able to meet the demands and needs of clients and businesses. The BSC has been supported by SPARK since 2009 and since then the goal has always been to provide more and better services to stimulate business development, capacity-building and entrepreneurship in Liberia.



In terms of the organisational capacity that was assessed along the five core capabilities (with indicators for each of these five capabilities) during the endline it can be seen that the BSC made progress along most of the capabilities. The capabilities to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew showed the greatest difference. The main indicators that led to an increase within the capability to act and commit were positive developments in organisational leadership, maintaining staff, building staff skills and the attempts at diversifying funding sources. On leadership for instance, it was said that an important aspect of the growth at the organisation involved the personal and professional development of the director. In tandem with the fact that SPARK has been withdrawing from operational management this is a positive development. A clear example of new funding sources is that the BSC have managed to attract a second major funder in the form of Chevron since 2015. Improvements in the areas of staff competencies to train and facilitate were seen through the development of training and facilitation skills and improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge. For more detail in relation to the enhancement of training and facilitation competencies, please see section 5.3.

Regarding the capability to adapt and self-renew the main developments were within the indicators on M&E application and the system for tracking the environment. A slightly different monitoring system was set up due to the introduction of the Salesforce software programme. Secondly, the designated role of the business coach in using this software and actively monitoring entrepreneur progress was put in place. However, more can be done to further build M&E competencies and integrate all components of an independent M&E system.

The capability to deliver on development objectives received the least score increase. The number of projects and locations has increased while planned outputs have occasionally not been reached, and there has been some trouble in implementation due to a busy schedule and delayed funding transfers.

The capability to relate was already rated highly during the baseline, and some further positive developments were made in the interactions with networks, partners and target groups. For example, networking skills and practices were built on through increased engagement with the networks surrounding SME development, but also knowledge on how to network and negotiate. It should be mentioned though that the reliance on SPARK and the BiD-Network should not be understated - many opportunities arose through those contacts, and new programmes that are being set up often need guidance. The capability to achieve coherence was slightly improved due to the fact that strategy and operational documents are being developed.

In the baseline the BSC and SPARK both expressed that operations needed to be expanded through the hiring of new staff and starting up centres in other counties in Liberia. It was explored that the BSC needs to look beyond 2015, through searching for new funding, developing alternative activities and increasing physical space. A key focus was to be on developing the human resources capacity of the BSC staff, to be able to work more efficiently, to become experienced in what they are doing. Cooperation and partnership with other organisations such as the Association of Liberian Universities and the University of Liberia was being explored during the baseline. In addition the BSC needed to find other big organisations and donors for future funding. In 2012 the BSC only received support from MFS II funds, while an agreement between the BSC and SPARK stipulated the expectation that the BSC would increasingly fund percentages of the budgets leading up to 2015 - the BSC would increase contributions to the budget between 10-20%, up to 50% by the end of 2015.

According to BSC staff the main changes that took place in the organisation since the baseline included the growth in the organisation: more staff members, more offices in various counties, more partners and clients were now active. The staff members strongly pointed to the improvement in staff skills; the improvement in team coordination and relations; the improvement of strategy and operational procedures; improved networking in Liberian society; and a slightly more effective monitoring system. In the general discussion on networking it came forward that the staff members of BSC had become more active in networking, due to improved skills on how to network but also practice in social networking and marketing. Support and training by BiD-Network, and MFSII supported international trips of the director helped in this regard. Regarding the slightly improved monitoring system it was noted above that Salesforce software and the training of the BSC business coach helped with this - these actions were taken to monitor the entrepreneur progress better and to offer an alternative to the Balance Scorecard, which did not seem to be working well. Two LIPA trainings were offered to the director and the business coach by SPARK, and the Salesforce software was piloted by SPARK at the BSC. Regarding the improvement in team relations and coordination the CFA funded a short teambuilding training for the BSC staff. In many aspects regarding the BSC team coordination, the management of the BSC offices and the improvement in strategy and operational documents hinted at an improvement in programme management - this was explored further in the process tracing section.

5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development to MFS II

The following section tries to answer the following evaluation questions (2 & 4):

- *To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*
- *What factors explain the findings drawn from the question above?*

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were related to these capabilities. 'Process tracing' was used to get more detailed information about the changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development interventions. Whilst the 5C endline process with BSC focused on the capability to act and commit ('improvement in training and facilitation competencies'), the focus on the capability to adapt and self-renew was expanded to address the issue of '(slightly) improved capacity for programme management', which covers a variety of different capabilities. This once more shows the importance of an integrated framework for organisational capacity rather than having separate capabilities or indicators. During the initial discussions and document review with the CFA and the SPO these two organisational capacity changes or outcomes were identified that merited further research. These organisational capacity changes are further discussed below.

Comments on intervention designs and SMART formulations
In the baseline report it was stated that the immediate objective of each training offered to the BSC was that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. It was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". The expected objectives were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). However,

during the baseline the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

So whilst the MFS II supported capacity development interventions have taken place, no decisive judgement can be made on whether these interventions were implemented as designed, since the design was not known during baseline, and has not been described as SMART objectives. Per intervention more specific objectives will be noted if they became clear from training reports.

'Improvement in training and facilitation competencies'
The following MFS II capacity development interventions were supported and funded by SPARK and were linked to this key organisational capacity change:

- Training in Business Development Services and facilitation skills by Triodos Facet - in 2012 and in 2013
- Training in facilitation skills by MDF in Accra Ghana - September 2012
- BiD-Network advisory support trainings: Business pitching and match-making in 2014, Ready to Finance (ToT); 2012, 2013, 2014 (this was funded by BiD-Network)
- International Entrepreneurship training in the Netherlands (Tilburg) for the programme coordinator - June/July 2013
- Expert panel forum conference on entrepreneurship in post-conflict settings, attended by programme coordinator, September 2013
- InfoDev training on Business Incubation - August 2013
- Visit of assistant project coordinator/office manager to Dakar (Senegal) with ILAB conference on business incubation 201

The following issues are discussed for the MFS II funded activities:

a. **Design:** the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
b. **Implementation:** the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
c. **Reaching objectives:** the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);
d. **Attribution:** the extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on ‘process tracing’). *The attribution question is addressed together for all the above-mentioned MFS II funded organisational capacity development interventions by the CFA.*

Training in facilitation skills and Business Development Services by Triodos Facet - in 2012 and in 2013

Design
The design of these Triodos Facet missions was prepared in collaboration with the CFA country manager. According to the training report from May 2012 a workshop programme was submitted to the partners and a schedule was agreed with them for the entire week of the mission.

Implementation
The Triodos Facet training package consisted of multiple trainings on Business Development Services and facilitation. A first mission in November 2011 aimed at assessing the training needs of the local partner organisations. The “Market Strategy Workshop” mission was the second mission in the process of supporting local BDS providers and was done in May 2012. The aims of the missions in November 2012 and in October 2013 were: BDS market strategy training (institutional capacity building - how to offer BDS) and an intensive BDS-skills training for trainers and counsellors.

Reaching objectives
Whilst not having SMART objectives a few things can be said about the more concrete results of these trainings by Triodos Facet in facilitation skills and business development services. The CFA reported that new skills were developed by BSC staff on delivering business skills training to entrepreneurs. The SPO noted that the BSC staff members had better knowledge and skills about general training and facilitation, and knew more about better BDS positioning. The long-term expectations are that BSC

members have more generic training and coaching skills, and a broader array of BDS services for the entrepreneurs and a better understanding of business development. The SPO wrote that due to these trainings a change of method on delivering trainings took place and new Business Development Services packages were developed. As such this training has indeed contributed to the overall immediate and long-term objectives mentioned in the baseline.

Respondents stated that the BSC staff have become increasingly able to provide better quality trainings and that they have developed their competencies in training and managing entrepreneurs, offering a tailor-made business development services, and guiding numerous business plan competitions. The trainings offered have also been seen as an incentive in order to motivate staff members.

Training in facilitation skills by MDF in Accra Ghana - September 2012

Design
The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline report it was noted that the long-term objective was that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent".

Implementation
This training was done in Ghana by MDF West Africa and two members of BSC attended this training. The focus was on how to act as a trainer and/or facilitator, draw out and process audience input for the purpose of moving discussions forward. Participants learned how to prepare and deliver training/workshop sessions, to recognize group dynamics and reflect on own performance.

Reaching objectives
Whilst not having SMART objectives, a few things can be said about the more concrete results of this training in facilitation skills by MDF. The SPO wrote that the BSC staff experienced basic facilitation techniques for providing training. The CFA acknowledged that the immediate goals were that BSC members gained better coaching and facilitation skills. The long-term goal is that all team members of the BSC need to be strong facilitators, trainers and coaches, and that these skills need to be refined and developed on a continuous basis. The CFA wrote that a good example of skill demonstration is how new materials from for instance IFC Business Edge, Microsoft BYB, and IYF's passport (training modules) to success have all been used and implemented smoothly by the BSC staff members.

BiD-Network advisory support trainings: Business pitching and match-making in 2014, Ready to Finance (ToT); 2012, 2013, 2014

Design
The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent".

This training and support from BiD-Network was spread out over 2012, 2013 and 2014 and was largely based on perceived needs of the SPO and SPARK and BiD-Network which made it relevant.

The expected effects were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation
The BiD-Network supported (MFS II funded) training addressed a number of topics in:

- Ready4Finance: Business & Financial Planning
- Pitching
- Investment Process
- Establishing a Business Angel Network
- Build Your Team
- Advisory Services:

– BiD Platform
– Business Plan Manager on BiD Website

Reaching objectives
The former BiD-Network advisor wrote that "the trainings were ambitious both in terms of content and skills/behaviour development and therefore improvements were seen gradually". It was stated that especially the director became proficient on both participatory and interactive training methodologies and content. By 2014, other staff members were on the right track. The CFA stated that "BiD Network's regular trainings have a tremendous impact on the overall knowledge and skill set of the BSC Monrovia. Their understanding of finance, business support, access to finance, training, coaching, investment and providing services to the entrepreneurs is mainly achieved thanks to these trainings". The long-term expectation expressed by the CFA is a broad sustainable understanding of finance, business support, access to finance, training, coaching, investment and providing services to the entrepreneurs. This is in order to make the BSC a large player in the SME development sphere in Liberia.

International Entrepreneurship training in the Netherlands (Tilburg) for the programme coordinator - June/July 2013

Design
The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent".

Implementation
The director of the BSC went to the summer school at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands for one month.

Reaching objectives
The immediate changes observed were that the director had a better understanding of international entrepreneurship. The long term expectation is that this training has contributed to getting a broader view on international entrepreneurship and the ability to innovate, and that the BSC will become a stronger more knowledgeable and respected partner to stakeholders in Liberia. The CFA said that it was good for networking. The participants made international contacts and attended interesting presentations.

The CFA stated that the international visits are good examples of very useful trainings: academic knowledge and expertise, broadening of perspectives, international networks and relations, but also trust and enthusiasm are stimulated with the participants.

Expert panel forum conference on entrepreneurship in post-conflict settings, attended by programme coordinator, September 2013

Design
The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". The CFA stated that the international visits are good examples of very useful trainings: academic knowledge and expertise, broadening of perspectives, international networks and relations, but also trust and enthusiasm are stimulated with the participants.

Implementation
This event took place as was written in the invitation of SPARK, and was from 16 to 20 September 2013.

Reaching objectives
This expert panel was in the Netherlands, and was deemed (by SPARK) to be highly valuable to the activities regarding the support of entrepreneurs in Liberia and the sustainability of the BSC Monrovia.

The event enabled the director to engage with various international organisations in the SME development field and was for example able to engage in discussions on business incubation.

InfoDev training on Business Incubation - August 2013

Design
The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent".

According to the training report this training was about Business Incubation. The modules selected by the local SPARK office for the 3 days training were Module 1 – Business Incubation Definitions and Principles; Module 2 – Business Incubator Models, Including Success Factors; Module 3 – Business Incubator Marketing; and Module 5 – Financing a Business Incubator.

An online needs assessment was completed before the training. The information gained from this questionnaire provided a basis for the InfoDev trainers for designing the training, and therefore made it relevant to BSC.

Implementation
Eleven participants attended and fourteen people provided complete needs assessments before the training. According to the InfoDev report "preparation and organization of the training was intensively and effectively supported by the local SPARK office. Thanks to the presence of BSC/SPARK staff during all the training organizational matters could be sorted out without difficulties and contributed much to the positive climate of the training. However, the downside of training in the host institution, with most of its staff attending the training, resulted in disturbances affecting the training".

Reaching objectives
Whilst not having SMART objectives in the baseline, a few things can be said about the InfoDev training on business incubation.

The business incubator training was expected to help with sustainability. The immediate objective was to learn about managing an Incubator and exploring financing options for an Incubator. The long term expectation is that the BSC develops other models for sustainability, better understands the challenges of spin-offs, provides hands-on technical assistance (right away), new services developed, more oversight to SMEs, and internal management strengthened.

The InfoDev report concluded that a business incubation programme supporting potential entrepreneurs beyond the initial phase (right after a business pan competition) needs to be intensified. The experience BSC has developed is a very valuable starting point, but without systematic further training and coaching it will be difficult to develop these activities towards a business incubation programme.

Visit of assistant project coordinator/office manager to Dakar (Senegal) with ILAB conference on business incubation 2014

Design
The immediate objectives this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff are able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". The CFA stated that the international visits are good examples of very useful trainings: academic knowledge and expertise, broadening of perspectives, international networks and relations, but also trust and enthusiasm are stimulated with the participants.

Implementation
The business incubator is expected to help with sustainability. The office manager of the BSC went to this conference in Senegal in 2014.

Reaching objectives
Whilst not having SMART objectives in the baseline, a few things can be said about the visit of the project coordinator/office manager to Dakar with ILAB conference on business incubation.

Not much is known about the specific objectives of this visit unfortunately, other than that it was stated to be a valuable experience in terms of knowledge on business incubation and networking.

Conclusions on design, implementation and reaching objectives

In the baseline the immediate and long-term objectives were formulated in a broad way. This might have been due to the great deal of trainings that were planned but not yet concretised. As such the baseline report only names a number of topics. It can be seen that the trainings have been relevant for the SPO, trainings that were planned have been executed, and more interventions were offered than expected. The general goal to build capacity of staff in order to carry out their routine activities can therefore be considered achieved, but the long term goal is still something that needs to be worked on.

Attribution

During the past years since the baseline in 2012, a great deal of capacity development interventions served to build the staff competencies, especially in the area of facilitation, coaching and mentoring. Trainings have been given by MDF, Triodos Facet (now called Enclude) and InfoDev. On the whole these trainings were requested by SPARK and MFS II funded and were evidently fitting the needs of the BSC staff in terms of project-related skills and implementation needs. In the detailed causal map for this organisational capacity change (see the visual in section 4.3.1) it is quite clear that both training and facilitation competencies as well as content-related entrepreneurship development knowledge can be greatly attributed to MFS II supported capacity development in this. This is especially related to particular trainings on facilitation skills and business development services, business incubation supported by SPARK and the various business and skills modules performed by the BiD-Network. Facilitation skills improvement included such topics as having ideas on material development and localizing training modules, learning new professional training methodologies, and recognizing energy levels. These issues can be traced back to the Triodos Facet and MDF trainings. Entrepreneurship development knowledge included topics such as market studies, business development modules, international corporate entrepreneurship, and knowledge on business incubation. These topics can be attributed to the Triodos Facet (supported by SPARK), InfoDev (supported by SPARK) and BiD-Network trainings. Furthermore, entrepreneurship and business knowledge can be greatly attributed to MFS II funded international courses and visits (supported by SPARK).

Throughout the period, the BSC staff were assisted and advised by SPARK and BiD-Network officers through regular informal visits, ongoing support and briefings. The improved knowledge and skills in training and facilitation can also be partly, but to a much lesser extent, attributed to non-MFS II supported trainings, which have been offered through IYF in the form of Build your Business and Passport to Success modules as part of the Chevron-funded programme, and a small training with IBEX.

All in all, the improvement in BSC staff competencies in training and facilitation since the baseline in 2012, can be strongly attributed to the capacity development interventions funded by MFS II (SPARK and to a slightly lesser extent BiD-network) through the provision of many trainings on these issues. It was noted however that BSC staff members were sometimes overwhelmed by the training events and partner visits and that this sometimes distracted them from their work. Furthermore, it was mentioned that increasingly staff training opportunities needed to be based on the demand of BSC staff: they possibly might need to include more staff members and should more explicitly target new skills areas.

'Slightly improved programme management capacity'

The following MFS II capacity development interventions were financially supported by SPARK and were linked to the key organisational capacity change:

- Monitoring & Evaluation course by Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA) - August 2012
- Development Management course with LIPA - September 2012 until March 2013
- Teambuilding and stress management by Hanson-Alp - January 2014
- Quickbooks training by LIPA - January 2014.

The following issues are discussed for the MFS II funded activities:

a. **Design:** the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)

b. **Implementation:** the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
c. **Reaching objectives:** the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);
d. **Attribution:** the extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on 'process tracing'). *The attribution question is addressed together for all the above-mentioned MFS II funded organisational capacity development interventions by the CFA.*

Comments on intervention designs

Also when it comes to this outcome are it was seen that in the baseline report it was stated that the immediate objective of each training offered to the BSC was that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. It was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". The expected objectives were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Monitoring & Evaluation course by Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA) - August 2012

Design

The immediate objective of these trainings was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". The expected effects were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

On local trainings given by the LIPA the CFA wrote that "these local trainings are good to attend and not very expensive. The Liberia Institute of Public Administration is a good initiative, with decent, if not excellent, trainings". Trainings are given on a semester basis, 1 or 2 evenings per week, and offer a more long-term discussion of topics. Regarding this specific training the immediate objective was a better understanding of Monitoring and Evaluation. The long-term goal behind this training in Liberia was to have a more sustainable understanding of monitoring and evaluation due to this longer weekly training versus a short term workshop.

Implementation

Two members of BSC were able to attend this course: the programme director and the business coach. The course started in August 2012.

Reaching objectives

The CFA said that the immediate change was better understanding of M&E, but it was not certain what the further effects of the training were. The director of BSC noted that the training was useful, but did not provide especially new information.

Development Management course with LIPA - September 2012 until March 2013

Design

The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". On local trainings such as the LIPA the CFA wrote that "these local trainings are good to attend and not very expensive. This training was engaged in for a better understanding of development management. The long term goal was to have a more sustainable understanding of development management due to this longer weekly training versus a short term workshop.

Implementation
Two members of BSC were able to attend this course: the programme director and the business coach. The course started in September 2012 and ended in March 2013.

Reaching objectives
The attending business coach/M&E officer noted that her skills in managing developmental programmes improved. The CFA noted that as with the previous training understanding of development management increased but he was not sure what the further effects were.

Teambuilding and stress management by Hanson-Alp - January 2014

Design
The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". This training was requested by BSC staff by the end of 2013 due to the busy workload then. SPARK agreed to the proposal.

The aim of this training was to strengthen team spirit and rejuvenate individual working attitudes for more efficient and effective output. From the training MoU: "BSC is interested in stress management team building exercises which should be fun, creative as well as meeting team building requirements - improving team spirit, team communication and interaction between members, working together and improving group cohesion".

Implementation
The subjects discussed during the session were:

1. Team members form a unified working group through mutual respect for each other's roles, responsibilities and contributions in order to work effectively to achieve organisational goals.
2. Team understands basic principles of stress such as causes of stress, effects and basic coping strategies.
3.

From the Hanson-Alp session report: "the sessions were interactive, with full participation of the staff. In all exercises and discussions, examples were taken from the experiences of the staff members present. All team members were given space and time to ask questions, voice opinions and to share personal stories and experiences. The sessions were a blend of discussions, group work and group activities".

Reaching objectives
Hanson-Alp, the consultant who did the training noted that the BSC staff "has a sincere wish to help and see the peoples conditions in Liberia improve and they are willing to dedicate their time and effort to achieve this goal. The atmosphere in the office is positive and the overall leadership is accepted and respected by the team members". This was reflected in the endline as well, where various staff members underlined that the coordination and collaboration was good.

Quickbooks training by LIPA - January 2014

Design
The immediate objective of this training was the same as above: the immediate goal is that staff is able to execute their routine job responsibilities. In the baseline reports it was noted that the long-term objectives were that "all trainings provided to the BSC staff are in anticipation of capacity development for sustainability of the organisation once it becomes independent". On local trainings such as the LIPA the CFA wrote that "these local trainings are good to attend and not very expensive. The Liberia Institute of Public Administration is a good initiative, with decent, if not excellent, trainings". Trainings are given on a semester basis, 1 or 2 evenings per week, and offer a more long-term discussion of topics.

Quickbooks is a software programme that helps with accurate financial reporting.

Implementation
The BSC administrative/finance officer said she made use of this training and found it valuable to improve her financial reporting.

Reaching objectives
The financial officer noted that the skills provided by the training helped her in her work as an administrative and financial officer. This was reflected on in the outcome tracing map, where it was noted that financial reporting had improved.

Conclusions on design, implementation and reaching objectives
In the baseline the immediate and long-term objectives were formulated in a broad way. This might have been due to the great deal of trainings that were planned but not yet concretised. As such the baseline report only names a number of topics. It can be seen that the trainings have been relevant for the SPO, trainings that were planned have been executed, and more interventions were offered than expected. The general goal to build capacity of staff in order to carry out their routine activities can therefore be considered achieved, but the long term goal is still something that needs to be worked on.

Attribution
The second change that was focused on with ‘process tracing’ was ‘slightly improved programme management’. This can be attributed to improved programme management competencies, improved organisational management and improved organisational reporting.

Programme management competencies were improved through better project management skills such as supervisory skills, communication skills, input-output methods; improved knowledge on public sector finance, and improved knowledge on M&E. These topics can be attributed to a number of key capacity development interventions. Trainings were given on Results-based Management (a training was given to the director in 2011, and later a training was offered at the LIPA), and these are MFS II funded by SPARK. Training on M&E was given to two staff members at the LIPA. Though knowledge of monitoring and evaluation procedures is reinforced, there was no clear evidence for a changed approach or development of a full M&E system.

Improved organisational management had four key components: improved organisational leadership, strengthened coordination and collaboration, situational adaptation, and developed policies and procedures. These changes can be less clearly linked to concrete MFS II funded capacity development interventions: coordination and collaboration within the BSC team has been helped by the teambuilding session that was funded by SPARK with MFS II funding. The development of policies and procedures can be strongly linked to the support from SPARK and support missions from MDF (funded by SPARK). The MDF support mission to work towards a strategic plan has been useful, but as yet this document is not completed. Key underlying aspects of this topic have been that the BSC needs to become more independent leading up to 2015 and that the BSC has a relatively open and flexible staff structure with multiple staff roles.

Improved organisational reporting can be attributed to two main changes and support. SPARK introduced the Salesforce software to remain more up to date on entrepreneurship progress, and financial reporting knowledge and skills were improved through LIPA training in Quickbooks for the financial officer. Though this has indeed improved reporting it should be noted that this is especially aided by the fact that SPARK staff can access this information directly as well through Salesforce.

Regarding the capacity development interventions to which this improved organisational reporting can be attributed, it was noted that many of these trainings were received by core staff members only, and that the learning outcomes of these various trainings were only limitedly transferred to programme implementation. All in all, the slightly improved programme management capacity since the baseline in 2012, can to a great extent be attributed to the capacity development interventions funded by MFS II (SPARK and BiD-Network), mainly through the provision of trainings mentioned this section. Less decisively and concretely was the general support and advice offered to BSC from the side of SPARK and BiD-Network, but it seems these had an influence on factors such as growth of leadership, personal growth of staff, better communication and coordination.

References and Resources

Overall evaluation methodology

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5c endline_questionnaire_training_BiD Network_perspective_Liberia_BSC_Maria Pontes
5c endline_questionnaire_training_management_perspective_Liberia_BSC_William Dennis_Training and Facilitation skills
5c endline_questionnaire_training_management_perspective_Liberia_BSC_William Dennis_Internal Systems and Control
5c endline_questionnaire_training_management_perspective_Liberia_BSC_William Dennis_International Youth Foundation
5c endline_questionnaire_training_management_perspective_Liberia_BSC_William Dennis_Public Procurement
5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_BSC_Himieda Wallace_Training and Facilitation
5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_BSC_Lawrence Yealue_Facilitation Techniques MDF
5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_BSC_Lawrence Yealue_InfoDev Business Incubation
5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_BSC_Lawrence Yealue_Training and Facilitation
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5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_BSC_William Dennis_M&E LIPA
5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_BSC_William Dennis_Training and Facilitation
5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_BSC_William Dennis_University of Tilburg
5c_endline_draftreport_country_SPO_26112014.docx
Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Liberia_BSC_SPARK
Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Liberia_BSC_SPARK
Annex C_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Liberia_BSC
Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Liberia_BSC_Wilson
Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_selected indicators_Liberia_BSC(William Dennis)
Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_selected indicators_Liberia_BSC_Lawrence

Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_selected indicators_Liberia_BSC_Himieda
Annex N_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_MandE staff_selected indicators_Liberia_BSC (1)
Annex P_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_field staff_selected indicators_Liberia_BSC
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_BSC
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_BSC_Bram
List of 5C indicator descriptions

Partner Documents
07022012_Annual_progress_reporting_format_updated
1. TRAINERS_MANUAL - FINANCIAL PROJECT REPORTING
10-steps of M& E
130913_Dilemmas_Background_Papers_def
130913_handout_expertmeeting_SPARK
130913_Invitation SPARK expert seminar 2013
15062011 Budget_BSC_MFS_II_Final_(Revised)
1-BSC Monrovia Project Proposal Form Ver 2012 6.1.2012
20130730 Market survey Questions
5. BSC Monrovia CS report
5C_baseline_report_Liberia_BSC_19012013_CK
A Guide to Civil Society Organizations Working on Democratic Governance (May 2005)
Accrediation Education.jpg
Accrediation Planning.jpg
Article of Incorporation
Balance Scorecard_BSC Monrovia
BiD Signed Contract 2014
BSC - MFS II Final Proposal 20111
BSC Monrovia - Project Activities Timeline 2012
BSC Monrovia Building Markets Yes Program Agreement
BSC Monrovia Organisational Chart 2014
BSC Monrovia Staff Code of Conduct
BSC Monrovia workplan 2014 - FINAL
BSC Monrovia_Procurement_Procedure
BSC Template Cash Count Liberia (Himieda)
BSC. Proposal for team building event with BSC
BSCM Contracts Matrix 2012 Final
BSCM Financial Reports Oct. 2012 -June 2013
BSCM Progress report template 2011 June - December 2011 Final
BSCM_Financial_Procedures_2012 Final
Certificate - EDN Kigali 001.jpg
Certificate of Business Registration BSC Monrovia.jpg
Contract BSC Monrovia & BiD Network MFSII
Copy of BSCM__Inventory_List_(Himieda)_review Sven
Copy of Budget 2012 MFS II April - December
Copy of Workplan & reporting template BiD network-MFSII 2012 (draft)
Cuttington Course in Project Management
Daily attendance sheet
Development Management Diploma Course11
Draft BSCM Organisational Policy Procedures Manual 11-8-14
Draft Budget 2012 MFS II April - Revised 6.1.2012
Employment Contract_Reserved_Locally
Exist interview formv2
F-BDS registration form
IEP Tilburg schedule2013
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International_Partner_Cooperation_Agreement_2012-BSC_Monrovia[1]
Lectures & Topics Assigned to Class Dates

MDF Facilitation Skills 001.jpg
MDF Picture 001.jpg
MIS - Liberia Q4 1222014
MOU between BSC & Peter Hanson-Alp
MP - input file 2011 results for CMs
NEW APPROVAL MATRIX for payments Final
NGO Accreditation
NIKOS 001.jpg
Overview of loanees over time Oct 2012
Partner Coporation Agreement (BSCM & SPARK)
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Quick Books Training Receipt
Recruitment and Selection Procedure BSC Monrovia
Report BSC Strategic Plan draft 5 Oct 2012
Report BSC Strategic Plan workshop
Report Febr 2012
Report SPARK Jan 2013 draft
Report SPARK May 2012
Report SPARK May 2012 final
Reporting template BSCMonrovia 2012 Liberia MFSII July - December 2012 update Himi
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Strategic Planning Matrix BSC workshop and priority setting - Revised
Strategic Planning Matrix BSC workshop and priority setting -Maria comments
Strategic Planning Matrix BSC workshop and priority setting
SUMMARY OF THE BSC TEAM BUILDING AND STRESS MANAGEMENT SESSIONS WITH BSC LIBERIA
Table of content Strategic Plan example
Timesheet Template_Revised
Triodos Facet MSFII - Mission report - Liberia - May12
Triodos Facet MSFII - Mission report - Liberia - Nov 12 final
TU ECTS 001

List of Respondents

BSC staff:

William Dennis	Programme Coordinator
Janice Love-Bropleh	Business coach / Monitoring Officer
Himieda Wallace	Finance / Administrative Officer
Lawrence Yealue	Assistant Project Coordinator and Office Manager
Harrison Chie	Maryland County Project Officer
Jeremie Carson	Bong County Project Officer
Joshua Beware	Grand Bassa County Project Officer

CFA:

Richard van Hoolwerff	SPARK Country Manager Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire

Other respondents:

Maria Pontes	Former BiD-Network Advisor to the BSC
Wilson Idahor	CEO of Top Consulting

Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[2] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

[2] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

Step 1. Provide the ***description of indicators*** *in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?

What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?

List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - o -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - o -1 = A slight deterioration
   - o 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - o +1 = Slight improvement
   - o +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: …... .
   - o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: …. .
   - o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: …... .
   - o **Other** interventions, actors or factors: …... .
   - o Don't know.

Step 2. ***Review*** *the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

Step 3. ***Send the formats*** *adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

Step 4. ***Collect, upload & code the documents*** *from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;

- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

Step 5. ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

> General causal map
>
> During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

Step 6. ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

Step 7. ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

Purpose of the fieldwork**:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

Self-assessments**:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

Step 8. ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

Step 9. ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

Step 10. ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

Step 11. ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

Step 12. Provide the ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

Step 13. ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

Step 14. ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

Step 15. ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing
Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

ETHIOPIA

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia

Capability to:	AMREF	CARE	ECFA	FSCE	HOA-REC	HUNDEE	NVEA	OSRA	TTCA
Act and commit	5	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	3
Deliver on development objectives	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	4	2	3	4	2	5	3	3	3
Relate	3	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
Achieve coherence	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia

Ethiopia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
AMREF	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	AMREF NL	Yes
CARE	Dec 31, 2015	Partly	Yes	Yes	Yes – slightly	CARE Netherlands	No - not fully matching
ECFA	Jan 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Child Helpline International	Yes
FSCE	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands	Yes
HOA-REC	Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes - slightly	ICCO	No - not fully matching
HUNDEE	Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Yes
NVEA	Dec 2015 (both)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN)	Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE
OSRA	C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE
TTCA	June 2015	Partly	Yes	No	Yes	Edukans Foundation	No - not fully matching

INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India[3]

Capability to:	BVHA	COUNT	DRISTI	FFID	Jana Vikas	Samar thak Samiti	SMILE	SDS	VTRC
Act and commit	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	5
Deliver on development objectives	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	1	4
Relate	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

SPOs selected for process tracing – India

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BVHA	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simavi	Yes; both capabilities
COUNT	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Woord en Daad	Yes; both capabilities
DRISTI	31-03-2012	Yes	Yes	No	no	Hivos	No - closed in 2012
FFID	30-09-2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

[3] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Jana Vikas	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF							No – delayed baseline
RGVN							No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS)	2013 possibly longer	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Hivos	No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS)	Dec 2013 intention 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - not fully matching focus
Smile	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Wilde Ganzen	Yes; first capability only
VTRC	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Red een Kind	Yes; both capabilities

INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia

Capability to:	ASB	Daya kologi	ECPAT	GSS	Lem baga Kita	Pt. PPMA	Rifka Annisa	WIIP	Yad upa	Yayasan Kelola	YPI	YRBI
Act and commit	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	5	4
Deliver on development objectives	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	3	1	2	4	2	3	4	4	1	1	4	3
Relate	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6
SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
ASB	February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hivos	Yes
Dayakologi	2013; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No: contract ended early and not matching enough
ECPAT	August 2013; Extension Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	Yes
GSS	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No: contract ended early
Lembaga Kita	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No - contract ended early
Pt.PPMA	May 2015	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	IUCN	Yes, capability to act and commit only
Rifka Annisa	Dec, 31 2015	No	Yes	No	Yes	Rutgers WPF	No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO
WIIP	Dec 2015	Yes	Not MFS II	Yes	Not MFS II	Red Cross	No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Yayasan Kelola	Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)	Yes	Not really	Yes	Not really	Hivos	No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos
YPI	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rutgers WPF	Yes
YRBI	Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes
Yadupa	Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now	Yes	Nothing committed	Yes	Nothing committed	IUCN	No, since nothing was committed by CFA

LIBERIA

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia

Capability to:	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Act and commit	5	1	1	1	3
Deliver on development objectives	3	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	2	2	2
Relate	1	2	2	2	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia

Liberia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BSC	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	SPARK	Yes
DEN-L	2014	No	No	Unknown	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
NAWOCOL	2014	Yes	No	No	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
REFOUND	At least until 2013 (2015?)	Yes	No	Yes	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
RHRAP	At least until 2013 (2014?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

4.

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

Step 1. Identify the ***planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions*** *within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

Step 2. Identify the ***implemented capacity development interventions*** *within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the ‘Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective’ for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for coding documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- 5C Indicators: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

Step 4. Construct the ***detailed, initial causal map*** *(theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).



Figure 1 *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9
Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)

Part of the model of change	Key questions	Type of evidence needed	Source of information
Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change	Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related	Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?	Describe where you can find this information
Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding	Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?	Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training Content evidence: what the training was about	Example: Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

Step 6. ***Collect data*** *to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

Step 7. ***Assess the quality*** *of data and* ***analyse data****, and develop the* ***final detailed causal map*** *(model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included) **Description of causal relation**	**Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)**	**Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation**	**Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak**	**Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected**
e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice	e.g. Confirmed	e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training		

Step 8. ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick’s model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and

SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

Capacity is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

Capabilities are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

Competencies are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

1. The capability to act and commit;
2. The capability to deliver on development objectives;
3. The capability to adapt and self-renew;
4. The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
5. The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

Appendix 3 Results - changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

3.1 Capability to act and commit

3.1.1 Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

This is about leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation.

Description of the endline situation:
SPARK, the MFS II funder of BSC, is not omnipresent in BSC Monrovia's activities any more. A management team comprising of Liberian nationals is now leading BSC Monrovia, with support and occasional visits from SPARK members (both in Liberia and from the Netherlands). Another reason is that the SPARK representative is now mostly based in Ivory Coast. SPARK noted that the capability, responsiveness and very smart leadership of the programme coordinator was important throughout the past two years, and this has become even better. BiD-Network underlined this and stated that the acting director proved to be an inspiring example to other staff members in terms of guidance, feedback and explaining new concepts and modules.

BSC Monrovia has responded and grown since the baseline in 2012. The organisation has added more hubs and employed people to lead those hubs. It has also provided training and is seemingly good at the programme side of the business; this is evident in the ability of the current leadership to continue the vision and the mission of the organisation with diminishing funding from SPARK.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.1.2 Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions

Description of the end line situation:
SPARK is not visible in the leadership structure of the BSC Monrovia at this point, but still plays an important role in terms of guidance for the BSC Monrovia. SPARK is very instrumental in sourcing funding, training opportunities for staff, and other programme activities for BSC Monrovia. BSC Monrovia on its own requires some strategic guidance still in the management of the organisation.

The management of the BSC has increasingly been taking up a leadership role and has started formulating own strategic directions. Due to the engagement and improved competencies of the current programme manager the BSC staff has increasingly been able to develop new network contacts, develop own programmes and tender for funding from other organisations. BSC Monrovia does not have full ownership of the organisation; they cannot make decisions on their own on what to do or set priorities, because they still have to consult with SPARK. For the aspect of strategic directions, they know where to head to but for operations, there is deterioration or break down in implementation of some of the projects due to logistical constraints.

The BSC Monrovia is gradually getting there. They have started developing a draft strategic plan and are making efforts to develop new services and products with the help of SPARK and BiD-Network. Furthermore, budget development is now more being done by the BSC, after which it is sent to SPARK for review.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

3.1.3 Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

This is about staff turnover.

Description of the end line situation:
The staff turnover is very low at BSC Monrovia. They have even hired more staff since the baseline in 2012, mainly project staff and interns. Due to the opening of the hubs most of the staff hired is for the outreach projects. The one key staff that left the BSC Monrovia since the baseline did so to take advantage of a scholarship to study oil and gas in the UK to join the staff of the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL). The person that replaced him as project coordinator/acting director has been well able to motivate and responsively challenge other staff members in their work.

Score: from 3 to 4 (improvement)

3.1.4 Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

Observable indicator: Staff have copy of org structure and understand this.

Description of the endline situation:
The BSC Monrovia recently crafted a new organisational structure of the organisation. There are also several guiding documents for the organisation, including a draft strategic plan.

Before scaling down the involvement of SPARK, the organisational structure at BSC Monrovia was not clear, especially the line of demarcation between SPARK and BSC Monrovia. And though SPARK is not officially represented in the offices of BSC Monrovia any longer, BSC Monrovia still has to depend on SPARK for guidance and inputs into the daily activities and reporting of the organisation.

The current management of BSC Monrovia is very adept at leading the organisation to accomplish its mission and goals. Under the leadership of the current management team, BSC Monrovia has opened hubs in several counties, employed several programme officers of the hubs, and provided training that built the capacity of the new staff to effectively manage the hubs.

Though BSC has established a structure, still isn't a human resources arm at the organisation.

Score: from 2 to 4 (considerable improvement)

3.1.5 Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.

Description of the endline situation:
The BSC is currently busy with the drafting of a strategic plan for after the 2015 period. This development has been positive since the drive to become sustainable and independent of MFS II funds is clear. This strategic plan will help in the guidance of the organisation. Although the strategic plan has not yet been approved, as the new ideas and programmes are evolving, 95% of the priorities have been agreed upon, especially where the BSC Monrovia sees itself in the next five years. The process of developing a strategic direction was stimulated by SPARK and was aided by MDF. Originally, the BSC Monrovia was seen as an extension of SPARK, but gradually, over the past two years, BSC Monrovia has now become slightly independent. A new strategic plan is currently being developed but there is no comprehensive M&E system that strategically guides the organisation in their decision making, although networking and collecting information from the external environment may inform strategic decisions.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

3.1.6 Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.

Description of the endline situation:
The daily operations of the BSC Monrovia as it relates to the strategic plan have improved. Staff of the BSC Monrovia is implementing projects in line with the strategic plan of the organisation, and task divisions are clear to who is in charge of specific projects, decreasing the amount of overlap in responsibilities. Weekly meetings serve for programme officers to update each other on progress. Some staff noted that occasional activities such as trainings on short notice can distract them in their daily work. Also the fact that two other organisations (SPARK and Accountability Lab) are active in the same building sometimes causes some distraction.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.1.7 Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.

Description of the endline situation:
In terms of staff skills the BSC Monrovia is improving. There has been improvement in skills training and facilitation, writing business plans, and training people/clients in business management. All staff members have been involved in these training topics, including staff members located in branches in Buchanan, Harper and Gbarnga. Many of the staff members are now certified trainers, with enviable business coaching and mentoring skills.

In terms of general skills, staff has been trained in (financial) reporting, budgeting, and programme management. The continuous coaching and the relatively low staff turnover have also helped the staff skills development of the BSC Monrovia. Throughout the past years the active involvement and regular visits of SPARK and BiD-Network representatives has also contributed to staff capacity development.

Furthermore, BSC Monrovia staff have gained some experience in networking, as far as linking up businesses with bank and non-bank financial institutions is concerned. They also gained experience in coaching of young entrepreneurs. However, it was reflected that still a lot of work can be done in terms of improving staff skills, namely in the areas of results measurement, evaluation and programme management.

Score: 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

3.1.8 Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

This is about whether staff at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities

Description of the endline situation:
In the past two years extensive training opportunities have been offered to the BSC. Some examples are trainings by SPARK in the development of financial procedures and monitoring tools; BiD-Network provided training on business monitoring and identification of financing for entrepreneurs; Triodos Facet provided training on Market/Business plan development; and MDF facilitated training on organisation and strategic strengthening. Some BSC members have had the opportunity to travel to the Netherlands, Rwanda and Ghana for training. In terms of local trainings several BSC members have had the opportunity to follow courses at the Liberia Institute for Public Administration (LIPA) both before and after the baseline.

Training events at the BSC since 2012:

- Training in facilitation skills by MDF in Accra Ghana - September 2012;
- Training in Business Development Services by Triodos Facet in November 2012;
- Training in facilitation skills by Triodos Facet - in 2012 and in 2013;

- International Entrepreneurship training in the Netherlands (University of Tilburg) for the programme coordinator - June/July 2013;
- InfoDev training on Business Incubation - August 2013;
- Expert panel forum conference on entrepreneurship in post-conflict settings, attended by programme coordinator, September 2013;
- BiD-Network trainings:
  - Business pitching and match-making in 2014;
  - Ready to Finance; 2012, 2013, 2014;
  - International Youth Foundation trainings: Build Your Business (2013, all staff), Passport to Success;
  - Technical assessment training by Investing in Business Expansion (IBEX - USAID) in 2013, for the business coach/monitoring officer;
  - Team-building training by Peter Hanson Alp in January 2014;
  - Visit of assistant project coordinator/office manager to Dakar (Senegal) with ILAB conference on business incubation 2014.

Due to delays in funding to meet training demands, training excursions are not as many in 2014 as they were in the years prior to the baseline. In a sense the amount of training opportunities offered is not so much a change: SPARK noted that there were similar, ample training opportunities offered before the baseline as well.

Training opportunities are constantly provided but sometimes there are overlaps. There are trainings being provided by different providers on the same topics. Staff members noted that the trainings have been good, but training needs assessments should be conducted within the BSC Monrovia in relation to the draft strategic plan, before new trainings are recommended. Furthermore, the timing of trainings should be considered in line with the normal operations of the BSC Monrovia.

BSC Monrovia's training for staff is set to situate the organisation to become the main site for business training and business development, and offer extended services that can also help with organisational sustainability.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.1.9.1 Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.

Description of the endline situation:
The biggest incentive for staff motivation within the BSC Monrovia has been the training opportunities for staff. There are plenty of opportunities for staff to keep them motivated, including significant training and travel opportunities abroad. Efforts to maintain and improve team communication and relations have also been undertaken. An example has been a team-building and stress management workshop organized in January 2014 at the request of the BSC staff, supported by SPARK. Staff members can also earn extra income through consultancy services where they benefit from their involvement in BSC Monrovia; this makes up for non-competitive salaries at BSC Monrovia.

The training incentives have been augmented by salary and fringe benefits such as health, transportation and communication allowances. The challenge has been recently that payments are not on time because remittance of funds by SPARK has been slower due to proposal writing procedures and financial reporting. The delay in remittance of funding has caused some issues especially with the running of projects and payment of remunerations of the staff. There has been a delay of funding from SPARK, which has led to the stretching of funds, and staff not being paid for 7 months as at the time of the endline evaluation. BSC Monrovia has acknowledged that this delay is partly due to late and faulty reporting.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.1.9.2 Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.

Description of the endline situation:
The funding outlook has changed positively due to the partnership with Chevron since 2013, helping the BSC in their target of getting funds from other sources than SPARK. There are other funding sources such as the BiD-Network. Though BiD-Network's funding is small they are consistent, and remittance of their funding is on time.

BSC Monrovia has now got multiple funding sources. The Chevron funding ($300,000) is for three years, and BSC Monrovia has just completed the first year of that project. They are still waiting to see if the Chevron project will continue, especially with the Tailor's Union ($20,000) for business development (training, business planning, business coaching and mentoring), which is funded by Chevron separately. Additional sources of funds include: the World Bank-funded YES project through the Ministry of Youth and Sports; consultancy for UNMIL national staff (providing business training, so when UNMIL leaves they can have business skills); $10,000 under the Goldman Sachs through CHF – 10,000 Women Programme.

By now, BSC Monrovia networks with a long list of Private Sector Development actors – both nationally and internationally – that's how they were able to garner most of these opportunities. However, it should be noted that SPARK has also been a key factor in the sourcing of these networks and funding: the Chevron contract was won due to networking of SPARK and the International Youth Foundation. SPARK often links the BSC Monrovia up with most of these opportunities by sharing information and invitations to network events, and guiding in the partnership engagement processes.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

3.1.9.3 Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.

Description of the endline situation:
Because BSC Monrovia is still developing operations manuals, there is still a low capacity to effectively compete for funding in accordance with accepted procedures. BSC Monrovia still requires assistance in developing fundraising procedures and developing marketable products and services.

SPARK has been very instrumental in sharing with the BSC Monrovia some of its procedures used in accessing external funding. They have shared their documents and BSC Monrovia is planning to adapt these to their local context in order to provide them with the edge to effectively apply for external funding.

To buttress the above, there is ongoing networking in the BSC Monrovia by both management and all staff. Networking by staff is via emails, working groups with government ministries, development partners, businesses and other clients networking with the BSC Monrovia to implement business development services. SPARK stated that networking for new projects had indeed become more effective and goal-oriented.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

3.1.10 Summary for capability to act and commit

BSC Monrovia has grown since the baseline in 2012. The organisation has added more hubs and employed people to lead those hubs. It has also provided training and is seemingly good at the programme side of the business. This is evident in the ability of the current leadership to continue the vision and the mission of the organisation with diminishing funding from SPARK. The leadership of the organisation has been taken up quite well by the current programme coordinator, who has been noted to have professionally stimulated, inspired, and guided staff of the BSC. SPARK has been increasingly withdrawing from operational management and giving the BSC a chance at the steering wheel. SPARK does keep an eye on new projects and gives advice. The current organisational structure now also better reflects staff roles and responsibilities since the involvement of SPARK in strategic and operational guidance has reduced since the baseline. A new strategic plan is currently being developed but there is no comprehensive M&E system that strategically guides the organisation in their decision making. Although networking and collecting information from the partners may inform their strategies.

Every staff member at BSC Monrovia has learned to do trainings and can now carryout trainings. It's now a policy at BSC Monrovia for each staff to have the capacity to do training. SPARK and BiD-Network have trained them in Liberia (and offered the possibility for individual trainings at other institutes), the Netherlands, Rwanda, and Ghana. This has led to a strong capacity building focus in the organisation. The continuous coaching and the relatively low staff turnover have also helped the staff capacity development of the BSC Monrovia. The overall enthusiasm for entrepreneurship in the UEC and at the SPARK head office also contributed to the staff capacity development. The training opportunities still are the main incentives for staff, since staff salaries are still not in line with the market. Furthermore, staff salaries have not been paid for seven months at the time of the endline due to inadequate proposals and financial reporting of BSC to SPARK, which delayed funding.

BSC Monrovia has got multiple funding sources, most notably via Chevron for expanding the number of Entrepreneurship Centres. However, it should be noted that SPARK has also been a key factor in the sourcing of these networks and funding. SPARK often links the BSC Monrovia up with most of these opportunities by sharing information and invitations to network events, and guiding in the partnership engagement processes. A funding procedure has not been developed yet but BSC, is planning to do that, with the support of related documents from SPARK. Strategic independency and organisational sustainability has been a main issue, particularly since it is trying to become more independent from SPARK.

Score: from 2.8 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.2 Capability to adapt and self-renew

3.2.1 M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organisational).

Description of the endline situation:
Until 2013, the BSC Monrovia used the “Balanced Scorecard” as its main approach for monitoring, to measure improvement and progress. This information was collected in for example overview of loanee sheets that were periodically updated. However, since 2013 BSC Monrovia also uses Salesforce software as the main key monitoring approach to keep up to date on progress of entrepreneurs. BSC Monrovia has dedicated a full time business coach/monitor to keep track of entrepreneur support projects and generate data for management decision-making purposes. The main value of the Salesforce software is that it provides indicators that show which entrepreneurs are defaulting and it shows more up to date snapshots of the progress and challenges. It helps the BSC to provide feedback that helps them improve their businesses. The BSC staff felt that the use of Salesforce increased the standards of reporting: it helped to manage information better and the information is much more up to date and organised. This made it easier for the staff working with Salesforce, such as the business coach, to write reports. The evaluation team asked about monitoring and evaluation systems at BSC. The staff explained that there is accurate monitoring taking place, mostly through the Salesforce software with regard to the Business Plan Competitions. SPARK bought the first Salesforce software to be piloted by BSC Monrovia, and it seems to have the further advantage that SPARK staff can access the information as well. In terms of monitoring and feedback on trainings the BSC uses student satisfaction forms.

Beside these tools, BSC also makes use of Market survey questionnaires and student satisfaction interviews to map needs of entrepreneurs, and to evaluate trainings and coaching sessions.

Monitoring is done by the provision of periodic updates and the production of monthly reports. The members of BSC field offices expressed that they were still using the balance score card.

The main problem with the M&E is that there are two systems being used for different reasons. One staff is in charge of fieldwork monitoring while another is in charge of monitoring entrepreneurs' progress. There are two systems for monitoring different kinds of projects. The staff member in charge of monitoring entrepreneurs and businesses has been assigned as the official BSC Monrovia business coach. She is now tasked with monitoring the SMEs using Salesforce. There is also a need to measure results and assess the growth of targeted businesses. On the whole there is a need to have a more comprehensive M&E system that helps to make informed strategic and operational decisions, although networking and collecting information on the external environment may inform strategic decisions.

Score: 2 to 3 (improvement)

3.2.2 M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.

Description of the endline situation:
The Project Coordinator and core staff members in Monrovia have undergone some M&E training and have gained some M&E skills. However, the members of the BSC recognize the need for more training and methods to apply M&E knowledge. They said that there is still need for considerable improvement, i.e., BSC Monrovia needs to develop performance indicators and templates with data management and understand the M&E strategies of the funding partners.

The business coach/monitoring officer has been trained and is considerably knowledgeable about using Salesforce to monitor and get feedback from clients. The Salesforce software was introduced by SPARK in 2013. SPARK mentioned that he felt that the staff's monitoring competencies have been improved.

Score: from 2 to 2,5 (slight improvement)

3.2.3 M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia is at this stage far away from having M&E in place that supports thinking through future strategies. The organisation currently uses two different approaches aimed at different kinds of monitoring and evaluation.

SPARK is helping BSC Monrovia to develop an M&E framework, e.g., the advisory board that provides expert business advice, and deployment of the Salesforce software that enables monitoring the business activities of clients, track performance, generate data to analyze business activities and provide timely advice and mentoring to clients.

Although the M&E and the subsequent reporting to donors has improved, using the M&E data for strategic decisions and interventions is not at the level it should be yet.

Score: from 2 to 2,5 (slight improvement)

3.2.4 Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

This is about whether staff talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staff are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia has developed a practice of holding meetings weekly at the beginning of the week, not only to discuss critical issues, but also to discuss the entire operations in terms of new plans, new ideas, and new ways of approaching targets geared toward consistently improving overall performance. With the help from SPARK, BSC Monrovia has designed new strategies on how to manage projects, relate to one another, and to know what is going on relative to achievement of the various objectives. SPARK stimulated this practice in order to control operating variables and deliver more effective services to clients. However, since there is no comprehensive M&E system in place that can guide the organisation strategically, these meetings tend to focus more on operational issues than strategic issues.

It is also indicated that meetings were better in 2012, as the entire team was at a central location. Now with the establishment of the outreach centres and the distance of staff from the central office, most meetings are by email, skype or phone. Meetings may not be regular but after every home-based activity there are meetings that reflect on the work. Discussions are mainly about prospects and challenges, but time specifically organised for reflection is limited.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

3.2.5 Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed and used.

Description of the endline situation:
All of the staff of BSC Monrovia has the opportunity to share new ideas and ways that they think could improve delivery of services based on, for example, their frequent contact with clients.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.2.6 System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organisation.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia has a system that tracks changes in the environment as it relates to developments in the private sector. They have a template to scan the operating environment twice a year. The template is an assessment form that is emailed to private sector development organisations and the National Investment Commission, to gather information about what has changed in the operating environment. BSC Monrovia uses the Survey Monkey online survey application to conduct surveys; and they also include their clients in this survey.

BSC Monrovia is heavily networked and partners provide information on trends. Besides this, the regional centres provide monthly reports on activities and these reports are circulated. Circulated reports to partners and networks prompt them to provide feedback on trends and activities. SPARK has also encouraged the BSC to participate in PSD meetings, forums, etc. in order for the organisation to keep abreast of the trends and changes in the sector. The BSC participated in the organisation of two conferences on MSME development in Liberia, and is part of an MSME working group led by the Ministry of Commerce. SPARK is a key actor connecting the BSC Monrovia to capacity building and funding partnership opportunities.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

3.2.7 Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.

Description of the endline situation:
The BSC uses formats at the end of trainings in order to ask participants what they have learned and whether their expectations have been met. The BSC Monrovia now officially has an advisory board, which they did not have at the time of the baseline in 2012. This is improving as they have regular meetings and referrals to advisory board members for business advices. Stakeholders like government, banks, and businesses work with BSC Monrovia.

The BSC Monrovia is now an active member of the Private Sector Committee on SME Development in Liberia. This membership enables the organisation to understand what the stakeholders want in terms of priorities and strategies, playing key roles in PSD in Liberia. BSC Monrovia now implements important PSD interventions; therefore, the stakeholders have a lot confidence in its capacity to effectively contribute to PSD in Liberia. An example of this is a programme funded by Chevron. BSC Monrovia has become well known, its work is widely known amongst stakeholders and partners. The BSC has also been linked to other actors in their field such as Building Markets, FED and Mercy Corps. The BSC is now present in Greater Monrovia, Bong, Grand Bassa and Maryland Counties at the universities and even in community colleges in Monrovia.

Active networking, in which the programme coordinator plays a big role, has helped get input from stakeholders on other possible programmatic connections and attracting more funding for the BSC. Due to active networking the BSC staff members are better informed on developments and trends within the SME climate and be more valuable coaches to the entrepreneurs that train with them .

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.2.8 Summary of the capability to adapt and self-renew

The BSC currently uses two different approaches aimed at different kinds of monitoring and evaluation: the balanced scorecard, and the recently introduced software Salesforce. Especially the use of Salesforce seems to have improved ways in which entrepreneurs are monitored and guided. The additional designation of a business coach/monitoring officer to focus on this process has contributed to improved progress reporting on entrepreneurs. In the past two years some M&E skills have been gained through LIPA training and SPARK guidance. BSC Monrovia is at this stage still far from having a comprehensive M&E system in place that can help to make informed strategic and operational decisions.

BSC Monrovia has developed a practice of holding meetings weekly at the beginning of the week, not only to discuss critical issues, but also to discuss the entire operations in terms of new plans, new ideas, and new ways of approaching targets geared towards consistently improving overall performance. Staff members feel they are able to contribute ideas and are encouraged to take responsibility. The relatively flat and open hierarchical structure stimulates this. When it comes to being in touch with trends within development environment the BSC has made steps may in terms of networking in relation to MSME development, and collecting information on the external environment from different stakeholders.

Score: from 2.6 to 3.1 (slight improvement)

3.3 Capability to deliver on development objectives

3.3.1 Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia has developed activity plans for all staff to carry out their various project activities. The activities in the work plans are guarded by the BSC, except for newly developed interventions. In these cases the advice and guidance of SPARK and BiD-Network is often still required. Many visits and other impromptu trainings by partners are not included in the planned activities. New interventions, like the plans to train health workers on Ebola-prevention measures, are still in the works.

Visits to BSC Monrovia showed many overlapping visits to BSC by partners and others, using strained staff to attend some activities not planned ahead.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.3.2 Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.

Description of the endline situation:
Resources are used in cost effective ways and according to the budgets. Through work plans, budgets, financial reports, timesheets and cash counting mechanisms the BSC keeps track of resource expenditures. Resources are limited, especially for the staff in the regional centres. Operational plans regarding resources and the effective use thereof are not clear: an example has been mentioned concerning the lack of clarity in addressing transportation needs.

Sometimes, delays in money transfers and the many visits by partners and others negatively affect the efficiency of the work at BSC Monrovia. Delays in money transfers sometimes have to do with the fact that receipts for financial reporting criteria are difficult to meet in informal business settings.

Score: from 3 to 2,5 (slight deterioration)

3.3.3 Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.

Description of the endline situation:
According to BSC management, 75% of planned outputs have been achieved over the past fiscal years. This can definitely be improved if funding delays can be decreased. Interviewed partners of the BSC suggested that the problem with management on the overall control of the project may not be due to partners' visits or interruptions, but rather be related to the management. This is because management should be the one telling the partners/visitors when the BSC is available for particular activities so as to avoid interruption of the work.

The BSC has been working on more projects since the baseline and staff report that most outputs have been delivered. However, it seems that delays in transfers of funding cause some difficulties in the implementation. A flexible and trustworthy relationship with the main donors has allowed for the BSC to be able to proceed with operations though.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.3.4 Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs

Description of the endline situation:
The organisation uses two and approaches for monitoring and evaluation. The balanced score card and Salesforce, both of them are mechanisms for measuring progress and ensuring that services meet clients' needs. The business coach/monitoring officer has been trained and is at the forefront of gauging impact of the training on entrepreneurs and business managers. This staff member is also involved in using the balanced score card method and receiving feedback on other projects in the field.

The BSC uses feedback questionnaires to allow students to show what they have learned and if their expectations were met. Other staff members have mentioned that regular interaction and visits have helped to get feedback from beneficiaries.

The establishment of the advisory board has also helped the organisation in accessing relevant business solutions for clients.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.3.5 Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia conducts performance reviews and it regularly monitors projects; and so they have up-to-date information and data on all projects. Documentation and sharing of information within the team has also improved a lot.

The organisation developed an update template that tracks the progress of projects and the quality of the outputs achieved, and then matches the inputs that have been made to produce the outputs achieved. SPARK also performs additional monitoring activities parallel to the BSC.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.3.6 Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available

Description of the endline situation:
The Salesforce software helps BSC Monrovia in monitoring and tracking clients' records and also provides information on gaps, payment of loans, and for BSC Monrovia it is a great monitoring tool. The use of Salesforce helps in making BSC Monrovia efficient in its provision of business development services.

The quality of the work is checked regularly, which gives rise to weekly monitoring through meetings.

The BSC Monrovia team noted that there is a weekly activity log and work plan used to monitor quality and efficiency. SPARK noted that consciousness about the balance between quality and efficiency has grown with experience.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

3.3.7 Summary of the capability to deliver on development objectives

In the last two years the BSC has seen an expansion in the number of programmes and projects as well as number of staff and operation areas. As such, more projects and Business Plan Competitions were held. On the whole it seems that according to BSC management 75% of planned outputs have been achieved over the past fiscal years. Funding transfers have affected cost-effective use of resources and efficiency of the work, but the BSC has managed to keep operations going through good communication and rapport with the main funders, and has been able to balance quality with efficiency of the work. Quality and efficiency are being monitored especially through the Salesforce software. Having operational plans in place has helped staff to deliver the outputs. But delays in funding and many visits and unexpected events from donors and partners, in addition to the many trainings, does keep staff distracted from their work.

Score: from 2.8 to 3.0 (very slight improvement)

3.4 Capability to relate

3.4.1 Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.

Description of the endline situation:
Since the baseline in 2012, there are more engagements with stakeholders, including IFC, banks, NIC, and the Corporate Responsibility Forum (CRF). BSC Monrovia engages these people on a regular basis. These stakeholders do not tell BSC Monrovia how to do their work but instead suggest to them on how to approach/do things related to the services that they provide. They suggest to BSC Monrovia what they think would help entrepreneurs.

The BSC policy procedures manual stated that the members of the BSC board come from various backgrounds in Liberian society, ranging from legal, educational, business and philanthropic orientations.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

3.4.2 Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia is joining new networks that are available but are not particularly the ones that have to do with entrepreneurship. The organisation is still part of the existing networks that have been improved. For example, the Association of Liberian Universities (ALU) is a collective that is targeted by BSC Monrovia in its entrepreneurial training programmes.

The BSC Monrovia is also trying to create a network of local investors. They have organized a programme called Finance Friday where on every last Friday stakeholders in finance, banking, and the general public can talk with entrepreneurs. It is a 2-hour programme. In the first hour entrepreneurs are lectured on specific topics, and then the next hour is for networking. The entrepreneurs meet bankers and people in the area of finance, find out where the problems are, and engage to work out issues.

The BSC Monrovia is part of a bigger network that involves a lot of higher level stakeholders and partners that are regularly at private sector development events, e.g., USAID/FED, SIDA, Building Markets, FED, Embassy of The United States of America, German Embassy, IFC, World Bank, Transtec, UNESCO, UNDP, Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Other international organisations and companies that the BSC has been into contact with include the Netherlands Africa Business Council (NABC), GIZ, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Swedish Embassy, Women Campaign International, Google West Africa Office, Philips, Bosh Bosh Project, Developing Market Associates, Humanity United and Virgin Unite.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

3.4.3 Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.

Description of the endline situation:
Logistical concerns were cited as the number one reason why frequent visits to target groups have been diminishing since the baseline. This reduction can also be based on delays of funding. But to improve on engagement with target groups through the monitoring visits, for the past two years BSC Monrovia has designed a strategy to engage target groups either by visitation or phone and email communications, where feasible. To do this, the BSC Monrovia set up a routine that every staff is assigned a certain number of clients to communicate with via phone or personal visit at least once a month; each staff has a batch of clients. The staff share the information gathered from the different batches of entrepreneurs through email exchanges. The CFA noted that the use of Salesforce software has made the engagement with their target group more frequent and structured.

Coupled with the above, BSC Monrovia now has outreach or regional centres. This is an effort to reach out to the target groups in rural areas. There were no such centres before the baseline in 2012. The project team and M&E staff also make frequent visits to these target groups in order to keep them engaged.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

3.4.4 Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

How do staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?

Description of the endline situation:
There is a need to improve relationships within the organisation since the organisation is growing.

For staff outside of Monrovia, the organisation relies on the exchange of information through emails. The BSC is a very young organisation, both in terms of its staff and the time that it has been in existence. It has an open and non-hierarchal structure, which facilitates communication and sharing of ideas, and making decisions together. A team-building workshop in 2014 has also helped to strengthen this.

The relationship amongst staff is good and staffers relate very well. The staff is allowed to be creative and innovative. The staff is free to contribute to the strategic implementation of projects. Decision-making is done through meetings and also by individual staff working on projects.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.4.5 Summary of the capability to relate

During the endline assessment it was clear that the BSC was working on increasing their connections, networks and partners. The past two years have seen the development of a local investor network, co-organisation of MSME conferences in cooperation with large donors and the Liberian government and expansion of current partnerships. Though the BSC still relies on SPARK and BiD-Network for support in finding and operating new programmes, developments show that the BSC is increasingly able to access local and national networks and opportunities. Interaction with stakeholders and beneficiaries has improved somewhat due to having regional centres, communicating by phone to clients, and by having regular field visits. Being a young organisation and the flexible and open organisational structure gives staff members space to share new ideas.

Score: from 4 to 4.3 (slight improvement)

3.5 Capability to achieve coherence

3.5.1 Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia is in the process of revisiting its vision, mission and strategic plan with assistance from the MDF and SPARK, incorporating new projects in furtherance of recent programmes. Staff is being involved in these revisions. The vision is still the provision of business development support and SME development. This is evident in the programmes and competitions and trainings provided by BSC Monrovia. There are more programmes than before the baseline in 2012.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.5.2 Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.

Description of the endline situation:
BSC Monrovia has developed a draft Policy Procedures Manual (latest version in August 2014) that includes policy documentation such as Human Resource management, finance, administration and programme management. These were missing at the time of the baseline. The draft operational procedures manual has been written and updated parallel to the development of the new strategic plan. SPARK has assisted the BSC Monrovia with the development of the operational manual – SPARK shared their operational manual that the BSC adapted for its use. The HR guidelines are now available to all staff and used in processes. There is also a manual which is used for day-to-day operations.

The main issue captured along the way was for the organisation to make active use of these documents and improve the versions along the way when changes arise: for now it seems that the activities and projects taking place are leading.

The new draft operational manual has been updated and elaborated to consider different aspects of the organisation such as HRM, Finance and administration, Programme management. However, partners noted that the full HRM policy has yet to be put in place.

Score: from 3 to 4 (improvement)

3.5.3 Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.

Description of the endline situation:
Most of BSC Monrovia's projects and activities are clearly aligned with strategic documents, contacts and operational procedures.

About 75% of the projects are aligned with the vision and mission to support entrepreneurship development through coaching, mentoring, facilitating match-making and helping with access to finance. The other projects slightly diverge in terms of target group and places of engagement. For example, the contract with the Literacy and Training for Employment Programme is to train youth that are at the level of secondary school students, whereas the BSC Monrovia's target groups are people in the age range of 18-40 years. BSC Monrovia is contemplating a slight revision of the vision and mission to take this age-deviation into consideration. Since the BSC mainly targets University and Colleges, to deal with secondary school students is a slight deviation from its mission. But this is a key demographic since many of these secondary students become target group members upon entry into any of the universities and colleges.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.5.4 Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.

Description of the endline situation:
There are new partners on board that contribute to similar activities, e.g., IYF, Accountability Lab, iLab, and Mercy Corps. BSC shares an office with SPARK (for the meantime) and Accountability Lab. Tasks and responsibilities are shared among core staff members. Projects activities are mutually supportive. BSC Monrovia is able to share resources to the end result, for example, the Chevron programme was deliberately aligned with the MFS II programme, and the World Bank's BDS programme was deliberately situated to develop the training skills of the BSC Monrovia. The work that the BSC is doing with the County Entrepreneurship centres expanded the reach of the BSC initiatives such as the Business Plan Competitions, business modules and life skills trainings. The contract with the Tailor Union to provide business skills training and coaching for those members that are eligible for a grant (also with Chevron) is an example of how a project falls in line with the overall BSC programme.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

5.3.1 3.5.5 Summary of the capability to achieve coherence

Since the baseline the BSC has greatly tried to build systems and strategies in order to operate in post 2015. Efforts were supported by SPARK and BiD-Network to develop services and build organisational capacity. Strategising sessions were held, new services and products are being thought up, and a strategic document is currently being developed. In line with this process, operations manual (including issues like HRM, finances, administration and programme management) has been updated and elaborated upon.

Whilst projects, strategies and associated operations are aligned with the vision and mission of the organisation, there are opportunities for projects funded by new donors that are not completely in line with the vision and mission. BSC is considering revising the vision and mission in line with a broadened scope of work. Different donors contribute resources to similar project activities and as such project activities are mutually supportive. Different donors contribute resources to similar project activities in order to address the bigger picture. Funding from different donors impact the development of entrepreneurial competencies amongst new entries and also strengthen those of current business practitioners. An example of this is very clear in the work with Chevron, as the initiation of three regional offices enables the BSC to offer similar projects and services in those areas. As such, Business Plan Competitions, basic business training modules and life skills training have been offered there.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

Below you can find a description of the key changes in organisational capacity of BSC since the baseline as expressed by BSC staff during the endline workshop. First, a description is given of how this topic was introduced during the endline workshop by summarising key information on BSC from the baseline report. This information includes a brief description of the vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, staff situation, clients and partner organisations. This then led into a discussion on how the organisation has changed since the baseline. In appendix 5 two specific organisational outcomes were examined through process tracing to see if and how these had changed, and what were the reasons for these changes. For BSC these were the 'competencies for training and facilitation', and the 'capacity for programme management'; both within the capability to act and commit.

The endline workshop started on the 7th of July 2014 at the BSC office in Monrovia. During this workshop, the staffs present were asked how they thought the organisation had changed since the baseline. This was done after the recap of the original vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, as described in the baseline report.

The BSC staff were asked to write down the key changes that have happened at the BSC in the last 2 years since the baseline. A lot has happened since the baseline, and some of the changes mentioned are described below :

- Increased training possibilities given to staff; Increased number of training modules offered;
- Training and facilitation skills developed and enhanced for many staff;
- Staff number was increased;
- BSC becoming better known in central Liberia;
- Number of centres increased: now the BSC is located in Gbarnga, Buchanan, Harper;
- More partners and clients working with the BSC. Examples were:
  - International Youth Foundation and Chevron to provide life skills training in three counties;
  - Yes Programme with SPARK: 240 entrepreneurs trained in 12 counties;
  - Cooperation with the Accountability Lab - on the Social Impact Tour for instance;
  - IT Business Plan Competition (BPC) to stimulate IT entrepreneurs - together with Lonestar telecom and iLAB;
  - BSC Academy;
  - Branson Scholarship programme;
  - Project with the National Liberian Tailor Union;
  - More synergy and teambuilding within the BSC team.

Many of the issues noted were related to the training of staff and, according to the group present, many staff members were now able to give trainings and facilitation sessions. Since 2012 these training and facilitation skills had been enhanced for the programme coordinator, the business coach/monitoring officer and the finance/administrative officer who had already been there for a while. The other, newer staff, had developed training and facilitation skills since they joined the organisation in 2013 and 2014. The programme coordinator stressed that this was essential: he reasoned that if the BSC becomes very good at giving trainings, at facilitating and helping entrepreneurs, then the BSC also becomes better able to go out and market itself, and get possibilities for funding and income. He said that there are more clients and funders, so the other important issue was 'improved networking skills & practices (for partnership development)'. This was mainly so for the programme coordinator, the business coach/monitoring officer and the finance/administrative officer.

Another staff member pointed at the introduction and use of Salesforce to monitor the activities of the entrepreneurs that the BSC is supporting: saying that this, together with some training, has given them a slightly more 'effective monitoring system'. This was called effective because the previous method for monitoring with the balanced score card was deemed ineffective.

During the workshop there was a discussion on the topic of organisational structure of the BSC, and that a number of key changes had happened which contributed to this. It was also agreed that some attention should be paid to the fact that the staff number had increased and that there were different BSC centres in three other counties. Also, efforts had been made to develop strategic ideas and develop the operational manual. Furthermore, the following areas had improved since the baseline in 2012: expansion of BSC offices and programmes; improvement of strategy and operational documentation; and improved team relations and internal communication. These changes are further discussed below.

For the development of the general causal map see also the visual below. The discussion was focused on two key issues: improved networking skills & practices [1] and a slightly more effective monitoring system [2]. Three additional issues related to expansion of BSC offices and programmes [3], improvement of strategy and operational documentation [4], and improved team relations and internal communication [5]. In this exploration of the general changes in the organisational capacity, the issues related to enhanced training and facilitation competencies [6] (another important area of change since the baseline) have been temporarily been exempted: these will be discussed in a separate, more extensive, process tracing causal map further on (see section after the general causal map). This to decrease the amount of double information presented, and to limit the amount of information per map.

In the causal maps the attempt is made to trace back key capacity outcomes to competencies and activities, and to factors and other underlying causes. Whilst the general causal map is mainly based on discussions during the endline workshop, additional information is added from additional sources. For the process tracing related causal maps, which are more detailed, sources are also being provided. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The bottom of the causal map shows the most important underlying causes, opportunities and constraints that have influenced the changes in organisational capacity. Certain key influencing causes and external developments that have substantially impacted the organisation are listed in the round boxes at the bottom in light green. The narrative first discusses the key organisational capacity changes listed at the top of the visual. Consequently, for each of these organisational capacity changes, the underlying causes will be explained from the top down, and from left to right.

The main underlying influencing factors and causes of changes in BSCs organisational capacity are related to the efforts made with the MFS II funding support [14]. From the beginning of the MFS II period SPARK and BiD-Network have strongly put focus on developing the BSC as an organisation, but also to develop the competencies of staff members. Part of the key incentives to motivate staff, as already noted in the baseline, were the many trainings planned from the beginning and the various opportunities that BSC staff members were stimulated to take. Both SPARK and, to a lesser extent, BiD-Network played important and influential roles in this. An important motivation that has guided the BSC since the baseline has been the expected need to become sustainable as an organisation and in relation to that to diversify funding sources [37]. For instance, in the yearly contracts with the United Entrepreneurship Coalition (UEC) the BSC is expected to contribute own funding and to work on independent strategic plans.


Increased funding possibilities [8]
BSC staff is resourceful and updated on newest developments and trends [9]
New ideas for programmes and collaborations [10]
Training and facilitation competencies developed and enhanced [6]
Better progress reporting towards donors [25]
Direct communication and coaching with entrepreneurs [26]
Other factors and more details in the Process tracing causal map
Increased connections [7]
Increased networking skills and practices (Mostly core staff) [1]
Slightly more effective monitoring system [2]
Expansion of BSC offices and programmes [3]
Improvement of strategy and concretising organsational procedures [4]
Improved team relations and internal communication [5]
Knowledge on how to network and negotiate [11]
Knowledge and practice in social networking and marketing [15]
Salesforce used since March 2013 [27]
Designated business coach role since end of 2013 [28]
Better understanding of monitoring processes [31]
Buchanan office (opened 2013) and Harper and Bong offices (April 2014) financed [33]
BSC strategic plan, operationl manual developed Finance and HR protocols adapted [38]
More synergy and better communication among the staff of BSC [40]
Opportunities to network in SA [20]
Business coach learned how to manage and engage relations with entrepreneurs [21]
Slow performance in loan repayment of BPC winners Hesitancy of banks to provide new ones [29]
Need for a proper monitoring system Before: balance scorecard did not seem to be working [30]
Chevron funding to expand operations to build SME capacity since April 2013 [34]
MDF Strategic planning workshop in September 2012 [39]
Teambuilding workshop By Hanson Alp Jan. 2014 [41]
Training in networking and negotiation skills BiD Network (April 2013) [12]
International entrepreneurship University summer course in Tilburg Programme coordinator (June-July 2013) [16]
Programme coordinator attended Expert Panel Forum conference on Entrepreneurship in Post-conflict settings in the Netherlands (Sept 2013) [18]
Visit of Office Manager to Dakar, Senegal for a regional meeting to present a project with ILAB 2014 [19]
Advanced entrepreneurship training for 17 entrepreneurs in South Africa Business coach attends 2014 [22]
General attendance of many meetings, events, informal interactions with stakeholders (programme coordinator but also other staff) [24]
LIPA training in Monitoring and Evaluation January 2013 Programme coordinator and business coach [32]
Members of staff were stressed due to workload [42]
BiD network Support [13]
Need to get ideas on what Liberians need to have or know to transact globally [17]
Branson Scholarship Programme launched through SPARK networking with Humanity United and Virgin Unite 2013 [23]
Bid/contact by SPARK and International Youth Foundation [35]
Need to engage in new partnerships to access funding and become competitive [36]
MFSII Coalition partners build capacity of local partners [14]
Striving for sustainability - Need to diversify revenue [37]

Increased networking skills and practices

A key organisational capacity change that was discussed during the development of the General Causal Map was the aspect of networking. Especially the programme coordinator was very sure that these skills had increased in the past two years [1]. He said that this was very important since improved networking skills could lead to more connections [7] and more funding being attracted [8]. Also, due to engaging in networking, BSC staff members are better informed on developments and trends within the SME climate and be more valuable coaches to the entrepreneurs that train with them [9]. The programme coordinator added examples of various networks the BSC is engaging in such as the USAID network which gave the BSC access to a Literacy and Training for Employment (LTEP) programme contract bid. The programme coordinator said that he had discussions with the World Bank and USAID about other projects related to SME and the development of new project bids. The new programme areas with USAID seemed to be related to youth, health issues, etc. Such experiences are valuable for the BSC as it also gives impulses to develop new and improved proposal templates with which to officially bid for contracts (Source: Project Proposal From BSC Monrovia 2014-2015). A third aspect which was deemed valuable when it came to improved networking skills related to the possibility to get new ideas for programmes and collaborations [10]. An example of this was the IYF and Chevron programme launched from January 2013 until December 2013. A second example was the organisation of two MSME conferences in April 2013 and April 2014 in cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce at the Monrovia City Cooperation building. These conferences opened up pathways to new programme discussions and partnerships. Ideas such as an IT Business Plan Competition arose through discussions with iLAB for example.

Generally it seems that networking for new projects falls mostly to the senior staff such as the programme coordinator, the business coach/monitoring officer and the finance/administrative officer. But also the programme staff have said that networking is part of their everyday activities - the Bong County officer stated that when he is working in Gbarnga, on the Cuttington University Campus, a lot of his work includes communication and awareness raising. The other two county officers agreed.

The staff members said that they had gained some knowledge on how to negotiate and how to network since they came to work for the BSC [11]. They said that a training from BiD-Network on networking and negotiation skills (in April 2013) was valuable to them as it gave them some ideas on how to find financing and how best to approach financiers [12]. BiD-Network guidance was given to them during this training as part of the BiD-Network coaching role [13], as part of the initiatives of the MFS II partners to build the capacity of local partners [14].

A second component that contributed to the improved networking skills and practices of the BSC related to knowledge and practice in social networking and marketing [15], based on a range of different events. Especially the programme coordinator mentioned two examples that improved his networking skills. The first was an International Entrepreneurship Programme, a summer course at the University of Tilburg in 2013, where he attended a month training in international entrepreneurship and had extensive possibilities to network with other course participants and international business relations [16]. This programme involved lectures and workshops on decision-making, intercultural negotiation and sales skills (Source: IEP Tilburg Course Schedule 2013). One of the key reasons he stated that motivated him to attend the summer school was that he (and the BSC) needed to get more ideas on ways in which Liberians and Liberian businesses can upscale and act internationally, through funding and partnership building, but also in what manner to conduct business internationally [17]. The second event which helped with practice in social networking and marketing was the SPARK Expert Panel Forum in the Netherlands. This forum was a conference on entrepreneurship in post-conflict settings in September 2013 and the programme coordinator was invited by SPARK to attend [18].

The experiences of other staff members were also shared. The assistant project coordinator and office manager visited a regional meeting on business incubation in Senegal. He presented some of the BSCs work with iLAB. This was a good opportunity for him to meet relevant stakeholders within the business incubation field [19]. He indicated that he also received training in incubation from various experts present at the regional meeting. The business coach/monitoring officer said that one of the main practices she had gained was to be able to network in South Africa [20] while travelling there as a business coach with 17 Liberian entrepreneurs. This experience contributed to increased knowledge in how to manage and engage in relations with international entrepreneurs [21]. This trip was geared towards advanced entrepreneurship training and networking and was organised through the Branson Scholarship Programme [22]. This project came about when SPARK staff travelled to San Francisco to meet people from Humanity United and Virgin Unite in 2013. Some of these representatives later visited the BSC in Liberia and were very positive about the centre. They wanted to work with businesses that the BSC worked with for a longer time, and had shown potential to operate internationally. These 'advanced entrepreneurs' needed to have been in business for more than 5 years, but need an extra push to become international, top Liberian companies [23].

The programme coordinator indicated that it was difficult to judge whether certain skills or knowledge in networking came from specific events. The fact that staff has been able to attend many meetings, events, informal interactions with stakeholders is immensely valuable to improve organisational networking and to practice that. The nature of the work the BSC engages in stimulates these kind of activities as well [24].

Slightly more effective monitoring system

The members of the BSC said that in the past years the monitoring system has been improved somewhat [2]. The programme coordinator noted that the reporting towards donors has improved: the BSC has more up to date and accurate information on their entrepreneurs, and is better able to show to potential donors what they are doing and what progress is made [25]. By having constant and direct engagement with entrepreneurs, and by focusing on this designated task the business coach/monitoring officer has increased her monitoring experience and practices [26].

This discussion mainly circled around the introduction of the Salesforce software programme [27] and the specific designation of one staff member as the BSC business coach since 2013 [28]. The business coach is also partially called the monitoring officer.

Salesforce is a software programme that makes it easier and quicker to share information on business indicators. These two developments were introduced due to the discovery that the BSC and SPARK needed to be better able to see how the Business Plan Competition grant and loan winners were managing their businesses and repaying their loans to the bank (for a documented example of the guidance plan for loanees see: Overview of loanees over time October 2012). These loans are guaranteed by SPARK, but in 2013 Liberian bank which was part of the agreement became more hesitant to give out loans and added extra demands [29]. The reason they stated for this was the slow rate of repayment by the first BPC winners. Since then SPARK and BSC have been searching for solutions, starting new ways of access to finance via the SPARK Ignite fund (Source: SPARK Annual Report for 2013, final version June 2014: page 20). In the past the balance-scorecard was used to monitor the BPC participants, but according to staff members this method did not seem to be working as hoped for (Source: Balance Scorecard BSC Monrovia). In addition to the balance scorecard an extra mechanism was sought by SPARK and the BSC. Thus, there was a need for a new system to be in direct contact with the entrepreneurs and be more up to date with their information [30]. The business coach was assigned to actively focus on this monitoring. She said that one of the advantages of Salesforce software is that it is also accessible for SPARK staff. With the support of the Salesforce software they look for four indicators: quantity of customers, customer satisfaction, profitability (internal organisation, process) and learning experience (what has the entrepreneur learned).

The business coach said that in addition to the previous aspects she also somewhat increased her knowledge of monitoring processes in the last years since the baseline [31]. Both the programme coordinator and the business coach/monitoring officer attended a training in monitoring and evaluation at LIPA in January 2013 [32], and this helped with additional knowledge on monitoring processes. The programme coordinator noted that this training was useful for introducing new ways of monitoring and evaluating. However, he also said that not all his expectations were met due to the fact that he was already applying certain principles in his work and that he had hoped for more (Source: Training Participant perspective BSC Liberia M&E LIPA). This training was supported financially by SPARK [12]. The CFA wrote that this LIPA training contributed to a more sustained understanding of monitoring processes and helped to improve the use of Salesforce (Annex B Support to capacity sheet CFA perspective: reference 18). On these local trainings by LIPA the CFA noted that they are useful to further build capacity in response to BSCs needs (Source: Annex B Support to capacity sheet CFA perspective: reference 10).

Expansion of BSC offices and programmes

The expansion of the BSC offices, staff and programmes since the baseline was an important improvement since the baseline according to the participants of the workshop [3]. The BSC was able to open three new offices in Gbarnga in Bong, Buchanan in Grand Bassa and Harper, Maryland [33]. The office in Buchanan was opened in 2013, and the other offices opened in April 2014. This was made possible due to funding from Chevron through SPARK and IYF [34]. The SME Entrepreneurship Centres were able to be brought to these areas through a bid by SPARK and IYF in which the BSC was a sub-contractor [35]. Additional motivation to enter in this project was that it was possible to upscale activities and diversify funding [36]. These options arose through intermediation and support of SPARK, while at the same time a motivation or push towards becoming financially sustainable and independent from SPARK [37].

Improvement of strategy and operational documentation

Parallel to these organisational developments, the BSC worked on improving its own organisational strategy and concretising organisational procedures [4]. The BSC also amended and improved several of the policy documents and these were incorporated in the Policy Procedures manual: operational guidance, human resources , finance protocols [38]. MDF played an important role in the strategizing process, coaching the BSC during several visits and running a workshop on strategic planning in September 2012 [39]. During these visits and the workshop issues such as strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and potential visions and strategies were brainstormed on. Tips were given on how to develop a strategic plan and how to structure such a document (this became clearer due to documents provided by MDF). Currently the strategic plan is under development but the draft Policy Procedures Manual was recently updated in August 2014. In the manual, chapters such as the role of the Board of Directors, organisational structure, asset management, financial management and human resources have been taken up (Source: Draft BSCM Organisational Policy Procedures Manual 11-8-14). One of the key reasons they mentioned why this was important was that if the BSC is going to be fully independent in the future, key policy and strategy documents are needed [37].

Improved team relations and internal communication

When talking about the internal dynamics of the organisation many of the staff felt that as a whole, communication has improved within the BSC as well [5]. They felt that this was important for the development of the organisation. The team collaboration and synergy has improved a lot, especially in 2014 with improved coordination, a more relaxed work atmosphere, and staff members being more open towards each other [40]. The BiD-Network advisor wrote that the support of BiD-Network and SPARK did not only focus on training. Many efforts were made with the SPARK country manager to build a team at BSC. A lot of effort was put into building the relationships within the team, growing their confidence as an organization and with different types of stakeholders, in negotiating proposals and improving internal systems (Source: Questionnaire training BiD-Network perspective: reference 4) [14]

One of the county project officers mentioned that one of the key activities that helped to work on this was a teambuilding training they had at the beginning of the year 2014 [41]. Apparently at the end of 2013 many of the BSC staff were feeling overworked and stressed [42]. After consultation with the contact person from SPARK, all the staff members were able to do a three-day teambuilding session on January 2014 with Peter Hanson Alp, a local consultant [41] (Source: Summary of the teambuilding and stress management sessions with BSC Liberia). The BSC staff members reported that this session was very valuable to practice stress management, teambuilding exercises and improve team spirit.

Appendix 5 Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

During the endline process, key organisational capacity changes have been identified in the following capabilities: capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew. These two capabilities have been chosen for the purpose of process tracing since these are the two capabilities that have most frequently been targeted by the CFAs. The organisational capacity changes that have been identified are based on a potential link with MFS II supported capacity development activities in these two capabilities, and on a variety of sources (secondary data as well as endline workshop data). The process tracing methodology has been adapted to the purpose of this evaluation and to investigate closely the underlying causes for these identified organisational capacity changes, and the extent to which these changes can be attributed to MFS II supported organisational capacity strengthening activities .

For BSC the following organisational capacity changes have been identified for the purpose of understanding the attribution:

- Capability to act and commit: 'Improvement in training and facilitation competencies'
- Capability to adapt and self-renew: 'Slightly improved programme management capacity'

Capability to act and commit - outcome 'enhanced training and facilitation competencies'
This topic was discussed quite extensively with the BSC staff due to the sheer number of trainings that they have had on these topics, or topics that they put to practice in their work through facilitating trainings. The examination of these trainings overlapped greatly with the process tracing segment planned for the next day. Therefore, the discussions on this topic during the development of the general causal map, were supplemented with points added during the second day. A separate causal map has been developed, focusing on exploring what makes the BSC staff better trainers and facilitators, where that comes from, and what kind of evidence they had for the issues mentioned.

The discussion initially started with a list of trainings and events they had taken part in the past couple of years (listed in brown boxes in the visual below).

- Training in Facilitation skills by Triodos Facet - in 2012 and in 2013 [9];
- Training in Business Development Services by Triodos Facet in November 2012 [9];
- Training in facilitation skills by MDF in Accra Ghana - September 2012 [10];
- International Youth Foundation trainings: Build Your Business (2013, all staff) [21], Passport to Success [22];
- Technical assistance training by Investing in Business Expansion (IBEX - USAID) in 2013, for the business coach/monitoring officer [15];
- BiD-Network advisory support trainings;
- Business pitching and match-making in 2014 [18];
- Ready to Finance (ToT); 2012, 2013, 2014 [25];
- International Entrepreneurship training in the Netherlands (Tilburg) for the programme coordinator - June/July 2013 [28];
- Expert panel forum conference on entrepreneurship in post-conflict settings, attended by programme coordinator, September 2013 [29];
- InfoDev training on Business Incubation - August 2013 [32];
- Visit of assistant project coordinator/office manager to Dakar (Senegal) with ILAB conference on business incubation 2014 [33].

The desire to be sustainable was one of the main underlying reasons for many of these trainings, both from the perspective of BSC and SPARK. The project coordinator explained that funding currently comes from the Dutch government, but it is important for the BSC to ask itself: "how can we also bring something to the table"? He explained that one of the skills needed to get income is to become great trainers and facilitators. As such the overall training and facilitation skills were enhanced in the past two years [1]. "If we become good in that, we become able to offer our services to earn income". Examples of this are the contracts with the Tailor Union (currently ongoing since 2013 with support of Chevron), and Literacy and Training for Employment (LTEP) programme (negotiated just before the endline) to provide services to entrepreneurs and work on development of SME. With that in mind the Dutch CFA SPARK has set its objective to build the capacity of the local partners. It was also mentioned earlier that the BSC needs to contribute independent funding as the MFS II period ends.

Due to the role which BSC seeks to play as a training and supporting centre for entrepreneurship development in Liberia the improved competencies to provide business skills training and coaching has led to more context-specific and direct coaching, with more entrepreneurs reached [2]. This was noted as a consequence of better training and facilitation skills in order to give high level business skills training (SPO Support to capacity sheet: reference 2), but also by the CFA who mentioned that the BSC are providing more services to the entrepreneurs they support (CFA assessment sheet: reference 1). On investment, the BiD-network advisor wrote that the trainings related to investment enabled BSC to be prepared to work together with entrepreneurs and SMEs with more growth potential (Questionnaire training BiD-Network perspective: reference 1). The CFA felt that the active participation and cooperation of SPARK and BSC have made the services that the BSC offers more context specific and therefore more effective (CFA Support to capacity sheet SPARK: reference 20).

According to BSC staff, key changes that came as a result of the improved training and facilitation competencies were that during the past years more programmes had been organised, such as regular BPCs in which more entrepreneurs were coached. As an example Business Plan competitions have been organised frequently since 2011, and now also in the 3 other counties BSC is also active. In addition different theme BPCs are planned - general, but also agricultural and IT-themed BPCs together with partners (Source: BSC Monrovia Workplan 2014; Overview of Loanees over time Oct 2012) [3]. More coaching and training has been done: for example, SPARK wrote in its Annual Report of 2013 that through the YES programme with the World Bank, together with the BSC 250 SMEs in Liberia were shortly trained in Business Development Services (Source: SPARK Annual Report 2013). Furthermore, the experience and the fact that the team has expanded had given the BSC the opportunity to search for more programmes and funding within their field. They can now refer to their credentials to gain new opportunities [4]. SPARK acknowledged this last aspect. He noted that BSC is now a more active and knowledgeable partner in the SME landscape in Liberia. He stated that that BSC has been invited to be a member of the MSME working group with the Ministry of Commerce (CFA assessment sheet SPARK: reference 8). This increased competence to deliver training and coaching to entrepreneurs has significantly improved their position amongst stakeholders (CFA assessment sheet SPARK: reference 9).

These training and facilitation skills are separated into two main categories: process (improved training and facilitation competencies [5]) and content (improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge [6]). How each of these changes came about is further explained below.



More context-specific trainings and direct coaching of entrepreneurs [2]
Able to provide Business Plan competitions, coach more entrepreneurs [3]
Build networks and expand into more programme areas [4]
Enhanced training and facilitation competencies [1]
Improved training and facilitation competencies [5]
Improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge [6]
Recognizing group energy levels and responses [7]
New professional training methodologies - more of a facilitation approach [8]
Ideas on material development and localizing training modules [12]
Entrepreneurship development knowledge [21]
Ideas on business incubation at BSC Letting SME people use facilities, testing the possibilities for incubation [31]
Business coach learned how to manage and engage relations with entrepreneurs [35]
BSC staff is resourceful and updated on newest developments and trends within the SME landscape [37]
Attention to local needs and getting feedback from participants [13]
Market study questionnaires for entrepreneurial training needs assessment [14]
Development of business training modules [15]
Knowledge on international corporate entrepreneurship, social networking and marketing [28]
Knowledge of business incubation [32]
Experience coaching entrepreneurs with the Branson Scholarship programme 2013-2014 [36]
Increased networking skills (Mostly core staff) [38]
Triodos Facet training in facilitation skills and Business Development Services November 2012 October 2013 [9]
MDF training in facilitation skills in Ghana September 2012 Programme coordinator and finance officer [10]
IBEX-USAID technical assistance training Business coach 2013 [16]
BiD Network Pitching and Matchmaking trainings [19]
Build your Business training For the whole BSC team 2013 [22]
Passport to Success Training Whole team 2013 [23]
Bid Network ToT Ready to finance 2012,2013,2014 [26]
International entrepreneurship University summer course in Tilburg Programme coordinator June-July 2013 [29]
Programme coordinator attended an Expert Panel Forum conference on Entrepreneurship in Post-conflict settings Sept 2013 [30]
InfoDev Incubation training Aug 2013 [33]
Visit of Office Manager to Dakar, Senegal with ILAB, and also received training in incubation 2014 [34]
Need to engage in new partnerships to access funding and become competitive [17]
BiD network Capacity support [20]
Programme with IYF and the Chevron CSR fund Since April 2013 For the building of SME capacity in Liberia [24]
Need to know what investors like to see in an entrepreneur [27]
MFSII Coalition partners build capacity of local partners [11]
Striving for sustainability Need to reduce funding from Dutch MFS [18]
Bid/contact by SPARK and International Youth Foundation 2013 [25]

Improved training and facilitation competencies

SPARK distinguished that the training competencies of the BSC staff have been developed, as well as their coaching, mentoring and monitoring competencies (CFA Assessment sheet SPARK: reference 1). The BiD-Network advisor said that she observed that during trainings delivered by the BSC staff they not only applied some of the methodologies and examples practiced during training sessions, but also made them their own and complementary to other trainings (Questionnaire training BiD-Network: reference 3). SPARK noted that the programme coordinator of the BSC, had become a better trainer as well (CFA support to capacity sheet: reference 12).

In relation to training and facilitation competencies, all the members of the BSC, including the three county project coordinators, are able to give trainings and facilitate sessions to the same standards. Some of the skills and practices they picked up as part of facilitation competencies included being able to recognize and read their participants, able to see their energy levels [7]; being able to apply facilitation techniques rather than maintaining too much of a lecturing style [8]; being able to adapt to participant levels and needs and yet remain in control of the session. The BSC staff has worked more with different methods and modules to address the needs of almost every sort of participant [12].

For these key competencies the trainings by MDF [10] and Triodos Facet [9] were named as instrumental to the BSC staff. A Triodos Facet training on business development services took place in November 2012 and another training by took place in October 2013 [9] for all staff members. Due to this 'business skills training and facilitation training' by Triodos Facet in October 2013 the BSC noted new skills and methods were developed (SPO Support to capacity sheet: reference 9). SPARK reported that due to this training by Triodos Facet the BSC staff have received better knowledge and skills in relation to general facilitation and training (CFA support to capacity sheet: reference 13).

MDF gave trainings on facilitation skills in 2012 in Accra, Ghana [10]. The BSC was represented by the programme coordinator and financial officer in Ghana, and they both said they got insights and practical advice in facilitation techniques, modules and methods. On the facilitation training by MDF the programme coordinator wrote that the BSC has now changed from giving traditional trainings to more organised trainings (Questionnaire training participant Programme coordinator - Training and Facilitation: reference 1). In the Facilitation Techniques training by MDF West Africa in September 2012 the BSC was exposed to basic facilitation techniques (SPO Support to capacity sheet: reference 3). These trainings were planned by SPARK and BSC with MDF and Triodos Facet before the baseline as part of the trajectory to build the capacity of the BSC [11].

The BSC staff mentioned that they also try to customize material and locally adapt their trainings [9]. This is aided by the use of a combination of knowledge from international trainings and getting feedback from their participants to learn about their weaknesses and strengths [13]. The BSC staff members gained insight in the need to make training material demand driven through the necessity of feedback sessions, careful development of training techniques (audio, visual, activity), and the SMART formulation of training objectives. These topics were mainly discussed during the Triodos Facet training November 2012 [9] (Source: Triodos Facet MFSII Mission Report Liberia Nov 2012). During this training they also practiced how to approach adult education and learned about the training cycle through various interactive exercises.

Another example of what was taken up related to localizing training was mentioned by the finance/administrative officer. She said that BSC now understood that it was also important to do research before the trainings are given, to explore the backgrounds and beginning situations of the participants. Two examples were shared with the evaluation team: an interview form to receive feedback on trainings and a market survey questionnaire that tries to find out from businesses what kind of recruitment needs they have (Source: Exist interview form v2; 20130730 Market Survey Questions). The finance/administrative officer said that the BSC now tried to do market surveys to identify entrepreneur needs so that the trainings become more relevant and interesting [14]. This partly was also a result of the Triodos Facet training on Business Development Services in November 2012 [9] (which followed up on a training given before the baseline in May 2012).

The participants of the endline evaluation workshop said that regarding the understanding of local training needs they also had some practice in the development of business training modules (this component has some overlap with the more content-related aspects of training) [15]. An example of something that influenced that was a training on technical assistance to entrepreneurs that the business coach/monitoring officer attended in 2013, by Investing in Business Expansion training (IBEX, which is related to USAID) [16]. This gave her ideas on how to guide entrepreneurs who have management and financing issues. The programme coordinator explained that this training was given to the BSC because of its membership to a USAID network [17]. USAID wants to strengthen business support centres and gave this training to all its USAID clients. After and during the training there was the possibility to do some networking as well, which led to some potential clients for the BSC. In the aftermath the BSC was urged by USAID to bid for a contract on managing a Government of Liberia National Business Development and Advisory Centre. They did not win this bid, but in June 2014 (during the endline) the BSC was moving to the next stage in a bid to get a contract for a Literacy and Training for Employment Project. These trends are an example of the attempts made by BSC and SPARK to make a more sustainable and diversely funded organisation [18].

Other experiences and events that strengthened the capacity to develop business training modules were the coaching sessions and guidance surrounding Matchmaking and Business pitch topics provided by BiD-Network [19]. BiD-Network, one of the Dutch organisations in the UEC, provided various coaching sessions through the personal involvement of the BiD-Network advisor [20]. She observed that the business and financial planning as well as pitching helped the BSC staff improve their service quality to their clients, the SMEs and entrepreneurs (Questionnaire training BiD-Network: reference 1). During trainings delivered by the BSC staff they not only applied some of the methodologies and examples practiced during training sessions, but also made them their own and complementary to other trainings (Questionnaire training BiD-Network: reference 3).

Improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge

The BSC staff members said that they had broadened their knowledge and content-oriented skills [6]. This category is built up of issues related to entrepreneurship development knowledge [21]; ideas on business incubation [31]; learning to manage relations with entrepreneurs [35]; and being resourceful and up to date on relevant trends and developments [37].

During the workshop it became clear that entrepreneurship development knowledge was increased [20]. This is clearly linked to the development of business training modules [15]. The modules Build Your Business [22] and the Passport to Success [23] were mentioned as important examples of events that helped to develop the business training modules. These are certified ToT module packages developed by experts, which teach ways in which entrepreneurs and youth can be successful in business, but also in life. As such, the Passport to Success discusses life skills training. These trainings were part of the programmatic goals of the project with IYF and the Chevron CSR funding [24]. Through networking via the Business Plan Competitions, SPARK made contact with Chevron Liberia, who as part of their oil exploration operations finance various Corporate Social Responsibility programmes. One of the things they wanted to do was support SME development in Liberia. SPARK and IYF did a proposal in which BSC figured as a sub-contractor [25]. The programme allowed the BSC to open 3 offices in Bong, Harper and Buchanan, and contributed greatly to the financial resources of the BSC. As a part of this programme the whole BSC team received training in the above mentioned modules [22/23] by IYF in 2013. The programme was running from the beginning of 2013 until the beginning of 2014, but the reports have been submitted and currently there is an ongoing discussion to extend the programme.

A similar topic which gave all BSC staff members more knowledge on entrepreneur development was the Ready for Finance training module [26]. This is somewhat similar to the IYF trainings, and was given to the BSC staff yearly (2012, 2013, 2014) by BiD-Network as part of capacity support [20]. This training, which is also given as a refresher training to senior staff members, is mostly used in the Business Plan Competitions (BPC). This helps the trainer to show entrepreneurs key things that investors like to see in a business person [27]. This perspective is also taken when giving matchmaking sessions. Through the training the BSC staff can show BPC participants how they can build relations with investors. The BiD-Network coordinator stated that "all trainings related to investment were perhaps advanced for the country context and the entrepreneur population the BSC works with, however, they prepared the BSC to work with entrepreneurs and SMEs with more growth potential expanding their network and business development opportunities" (Questionnaire training BiD-Network: reference 1). It was noted that Salesforce is being used as a monitoring system to help coaching the BPC entrepreneurs (more on this in a later section of the narrative).

On entrepreneurship development the programme coordinator found it especially valuable to be able to tell Liberian entrepreneurs what they need to know on international corporate entrepreneurship [28]. How Liberian businesses can use technology, social media, but also talk the language of international business. He mentioned two international trips which really helped him to conceptualize these topics. The programme coordinator was able to attend a summer school at the University of Tilburg for a month in June/July 2013 [29]. The topic was international entrepreneurship, and mostly addressed the question of what businesses need to operate on an international level, how this works, and what entrepreneurs can do to improve this. Some topics and tips discussed during the summer school which he found quite valuable include: social media marketing, corporate entrepreneurship, networking visits, negotiation games (Source: IEP Tilburg schedule 2013). This course, according to the programme coordinator, was quite valuable in terms of understanding international business which he could use in his projects, but also gave him good opportunities to network and practice networking. It also showed him the importance of keeping up to date with developments in business, trends and contexts: to be resourceful at all times in order to help his business customers. The programme coordinator was also given the chance to come to the Netherlands at the invitation of SPARK to join the Expert Panel Forum on Entrepreneurship in Post-conflict Settings in September 2013, giving him an international stage to network and to learn from peers [30] (Source: 130913 Handout Expert meeting SPARK).

A specific component of business knowledge has been the focus on business incubation. This served to give the BSC staff ideas on how to provide these services [31]. Business incubator services are seen as a strategically valuable service for young and beginning entrepreneurs, and a financially interesting direction for the BSC. Due to the challenging context of Liberia it is currently not possible to offer full incubation services yet. In the past two years the BSC staff have gained knowledge and ideas on this topic however [32]. Currently experiments with these ideas are ongoing with potential entrepreneurs and BSC is learning from them. An example of this is through testing their facilities on certain individuals on an ad hoc basis. The training by InfoDev (and financed by SPARK) in August 2013 on business incubation was clearly done in order to see how this could help with sustainability, how to get the expertise to run it, manage the facilities and finance a business incubation service [33]. Now the BSC are in the process of exploring their options. This is working towards getting official plans and strategies in the next phase. This second phase is really planning to focus on financing the incubator: people are using the internet, they have a large copying machine, and there is a conference room. The BSC is still deciding on how much to fairly ask people to pay for this. Many of the options are related to fast communication opportunities at the BSC such as internet connectivity. The business coach wrote that "as our organization is into business development, the training is helping me develop ideas on how we can start an incubator" (Questionnaire training participant perspective Business Coach InfoDev Business Incubation). The programme coordinator wrote that the training gave him the chance to learn about Incubation Management, as it was a new experience for him (Questionnaire training participant perspective Programme Coordinator InfoDev Business Incubation). The BSC office manager added that he was able to go to Dakar in Senegal in 2014 on a regional meeting to present the BSCs work with iLAB. He said that while he was there he attended some workshops and visited some business incubators there, getting more ideas on how to apply that in Liberia [34].

Two final personal topics were addressed within the subject of improved entrepreneurship and business knowledge. The first was that the business coach said she had become much better in managing, and engaging in, relations with high level entrepreneurs [35]. This was due to the opportunity to participate in and guide the Branson Scholarship Programme for advanced entrepreneurs [36] (discussed in the general causal map as well). The programme coordinator showed the evaluation team the personal video message that Richard Branson sent the BSC. Here, the entrepreneurs selected would be able to participate in advanced entrepreneurship training. This programme will continue until November 2014. The business coach went with 17 selected entrepreneurs to South Africa and attended the programme with them, gaining skills in networking, international entrepreneurship knowledge, and how to manage relations with entrepreneurs. The second point was grasped as resourcefulness and being updated on the relevant trends and developments related to SME in the country [37]. The programme coordinator said that as the combination of the trainings, with experience and the multiple projects ongoing the staff members were learning more and more every day. This was supplemented with almost every staff member often having a networking role in their daily work [38]. SPARK wrote that the ongoing trainings and coaching have increased the ability of the BSC to network and gain a substantial position amongst their peers and stakeholders (Source: CFA Assessment sheet Liberia BSC SPARK: reference 7).

Final comments

During the evaluation team's initial preparation it was explored that the BSC might have strengthened its competencies in training and facilitation through designating specific roles and topics for trainers. However, when this suggestion was put forward the BSC staff disagreed. Instead, they said that every different project or activity can have someone who is in charge or managing the project. These tasks are said to be divided on the basis of personal background and time available. The programme coordinator explained that for certain projects he might have the lead, but that the office manager for instance was in charge of the Business Angel Network, just as the business coach is in charge of the monitoring of the BPC participants. They said that the business training and facilitation competencies had increased due to collective efforts and teamwork. They mentioned that the fact that they would be able to fill in for each other whenever needed was very valuable to them.

The issue of leadership in the workshop was not mentioned very much, even though the evaluation team did notice that the core staff (programme coordinator; finance administrative officer; business coach) were those that had grown most. Noticeably, the programme coordinator was the most present during the workshop and the most knowledgeable in the discussion. This sometimes led to one-sided conversations, while the moments that the programme coordinator did not attend the workshop opened up space to talk for the other BSC staff members.

The more senior staff, including the office manager (who joined in 2013), attended almost all of the trainings as well. At the end the office manager noted that the amount of trainings was very high, which sometimes distracted staff from their work, and the topics a bit repetitive. He made the comment that in the future, as BSC tries to find its own way, it might be more important to base the training programme on the articulated BSC staff needs. This will hopefully increase effectiveness of trainings and sharpen the skills of BSC staff more.

Capability to adapt and self-renew - outcome 'Slightly improved capacity for programme management'

The organisational change focused on with process tracing, circled around exploring the improved capacity for programme management within the 'capability to adapt and self-renew'. This outcome area was explored due to the interest of the evaluation team in a number of trainings received that can be related to this aspect, ea. Monitoring and evaluation trainings, programme and results-based management courses. Most of the discussions that took place during this session was with the core staff of the BSC Monrovia rather than field staff.

Some of the main issues that underlie the attention that has been paid to programme management in the past years relate to the goal the BSC has to become a sustainable SME development centre [26]. This has also been stimulated by SPARK, through yearly contracts and co-financing goals. The BSC wants to become independent as an individual organisation. In relation to this SPARK reflected that the deviation between donor contracts and the strategic plan seems to impact the strategic direction in the sense that the way in which the contract between SPARK, BiD-Network and BSC is organised hampers the full development of an independent strategy (CFA assessment sheet: reference 7). Furthermore, SPARK explained that: "the role of SPARK is in this sense - [to] help with the set-up of personnel roles, and organisational policies, but also say that sometimes these can change, showing BSC that flexibility is possible sometimes" (CFA support to capacity sheet: reference 8).

The programme coordinator said that in the past years the BSC has become much stronger in programme management [1]. He mentioned that this was demonstrated by the fact that the BSC has so many projects and programmes that need to be managed [2]. He said that the BSC "managed the Yes programme (with SPARK). This programme was designed to train 260 existing businesses in 12 counties in 2012 and 2013. Part of the goal was to identify the existing companies to work with and train them. The BSC also did a Transtec project through the World Bank. For the Chevron programme (since April 2013- 2014), the Corporate Lead project, the BSC was the sub-contractor for SPARK for 1 year. For this project the BSC set up entrepreneurship centres and trained 150 people in different business models such as the Passport to Success". The underlying expectation is that due to the positive and successful management of various projects will lead to new projects in the future.

The efforts to improve on programme management stem from the opportunities offered by SPARK and BiD-Network [11], and that the BSC has been set up to have a flexible organisational structure [19].

The identified need by both SPARK and BSC to become more independent and sustainable has been an important mission [26]. As part of this focus on becoming independent and sustainable after 2015 the programme coordinator really wanted to get across that the BSC operates separately from SPARK even though SPARK is still located in the same office for the time being. SPARK tried to tell the evaluation team the same: in the future this might be more emphasized due to the fact that SPARK moved to a different office in July 2014 (CFA assessment sheet: reference 5). In addition to that, another aspect that helps with an increased ability to function autonomously is that the SPARK Country Manager (the CFA) currently resides in Ivory Coast and visits the operations in Liberia every 1 - 2 months (CFA assessment sheet: reference 8). The CFA said: "SPARK no longer provides operational procedures. Activities are reviewed on their procedures but the BSC itself guards them in the first place. Only with newly developed interventions and activities SPARK offers support in developing the procedures" (CFA assessment sheet: reference 15).

The discussion on improved programme management capacity was guided by three main components: improved project management competencies [3]; improved organisational management [14]; and improved organisational reporting standards [31].


Better able to manage multiple projects [2]
Slightly improved capacity for programme management [1]
Improved programme management competencies [3]
Improved organisational management [14]
Improved organisational reporting standards (towards external partners) [32]
Project management knowledge and skills - supervisory skills - communication skills - input – output method for result-based management [4]
Improved knowledge on public sector finance and budgeting [9]
Slightly improved knowledge on Monitoring and Evaluation [12]
Improved organisational leadership [15]
Strengthened coordination and collaboration (teamwork) [18]
BSC adapts to situations and makes key decisions on how to manage projects [24]
Improved policies and procedures for managing various projects [29]
Different funding sources have different reporting requirements [33]
Financial reporting [35]
Salesforce helps to manage and makes reporting easier [38]
Result-based management training – 2011 MDF Programme coordinator [5]
LIPA 2013 Development Management training for the business coach and programme coordinator [6]
Office manager has an academic background in Human Resources [7]
Financial officer with personal experience and various trainings in financial management [10]
Solid leadership of programme coordinator [16]
Each staff members is involved in programme management roles alternatively [19]
Access to a network of certified trainers that can fill in [21]
Good human relations within team, effective use of language [22]
New ideas for getting projects and models for sustainability [25]
Strategic Planning Matrix developed, however, lack of Final Strategic Plan [30]
Quickbooks training for financial officer in January 2014 by LIPA [36]
Financial officer had a training in financial management with SPARK and BiD-Network in 2013 [37]
Introduction of Salesforce by SPARK in 2013, by way of pilot [39]
IBEX technical training Business coach 2013 [8]
LIPA training in Monitoring and Evaluation Programme coordinator and business coach [13]
Personal growth of programme coordinator; financial officer and business coach [17]
Teambuilding training 2014 [23]
Networking opportunities of the programme coordinator [26]
Difficulties in transfering funds between projects and programmes causes some logistical and financial issues [28]
Strategic Planning Workshop with MDF in September 2012 [31]
Training/briefings on reporting from SPARK, IYF and BiD-Network [34]
BPC winners were repaying loans too slowly according to Liberian banks [40]
MFSII Funding [11]
Open and flexible structure and culture of the BSC [20]
Striving for sustainability – SPARK moving to a separate office in 2014 [27]

Improved programme management competencies

When asked what it was that the staff of the BSC needed to become better at programme management the programme coordinator said that programme management competencies have improved throughout the years [3]. Under project management competencies three aspects can be seen to have been built on: project management knowledge and skills [4], knowledge on public sector finance and budgeting [9], and knowledge on monitoring and evaluation [12].

The aspects mentioned under project management skills were related to supervisory skills, communication skills, and knowledge on input and output methods [4]. The programme coordinator said that he had gained skills in project cycle management, proposal writing and communication skills. The most valuable knowledge he still uses was the input-output method for results based management. Initially the SPO reported that the BSC staff now implement projects aligned to specific results as described in proposals. Their output-outcome and impact module has been adapted (SPO support to capacity: reference 1). The input-output model is used for BSC strategizing for instance, as the strategic objectives matrix distinguishes between these separate components (Source: Strategic Planning Matrix BSC workshop and priority setting). The programme coordinator said that he learned most of these things quite a few years ago, with a Results-Based Management training by MDF in 2011 for instance [5].

The programme coordinator stated that the LIPA training in 2013 on development management was also valuable to refresh his skills [6]. He shared an assignment with us from that course which explored the differences between project and programme management, and asked the participants to expand on the differences between policy statements and strategic plans (Source: Development Management Diploma Course11). The business coach also attended this training and said that due this Development management training in September 2012 to March 2013, she was able to practice knowledge gained on management of development projects in her work. The office manager, who joined the BSC in March 2013, said that before he came to the BSC he did a master in human resources and within that academic training had done some courses on organisational management [7]. He felt confident that he brought that experience to the table in terms of programme management. The business coach told us that she felt that an IBEX technical assessment training in 2013 was valuable for her programme management skills, saying that she got knowledge on management in order to help entrepreneurs run their businesses [8].

Project management competencies also included the financial officers' knowledge on public sector finance and budgeting [9]. The financial and administrative officer said she had various trainings in financial management in the past years before and after the baseline. She sent us a programme management study-guide from the Cuttington University in Bong County, and a curriculum list for an LIPA course in public sector finance from 2011 [10] (Source: Cuttington Course in Project Management; Public Sector Finance Lectures and Topics). The LIPA trainings that the BSC attends are often financed by SPARK with MF SII funds [11].

Knowledge on monitoring and evaluation was slightly improved. The business coach said that she somewhat increased her knowledge of monitoring processes [12]. Both the programme coordinator and the business coach/monitoring officer attended a training in monitoring and evaluation at LIPA in January 2013 [13], and this helped with additional knowledge on monitoring processes. The programme coordinator noted that this training was useful for introducing new ways of monitoring and evaluating. However, he also said that not all his expectations were met due to the fact that he was already applying certain principles in his work and that he had hoped for more (Source: Training Participant perspective BSC Liberia M&E LIPA). The business coach said that she is now able to get faster and more reliable results due to the LIPA training in M&E. She mentioned that she has made some changes related to M&E in her work, due to working with Salesforce (Questionnaire training participant perspective the business coach Development Management: reference 2).

On the LIPA the CFA says: "These are local trainings, good to attend and not very expensive. LIPA is a good initiative that needs to be supported, with decent trainings. Semester basis, 1 or 2 evenings per week, and a more long-term discussion of topics" (CFA support to capacity sheet: reference 11). SPARK did however note that he was not sure of the extended organisational impact of the LIPA course related to Monitoring and Evaluation (Source: CFA support to capacity sheet: reference 18).

Improved organisational management

Organisational management was said to have been improved [14], because of the following reasons: improved organisational leadership [15], strengthened coordination and collaboration [18], situational adaptation in decision-making [28], improved policies and procedures [29]. However, strategic planning and documentation still require more attention.

Improved organisational leadership

An important component that has been mentioned mostly by SPARK and BiD-Network relates to organisational leadership [15], even though it was not discussed clearly in the workshop. Some issues that may have contributed to the leadership of the BSC are the positive developments related to the programme coordinator [16]. After the previous programme coordinator left, he has been able to fill in and both SPARK and BiD-Network have been very positive about him. SPARK said: "the programme coordinator has shown potential and more capacity in being inspiring, responsive and smart leadership". SPARK CFA mentioned another component that might have improved leadership was the personal growth of the business coach and finance officer [17] (CFA assessment sheet: reference 3). It was mentioned that organisational leadership benefitted from the long-term commitment and personal expertise of SPARK, as well as the training possibilities offered to the programme coordinator and staff [11]. Also the own efforts of the BSC staff to pursue other training opportunities, for example with the LIPA trainings [13] has added to this personal development (CFA support to capacity sheet: reference 10).

Strengthened collaboration and coordination

The members of the BSC said that one of the most important aspects of internal organisation dynamics was that coordination and collaboration has been strengthened in the past two years [18]. This is partly due to having different projects being managed by different officers [19]. The office manager mentioned that an aspect which makes the BSC better at programme management is that there is a flexible structure, which allows staff to contribute ideas freely and the management is mostly busy with steering. He said "creativity is not being stifled, and the open flexible structure is a key strategy that keeps the momentum going". The business coach said that not have a very hierarchical structure enabled better communication among staff, as well as use people's personal backgrounds to contribute to operations. This shows how the BSC organisation is generally more flat than other organisations in Liberia [20]. As an example it was mentioned that some of the internal projects are being managed by different people at the BSC. For instance the Business Angel Network is managed by the office manager, the Business Advisory Network by the programme coordinator, and the Business Academy and the project for the Tailor Union is managed by the financial administrative officer. As such they said that the initial titles by which their roles were named are more flexible than it seems. These roles change according to the projects at hand, and the time available for each senior staff member. The members of BSC stressed that everyone at the BSC head office should be able to fill in for others if the need arises.

The programme coordinator stated that coordination is a good part of these internal relations: "someone can pick up where someone else has missed out or is delayed". He explained that for example if a visitor comes to the centre to get to know the BSC but the main project contact-person is delayed, another staff member can pick up and give a presentation on the activities of the BSC while the other person gets to the centre. Thus collaboration and coordination are important aspects of the internal management structure. However, as such there are no dedicated staff roles for M&E for instance. Staff members said that the BSC was a flexible organisation since it was established, and the support from SPARK and BiD-Network have made it even more so - it is within the culture of the BSC. Due to this, and the fact that staff roles are flexible, each staff member is involved in programme management.

Collaboration and coordination also involves other contacts that can help out with projects. The BSC staff mentioned that they have a reliable network of consultant trainers that can offer support with projects [20]. The former programme coordinator, who used to work for BSC, is sometimes asked to help out when things get busy. So the people that can work for BSC changed from basic core staff for SME development, to a network of trainers that complement the needs on the project [21]. This cooperation is often on the basis of contractual agreements. For example, regular partner consultants are asked to perform as judges for the BPCs (Source: BSCM Financial Reports Oct 2012- June 2013).

BSC staff, including field staff have been agreeing throughout the workshop that good human relations within the BSC exist. Effective communication is a big part of that [22], and the fact that every member of BSC is open to talk. The members of the field offices of BSC also felt that way. They mentioned that the teambuilding session in 2014 with Hanson Alp (funded by SPARK [11]) was valuable to them, and strengthened their collaboration and cooperation attitudes towards each other [23].

Adaptation to situations and making key decisions
Another aspect that helps the BSC with regard to its internal management is that the BSC staff have become better at making decisions and adapting to situations that arise in order to manage projects [24]. The office manager explained that being better at situation analysis meant that the BSC is better at reading and building external relations with other funders. He told us that it takes time to manage those relations and this necessitates being well-informed and clear on the goals that you have. The BSC is also actively thinking of strategies to find new ways of raising funds, such as an Agriculture Business Plan Competition with Wienco, an IT Business plan competition with iLab, exploring opportunities for job placement services, and developing a business incubator [25] (Source: BSC Monrovia Workplan 2014). Some of these ideas come through networking opportunities by the programme coordinator [26]. He mentioned that a contract with LTEP was being negotiated at the moment through his contacts. This adaptation to opportunities that arise stems from the need to be more financially sustainable in the future [27].

The financial administrative officer mentioned an example in which the BSC had to be creative and flexible in performing its operations. This was when Transtec (from the World Bank) and SPARK had a project together in which BSC was sub-contracted. In this case the funds for the project came in late [28]. This was challenging, because it put BSC in a predicament how to implement the programme when there was no money to finance it. The BSC staff had to travel in the rainy season to 12 counties. The programme coordinator mentioned that the planning, task division was done beforehand, but eventually a decision had to be made to temporarily use funds from other projects. Luckily the good relation between SPARK and BSC enabled BSC to temporarily shift some project funds to the project by Transtec and SPARK. The programme coordinator described that troubles and differences between SPARK and BiD-Network financing sometimes also led to challenges. BiD-Network apparently is more direct with funding procedures than SPARK. He said that, in 2014, due to delays in reports, proposal and contracts the BSC did not receive funds from SPARK yet. This has been a major issue with SPARK for the past months as operational activities are jeopardized and staff members are paid less for the time being.

Improved policies and procedures
The programme coordinator noted that with regard to organisational policies there have been some improvements [29] , that also contributed to improved organisational management. There has been a greater need to have the procedures and know-how to manage the different projects and follow the needed steps. As a result of that, the operational procedures manual has been updated. This included attention to HRM, recruitment and procurement policies, asset management, financial management (Source: Draft BSCM Organisational Policy Procedures Manual 11-08-14; BSC Monrovia Organisational Chart 2014). This contributes to acting more autonomously, and working towards becoming more independent from SPARK [27].

In the past years also attention was given to improving and working on the BSC strategic plans. Though BSC has been operating with a clear idea of the focus they have and how they want to achieve it, a concrete, final strategy plan was lacking. A strategic planning matrix was developed in 2012 to guide the objectives of the BSC [30]. The strategic planning training by MDF played an important role in helping to define priorities for the BSC. This training was held in September 2012 in Liberia [31]. The main focus of this workshop was to identify major strengths and weaknesses of the BSC, identify major opportunities and threats and define strategic options for the next 5 years. Based on these discussions the BSC defined emphasis points for the 3-5 years ahead (Source: Report BSC Strategic Workshop; Strategic Planning Matrix BSC workshop and priority setting).

Improved organisational reporting standards
The final key component of programme management that the BSC staff uncovered is that organisational reporting is improved in the last years. Both narrative and financial reporting standards are better [32]. There are still some challenges in these areas however: an example is when the BSC

is working with informal companies in various towns in Liberia. In these cases many entrepreneurs are working in the informal sector and do not work actively with receipts, even though these entrepreneurs might have a venue or a thriving business, and the knowledge to match it. But when you also have to report to donors and funders these financial reports are quite important [33]. Fortunately the BSC seems to have good arrangements and mechanisms with SPARK and other organisations on how to report financial support and transfers. The various donors that BSC works with also have certain reporting standards and templates. For instance, for the Chevron programme there was an informal meeting with SPARK on how the reporting should be done according to Chevron. In the past years the members of BSC have become familiar with the various reporting standards through trainings briefings on reporting by SPARK, IYF and BiD-Network [34]. They said that none of their narrative and financial reports have been rejected thus far, although getting the reports written on time does sometimes pose difficulties.

Financial reporting competencies had improved according to staff members [35], and the financial administrative officer seemed to be the main financial person at the BSC. She mentioned a number of trainings she went to in order to work on topics related to that. She was trained at LIPA in Quickbooks in January 2014, through which she learned how to use that programme for financial reporting [36]. She showed us the receipt for the amount of 500 dollars paid to a consultant for Quickbooks training. She also had an internal training in financial management from SPARK and from BiD-Network in 2013. She showed the evaluation team the SPARK financial reporting training guide which discussed issues such as activity-based budgeting, reporting formats, expense reporting [37]. The programme officer observed that due to these trainings the financial officer had broadened her horizon on internal control in order to attract funds and manage risks (Training questionnaire management perspective Programme coordinator Internal systems and control: reference 1). He said that: "we at the BSC have now started to implement some of the techniques and best practices of internal control systems. My finance officer has been very up to date with financial control and has now developed an internal control manual" (Source: Training questionnaire management perspective programme coordinator Internal systems and control: reference 3; Draft BSCM Organisational Policy Procedures Manual 11-08-14).

The BSC staff felt that the use of Salesforce increased the standards of reporting: it helped to manage information better and the information is much more up to date and organised [38]. This made it easier for the staff working with Salesforce, such as the business coach, to write reports. The evaluation team asked about monitoring and evaluation systems at BSC. The staff explained that there is accurate monitoring taking place, mostly through the Salesforce software with regard to the Business Plan Competitions. The business coach said that soon she would go to three different counties in Liberia to assess and monitor the sales of the entrepreneurs using Salesforce. We were told that Chevron for instance has its own monitoring specialists to monitor that programme. When we asked more about how Salesforce is used beyond monitoring it became clear that the Salesforce information is also easily accessible for SPARK staff to work with. The Salesforce software was introduced by SPARK in 2013 [39]. SPARK mentioned that he felt that the staff's monitoring competencies have been improved (CFA Assessment sheet: reference 2). Salesforce is now used to monthly check the entrepreneurs under support of the BSC (CFA assessment sheet: reference 10). He said: "The use of Salesforce has made the engagement with their target group more frequent and structured" (CFA Assessment sheet: reference 17). One of the reasons that SPARK introduced this is that the Liberian banks that provided the loans had been complaining that their loans were not being repaid fast enough [40]. These banks have said that SPARK is the financial backer and that these loans should be repaid by SPARK. This has led to the BPCs no longer having automatic loans for BPC winners. It is hoped that by monitoring the entrepreneurs more closely they will be able to coach them and hopefully get them secure enough to pay back the loans.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

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The Centre for Development Innovation works on processes of innovation and change in the areas of food and nutrition security, adaptive agriculture, sustainable markets, ecosystem governance, and conflict, disaster and reconstruction. It is an interdisciplinary and internationally focused unit of Wageningen UR within the Social Sciences Group. Our work fosters collaboration between citizens, governments, businesses, NGOs, and the scientific community. Our worldwide network of partners and clients links with us to help facilitate innovation, create capacities for change and broker knowledge.

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Endline report – Liberia, DEN-L
MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Sam Gotomo (ME)
Bram Peters (CDI)
Cecile Kusters (CDI)
Stanford Peabody (ME)
Musu Washington Gopeya (ME)

Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
Making Enterprises

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, January 2015

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This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Liberia, DEN-L. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Keywords: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

Report CDI-15-006 |

Contents

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The Liberia 5C evaluation team

List of abbreviations and acronyms

5 C	Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities
Causal map	Map with cause-effect relationships. See also ‘detailed causal map’.
Causal mechanisms	The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcom
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, the Netherlands
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
CRS	Community Radio Stations
CSML	Civil Society and Media Leadership (an IREX programme)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCR	Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation
Detailed causal map	Also ‘model of change’. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question)
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
FED	Food and Enterprise Development (Programme)
General causal map	Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception.
IREX	International Research & Exchanges Board
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFS	Dutch co-financing system
MIS	Management Information System
MTO'B	Miriam T. O'Brien (Centre)
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OD	Organisational Development
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Process tracing	Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms
SPO	Southern Partner Organisation
ToC	Theory of Change
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USADF	United States African Development Fund
VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Association
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre

1 Introduction & summary

1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: DEN-L, in Liberia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of

Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

This report contains the organisational capacity component of the MFSII endline study in Liberia, concerning the Development Education Network-Liberia (DEN-L). The endline discovered that DEN-L has encountered many changes and developments in the last two years, and has largely maintained capabilities as described in the baseline. Within the capability to act and commit it was seen that leadership has remained solid and participatory, staff capacity was built on through cooperation with the multiple partners of DEN-L, and staff motivation was noted to be good. The capability to adapt and self-renew slightly changed due to increased competencies on M&E and slightly better monitoring of projects. Within the capability to deliver on development objectives improvements were seen through more attention to quality reporting, efficient implementation and cost-effective resource use. The capability to relate was slightly enhanced due to the expanded participation in various partnerships and networks. The capability to achieve coherence did not change significantly, though the organisation has emphasised further development of their social enterprise business model for the future.

The evaluators considered it important to note down the SPO's perspective on what they experienced as the most important changes in the organisation since the baseline. SPO staff members noted key changes at the organisation to be that DEN-L has increased diversification of funding sources, has increasingly project-based staff, and has improved staff capacity. Driving factors that influenced the attention to diversity of funds and a more project-based staff were that the reduced funding from long-term funders such as ICCO, Trocaire and Irish Aid has led DEN-L to seek other more short-term ad-hoc projects in different areas in Liberia; and the strategy of developing the organisation as a sustainable development study centre. The efforts to build staff capacity came from various angles: support from existing partnerships and donors for capacity development, the organisational need for well-educated staff, and a good connection with various Irish partners. ICCO supported the development of staff capacity through funding for university/college education for DEN-L staff and financing an Annual General Meeting.

It should be noted that this endline assessment was carried out just before the Ebola virus epidemic and crisis hit Liberia as of July 2014. The effects of the epidemic have heavily impacted the staff and operations of all assessed organisations, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. As such the evaluation team acknowledges that the assessment described in this endline may not fully resemble the current situation in early 2015.

2 Context and General Information about the SPO – DEN-L

2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

Country	Liberia
Consortium	Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR)[1]; ICCO Alliance
Responsible Dutch NGO	ICCO, Netherlands; Save the Children Fund, Netherlands
Project (if applicable)	DEN-L has three major programmes: the Civic Action Programme (CAP), Gender Action Programme (GAP), and the Outreach for Change (OFC) Programme
Southern partner organisation	Development Education Network-Liberia (DEN-L)

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation components:

Achievement of MDGs and themes	x
Capacity development of Southern partner organisations	x
Efforts to strengthen civil society	

2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The history of Liberia is a turbulent history. Settled by freed slaves from the United States around 1822, the newly formed state proclaimed independence in 1846. The Liberian state slowly expanded from the coast into the hinterlands and, though the state was founded on principles of freed slaves, the upholding of settler rights increasingly led to the suppression of indigenous peoples. In 1980 a coup d'état took place which ended the more than 100 year rule of the settler party (Pajibo, 2012; Richards et al., 2005). The military government, led by former sergeant Samuel K. Doe, suspended the constitution and instituted a repressive political system. In 1989 the invasion of Charles Taylor triggered the civil war in Liberia which lasted on and off between 1989 and 2003. The war, which was characterized by great terror and gruesome atrocities, counted many different fighting groups and changing alliances. Eventually the war ended with the departure of Charles Taylor, the institution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 (Pugel, 2009). After the war ended in 2003, with the intervention of a 15,000 man UN force, a peace-building process started and is still ongoing (Richards et al., 2005).

Since the end of the civil war, the Liberian government has formulated the 'Agenda for Transformation' (AfT) as a five-year development strategy from 2012 to 2017. It followed the three–year (2008-2011) Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which transitioned Liberia from post-conflict emergency reconstruction to economic recovery. The AfT was considered a first step toward achieving the goals set out in Liberia RISING 2030, Liberia's long-term vision of socio-economic transformation and development. The AfT articulates precise goals and objectives and corresponding interventions that should move Liberia closer toward structural economic transformation, prosperity and inclusive growth.

1 Due to lack of response of the DCR CFA during the baseline, the capacity development endline mostly focused on the activities of ICCO. DCR/ZOA was interviewed as a partner of DEN-L during the endline.

Perhaps one of the most critical achievements, of both the Liberian government and UNMIL, has been the maintenance of peace and security. Though Liberia continues to rely on the support the United Nations peacekeepers, it is hoped that the government will gradually assume full responsibility for maintenance of security for the coming years. This fragile peace has allowed Liberians to return to their farms, start businesses, return to their country from abroad, and witness an increase in flows of Foreign Direct Investment to Liberia. To revitalize the economy, the three-pronged economic strategy of the PRS focused on (i) rebuilding critical infrastructure; (ii) reviving traditional resource sectors; and (iii) establishing a competitive business environment.

The challenges Liberia is facing are daunting however. Starting from a state of post-conflict instability, extremely weak state institutions, and an economy left in shambles by nearly two decades of violence, further issues relate to minimal reconciliation efforts, high unemployment levels, low levels of education and limited access to healthcare. Within the field of governance and justice Liberia has much work to do. In the post-conflict period reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts have mostly been steered by international initiatives and forces such as the United Nations (Pajibo, 2012). The Truth and Reconciliation Committee, instituted to move on the path towards reconciliation rather than justice, has noted that those who committed war crimes in the civil war should be held accountable. This has not been the case, and the current political establishment has not acted on this view. The security and police sector are currently undergoing training and reform to take over the role of maintaining peace in the country. This is a difficult process, as for instance the police are often considered as predators rather than protectors. Access to justice is limited and trails often take long as only a limited number of cases are concluded each year (Human Rights Watch Liberia country chapters 2014).

Liberia is currently still receiving large amounts of international aid and budget support, and the transition to strengthen the main productive sector, agriculture, is still very much in a preliminary stage (Solà-Martin, 2012). According to the African Economic Outlook 2014, more than 70% of households in Liberia are engaged in rice production. However, since 1980 yields have not increased substantially and more than half of the country's rice is imported. Economic growth has thus far been heavily dependent on the natural resource sector, including goods such as ores, lumber, rubber and palm oil exports. In recent years the services sector has also been growing significantly, even though it is noted that the slow withdrawal of the UNMIL forces in 2015 will affect the demand for these services. It was reported that the informal economy, which reflects a large proportion of Liberian economic activity, has grown even though this has not translated into a decrease in poverty (African Economic Outlook 2014).

Major economic constraining factors include the lack of electricity and basic infrastructure. Until now infrastructure and basic services saw more than US$500 million of direct investment, with key components of infrastructure (including airports, seaports, and roads) renovated or reconstructed. Plans are made to build a large hydropower dam to improve access to electricity. However, these investments alone will not be sufficient to diversify the Liberian economy, nor create jobs for the roughly 500,000 Liberians who will graduate from secondary and post secondary institutions in the next 5 to 10 years. The Liberian government has worked out a plan to establish a competitive business environment for firms in Liberia. It has reformed the Tax Code and the Investment Code, making them more competitive and beneficial to growth. It has streamlined business registration processes; established a one-stop-shop for customs clearing; and started implementing proactive industrial policies as a way of facilitating the growth of local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES). The Government also made it a priority to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment, which is necessary for growth. Further, it maintained a cash-based balanced budget; significantly increased government revenue; moved toward multi-year financial planning; and achieved US$4.9 billion of cumulative debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. These and follow-up actions are creating the right incentives for further growth in employment, GDP, and public and private investment.

Ebola outbreak

West Africa is currently experiencing the largest outbreak of Ebola ever recorded. In Liberia, the disease was reported in Lofa and Nimba counties in late March 2014. In July, the health ministry implemented measures to improve the country's response. On 27 July, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberian president, announced that Liberia would close its borders, with the exception of a few crossing points such as the airport, where screening centres would be established. Public gatherings were banned, schools and universities were closed, and the worst affected areas in the country were placed under quarantine.

In August, President Sirleaf declared a national state of emergency, noting that it might require the "suspensions of certain rights and privileges". The National Elections Commission announced that it would be unable to conduct the scheduled October 2014 senatorial election and requested postponement, one week after the leaders of various opposition parties had publicly taken different sides on the issue. In late August, Liberia's Port Authority cancelled all "shore passes" for sailors from ships coming into the country's four seaports. As of 8 September, Ebola had been identified in 14 of Liberia's 15 counties.

Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future. UN agencies such as the World Bank and international NGOs like Plan International, etc., have begun thinking post-Ebola, and have, therefore, embarked on conducting research and studies on the impact of Ebola on communities and the country, resilience of communities and the health care system, weaknesses in the health care system, etc.

As of January 2015 the Ebola epidemic seemed to be stabilising in Liberia. According to Medecins sans Frontieres the count is now around 8,157 cases and 3,496 deaths registered during the entire epidemic in Liberia (MSF Ebola crisis update 13-01-2015). This stabilisation means that the amount of new cases coming in has decreased significantly to around one case per week in Monrovia, but it is essential to not let the epidemic resurge. Not only Ebola patients have faced difficult times: the crisis has meant that general access to healthcare is even worse than before, As the Special Representative of the UN Secretariat in Liberia noted: rebuilding the country after the Ebola crisis will mean that the factors that caused the virus to spread so quickly need to be urgently addressed. This includes weak trust among the Liberian people, badly functioning basic services such as healthcare and education, lack of accountability and an over-centralized government (UN Special Representative Karen Landgren, 20-01-2015).

As it is with all sectors of Liberian society, this Ebola outbreak is testing the resilience of the SPOs to the highest limits. The SPOs are responding by readjusting their regular programmes by designing new strategies and realigning their resources to join the fight against the deadly Ebola virus disease. This is coming in the forms of Ebola awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for victims and survivors, provision of support to community care centres (CCCs), and procurement and distribution of sanitising supplies to communities.

DEN-L

As the war ended and the country set out on the long road to recovery, DEN-L widened the scope of its training program, i.e., in addition to the Development Education and Learning Teams in Action (DELTA), Training for Transformation, DEN-L included economic development targeting community-based microenterprises as a contribution to the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) and the subsequent Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) of the Government of Liberia. DEN-L continues building the capacities of community-based organization to effectively facilitate community-driven local development planning and project implementation; and complemented with economic development programs targeting conflict-affected communities and community-based microenterprises.

Since the baseline in June 2012 DEN-L has been striving to survive and to implement human development programmes in line with its vision, mission and its three-year (2012-2014) strategic plan, in partnership with external funding partners. Like all non-profit non-governmental organisations currently participating in the reconstruction and recovery of Liberia, DEN-L heavily relies on grant funding that is channelled either directly by donor agencies or through co-financing agencies. Grant funding from DEN-L's core funding partners for institutional support and project implementation has been steadily diminishing since the baseline, and at the endline evaluation the evaluators found out that all of the organisation's core funding partners had either stopped funding DEN-L completely, or were in the final stages of withdrawing.

The on-going Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in the Mano River Basin that is inflicting high human toll on Liberia in particular, and the consequent state of emergency declared by the Government of Liberia last August, which imposes restrictions on gatherings and movements of people, has seriously affected the capacity of DEN-L to operate effectively. Prior to Ebola ravaging Liberia, DEN-L had adopted the following two-pronged approach for survival and growth:

Survival strategy: DEN-L has deployed its expertise and experience in development education training, capacity building, and participatory community-driven development to attract partnerships with more international development organisations to collaborate on project implementation, with DEN-L as the implementing partner. This has enabled DEN-L to retain most of its staffs in the short-term, but they are still vulnerable to pouching of their staffs by better-funded international development organisations.

Growth strategy: Confronted with the twin realities of rapidly diminishing grant funding and the demands of funding partners for DEN-L to strive for sustainability, the organisation has finally embraced social enterprise as an alternative to dependency on grant funding. DEN-L has taken concrete steps toward becoming a sustainable social enterprise, including a) restructuring its board of directors to attract professional expertise to improve governance and fundraising, b) developing a business plan to commercialize services at its MTO'B Training Centre in Gbarnga, c) upgrading from group lodging to private lodging, d) increasing accommodation capacity at the MTO'B Training Centre, c) increasing output of its piggery, d) investing some of its operating income in higher education of deserving staff members, e) using the expertise and experience of its professional staffs to render consulting services, and f) have set up a committee to develop curriculum for development studies.

The on-going Ebola outbreak has caused DEN-L to reduce activity and staff, and to refocus attention on combining efforts with government agencies and other non-governmental organisations to respond to the Ebola outbreak. The contribution of DEN-L is mainly in the areas of supporting the Bong County Taskforce on Ebola with mobilization and sensitization of communities; interacting with the donors' support group; and building capacity of local government offices at district level to properly coordinate the Ebola response.

DEN-L has reached out to 5 districts in Bong County; and has asked its current funding partners to divert some funding to Ebola response.

2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2004

What is the MFS II contracting period: 2011 ICCO funded projects; Bridging Phase (2012 to 2014) and LCDGP coalition (2013-2015)

Did cooperation with this partner end? NO

If yes, when did it finish? N/A

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: N/A

If not, is there an expected end date for the collaboration? 2015

2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

History

DEN-L was founded in 1999 and incorporated in 2000 when the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) ended its assistance to the repatriation and resettlement programme for Liberian refugees. DEN-L is an offspring of this relief programme that operated in Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Liberia during the war years. This was before 1999. After JRS-relief programme faded away the group of Liberians, about 10 persons who worked with them in exile came back home and continued the leadership training and other programmes and they formed DENL. Although JRS was no longer around and they were focusing mainly on training people, they still had a small relief component in their programme. At the beginning DEN-L training mainly targeted women groups, community based organisations, civil society, NGOs and INGOs. Their target group was vulnerable people. They focused on empowering rural communities and training vulnerable people.

Vision

The vision of DEN-L is to see "Liberia at peace with itself and its neighbours".

Mission

The mission of DEN-L is to build a constituency of people-to-people formations in pursuit of grassroots empowerment, economic justice, democratic development and gender equity for a just and peaceful Liberia. The goal of DEN-L is to be a “Sustainable Development Study Centre in Liberia by the year 2017".

Strategies

In the first instance the strategy of DEN-L was to focus on the provision of relief to vulnerable people in Liberia including women empowerment. Eventually the project became more and more gender based and not only targeting women. During the baseline it was said that DEN-L was looking at development education training specifically as the main tool for these programmes. DEN-L had broadened its activities into three thematic programmes: civic education and awareness; mainstreaming of gender; and outreach actions to a wide range of people, not just women or children. Key strategies are thus:

1. To contribute to the building of a peaceful Liberia through an empowered society at all levels;
2. To contribute to the empowerment, human rights and equality of women and girls as Liberian citizens in all aspects of their lives;
3. To strengthen and maintain DEN-L as an effective, efficient organisation committed to a Liberia at peace with itself and its neighbours.

3 Methodological approach and reflection

3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[2].

[2] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change.

Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II

supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design: mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the

Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

4 Results

4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of DEN-L that have taken place since the baseline in 2012 are described. The information is based on the information provided by ICCO.

Table 1
Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline

Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention	Objectives	Activities	Timing and duration	Budget
Annual General Meeting and staff retreat	Institute the development of the strategic plan for DEN-L	Strategy development, staff appraisal and planning	December 2013 - March 2014	€ 3000 Euro
Undergraduate studies	Acquired personal advancement and built institutional personal profiles	Financial support for sending staff members to school and university	Throughout 2012-2014	€ 1,500 Euro
ICCO monitoring visits	Visits for monitoring and discussion purposes	Discussions on funding, sustainability, business development and organisational strengthening	Throughout 2012 and 2013 - latest in March/April 2014	
Coordination meetings	Sharing of information among partners and groups (programmatic cross learning in the LCDGP	Interactions among members of the LCDGP and the Programme Management Committee (PMC)	Throughout 2013-2014	$ 1520 Dollars (2013) 7000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)

Source: CFA support to capacity sheet, SPO support to capacity sheet; LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO; LCDGP Budget Revised June 20 2014 RHRAP

4.2 Changes in capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities (4.2.1). This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also appendix 3. In addition to this staff present at the endline workshop was asked to indicate the key changes in the organisation since the baseline. The most important is key organisational capacity changes have been identified, as well as the reasons for these changes to come about. This is described in a general causal map, both as a visual as well as a narrative. The summary results are described in 4.2.2 whilst the detailed general map is described in appendix 4.

4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline.

Summary of the capability to act and commit



In the years since the baseline DEN-L has been adapting to changing circumstances and a decrease in funding. The leadership still seems to be responsive and the development of a new strategic plan has been set in motion thanks to the General Assembly and the Board. The organisation of the General Assembly was supported by flexible funds from ICCO. The insistence of funding partners on more involvement of the board of directors in providing strategic guidance increased compared to the baseline situation, and this has contributed to slight improvement in the strategic leadership of DEN-L. The organisational structure and objectives of the organisation are clearly displayed at the DEN-L headquarters and is understood by staff.

In 2013, the management of DEN-L adopted 'social enterprise' as the model for sustainability and long-term development, and encouraged by supporting funders DEN-L has sought for other ways to implement projects and to offer services. The development of the MTO'B centre has contributed to this as well. DEN-L's partnerships with ICCO, Trocaire, and Irish Aid, which mostly rested on 3-year funding cycles, have ended. This has driven DEN-L to adapt by forging partnerships with new funding agencies, including OSIWA, CAFORD, USAID/IREX, Save the Children/UK, and UN Women for the implementation of short-term projects with durations of 6-12 months. DEN-L claims to still maintain its core values in the context of competitively vying for small grants and implementing short-term projects that are prioritized by external funding agencies, but they admit that the small grants are sought purposefully to access funding since its long-term funding partners have withdrawn the long-term grant funding programs.

The staff capacity at DEN-L has improved in the last years: staff members have the necessary skills to perform projects; staff members are actively stimulated to follow trainings and university courses. More qualified staffs are being selected for relevant projects. Also, the interactions with various partners have offered DEN-L a diverse range of trainings and workshops. DEN-L staff members have built knowledge and skills on for example M&E, result-based management, proposal development and reporting. The full application of the knowledge from trainings is something that needs to be worked on. Staff motivation seems to be good due the incentives in place, and staff turnover is generally low.

However, there are concerns about whether DEN-L will be able to keep up these incentives due to the unpredictability of funding.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.8 (very slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to adapt and self renew



In many ways this capability still greatly reflects the situation in the baseline: the governance structure of DEN-L allows for staff at different levels to contribute ideas on projects and project proposals. Staff mentioned they feel able to share thought and give feedback on how the organisation operates. However, the organisation does not have a monitoring and evaluation framework, strategy, and performance monitoring plan. They do not have project-based performance indicators that could be used to collect data in a systematic manner for analysis and objective determination of the results of the many projects that they implement. Most of the M&E tasks serve along funding partner lines and guidance. According to the funding partners interviewed, reporting on the deliverables of the various projects has also improved considerably since they introduced various reporting templates and setting of milestones to be achieved within fixed time frames.

The transition towards being a sustainable enterprise is still ongoing and the investments related to that have been there via multiple funding partners - however, these funding activities are still quite dependent on the projects that are available.

The wide contacts DEN-L has in both Bong County and Monrovia, and its participation and good relations with both national and international stakeholders mean that the organisation stays in touch with trends and developments in society. Interaction with beneficiaries is actively sought in formal and informal ways.

Regarding the development of M&E competencies and M&E structures much is still needed. Though some skills and knowledge has been built through various trainings and assessments with various partners, M&E mostly is taken up on a project basis and resides in the hands of funding partners. There have been intentions to actively set up an M&E protocol and system but for now this has not been taken up.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.4 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to deliver on development objectives



DEN-L has taken necessary steps to improve quality of project implementation in the past years. Since funding is now increasingly coming from multiple, smaller projects, the focus on balancing funding with quality and efficient implementation is growing. Grant agreements and guidelines provided by funding partners provide guidance for proper project management.

Partners reported that DEN-L's capacity to work with feedback has improved in the past years, and there is more emphasis on timely reporting and accurate implementation of activities. Staff members have taken up more responsibility in contributing and controlling project budget lines in work plans. The combination of annual work plans and project work plans are use to guide project activities.

Most of the M&E tasks serve along funding partner lines and guidance. Needs assessments are carried out in project areas before project preparation and implementation. Community members plan their activities and DEN-L supports them in carrying out the activities. The strategy to be in contact with beneficiaries has not changed but the scope has. DEN-L is able to do baseline assessments but often there are no funds provided to do endline assessments.

Score: from 3.4 to 3.8 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to relate

DEN-L is an active member in local, national and international networks. In the past years these activities have been expanding and new partnerships have been built. The diversity of actors connected to DEN-L has also been expanding to include new target groups in different areas, and state and private sector actors. Engagement with target groups has been taking different forms per project, and DEN-L is encountering new mechanisms to explore this, for example through field visits, bringing target groups from different areas to the MTO'B centre, and through mentoring approaches.



Internally the DEN-L structure seems to be able to give guidance to these diverse activities and internal organisational relations seem open yet structured. The leadership of DEN-L comprises of the General Assembly that defines the broad direction of the organisation, the board of directors that makes policy and provides strategic guidance, and the operational leadership (directorate/management team) that manages the day-to-day operations of DEN-L, including management of staff performance. Management did mention that they sometimes feel stretched by the demands placed on them from all the different sides - this sometimes is expressed in miscommunication. The general assembly has been the main way stakeholders and staff members are able to influence organisational policies and strategies. The management is consciously making attempts to include staff in communication and decision-making.

Score: from 3.9 to 4.1 (very slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to achieve coherence



DEN-L has a clearly articulated mission that is understood by the Board of Directors, management team, and the project staff. The board of directors and operational management of DEN-L periodically discuss the vision, mission and strategies in the organisation, and they normally craft a strategic plan every three years. The end of the current strategy is by the end of 2014.
In the implementation of the strategic plan DEN-L has been able to manage the gradual withdrawal of long-term funders by increasing the number of short-term 'ad hoc' projects. These projects have been within the strategic orientation of DEN-L to build capacity of local civil society, communities, engage in the economic empowerment of women, and develop social enterprise.

A previous institutional capacity review from 2011 noted that "that DEN-L is caught in a web of doing. DEN-L needs to change from seeing itself as a passive donor dependent organisation to shape up for the new opportunities that will arise at this stage of development." Currently this still holds true. DEN-L is still searching for ways "to bring a more comprehensive strategic refocusing if it is to be sustainable in a new context for Liberia". The organisation is attempting to transform into a social enterprise. This shows that the current leadership of DEN-L is forward thinking and is proactively seeking out ways and means of becoming a sustainable social enterprise. This could be a step toward moving from 'doing' to taking on a "direct policy-influencing role, and partnering with government ministries and development, while retaining the capability to be constructively critical".

Score: from 3.9 to 3.9 (no change)

4.2.2 Key organisational capacity changes - general causal map -

During the endline workshop at the SPO, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in in the organisation since the baseline. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organisational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the endline workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is summarised below. The detailed general causal map (both as a visual and well as a narrative) is described in appendix 4. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organisational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of SPO staff present at the endline workshop. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink.

The five staff members wrote down the changes they had seen happening at DEN-L. From there the facilitator organised these, bringing forward the most important issues relating to organisational capacity, linking the issues that were mentioned twice or that were closely related.

Some of the key changes that were initially identified included:

- Reduction in main funding partners
- Spreading out of DEN-L activities: more small grant projects and in more locations in Liberia, and therefore more project-based funding and procedures
- The further development of the initiatives at the MTOB centre such as the pig farm and the development of the lodging facilities
- More staff engaged in higher education and trainings, gained diverse skills in, for example, VSLA, M&E, proposal writing
- Increase of staff working on different projects
- Regular annual staff appraisal
- Project proposals also being developed by programme staff
- Partnerships strengthened with Ireland and with universities within Liberia.

Eventually the most significant changes according to the DEN-L staff were categorized according to key themes. This led to <u>3 key areas of change</u>: increase diversity of alternative funding sources, increasingly project-based staff, improved staff capacity. These changes and the reasons for these changes were further explored, which has resulted in a 'general causal map' (visual and narrative), see below.

These changes are expected to contribute to the vision of DEN-L to become a sustainable development study centre. At the basis of the general causal map there are a few ongoing shifts in the landscape that have had an important influence to the organisational capacity of DEN-L: the reduction in long-term funding programmes since 2011 and more concretely in 2014. Trocaire and Irish Aid, two major funding partners of DEN-L, Trocaire has pulled out of Liberia while Irish Aid is yet to finalize its program for Liberia. ICCO still remains a core partner but the funding from ICCO has significantly decreased [1]. As a result of this DEN-L has increasingly and actively changed its strategy to find additional funds [2], involving increasingly diverse and more short-term projects that relate to the expertise of DEN-L. This has led to a portfolio of projects that now not only take place in Bong, Nimba and Lofa (the initial core areas of operation of DEN-L), but also other regions in Liberia [3]. Other core factors that have influenced and steered the changes that occurred at the organisation relate to the vision of DEN-L to be a "sustainable development study centre" [4] (and the ideas on how to work towards this via the development of the MTOB centre) [5], and the long-standing relationship with partners in Ireland who are still able to work with DEN-L [6]. The organisation is consciously working to maintain its values but the thematic areas of the organisation continue to change.

DEN-L has increased its **diversity of alternative funding sources** [7]. Staff members of DEN-L now feel that they are now able to face challenges and survive in the storm. A key development that has strengthened DEN-L in sourcing funding has been the further development of the MTOB centre through further investments in facilities (rooms and other assets – pig farm) and consulting services [11]. DEN-L has been working on its mission to become a sustainable development studies centre that is able to offer trainings and capacity-building services to organisations and civil society groups [5]. At the same time DEN-L was forced to develop these facilities and services more urgently. DEN-L needed to look for ways to finance important institutional costs such as administrative functions [16]. The reason for this is that it turned out that the smaller and shorter projects they were now engaging in would rather not pay for much institutional overhead [3]. The head of HR mentioned that: "Now, a great portion of the benefits from the centre are being sourced to support project management and administration. This is a bit of a struggle sometimes". Another component of increased diversity of funding were the strengthened ties with partners in Ireland. The partnership with the 'Friends of DEN-L' in Ireland has further opened opportunities for getting funding (both for scholarships and for direct funds to the program) [17]. Project staff are increasingly being engaged more and more with proposal writing and bringing in projects individually, whilst before this was mainly done by the programme director [18].

There is a change to **more project-based staff**, where project staff members are more involved in project management, and the hiring of staff is more project-based since 2012 [8]. The staff at the workshop explained that more people are being hired on a project basis, and that those with specific skills and experience are being retained as consultants dependent on the projects at hand [22]. This was also reflected in one of the interviews with a partner (Trocaire). They had the impression that DEN-L had made some good, but hard, choices in terms of who they hire and no longer just hire friends or family. Instead they try to hire on the basis of what a person can do in the project. Underlying the retaining and flexible hiring of more people with special skills and experience is that DEN-L is now more actively looking for people with qualifications and top physical condition [23]. Another reason for retaining and flexible hiring of people with special skills and experience is the specific requests of the short-term projects with various donors and NGOs that have certain targets and are working in different localities [3]. DEN-L staff cannot be everywhere at the same time and therefore more staff members are attracted based on the project budget and area of activities. This also means that these specific project officers have more individual management tasks, such as taking care of the work plans and budgets [25]. In our discussions with the director of DEN-L it later came forward that regular communication and meet with staff on different projects was becoming difficult.


Working towards the vision of becoming a "Sustainable Development study centre" [10]
Increased diversity of alternative funding sources [7]
Increasingly project-based staff [8]
Improved staff capacity [9]
Further development of the MTOB centre [11]
Partnership strengthened with Ireland: 'Friends of DEN-L' established 2012 [17]
Staff skills and knowledge development [26]
More staff with higher education [34]
Increased demand for lodging and training [12]
Agricultural activities at the DEN-L farm upscaled [13]
CSO resouce centre was set up through the IREX CSO/CRS project 2012 [15]
Project staff more active in proposal writing and bringing in projects [18]
People with special skills are being retained as consultants [22]
Facilitation and documentation skills, M&E knowledge through CSO resource centre [27]
Staff encouraged to pursue higher education at various universities [35]
More international training for staff Programme officer – 2013 Deputy director – 2014 [36]
More partnerships for higher education and HR development [39]
Farming as a business training (FED 2012) [14]
Challenge: ad hoc projects do not consider admin cost in budgets [16]
Proposal writing trainings 2012/2013 by: IREX/internal sessions [19]
In-house trainings in proposal writing by former director [21]
Staff been selected based on qualifications and physical fitness [23]
Project staff are more involved in budget management trend since 2012 [25]
Organisational development and social enterprise development trainings by IREX Trajectory 2012-2014 [28]
M&E training by ZOA and UNMIL 2012 [30]
MoU signed with the University of Ireland [40]
IREX programme to strengthen Civil society organisations and community radio stations [20]
Many staff in different projects and different areas [24]
Skills training in Village Savings and Loans Associations (CARE) 2012 [29]
Improved audio recording skills for theater through training by sound recording specialist hired by DEN-L [31]
DEN-L wants to have international and university trained staff [38]
DEN-L directors attended BSC studies in Ireland The current director will go for her master in 2014 sponsored by Trocaire [41]
MTOB centre part of DEN-L [5]
Many ad hoc projects in several different counties Additional programmes in 2012 and between April 2013 and June 2014 [3]
Various organisational assessments by donors [32]
Staff appraisal regularly carried out annually (supported financially by ICCO) [33]
DEN-L strategy and mission [4]
Long standing relationship with Ireland through co-founders and funding [6]
Strategy developed to diversify funds, and active search for projects within DEN-L expertise [2]
Reduction in long-term funding partners 2011- 2014 [1]

One of the key issues that was prominently discussed during the causal map was the DEN-L perceived **improvement of staff capacity** [9]. Many staff present felt that in the past two years many staff members have been able to take part in many trainings and educational activities, as well as been involved in organisational processes. This latter aspect has been through regular staff appraisals and the organisation of an Annual General Meeting (these were sponsored by ICCO in 2013 and 2014). DEN-L has mentioned in its strategic plan the need for higher educated staff in order to keep up to date with the developments within Liberian society. Regarding staff skills and knowledge development [26], DEN-L staff members mentioned in the discussion were that they had become better in proposal writing [18], which is explained above, and also in facilitation, documentation and M&E [27]. IREX and the DEN-L staff mentioned that they are looking for potential interventions to build an M&E system. The presence of the IREX-sponsored Resource Centre for CSOs [15] has also allowed staff to practice facilitation, documentation and research. The second component that contributed to improved staff capacity was that more staff members were engaged in higher education learning [34]. ICCO support was also involved in this. DEN-L staff clarified that a number of staff members received higher education in various schools and universities. More international trainings have taken place as well [36]. The third factor leading to staff being educated more highly was due the establishment of a number of partnerships for higher education and human resource development [39]. In the past Trocaire supported the directors of DEN-L to study in Ireland and now, within the context of partnerships DEN-L had solidified its scholarship arrangement with the Kimmage University in Ireland[41].

5 Discussion and conclusion

5.1 Methodological issues

The Liberia 5C evaluation team conducted a two-day workshop with three subgroups of staffs including management, program staff, and program support consultants. The Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director for Program were out of office at the time of the endline evaluation, on mission to Sierra Leone and Australia, respectively. DEN-L is an organized group with an effective participatory operational leadership. With these organised groups, it was well possible to conduct the workshops and the individual interviews, even in the absence of two of the top management members. The Executive Director was subsequently interviewed in Monrovia, and the Deputy Executive Director for Programs completed the indicators questionnaire and submitted it electronically to the evaluation team. The Deputy Executive Director for Programs completed the Support to capacity sheet and submitted it to the Liberia 5C evaluation team together with other documents, which were coded and included in Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis.

The member of the board of directors that was interviewed during the baseline in June 2012 was still available and was interviewed for the endline evaluation. The Program Officer of ICCO responsible for Liberia completed the Support to capacity sheet and submitted it to the Liberia 5C evaluation team, which was also coded and included in the endline evaluation database for analysis. The funding partners of DEN-L (Trocaire, IREX and ZOA) were accessible. The Liberia 5C evaluation team conducted face-to-face interviews with the focal persons of Trocaire, IREX and ZOA Refugee Care regarding the development of capacity of DEN-L.

In general, all the required data collection activities have been implemented so that adequate information was available for analysis.

5.2 Changes in organisational capacity

At the endline DEN-L was seen to be an organisation where many changes have been occurring in the past years since the baseline since 2012. Regarding the 5 capabilities it was seen that DEN-L made small improvements across the 5 capabilities, mostly in the areas of the capability to act and commit and the capability to deliver on development objectives.



The main indicators that showed improvement within the capability to act and commit related to the indicators on leadership, staff capacity and motivation. Leadership has remained solid and responsive throughout the past two years, operating in a participatory manner, and is looking towards the future by setting in motion the development of the new strategic plan. This has also come to expression in the organisation of the staff retreat in 2013 and the Annual General Meeting in 2014. In the Annual General Assembly members of DEN-L mandated the management and board to develop the new strategic plan for 2015 - 2017. The financial support of ICCO was applied in the organisation of these events. In the area of staff capacity some positive developments have taken place: more different organisations have offered training to staff members, DEN-L is paying more attention to staff recruitment procedures, and staff is operating more independently. The indicators within the capability to adapt and self-renew have not changed significantly, only on the indicators regarding M&E application and M&E competencies some trends were seen: partner-supported trainings (by ZOA and UNMIL for instance) were done on the topic of M&E with staff, and the monitoring of projects has slightly improved. Within the capability to deliver on development objectives the organisation shows progress along a wider line of indicators. Quality of reporting and efficient implementation has become a focus of the organisation. As such cost-effective resource use and the mechanisms to make sure beneficiary needs are addressed have slightly improved, partly in relation to the scope of the projects DEN-L is engaged in. Within the capability to relate and the capability to achieve coherence no significant changes were seen, other than that DEN-L is currently developing the new strategic plan for the coming years which will more put more emphasis on developing a social enterprise model.

A key dynamic which has heavily influenced the organisation has been the changing funding outlook, and the adaptation this has entailed. DEN-L's partnerships with ICCO, Trocaire, and Irish Aid, which mostly rested on 3-year funding cycles, have ended. This has driven DEN-L to adapt by forging partnerships with new funding agencies, including OSIWA, CAFORD, USAID/IREX, Save the Children/UK, and UN Women for the implementation of short-term projects with durations of 6-12 months. DEN-L claims to still maintain its core values in the context of competitively vying for small grants and implementing short-term projects that are prioritized by external funding agencies, but they admit that the small grants are sought purposefully to access funding since its long-term funding partners have withdrawn the long-term grant funding programmes.

DEN-L's quest for operational and financial self-sufficiency, and its goal of transforming itself into a full-fledged Development Studies Centre, is the driving force motivating its management to formulate and implement various sustainability strategies based on a social enterprise model. The management has also encouraged some staff members to acquire higher education in order to remain relevant to the future direction of the organization. A number of key changes have taken place in the past two years: increasingly diverse alternative funding sources, more project-based staff and improved staff capacity. Alternative funding sources have come through smaller projects implemented all over in

Liberia, but also through the development of the M'TOB centre. At the headquarters there is the possibility to stay the night, and the organisation has a pig farm to generate income.

Regarding more project-based staff it was seen that more staff members are currently involved in project proposal writing and project management, in contrast to the past when only the program officer, finance officer, and the executive director wrote project proposals and managed projects. Part of this trend is also selecting more qualified and professional staff members, and paying attention to internal communication through staff appraisals. These more project-based staff roles and activities do lead to challenges however. The spread-out locations of the projects in Liberia and the fact that funding for administration and overhead is hardly provided, does sometimes lead to disconnected internal communication and management being stretched.

A key area of attention has been on improving staff capacity. There are now better educated and trained staff members that are capable of taking on the tasks that were previously performed only by the Executive Director, Program Director, and Finance and Administration Director. A wide range of activities have taken place to stimulate staff training and education. More conscious efforts on the part of interested staff members to strive for attainment of higher education in preparation of being part of future staffing of DEN-L has taken place. This focus has been supported by a broader knowledge and skills base of staff members. Development education through training is the core activity of DEN-L, and this is in line with more staff members now obtaining university and college degrees in various disciplines. Currently, three of DEN-L's directors have earned master's degrees and two more are candidates for master's degrees. Eleven of DEN-L's current staff members have earned Bachelor's degrees in different disciplines. The multiple partners, including DRC-ZOA, have done multiple assessments and training events at DEN-L. In areas such as facilitation, documentation, organizational development and M&E trainings have been done, both by external partners, as well as in house trainings.

The overall picture that was given at the endline hinted that DEN-L is an organisation encountering various changes and challenges, but with the vision, reputation and structures basically in place that will help with this transition to be sustainable in a dynamic context. Partner organisations interviewed suggested that communication and responsiveness of the organisation has improved. It should also be noted that the Ebola outbreak has heavily impacted the organisation and the environment in which it operates: the consequences are yet uncertain. It can be seen from the general causal map, that the influence of the MSF II supported capacity interventions only somewhat figures in the organisational changes at DEN-L: mainly in terms of staff capacity development.

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Guidelines and formats for the 5C endline study

5c_endline_draftreport_country_SPO_26112014
Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Liberia_DEN-L_ICCO Annex F_5c endline self-assessment sheet_management_Liberia_DEN-L
Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Liberia_DEN-L_ICCO
Annex C_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Liberia_DEN-L
Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Liberia_DEN-L_DCR
Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Liberia_DEN-L_IREX
Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Liberia_DEN-L_Trocaire
Annex E_5c endline interview guide_OD consultants_selected indicators_Liberia_DEN-L(Zubahyea Joejoe)
Annex G_5c endline self-assessment sheet_programme staff_Liberia_DEN-L
Annex I_5c endline self-assessment sheet_admin HRM staff_Liberia_DEN-L
Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_selected indicators_Liberia_DEN-L
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet - Sam
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_DENL_Stanford
List of 5C indicator descriptions

Partner Documents

5C_baseline_report_Liberia_DEN-L_19012013_CK
BRIEFING ON LCDGP STRATEGIC PLAN VALIDATION PROCESS
Contract DEN-L
CSO Assessment_Tool_FINAL
DEN-L - CAPACITY ASSESSMENT REPORT- DENL Dot Comment
DEN-L semi Annual report to ICCO- 2013 Liberia CT&D
DEN-L 2014 ACTIVITIES WORKPLAN
DEN-L Application for CAFOD Revised
DEN-L Budgert and Timeline Worksheet in CAFOD Application Form docurment zip CAFOD Application Form (2)
DEN-L Final 2014 Proposal to OSIWA
DEN-L Human Resource Policy , August 9, 2011
DEN-L Standard Operating Procedures 3
DEN-L Strategic Plan - External document[1]
DEN-L Structure 001
DEN-L's Final Summary Narrative Report WPS Project Dot
Feedback to the PMC-June
FINAL- consolidated- Partners'capacity assessment report
FINAL TOR FOR PMC-Final
FINAL TOR FOR TPs- Final
FINAL Trocaire end of year report 2013
ICCO Audit Report 2013
Institutional Support to LCDGP Partners

LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report
LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO
LCDGP GRANT AGREEMENT 2013-2015
LCDGP Project Plan- Final
MTOB_BPApril16
PMC FINAL REPORT
RSC Project Narrative (Feb-Dec 2014)
RSC Project Timeline (Feb-Dec 2014)

7 List of Respondents

DEN-L staff:

Dorothy Tooman	Executive Director
Bill Cooper	Deputy Head of Finance and Administration
Peter S. Dolo	Head of Human Resources
Johnson Kessely	Resident Consultant
Karmue Kamara	Programme Officer (Theatre project)
Varbah Tennie	Programme Officer (Save the Children project)

CFA:

Lindora Diawara	ICCO ROWA Programme Officer for Liberia
Allen Lincoln	PMC coordinator of the LCDGP

Partner respondents:

Arthur Berrian	IREX Senior Programme Officer of the Regional Support project
Paul Allen	Head of the Trocaire Liberia programme
Rogelio Simbulan	DCR Capacity Building Officer

Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[3] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

[3] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

Step 1. Provide the ***description of indicators*** *in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?

What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?

List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - o -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - o -1 = A slight deterioration
   - o 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - o +1 = Slight improvement
   - o +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*

- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ....
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ....
- o **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ....
- o Don't know.

Step 2. ***Review*** *the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

Step 3. ***Send the formats*** *adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

Step 4. ***Collect, upload & code the documents*** *from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;

- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

Step 5. ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:
- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

Step 6. ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

Step 7. ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

Step 8. ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

Step 9. ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

Step 10. ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

Step 11. ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

Step 12. Provide the ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

Step 13. ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

Step 14. ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

Step 15. ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the

purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

ETHIOPIA

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia

Capability to:	AMREF	CARE	ECFA	FSCE	HOA-REC	HUNDEE	NVEA	OSRA	TTCA
Act and commit	5	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	3
Deliver on development objectives	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	4	2	3	4	2	5	3	3	3
Relate	3	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
Achieve coherence	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia

Ethiopia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
AMREF	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	AMREF NL	Yes
CARE	Dec 31, 2015	Partly	Yes	Yes	Yes – slightly	CARE Netherlands	No - not fully matching
ECFA	Jan 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Child Helpline International	Yes
FSCE	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands	Yes
HOA-REC	Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes - slightly	ICCO	No - not fully matching
HUNDEE	Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Yes
NVEA	Dec 2015 (both)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN)	Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE
OSRA	C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE
TTCA	June 2015	Partly	Yes	No	Yes	Edukans Foundation	No - not fully matching

INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India[4]

Capability to:	BVHA	COUNT	DRISTI	FFID	Jana Vikas	Samarthak Samiti	SMILE	SDS	VTRC
Act and commit	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	5
Deliver on development objectives	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	1	4
Relate	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

SPOs selected for process tracing – India

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BVHA	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simavi	Yes; both capabilities
COUNT	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Woord en Daad	Yes; both capabilities
DRISTI	31-03-2012	Yes	Yes	No	no	Hivos	No - closed in 2012
FFID	30-09-2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

4 RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Jana Vikas	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF							No – delayed baseline
RGVN							No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS)	2013 possibly longer	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Hivos	No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS)	Dec 2013 intention 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - not fully matching focus
Smile	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Wilde Ganzen	Yes; first capability only
VTRC	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Red een Kind	Yes; both capabilities

INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia

Capability to:	ASB	Daya kologi	ECPAT	GSS	Lem baga Kita	Pt. PPMA	Rifka Annisa	WIIP	Yad upa	Yayasan Kelola	YPI	YRBI
Act and commit	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	5	4
Deliver on development objectives	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	3	1	2	4	2	3	4	4	1	1	4	3
Relate	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
ASB	February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hivos	Yes
Dayakologi	2013; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No: contract ended early and not matching enough
ECPAT	August 2013; Extension Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	Yes
GSS	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No: contract ended early
Lembaga Kita	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No - contract ended early
Pt.PPMA	May 2015	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	IUCN	Yes, capability to act and commit only
Rifka Annisa	Dec, 31 2015	No	Yes	No	Yes	Rutgers WPF	No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO
WIIP	Dec 2015	Yes	Not MFS II	Yes	Not MFS II	Red Cross	No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Yayasan Kelola	Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)	Yes	Not really	Yes	Not really	Hivos	No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos
YPI	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rutgers WPF	Yes
YRBI	Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes
Yadupa	Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now	Yes	Nothing committed	Yes	Nothing committed	IUCN	No, since nothing was committed by CFA

LIBERIA

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia

Capability to:	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Act and commit	5	1	1	1	3
Deliver on development objectives	3	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	2	2	2
Relate	1	2	2	2	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia

Liberia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BSC	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	SPARK	Yes
DEN-L	2014	No	No	Unknown	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
NAWOCOL	2014	Yes	No	No	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
REFOUND	At least until 2013 (2015?)	Yes	No	Yes	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
RHRAP	At least until 2013 (2014?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

Step 1. Identify the ***planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions*** *within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

Step 2. Identify the ***implemented capacity development interventions*** *within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

Step 4. Construct the ***detailed, initial causal map*** *(theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).



Figure 1 *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)

Part of the model of change	Key questions	Type of evidence needed	Source of information
Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change	Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related	Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?	Describe where you can find this information
Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding	Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?	Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training Content evidence: what the training was about	Example: Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

Step 6. ***Collect data*** *to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

Step 7. ***Assess the quality*** *of data and* ***analyse data****, and develop the* ***final detailed causal map*** *(model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included) **Description of causal relation**	**Confirming / rejecting a causal relation (yes / no)**	**Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation**	**Strength of evidence: strong / rather strong / rather weak / weak**	**Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed / rejected**
e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice	e.g. Confirmed	e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training		

Step 8. ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and

SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

Capacity is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

Capabilities are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

Competencies are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

The capability to act and commit;

The capability to deliver on development objectives;

The capability to adapt and self-renew;

The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);

The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

Appendix 3 Results - changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

Capability to act and commit

1.1. Responsive leadership: ‘Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

This is about leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation.

Description of the endline situation:

DEN-L has adopted the ‘participatory management system’ that makes participation in decision-making across all levels of the organisation – General Assembly, Board of Directors, Directorate, and staff – possible. This is important because management of the organisation is not entirely centred on a particular individual. This makes it possible for major decisions and actions to be taken in the absence of some of the directors. The sitting Executive Director of DEN-L confirmed this as a standing policy of the organisation. This policy bears the hallmark of a responsive, inspiring and proactive leadership.

Since the baseline in June 2012, the General Assembly of DEN-L was held in 2013 and mandated the board of directors and the management team (directorate) of DEN-L to draw up a new three-year strategic plan spanning for the period 2015-2017. The general assembly further mandated the board of directors and directorate of DEN-L to improve the governance and management of the organisation by implementing the following tasks as an integral part of their current strategic planning process:

- Clarify the role and functions of the General Assembly;
- Introduce a procedures handbook for the board of directors, broaden board membership to draw in strategic expertise, and share responsibility with the board in all key matters involving policy, strategic planning, resource mobilization, and accountability for entrusted resources and planned results and outcomes;
- Compile and harmonize corporate documentation.

If implemented, these changes could set DEN-L on course to achieve effective governance and accountability, which are the prerequisites to acquiring the capability of delivering on its development goals and objectives.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions.

Description of the endline situation:

The General Assembly (GA) and the Board of Directors of DEN-L set the strategic directions and make policies for the organisation. External factors, particularly funding, largely influence the strategic directions and policy choices of DEN-L.

DEN-L's projects and relationship with funding partners are based on its mission and strategic plan. This is the reason why resident funding agencies engage with DEN-L as partners, as DEN-L is operational and generally there is a slight improvement in strategic guidance. The majority of DEN-L's funding partners interviewed think that DEN-L's "leadership is solid – but their orientation on programme thinking is still under development".

In 2013, the management of DEN-L adopted 'social enterprise' as the model for sustainability and long-term development. The insistence of funding partners on more involvement of the board of directors in providing strategic guidance increased compared to the baseline situation, and this has contributed to slight improvement in the strategic leadership of DEN-L. The 2013 General Assembly of DEN-L passed a resolution for a new three-year (2015-2017) strategic plan to be developed. The collective leadership of DEN-L is presently looking for funding to implement the resolution.

The issue of ownership of DEN-L was finally resolved by the 2013 General Assembly of the organisation. The Resolution answered this question explicitly by naming the incorporators of DEN-L as the 'legal owners' of the organisation since they bear legal liability for the organisation. This was agreed because the organisation has people that are legally liable for the organisation, and since the incorporators bear legal responsibility they have ownership.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

This is about staff turnover.

Description of the endline situation:
Staff turnover at DEN-L has been relatively low since the baseline in 2012, particularly for core staff that has not changed. However, two staff members of a capacity building project for CSOs/NGOs that DEN-L won after the baseline left to take up higher-paying jobs with international organisations in Monrovia.

With the exception of the two project staff that left to take advantage of better employment opportunities, the workforce of DEN-L has only slightly changed since the baseline.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.4. Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

Observable indicator: Staff have copy of organisation structure and understand this.

Description of the endline situation:
The organisational structure and objectives of the organisation are clearly displayed at the DEN-L headquarters and is understood by staff.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

1.5. Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.

Description of the endline situation:
DEN-L follows the strategic plan that was designed, until 2014. The new strategic plan is currently being drafted with the support of the Board and the General Assembly. Though M&E is not structurally

used, a business plan for the MTO'B Centre has been drafted which offers ideas to help DEN-L to offer more social enterprise-related services.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.

Description of the endline situation:
DEN-L runs a small office with 10 staff and has adequate policies, procedures and internal controls in place to mitigate risks to the organisation. Staff responsibilities are detailed in their job descriptions that are part and parcel of their employment contracts. Bank reconciliations are routinely prepared by the accountant, reviewed by the Finance and Administrative Director, and approved by the Executive Director.

The ending of funding for the 3-year programming cycles of DEN-L by their 'traditional donors' has driven DEN-L to taking on more 'non-core projects' or 'ad hoc projects' and implementing those in different locations (counties) in Liberia. With this change the day-to-day operations of DEN-L are now being carried out in locations different from those defined in their current strategic plan.

A majority of the management and staff of DEN-L are aware that not all of the 'ad hoc projects' that the organisation is currently sourcing and implementing in partnership with various funding partners resident in Liberia are directly in line with DEN-L’s strategic plan. Some 'ad hoc projects' are sought mainly for fundraising purposes, and are implemented to support propagation of the core values of the organisation. The staff members of DEN-L at different levels admit that these 'ad hoc projects' are implemented purposely to maintain the organisation, while at the same time keeping in mind the core values, vision and mission of DEN-L.

DEN-L is perceived by some of their funding partners as being organized and having a very good reputation in the work they do, as well as working towards ensuring a certain level of organisational independence and financial viability.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.

Description of the endline situation:
The members of the management team (directorate) of DEN-L, the Executive Director, Programme Director and Finance and Administration Director, possess the requisite academic qualifications and practical work experience for the positions that they occupy in DEN-L. For example, the Executive Director holds Bachelor’s Degree in Development Studies from Ireland, with Certificates in Transformative Development, Management at Internal Level, with more than 15 years of work experience in programme design and management, and facilitation of training; the Director of Programmes holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Rural Development and Public Administration from Cuttington University, with 15 years of work experience programme design and management, and facilitation of training; the Director of Finance and Administration also holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Accounting and Management from Cuttington University, with 20 years of work experience in financial accounting and reporting; and the Human Resources Manager holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Management and Economics from the University of Liberia, with 14 years of experience in human resource management and project development and management.

Staff are currently selected based on qualifications, and those staff that were on board before are now studying at various universities to acquire the requisite knowledge and skills for the work. It seems that university degrees contribute greatly to staff skills, and a university profile is what DEN-L is searching for.

Some staff members are currently in higher learning institutions (Cuttington University, University of Liberia); some staff members are attending in-service trainings (training on job); and some staff are attending training workshops in and outside of the country. DEN-L provides the opportunity for staff to advance their education: ICCO provided flexible funds for staff development; and the Friends in Ireland provide scholarships for DEN-L staff. The management believes that the organisation should have qualified people working for them, and because they see staff aspiring higher education. For example, the board has approved a sabbatical leave for the current Executive Director to go to Ireland for postgraduate studies, and other staff members are presently studying at Cuttington University in Gbarnga for undergraduate degrees.

Some of the funding partners of DEN-L interviewed think that as far as their specific projects are concerned, DEN-L has the required skills to effectively implement them. Other funding partners of DEN-L think that the organisation needs to have grounded knowledge in the thematic fields that they work in, and noted that they have observed that some of DEN-L's staff are making efforts to get more education both in and out of the country, and cited the travel of the Deputy Director for Programmes to Australia for training at the time of the endline as a clear example. The impact has yet to show. M&E skills are something they really need to work on. DEN-L is preparing to become a certified development studies institution in Liberia. This shows that DEN-L still needs a lot of financial and technical support to build its human resource capacity to the level that enables it to become a certified professional training institution. Trocaire and IREX independently confirmed this.

More staff members are now involved in project proposal writing, project management, and providing social development consultancy services under the auspices of DEN-L. Some project staff have received training in M&E, reporting, proposal writing, and message development for the theatre, behaviour change communication, and project management. These training needs were identified during assessments conducted by several partners including ICCO, ZOA, UNDP, and Save the Children during which it became clear that some competencies were lacking.

Score: from 3.5 to 4.5 (improvement)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities

Description of the endline situation:
The personnel policy of DEN-L provides a three-pronged plan for each staff. This means that an opportunity is provided for each person in a staff position to train his or her immediate subordinate, and at the same time learn from his or her supervisor to encourage possible succession, enhance staff retention and minimize staff turnover.

DEN-L seeks to complement its in-service, on-the-job training with training opportunities provided by its funding partners for its staff to benefit from the ancillary training opportunities provided by its partners. For example, Trocaire provided training on M&E and result-based management; and proposal development and reporting. DEN-L's staffs have had a number of training opportunities provided by their various funding partners including ICCO, DCR/ZOA, and UN Women.

Some staff members have been afforded opportunities to study outside of the country, including the director, deputy-director and a member of the DEN-L trainer team. Before the baseline in 2012, the two former Executive Directors of DEN-L, had opportunities to study in Ireland where they earned their respective postgraduate degrees.

Some donors (ICCO, TROCAIRE, UNMIL, SAVE THE CHILDREN, USADF, etc.) have also supported staff development; and DEN-L is also investing some of the rent income generated from the use of facilities at the MTO'B Training Centre to support staff development.

Furthermore, through networking, some staff members have been given opportunities for external short-term trainings. Through DEN-L's direct contacts with other organisations, information has been received for training opportunities, which has resulted in training opportunities for some staff members with external funding – e.g., training on UN Resolution 1325 which came through the Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL) from the Organisation Development mentor/trainer of WONGOSOL assigned to the IREX project. Other organisations including the Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (DCR), for example, that takes keen interest in staff capacity building, offer different training opportunities.

The following organisations and projects have also offered additional training opportunities to DEN-L staff:

- CARE Trajectory in 2012: Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) training
- Food and Enterprise Development (FED) - May 2013: Farming as a business
- IREX - throughout 2012-2013: Proposal writing - internal training by key staff, and external trainings
- IREX Training in 2012: Part of CSO Resource Centre Project - TOT on Organisational Management (proposal writing, financial management, and reporting); every two/three months by external consultants, and the trajectory ended in May 2014.
- IREX CSO project component since 2013: TOT on Social Enterprise Development for DEN-L - every two months.
- UN-WOMEN since 2012-2014: Organisational reporting, financial management - for DEN-L management of funds - once or twice every project year.
- DCR/ZOA and Save the Children/UK provided basic M&E training to DEN-L staff
- IREX is working with DEN-L to train and set up M&E system.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.

Description of the endline situation:

Incentives for staff have improved since the baseline in 2012. The main incentives that DEN-L gives to its staff are financial remunerations and the legally prescribed fringe benefits. Conditions of staff development have also improved, including flexibility in working hours for staff members who are capable of paying their own university fees and willing to continue working with DEN-L.

In addition to remunerations and fringe benefits, DEN-L fosters freedom of ideas and expression. DEN-L also proactively implements a policy of two-way hierarchical mentoring-on-the-job that is geared towards predictable succession and minimization of unhealthy staff turnovers. DEN-L also provides financial support to staff members for academic studies and other specialized trainings. The management of DEN-L also provides meals to staff daily for lunch at the MTO'B Training Centre.

DEN-L's transition to 'ad hoc projects' stemming from the end of funding from traditional donors also brought with it opportunities for the organisation to negotiate extra percentages for management for supervision, and higher salaries for project staff in order to attract the best qualified and experienced people to implement the various 'ad hoc projects'. This has considerably improved salaries, which is an added incentive, and the project staffs are much happier. The project staff are paid according to salaries allocated in the budgets of projects. Staff members within DEN-L generally stay with the organisation.

There is constant fear of deterioration of the incentives. Remunerations are still an issue. There was a lawsuit that forced DEN-L to pay staff severance benefits and it has cost DEN-L a lot of money to settle these claims. Now, they have to only employ people they actually need or who are already trained. Resources are scarce. The board member interviewed said that in the past the management of DEN-L employed and fired staff at will but due to the severance benefit issue, they now only employ qualified people and provide them with adequate salaries and benefits. What could not be ascertained is if the salaries and benefits mentioned are commensurate with either the minimum wage or prevailing market rates.

However, the management of DEN-L claimed that its incentives/salaries compared to the incentives/salaries of the government and other organisations, are much better and higher than before the baseline in 2012. Also staff are now paid on time more often. DEN-L encourages free-flowing feedback among staff as a way of strengthening the working relationship. Regular salary payment, sharing of information on time, respect for all staff and decisions that affect them and their works are among the changes that have occurred since the baseline, as it relates to incentives.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.

Description of the endline situation:

DEN-L has implemented projects funded by ICCO, Trocaire/European Commission, OSIWA, Oxfam, DCR/ZOA, IREX/USAID, UNMIL, UN Women, Africare, Save the Children/UK, and FED/USAID, before and after the baseline. DEN-L's social enterprise – the MTO'B Training Centre – also contributes financially to its sustainability.

DEN-L currently has access to grant funding from multiple resident funding partners for project implementation. Its funding partners transfer grant funds directly to DEN-L through direct bank transfers.

The number of funding partners that have funded the core activities of DEN-L over the years has reduced. Irish Aid and Trocaire have left, and ICCO, too, has given notice that it is also pulling out of Liberia, leaving the organisation with mostly ad hoc projects which are in most cases short-term and do not provide funding for follow-up.

Since the baseline in 2012 DEN–L has received grant funding from eleven (11) different funding partners to implement projects ranging from 1-5 years in duration, to support peace and security, food security, improving capacity of non-state actors, community awareness, community development institutions, giving visibility to women's ingenuity, empowering Liberian civil society organisations through effective media interaction, capacity development, networking and access to information in Nimba, and Grand Bassa Counties, building the capacity of women and girls to participate in governance and decision-making processes at local and national levels, capacity building for farmer organisations, training farmers' association in organisation development and farming as business, civil society and media leadership, and cassava farmers survey in Liberia. Below you can find a table describing the list of funding partners in projects implemented since the baseline in 2012.

Table 2

List of Funding Partners and Projects Implemented since the baseline in 2012

Funding Agency (Indicate name, address and cell no. Of the contact person)	Name and Location of Project	Contract Amount	Contract Period (From X to Y date)	Status*
United States African Development Foundation	Community Development Institution Projects	USD 243,512	April – December 2013	100% Complete
Save the Children/UK	Improving capacity of non-state actors	Euros 44,538.30	April 2013 - March 2014	50% Complete
UN Women	Women peace and security project	USD 95,605	October 2012 – June 2013	100% Complete
UNMIL	Awareness raising on issues that affects community and people	USD 30,000	January 2012 – December 2013	100% Complete
ICCO	Giving visibility to women ingenuity	Euros 135,000	July 2012 – August 2015	50% Complete
Trocaire	Empowering Liberia civil society through effective media interaction, capacity development, networking and access to information in Nimba, and Grand Bassa Counties	Euros 86,720	Jan 2013 – April 2014	96% Complete
OSIWA	Building the capacity of women and girls to participate in governance and decision-making processes at local and national levels	USD 53,825.30	August 2012 – July 2013	100% Complete
OXFAM	Capacity building for farmer organisation	USD 49,940	April – June 2013	100% Complete
ZOA	Training farmers association in organisation development and farming as business	USD 120,960	July 2013 – December 2014	50% Complete
IREX/RSC	Civil society and media leadership programme	USD 394,858.30	May 2013 – April 2014	40% Complete
FED	Cassava farmers survey project	USD 53,270	July – August 2013	100% Complete

In addition to the above listed grant funding received from donors since the baseline in 2012, DEN-L also generates funds from its MTO'B Training Centre in Gbarnga, and also from social development consultancy services. In 2012, for example, the combined total amount of funds generated by the MTO'B Training Centre and consultancy services constituted 60% of the organisation's annual budget (60% of US$550,000 or US$330,000). The MTO'B Training Centre is a subsidiary of the Development Education Network-Liberia (DEN-L), which is a non-profit organisation. The centre serves more than 1,500 persons annually. The centre provides a range of services including catering, lodging, and venue rental for workshop and conference purposes. The centre also has an agricultural activity (raising pigs) that DEN-L added in 2012 for income generation (this has grown considerably from 4 piglets at the baseline to more than 100 pigs at the endline).

The MTO'B Training Centre has two main objectives:

- Increase the income of the MTO'B Training Centre from US$50,000 annually to US$100,000 annually, by 2015.
- Make the MTO'B Training Centre an outstanding facility by improving the facilities and making customer satisfaction a priority.

Dwindling resources due to the global financial crisis, mainly in donor countries, has constrained the DEN-L to cut back on its programmes and personnel. This reality and the need for sustainability of the organisation in the wake of donors' cut backs prompted the opening of the MTO'B Training Centre as an alternative source of income. Income raised from the centre is used for the upkeep and improvement of the centre. On an annual basis and when the need arises, earnings from the centre go towards local contribution to DEN-L's developmental programmes. All proceeds from the centre go towards making DEN-L sustainable in the long-term. There is improvement because DEN-L has a business plan to develop the DEN-L Training institute. They had this before 2013 but they are somehow not proactive in implementing it.

Score: from 3 to 2.5 (slight deterioration)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.

Description of the endline situation:
This issue has not changed much. The issue of visibility of DEN-L at the level of Monrovia has not changed in any way. There is no liaison person in Monrovia. The organisation still largely relies on participating in different stakeholder meetings and sharing information about the work of the institution, establishing links with key individuals (board members with connections, the chairman of the General Assembly of DEN-L), and organisations (e.g., Friends of Ireland formed) that help explore funding opportunities for the work.

DEN-L also looks out for new funding opportunities through media and networking for funding partners both locally and internationally, and writes different small grant proposals to raise funds for projects for the organisation to implement.

DEN-L has created new funding opportunities by introducing a policy of charging fees for consultancy services and developing facilities at the MTO’B Training Centre in Gbarnga: lodging, conference rooms, and the selling of pork produced at the MTO’B Training Centre to raise funds for the organisation.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to act and commit
In the years since the baseline DEN-L has been adapting to changing circumstances and a decrease in funding. The leadership still seems to be responsive and the development of a new strategic plan has been set in motion thanks to the General Assembly and the Board. The insistence of funding partners on more involvement of the board of directors in providing strategic guidance increased compared to the baseline situation, and this has contributed to slight improvement in the strategic leadership of DEN-L. The organisational structure and objectives of the organisation are clearly displayed at the DEN-L headquarters and is understood by staff.

In 2013, the management of DEN-L adopted ‘social enterprise’ as the model for sustainability and long-term development, and encouraged by supporting funders DEN-L has sought for other ways to implement projects and to offer services. The development of the MTO'B centre has contributed to this as well. DEN-L’s partnerships with ICCO, Trocaire, and Irish Aid, which mostly rested on 3-year funding cycles, have ended. This has driven DEN-L to adapt by forging partnerships with new funding agencies, including OSIWA, CAFORD, USAID/IREX, Save the Children/UK, and UN Women for the implementation of short-term projects with durations of 6-12 months. DEN-L claims to still maintain its core values in the context of competitively vying for small grants and implementing short-term projects that are prioritized by external funding agencies, but they admit that the small grants are sought purposefully to access funding since its long-term funding partners have withdrawn the long-term grant funding programs.

The staff capacity at DEN-L has improved in the last years: staff members have the necessary skills to perform projects; staff members are actively stimulated to follow trainings and university courses. More qualified staffs are being selected for relevant projects. Also, the interactions with various partners have offered DEN-L a diverse range of trainings and workshops. DEN-L staff members have built knowledge and skills on for example M&E, result-based management, proposal development and reporting. The full application of the knowledge from trainings is something that needs to be worked on. Staff motivation seems to be good due the incentives in place, and staff turnover is generally low. However, there are concerns about whether DEN-L will be able to keep up these incentives due to the unpredictability of funding.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.75 (very slight improvement)

Capability to adapt and self-renew

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organisational).

Description of the endline situation:

The M&E situation has not changed yet at DEN-L. The organisation does not have a monitoring and evaluation framework, strategy, and performance monitoring plan (PMP). They do not have project-based performance indicators that could be used to collect data in a systematic manner for analysis and objective determination of the results of the many projects that they implement. Consequently, there is very little opportunity for management decision-making based on sound empirical analyses required to objectively measure progress toward addressing the actual root causes of all forms of injustice. According to the funding partners interviewed, reporting on the deliverables of the various projects has also improved considerably since they introduced various reporting templates and setting of milestones to be achieved within fixed time frames.

Some of the project staff of DEN-L's various projects received training in M&E since the baseline, as part of efforts to prepare them adequately to carry out the activities of the projects that they are assigned to. The project staff use data collection and reporting templates developed and given to them by the funding partners specifically for their projects. Monitoring and evaluation oversight is generally in the hands of funding organisations.

Notwithstanding the acquisition of M&E skills DEN-L by some of DEN-L's staff working on projects, DEN-L as an organisation has not yet harnessed the existing M&E skills by developing an M&E framework and management information systems for the organisation.

Score: from 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.

Description of the endline situation:

M&E competencies in DEN-L have improved slightly because some of their current funding partners have provided training on M&E for the staff employed by DEN-L to implement their respective projects.

The question to ponder is whether or not DEN-L will have the means of retaining and maintaining those project staff that have acquired M&E skills after closure of those projects that they were employed to implement.

It is worth noting that DEN-L as an organisation recognizes the need for M&E skills and the application of M&E to their future strategies, but they seem unwilling or hesitant to invest in the integration of M&E into their programme design. This is a serious shortfall in their programme design.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.

Description of the endline situation:
M&E is not effectively applied by DEN-L to assess the effects of the services that they deliver to the beneficiaries of their projects, i.e., the results and outcomes of projects, to inform future programming strategies.

DEN-L still heavily relies on the feedback that they get from project beneficiaries, funding partners, and its members at conferences, reflection meetings, retreats and its Annual General Assembly to draw out experiences and lessons learned, which they use as basis for strategic planning, advocacy, and development of future programmes and projects.

This is still happening because since the baseline in 2012, DEN-L has not made any investment in developing an institutional M&E policy, strategy and a proper M&E system. Consequently, DEN-L's funding partners rely on their own internal M&E units to monitor the projects funded by them and implemented by DEN-L.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

This is about whether staff talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staff are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.

Description of the endline situation:
The management of DEN-L has in place a system of conducting monthly and quarterly meetings with project teams to discuss and deal with issues affecting project planning and implementation. Work planning is done along with the staff assigned to specific projects with inputs from other project and support staff. The main challenge to this process is that follow-through on issues arising from the management meetings is poor.

The management of DEN-L still conducts SWOT analysis involving majority of staff members to assess the overall operational and institutional capacity of the organisation.

Staff members are encouraged to give and take feedback from each other informally on a regular basis.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed and used.

Description of the endline situation:
Freedom of ideas in DEN-L is still concentrated on the inputs that staff members make to project proposal development, operational planning and implementation of project activities, and not on innovative ideas that encompasses the overall growth and development of the organisation. This self-inflicted limitation was already recognized in the previous strategic plan where the institutional capacity issues of DEN-L at that time were captured.

This was noted that "the level of required change indicated by this review raises issues of institutional capacity for DEN-L. Capacity within the organisation needs to match the ambition and potential to affect change. Capacity can be developed within any organisation that has an existing resource pool, and there is an abundance of talent within DEN-L that could be developed for new roles. The organisational changes adopted as a result of the 2007 Strategic Plan have or will improve the possibilities for this talent to emerge but it also needs to be prompted by creating a safe space for innovative thinking, challenging inputs and open discussion. At the moment there is little space for thinking and only tentative thought about where this should happen. The reviewers are firmly of the view that this needs to be determined by [strategic] management – and specifically triggered by the operational management."

The situation described above unfortunately still holds true today. The strategic leadership of DEN-L is yet to take up the mantle of corporate leadership and unleash social entrepreneurship as the modus operandi of DEN-L.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organisation.

Description of the endline situation:
In terms of formal systems in place to track trends and developments nothing has changed. DEN-L's system for being in touch with general trends and development in its operating environment includes gathering and analyzing market data to ascertain demand for the services offered by its MTO'B Training Centre in Gbarnga; participating in sector coordination meetings of the government and development partners on the one hand, and networking meetings of civil society organisations on the other; membership in the network of local civil society organisations operating in Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties; and membership in the coalition of NGOs working together to implement the ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP).

DEN-L still maintains its website and has also created a Facebook page. The website and the Facebook page are used to keep stakeholders abreast of development trends in DEN-L. The interesting aspects of DEN-L's activities are regularly posted on its Facebook page and they do get feedback from stakeholders and their fans. The website is also regularly updated.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.

Description of the endline situation:
DEN-L considers its members and the beneficiaries of their services as key stakeholders. The operational management of DEN-L involves the member organisations and the board of directors in setting policy and strategic priorities; and the beneficiaries of their services are also involved in projects from the beginning through needs assessments, and making known the activities and benefits of the projects to them in a transparent manner.

In general DEN-L is very responsive to both the beneficiaries of their services and their funding partners. They discuss the work plans of the different projects with the different funding partners. From the beneficiaries' perspective, they are happy with DEN-L because their project staffs are always in the field and working with them. However, a few beneficiaries would know the management team because most engagement is at the project level with the dedicated project staff.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

Summary of the capability to adapt and self renew
In many ways this capability still greatly reflects the situation in the baseline: the governance structure of DEN-L allows for staff at different levels to contribute ideas on projects and project proposals. Staff mentioned they feel able to share thought and give feedback on how the organisation operates. However, the organisation does not have a monitoring and evaluation framework, strategy,

and performance monitoring plan. They do not have project-based performance indicators that could be used to collect data in a systematic manner for analysis and objective determination of the results of the many projects that they implement. Most of the M&E tasks serve along funding partner lines and guidance. According to the funding partners interviewed, reporting on the deliverables of the various projects has also improved considerably since they introduced various reporting templates and setting of milestones to be achieved within fixed time frames.

The transition towards being a sustainable enterprise is still ongoing and the investments related to that have been there via multiple funding partners - however, these funding activities are still quite dependent on the projects that are available.

The wide contacts DEN-L has in both Bong County and Monrovia, and its participation and good relations with both national and international stakeholders mean that the organisation stays in touch with trends and developments in society. Interaction with beneficiaries is actively sought in formal and informal ways.

Regarding the development of M&E competencies and M&E structures much is still needed. Though some skills and knowledge has been built through various trainings and assessments with various partners, M&E mostly is taken up on a project basis and resides in the hands of funding partners. There have been intentions to actively set up an M&E protocol and system but for now this has not been taken up.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.3 (very slight improvement)

Capability to deliver on development objectives
3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.

Description of the endline situation:
DEN-L operates on three levels of planning: a) 3-year strategic plan, b) annual work plan, and c) project work plans. The current strategic plan of DEN-L covers the period 2011-2014, which ends in December 2014. DEN-L prepares an Annual Work Plan (AWP) for every fiscal year, which includes its core activities and the activities of current funded projects.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.

Description of the endline situation:
The management of DEN-L and project staff ensure that project funds are spent in accordance with budget allocations, the regulations of funding partners, and the financial management procedures of DEN-L.

Budgeting for the projects is activity-based, which makes it easy for the management of DEN-L and the project staff to plan and implement, and easily track implementation of the project activities and expenditures effectively. A notable change in the way DEN-L is managing projects since the baseline is that staff assigned to projects do not just develop work plans and implement them, but now also keep track of the funds with particular reference to tracking implementation of project activities and co-management of project budgets with the finance office to ensure that expenditures do not exceed the project budgets.

However, the management of DEN-L, the project staff, and funding partners interviewed did not indicate to the evaluation team that cost-benefit analyses are conducted to ascertain the cost-effective use of resources.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.

Description of the baseline situation:
A clear majority of the funding partners of DEN-L interviewed indicated that the extent to which the organisation delivers planned outputs has improved considerably.

The funding partners referred to, further indicated that DEN-L carries out the projects in accordance with planned activities, and where changes are needed for any reasons the relevant funding partners are informed; changes are discussed, including the shifting of budget lines, and mutually agreed and effected.

The subgroups of DEN-L interviewed also confirmed that the value the organisation attaches to timely and efficient achievement of outputs is highly prioritized by both management and project staffs.

Score: from 3.5 to 4.5 (improvement)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs

Description of the baseline situation:
DEN-L uses ‘listening survey’ and ‘participatory needs assessment’ as tools to assess the needs of the beneficiaries of their projects. Needs assessments are carried out in project areas before project preparation and implementation. Community members plan their activities and DEN-L supports them in carrying out the activities. The strategy to be in contact with beneficiaries has not changed but the scope has. DEN-L’s staff carries out the needs assessments along with community members; and beneficiary communities, NGOs and CSOs are involved with project implementation; and the beneficiaries of the projects are made aware of project funding. DEN-L attaches high priority to beneficiary assessments as the start up activity of all projects to ensure that interventions meet the beneficiaries’ needs.

DEN-L also listens to feedback from the funding partners, which is much better since the baseline. There are improvements in listening to their funding partners in terms of how the funding partners mentor them.

Since DEN-L also knows more about M&E now, they have more contacts with beneficiaries and also get feedback from them about the relevance and impacts of the various projects.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.5.Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio’s)'

This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.

Description of the endline situation:
Den-L as an institution has no M&E policy, strategy, nor system. The organisation relies on the M&E knowledge and skills of the project staff to monitor the progress of projects and this is based on

monitoring requirements and guidelines of funding partners. Nothing has changed in the way of tracking efficiency. No significant change has occurred in the situation of this indicator since the baseline in 2012, as DEN-L does not link outputs to related inputs.

DEN-L conducts baseline studies for the various projects that the organisation implements but they often do not conduct endline studies to ascertain the results and impacts that their projects might be making on the beneficiaries. DEN-L staff mentioned that this is the case mostly for shorter and smaller projects. The 'ad hoc' project partners do allocate funds in the project budgets for baseline studies, but they do not allocate any funds in the project budgets for endline studies.

DEN-L includes ‘monitoring’ in the work plans of the various projects as a project activity, and uses templates provided by its various funding partners to monitor progress for each project.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available

Description of the endline situation:
Delivery of good quality service is a core value of DEN-L. However, the absence of systematic M&E makes it quite challenging to ascertain the quality of the services that the organisation provides to beneficiaries of its peace, security, civic and economic empowerment projects.

According to the various subgroups of DEN-L interviewed, the availability of funding for the various 'ad hoc projects' has helped DEN-L to critically look at the issue of quality with the view of improving service delivery.

The numbers of 'ad hoc projects' have increased, thereby helping to decrease the funding gap. Provisions of the grant agreements makes it obligatory on the part of DEN-L to ensure that all of the entrusted financial resources are utilized for the projects and are properly accounted for in line with the regulations and guidelines provided by the various funding partners for proper management of the funds.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to deliver on development objectives
DEN-L has taken necessary steps to improve quality of project implementation in the past years. Since funding is now increasingly coming from multiple, smaller projects, the focus on balancing funding with quality and efficient implementation is growing. Grant agreements and guidelines provided by funding partners provide guidance for proper project management.

Partners reported that DEN-L’s capacity to work with feedback has improved in the past years, and there is more emphasis on timely reporting and accurate implementation of activities. Staff members have taken up more responsibility in contributing and controlling project budget lines in work plans. The combination of annual work plans and project work plans are use to guide project activities.

Most of the M&E tasks serve along funding partner lines and guidance. Needs assessments are carried out in project areas before project preparation and implementation. Community members plan their activities and DEN-L supports them in carrying out the activities. The strategy to be in contact with beneficiaries has not changed but the scope has. DEN-L is able to do baseline assessments but often there are no funds provided to do endline assessments.

Score: from 3.4 to 3.8 (slight improvement)

Capability to relate

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.

Description of the endline situation:

The partners of DEN-L interviewed generally agreed that DEN-L is an inclusive organisation and that this has made them an improved organisation because they strive to include everybody - the beneficiary communities, government, and civil society stakeholders in the formulation of their policies and strategies.

Some of the funding partners of DEN-L interviewed admitted that they are aware that DEN-L meets with its stakeholders. One partner averred, “We are aware of these processes, but we did not get involved. We have not been part of the policy and strategy formulation of DEN-L."

DEN-L further engages its key stakeholders – general assembly and board of directors through their mechanism of "annual general assembly to involve those particular stakeholders in the strategic leadership of the organisation." DEN-L uses the annual general assembly of its members to involve some of the people from the target communities to receive their inputs for policies and strategic planning. The organisation intends to continue on this path depending on availability of resources to cover the costs of the annual general assembly. The members of DEN-L that participate in its annual general assembly are drawn from amongst its partner organisations. These organisations contribute inputs to DEN-L’s policy and strategic plan.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.

Description of the endline situation:

DEN-L has increased relationships with both national and regional level networks of civil society networks and international development organisations and funders. They have also increased participation in networks and partnerships with government agencies, corporate actors, and institutes of learning.

Since the baseline in 2012, DEN-L has improved partnering with both international and national NGOs to jointly implement projects. DEN-L is currently in partnerships with two Dutch co-financing agencies – ICCO and ZOA/DCR – as well as with several international development organisations currently funding targeted programmes in different thematic sectors in Liberia, including Trocaire, OSIWA, IREX, UNMIL, UN WOMEN, Save the Children/UK, Oxfam, and DAI/FED/USAID.

A shining example of improved partnering with other development organisations was the arrangement for the implementation of the European Commission-funded ‘Non-State Actors' project involving DEN-L, Educare, ActionAid and NEAEL. These partners jointly planned most of the project activities over the life span of the project; shared and coordinated information of travel, workshop schedules, and meetings; effectively involving and coordinating with the County Coordinators of the Ministry of Gender and Development, and other local government officials in organizing meetings and workshops. These actions helped enhanced the smooth implementation of project activities.

DEN-L has improved engagement with state actors at different levels, particularly at the county level. DEN-L has also improved networking and collaboration with local leaders and the Ministry of Gender and Development through the Gender Coordinators based in its core counties of operation – Bong, Lofa and Nimba - in mobilizing communities and following up on different community development projects.

Since the baseline DEN-L has also extended its networking and collaboration to contribution of input to the local government, communities and concessionaires in planning Corporate Responsibility projects in Bong County. For example, DEN-L participated in a meeting organized by ArcelorMittal Liberia Limited, an iron ore concession operating in Nimba, Bong and Grand Bassa Counties, for state actors and local government officials. The meeting highlighted ArcelorMittal's Cooperate Responsibility to the affected communities and how it intends to engage CSOs in the delivery of services to affected communities.

DEN-L currently plays the role of co-coordinator of the Bong County Chapter of the National Civil Society Council of Liberia. They were elected to serve a term of three years in that capacity. In the true sense of networking they occupy a lead role as an NGO in Bong County. DEN-L is still actively involved and they are occupying a key position in the CSOs' network; and are also still actively involved and are influential in the Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL). One the things people say about DEN-L is that they are strong in networking.

Since the baseline, DEN-L has joined two more networks: the Consortium of CSOs for Natural Resource Management that monitors the management of natural resources by the Government of Liberia; and the Grassroots Women's Network in Bong County, which advocates for development of peace-building activities towards strengthening the link between women and the maternity hospital in Gbarnga.

Finally, DEN-L is also in consultation with the University of Ireland, Cuttington University, Kofi Annan Institute of Peace Studies of the University of Liberia, and the Bong Technical College to sign Memoranda of Understanding for partnership and exchange visits among these institutions. DEN-L participates in these many networking and coordination meetings mainly for the purpose of sharing of information among partners and groups (programmatic cross learning), to improve collaboration and coordination among partners, to foster better working relationships.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.

Description of the endline situation:

The funding partners of DEN-L interviewed confirmed that the organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups in their living environment. In some cases target groups from different areas are brought to the study centre to take part in the same training. This means that DEN-L maintains direct contact with beneficiaries of their projects mainly during project implementation, particularly those that receive small grants from DEN-L. The direct and frequent contact is to ensure that planned project activities are fully implemented to achieve the objectives and results of the projects.

The forms of contact that DEN-L maintains with the beneficiaries or clients of its projects include the following:

Visitation to the offices of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Community Radio Stations (CRSs) by its mentors to provide one-on-one mentoring of managers and staff (through the IREX project);

Telephone and e-mail communications carried out on an on-going basis between the mentors and the managers for the purpose of sharing information and resources;

Mentoring support at the RSC when the mentors are not in the field they provide mentoring to the CSOs/CRSs in proposal development, advocacy action planning, planning of roundtable conferences, and conflict management/resolution processes; and provision of training in computer maintenance, and the use of the internet to access information or conduct research.

Score: from 3. 5 to 4 (slight improvement)

4.4. Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

How do staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?

Description of the endline situation:
To fully understand how relationships within DEN-L work one needs to know that the organisation has a hierarchical leadership structure, and the practical manifestation of this structure is reflected in the positioning of staff members and the allocation of decision-making power. To put this into proper perspective, the leadership of DEN-L comprises the General Assembly that defines the broad direction of the organisation, the board of directors that makes policy and provides strategic guidance, and the operational leadership (directorate/management team) that manages the day-to-day operations of DEN-L, including management of staff performance.

At the level of the operational leadership (management team) DEN-L has three layers of staffing – directors (executive, programme, and finance directors), project coordinators, and project staff. DEN-L employs a 'participatory management' approach that involves the three categories of staff in interactions relative to sharing of information, experience, feedback, ideas and inputs to strategic planning, project development and management.

Communication flow among the three layers of staffing is generally good, as people feel comfortable to say what they want. The management did mention that communication and planning is sometimes a bit tricky due to the demands and requests from various stakeholders. The subgroups of the management of DEN-L interviewed showed that the management of the organisation is making conscious efforts to create space for uninhibited internal contacts, communication and decision-making amongst DEN-L's staff. They encourage everyone to be informed, and to freely speak what's on their minds, and to be able to follow it up with management for appropriate action(s) to be taken.

DEN-L's staff members respect each other's cultural values and religions. They speak and act in line with their various cultural values. DEN-L embraces diversity in its staffing.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

Summary of the capability to relate
DEN-L is an active member in local, national and international networks. In the past years these activities have been expanding and new partnerships have been built. The diversity of actors connected to DEN-L has also been expanding to include new target groups in different areas, and state and private sector actors. Engagement with target groups has been taking different forms per project, and DEN-L is encountering new mechanisms to explore this, for example through field visits, bringing target groups from different areas to the MTO'B centre, and through mentoring approaches.

Internally the DEN-L structure seems to be able to give guidance to these diverse activities and internal organisational relations seem open yet structured. The leadership of DEN-L comprises of the General Assembly that defines the broad direction of the organisation, the board of directors that makes policy and provides strategic guidance, and the operational leadership (directorate/management team) that manages the day-to-day operations of DEN-L, including management of staff performance. Management did mention that they sometimes feel stretched by the demands placed on them from all the different sides - this sometimes is expressed in miscommunication. The general assembly has been the main way stakeholders and staff members are able to influence organisational policies and strategies. The management is consciously making attempts to include staff in communication and decision-making.

Score: from 3.9 to 4.1 (very slight improvement)

Capability to achieve coherence

5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.

Description of the endline situation:

DEN-L has a clearly articulated mission that is understood by the Board of Directors, management team, and the project staff. The vision of DEN-L is “to create a Liberia at peace with itself and its neighbours”; and the mission of DEN-L is “to build a constituency of people-to-people formations in pursuit of grassroots empowerment, economic justice, democratic development, and gender equity for a just and peaceful Liberia”. The subgroups of DEN-L interviewed indicated that their donors are interested in their mission, vision and core values, and that they prefer providing support to what they stand for instead of project activities outside of their mission and vision.

The board of directors and operational management of DEN-L periodically discuss the vision, mission and strategies in the organisation, and they normally craft a strategic plan every three years. An internal review conducted in anticipation of DEN-L’s current strategic plan that is ending this year (2011-2014), made the following interesting conclusion that still holds true at this endline evaluation:

“[...] in order to maximize the impact of the work carried out by DEN-L, and to ensure coherence between the values and approaches of the organisation, and its vision for Liberia, the following recommendations were suggested for prioritization in the strategic planning process":

“DEN-L needs to bring about a more comprehensive strategic refocusing if it is to be sustainable in a new context for Liberia. While grassroots action is the core of the organisation’s work it must also take on a direct policy-influencing role and, as appropriate, move into a partnering arrangement with government departments and development agencies, while retaining the capability to be constructively critical. Liberia is at a stage where events can be influenced beyond the normal range of expectations, so there is a profoundly unique opportunity at hand. However, there is a view, borne out by this review, that DEN-L is caught in a web of doing. DEN-L needs to change from seeing itself as a passive donor dependent organisation and to shape up for the new opportunities that will arise at this stage of development under Liberia Rising - which will bring a restructuring of aid, and hopefully, a further embedding of democracy and stability. This will bring increased opportunities, especially at county level. If DEN-L remains solely at this ‘doing’ level it will inevitably be pushed into a provision role rather than shaping up society during this significant window of opportunity. It is not often that NGOs are given an opportunity to influence the nature of the society that will be constructed.”

Since the baseline in 2012 DEN-L has convened one Annual General Assembly. Among the results laid out in the Resolution of that general assembly are the issues of broadening the membership of the board of directors to attract board members that bring specialized expertise; and more involvement of the board in strategic planning. This is a testament that DEN-L is still searching for ways “to bring a more comprehensive strategic refocusing if it is to be sustainable in a new context for Liberia”.

Pursuant to the recommendation for strategic refocusing suggested by the review, DEN-L is attempting to transform into a social enterprise. This shows that the current leadership of DEN-L is forward thinking and is proactively seeking out ways and means of becoming a sustainable social enterprise. This could be a step toward moving from 'doing' to taking on a “direct policy-influencing role, and partnering with government ministries and development partners, while retaining the capability to be constructively critical”.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.

Description of the endline situation:
DEN-L has developed and published their finance, administration, and human resource policies, but these were already in place during the baseline in 2012. DEN-L uses work plans, project plans, reporting templates and the monitoring guidelines provided by its funding partners to monitor progress of implementation of their projects.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.

Description of the endline situation:
The operations of DEN-L are partially in line with its strategic plan. There are compromises due to either the decrease in funding from or complete withdrawal of DEN-L's 'long-term funding partners', which has driven the organisation to forge relationships with various new funding partners for the implementation of 'ad hoc projects' based on the strategies and guidelines of the funding partners.

Both the management team and project staff of DEN-L admit that there have been compromises because the activities of the different funding partners do not help DEN-L in its quest to "bring about a more comprehensive strategic refocusing in order to be sustainable in a new context for Liberia". They rather provide short-term funding that enables DEN-L to remain in the 'provision role' rather than ascending to the 'policy-influencing role' recommended by the strategic review.

The funding partners of DEN-L provide funding support that crosscut different thematic areas within the vision of DEN-L, including training, awareness, gender, advocacy, food security, agribusiness development, natural resource governance and management, corporate social responsibility, because of the way these are linked.

Score: from 4 to 3.5 (slight decrease)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.

Description of the endline situation:
Since the baseline in 2012 DEN-L has implemented a plethora of 'ad hoc projects' ranging from 6-12 months in duration, funded by different funding partners in different thematic sectors, and in different counties across Liberia, but all of the projects are geared towards building the capacities of local civil society organisations and communities in peace and security, civic education, information dissemination, social enterprise development, and economic empowerment of women.

The portfolio of projects and activities being managed and implemented by DEN-L provide opportunities for mutually supportive efforts as they fall within the strategies of DEN-L. For example, building the capacity of local civil society organisations to monitor the activities of the government and development partners and advocate for change, in tandem with building the capacity of community radio stations to produce and broadcast peace and development programmes, are indeed complementary and mutually supportive. However, when it comes to working towards their mission of becoming a sustainable development study centre not all projects necessarily support this.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

Summary of the capability to achieve coherence

DEN-L has a clearly articulated mission that is understood by the Board of Directors, management team, and the project staff. The board of directors and operational management of DEN-L periodically discuss the vision, mission and strategies in the organisation, and they normally craft a strategic plan every three years. The end of the current strategy is by the end of 2014.

In the implementation of the strategic plan DEN-L has been able to manage the gradual withdrawal of long-term funders by increasing the number of short-term 'ad hoc' projects. These projects have been within the strategic orientation of DEN-L to build capacity of local civil society, communities, engage in the economic empowerment of women, and develop social enterprise.

A previous institutional capacity review from 2011 noted that "that DEN-L is caught in a web of doing. DEN-L needs to change from seeing itself as a passive donor dependent organisation to shape up for the new opportunities that will arise at this stage of development." Currently this still holds true. DEN-L is still searching for ways “to bring a more comprehensive strategic refocusing if it is to be sustainable in a new context for Liberia”. The organisation is attempting to transform into a social enterprise. This shows that the current leadership of DEN-L is forward thinking and is proactively seeking out ways and means of becoming a sustainable social enterprise. This could be a step toward moving from 'doing' to taking on a “direct policy-influencing role, and partnering with government ministries and development, while retaining the capability to be constructively critical”.

Score: from 3.8 to 3.8 (no change)

Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

Below you can find a description of the key changes in organisational capacity of DEN-L since the baseline as expressed by DEN-L staff during the endline workshop. First, a description is given of how this topic was introduced during the endline workshop by summarising key information on DEN-L from the baseline report. This information includes a brief description of the vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, staff situation, clients and partner organisations. This then led into a discussion on how the organisation has changed since the baseline.

Introduction

The endline workshop started on Monday, 23rd of June 2014, at the DEN-L Miriam T. O'Brien (MTOB) Centre, just outside of Gbarnga. During this workshop, the staffs present were asked how they thought the organisation had changed since the baseline. This was done after the recap of the original vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, as described in the baseline report. These key changes are further described below. Unfortunately, due to miscommunication, the director and the deputy-director were out of the country at the time of the workshop and a great deal of other staff also was out on different assignments in the field. The research team was able to interview the director of DEN-L extensively at a later stage, and her comments have been inserted where possible.

The staff members wrote down the changes they had seen happening at DEN-L. From there the facilitator organised these, bringing forward the most important issues relating to organisational capacity, linking the issues that were mentioned twice or that were closely related. Eventually the most significant changes according to the DEN-L staff were categorized according to key themes. This led to <u>3 key areas of change</u>: increase diversity of alternative funding sources, increasingly project-based staff, and improved staff capacity. These changes and the reasons for these changes were further explored, which has resulted in a ‘general causal map’ (visual and narrative), see below.

Some of the key changes that were initially identified included:

- Reduction in main funding partners
- Spreading out of DEN-L activities: more small grant projects and in more locations in Liberia, and therefore more project-based funding and procedures
- The further development of the initiatives at the MTOB centre such as the pig farm and the development of the lodging facilities
- More staff engaged in higher education and trainings, gained diverse skills in, for example, VSLA, M&E, proposal writing
- Increase of staff working on different projects
- Regular annual staff appraisal
- Project proposals also being developed by programme staff
- Partnerships strengthened with Ireland and with universities within Liberia.

Key organisational capacity changes in DEN-L - General causal map

The general causal map was developed with as its departure points some of the major changes that have occurred at DEN-L since 2012: increased diversity of alternative funding sources; increasingly, project-based staff; and of improved staff capacity. These changes are expected to contribute to the vision of DEN-L to become a sustainable development study centre. At the basis of the general causal map there are a few ongoing shifts in the landscape that have had an important influence to the organisational capacity of DEN-L: the reduction in long-term funding programmes since 2011 and more concretely in 2014. Trocaire and Irish Aid, two major funding partners of DEN-L, Trocaire has pulled out of Liberia while Irish Aid is yet to finalize its program for Liberia. ICCO still remains a core partner but the funding from ICCO has significantly decreased [1]. As a result of this DEN-L has increasingly and actively changed its strategy to find additional funds [2], involving increasingly diverse and more short-term projects that relate to the expertise of DEN-L. This has led to a portfolio of projects that now not only take place in Bong, Nimba and Lofa (the initial core areas of operation of DEN-L), but to other regions in Liberia [3]. Other core factors that have influenced and steered the changes that occurred at the organisation relate to the vision of DEN-L to be a "sustainable development study centre" [4] (and the ideas on how to work towards this via the development of the MTOB centre) [5], and the long-standing relationship with partners in Ireland who are still able to work with DEN-L [6]. The organisation is consciously working to maintain its values but the thematic areas of the organisation continue to change.

In the general causal map each of these key changes are further discussed. The numbers in the narrative refer to information organised visually in the map on the next page. In the causal maps the attempt is made to trace back key capacity outcomes to competencies and activities, and to factors and causes. At the top the main capacity competencies and outcomes are positioned. These main capacity themes (in yellow boxes) and some of their key consequences (in purple boxes) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the outcomes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The bottom of the causal map shows the most important underlying causes, opportunities and constraints that have influenced the organisation. Certain key influencing causes and external developments that have substantially impacted the organisation are listed in the round boxes at the bottom in light green.

The key areas of change in organisational capacity since the baseline concerned ‘increased diversity of alternative funding sources’ [7], ‘increasingly project-based staff [8]’ and ‘improved staff capacity’ [9]. These three capacity-related outcomes were said to be instrumental in enabling DEN-L to work towards becoming a sustainable development study centre [10].

Increased diversity of alternative funding sources

DEN-L has increased its diversity of alternative funding sources [7]. Key contributions to this change include: development of the Miriam T. O'Brien Centre facilities and activities [11]; strengthened funding partnerships with the Friends of Ireland and local universities [17]; and more active proposal writing [18]. Staff members of DEN-L now feel that they are now able to face challenges and survive in the storm: "we are not being spoon fed", said one staff member.

A key development that has strengthened DEN-L in sourcing funding has been the further development of the MTOB centre through further investments in facilities (rooms and other assets – pig farm) and consulting services [11]. When it comes to the MTOB centre as a whole the staff members say that more is planned: they built 6 self-contained rooms for guests to stay in, and intend to build 12 new rooms. According to staff, this was due to an increasing demand for DEN-L’s training and lodging facilities [12]. Agricultural activities were up-scaled as well: The area also holds a piggery where now more than 100 pigs (compared to 4 pigs in 2012) are being raised to provide food for the cafeteria [13]. This was helped in its development by a staff member who was sent to a training by the Food and Enterprise Development (FED) programme to get some training in 'farming as a business' in 2012 [14]. A third reason for increased diversity of funding sources was a project with IREX in 2012 and that started up a CSO resource centre at the MTO'B centre [15], .

The above-mentioned developments have all been examples of the way DEN-L has been working on its mission to become a sustainable development studies centre that is able to offer trainings and capacity-building services to organisations and civil society groups [5]. At the same time DEN-L was forced to develop these facilities and services more urgently. DEN-L needed to look for ways to finance important institutional costs such as administrative functions [16]. The reason for this is that it turned out that the smaller and shorter projects they were now engaging in would rather not pay for much institutional overhead [3]. The head of HR mentioned that: "There is a restricted amount for institutional support - mostly 3% or 4% per project. Now, a great portion of the benefits from the centre are being sourced to support project management and administration. This is a bit of a struggle sometimes".

Another component of increased diversity of funding was the strengthened ties with partners in Ireland. The partnership with the 'Friends of DEN-L' in Ireland has further opened opportunities for getting funding (both for scholarships and for direct funds to the program) [17]. These donations from Ireland, reaching back to the ties of the original founders of DEN-L (two Irish nuns), have been regular for a long time. These long-standing relations with Ireland are still kept solid [6].

The final component that helps with finding alternative funding sources has to do with project staff being engaged more and more with proposal writing and bringing in projects individually, whilst before this was mainly done by the programme director [18]. One of the reasons for this increased engagement of staff in proposal writing included the proposal writing trainings between 2012 and 2013 [19]. IREX did the trainings as part of the Organisational Development trajectory for the civil society organisations resource centre that they are funding at the DEN-L's MTO'B Centre [20]. Also within DEN-L efforts were made to provide in-house trainings in proposal writing. This also relates to staff skills and wide range of topics are being taught to each other internally: for example, when the former DEN-L director came from his Master's degree studies in Ireland he organized a session with staff and shared what he learned [21].

Increasingly project-based staff

According to staff, there is a change in staff structure, where project staff members are more involved in project management, and the hiring of staff is more project-based since 2012 [8]. The staff at the workshop explained that more people are being hired on a project basis, and that those with specific skills and experience are being retained as consultants dependent on the projects at hand [22]. This was also reflected in one of the interviews with a partner (Trocaire). They had the impression that DEN-L had made some good, but hard, choices in terms of who they hire and no longer just hire friends or family. Instead they try to hire on the basis of what a person can do in the project. Underlying the retaining and flexible hiring of more people with special skills and experience is that DEN-L is now more actively looking for people with qualifications and top physical condition, according to the Deputy Director for Finance and Administration [23]. Another reason for retaining and flexible hiring of people with special skills and experience is the specific requests of the short-term projects with various donors and NGOs that have certain targets and are working in different localities [3]. The target communities for DEN-L are Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties but other aspect of the organisation's work brings people from across the country as well as Serra Leone and Guinea. DEN-L staff cannot be everywhere at the same time and therefore more staff members are attracted based on the project budget and area of activities. This also means that these specific project officers have more individual management tasks, such as taking care of the work plans and budgets [25]. In our discussions with the director of DEN-L it later came forward that regular communication and meet with staff on different projects was becoming difficult. In fact, on the day of the endline workshop, the present staff lamented the lack of communication about the workshop and stated that many programme and field staff members were out in the field a lot. This outcome was not explicitly explored during the causal map however but might be distilled from the discussions during the endline workshop and the interviews that the team did afterward. The director later mentioned that she is sometimes split between Monrovia and Gbarnga. She says that many of the projects and donors are in Monrovia so she has to meet with them often, while their offices activities are in Bong County. This leads to a lot of travelling.

Improved staff capacity

A key issue that was prominently discussed during the causal map was the DEN-L focus on the perceived improvement of staff capacity [9]. Many staff present felt that in the past two years many staff members have been able to take part in many trainings and educational activities.

In this causal map this has been split into new and better skills for staff and more staff with higher education. It should be noted that it was not exactly clear to what extent these new skills and education have changed project implementation, but DEN-L has mentioned in its strategic plan the need for higher educated staff in order to keep up to date with the developments within Liberian society.



Working towards the vision of becoming a "Sustainable Development study centre" [10]
Increased diversity of alternative funding sources [7]
Increasingly project-based staff [8]
Improved staff capacity [9]
Further development of the MTOB centre [11]
Partnership strengthened with Ireland: 'Friends of DEN-L' established 2012 [17]
Staff skills and knowledge development [26]
More staff with higher education [34]
Increased demand for lodging and training [12]
Agricultural activities at the DEN-L farm upscaled [13]
CSO resouce centre was set up through the IREX CSO/CRS project 2012 [15]
Project staff more active in proposal writing and bringing in projects [18]
People with special skills are being retained as consultants [22]
Facilitation and documentation skills, M&E knowledge through CSO resource centre [27]
Staff encouraged to pursue higher education at various universities [35]
More international training for staff Programme officer – 2013 Deputy director – 2014 [36]
More partnerships for higher education and HR development [39]
Farming as a business training (FED 2012) [14]
Challenge: ad hoc projects do not consider admin cost in budgets [16]
Proposal writing trainings 2012/2013 by: IREX/internal sessions [19]
In-house trainings in proposal writing by former director [21]
Staff been selected based on qualifications and physical fitness [23]
Project staff are more involved in budget management trend since 2012 [25]
Organisational development and social enterprise development trainings by IREX Trajectory 2012-2014 [28]
M&E training by ZOA and UNMIL 2012 [30]
MoU signed with the University of Ireland [40]
IREX programme to strengthen Civil society organisations and community radio stations [20]
Many staff in different projects and different areas [24]
Skills training in Village Savings and Loans Associations (CARE) 2012 [29]
Improved audio recording skills for theater through training by sound recording specialist hired by DEN-L [31]
DEN-L wants to have international and university trained staff [38]
DEN-L directors attended BSC studies in Ireland The current director will go for her master in 2014 sponsored by Trocaire [41]
MTOB centre part of DEN-L [5]
Many ad hoc projects in several different counties Additional programmes in 2012 and between April 2013 and June 2014 [3]
Various organisational assessments by donors [32]
Staff appraisal regularly carried out annually (supported financially by ICCO) [33]
DEN-L strategy and mission [4]
Long standing relationship with Ireland through co-founders and funding [6]
Strategy developed to diversify funds, and active search for projects within DEN-L expertise [2]
Reduction in long-term funding partners 2011- 2014 [1]

Staff skills and knowledge development

Regarding staff skills and knowledge development [26], some of the key skills that DEN-L staff members mentioned in the discussion were that they had become better in proposal writing [18], which is explained above, and also in facilitation, documentation and M&E [27]. The latter was a result of IREX trainings on Organization Development such as communication, reporting, monitoring and evaluation in 2013 [28]. They recently started a trajectory to train DEN-L staff in social enterprise development. According to IREX, their idea is to train and build the capacity of DEN-L staff so that they can teach other CSOs and community radio stations about organisational development and social enterprise development. IREX and the DEN-L staff mentioned that they are looking for potential interventions to build an M&E system, but those plans have not yet been further developed. The presence of the IREX-sponsored Resource Centre for CSOs [15] has also allowed staff to practice facilitation, documentation and research. IREX has sent two consultants to do these trainings with CSOs in the area and also allowed DEN-L staff to profit from that. Some specific employees trained in Organisational Development in 2013 were:

- Marie Tamba — Programme officer for the IREX CSO/CRS project
- Karmue Kamara — Programme officer for the Theatre activities of DEN-L
- Augustine Tweh — Coordinator for Save the Children/DRC project
- Varbah Tennie — Coordinator for Save the Children project
- Beatrice Sondah — DEN-L trainer
- Esther Jarwu — Coordinator for the Gender Action Programme
- Peter Dolo — Human Resource manager
- Zubahyea Joejoe — Former director

Some of the other trainings to build DEN-L staff capacity included: Village Savings and Loans Association training by CARE in 2012 [29]; M&E trainings by ZOA and by UNMIL [30] (both separate, but in 2012); a training on audio recording by a local specialist paid for by DEN-L [31]. Some of these trainings, such as the M&E trainings, have been initiated by some organisational assessments being done by some organisations: four different assessments by four different donors on the capacity development of DEN-L led to the organization putting more effort in training staff and getting qualified staff members. ICCO, IREX, ZOA and Save the Children and UN Women assessed these needs for training staff in monitoring and evaluation, proposal writing, VSLA, financial management, and business development [32]. When it comes to monitoring and evaluation skills however, the effects of the training seem to be mostly limited to engagement with beneficiaries, as there is no structural DEN-L M&E system. Participants of the workshop told us that almost each project was monitored through the funding organisation. DEN-L members said that they were working towards setting up a system.

In addition to the external organisational assessments, since the last two years an annual staff appraisal has been done to assess staff expectations and experiences, including looking at what kinds of trainings they are interested in [33]. Many staff present felt that they had been involved in organisational processes through these appraisals but also through the organisation of an Annual General Meeting in 2014. This was sponsored by ICCO. These events were occurring more often since the baseline.

More staff with higher education

The second component that contributed to improved staff capacity was that more staff members were engaged in higher education learning [34]. As part of the DEN-L strategy and mission staff members are generally encouraged to pursue education in higher education institutions, and occasionally they are able to get some funding for that. The ICCO funding has been used in this respect to help various staff in pursuing this, with an amount of 1500 Euros (DEN-L support to capacity sheet - SPO perspective) [35].

DEN-L staff clarified that a number of staff members received higher education in various areas, as follows:

Position	Year	Degree
DEN-L trainer	2012	Bachelors of Arts (Sociology)
Save the Children coordinator	2013	Bachelor of Science (Management)
Financial officer	2014	Master of Science (Finance)
Human resource manager	2014	Master candidate (Regional Planning)
Gender for Action coordinator	2012	Bachelors of Arts (Sociology)

More international trainings have taken place since 2012 as well [36]: a DEN-L trainer who is part of the IREX project was able to go to Switzerland in 2013 on a scholarship revolving around the topic of UN resolution 1325. The deputy director for programmes was able to do short term course in Australia in 2014. The possibility for the DEN-L trainer (not in the workshop) to go to Switzerland was explored through networking of the director of DEN-L and through active application [37]. These attempts supported staff capacity development through higher education and learning and the need for DEN-L to confidently become a development studies centre were among the key influencing factors [38].

The third factor leading to staff being educated more highly was due the establishment of a number of partnerships for higher education and human resource development [39]. Within the context of partnerships the head of Human Resources said that DEN-L had now also solidified their arrangement with the Kimmage University in Ireland: a Memorandum of Understanding has been signed [40]. The date was not actually mentioned in the discussion. The fact that the current director, and two previous DEN-L directors have studied in Ireland, and the fact that DEN-L has good contacts there gives DEN-L the possibility of funding and scholarships there [41]. In the past Trocaire supported the directors of DEN-L to study in Ireland. These directors got their masters from Kimmage University. The current director received funding from Trocaire to start a Masters' degree in Ireland in September 2014.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

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Endline report – Liberia, NAWOCOL MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Sam Gotomo[2]
Bram Peters[1]
Cecile Kusters[1]
Stanford Peabody[2]
Musu Washington Gopeya[2]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 Making Enterprises

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, January 2015

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This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Liberia, NAWOCOL. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Keywords: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

Report CDI-15-007 |

Contents

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The Liberia 5C evaluation team

List of abbreviations and acronyms

5 C	Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities
AGM	Assembly General Meeting
Causal map	Map with cause-effect relationships. See also ‘detailed causal map’.
Causal mechanisms	The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, the Netherlands
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
Detailed causal map	Also ‘model of change’. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question).
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
FED-cluster	Fair Economic Development Cluster (part of LCDGP)
General causal map	Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception.
ICCO-ROWA	ICCO Regional Office West Africa
LCDGP	Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFS	Dutch co-financing system
MIS	Management Information System
NACP	National AIDS/STI Control Programme
NARDA	National African Research and Development Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OD	Organisational Development
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Process tracing	Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms
SPO	Southern Partner Organisation
ToC	Theory of Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre
WCI	Women Campaign International
WIPNET	Women in Peace-building Network
WONGOSOL	Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia

1 Introduction & summary

1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: NAWOCOL, in Liberia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in Appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in Appendix 4.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

This report contains the organisational capacity component of the MFSII endline study in Liberia, concerning the National Women's Commission of Liberia (NAWOCOL). The endline discovered that NAWOCOL was somewhat recovered from a difficult time during the baseline, and has seen slight positive changes along the five organisational capabilities. The capability to act and commit showed progress due to positive developments regarding the presence of the active director and the reconstitution of the Board. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew positive developments were that NAWOCOL has hired a consultant to help with setting up an M&E system and writing the new M&E protocol. Regarding the capability to deliver on development objectives, changes were that it was now possible to get a better idea of the operational plans at NAWOCOL, and to see what outputs have been delivered. This is only slightly better than in the baseline though: NAWOCOL has an issue with providing reports and plans. The capabilities to relate and to achieve coherence have improved a bit - especially within the latter capability a development is that NAWOCOL is seeking to explore a new strategic direction and has put a number of operational documents in place.

The evaluators considered it important to note down the SPO’s perspective on what they experienced as the most important changes in the organisation since the baseline. SPO staff members noted key changes at the organisation to be that a new organisational paradigm shift has been authored, search for more diverse funding is ongoing, and there is a management team that is better at multi-tasking. The new organisational paradigm development followed from a few key driving factors: that funding has been quite low (especially funding from main donor ICCO (MFS II)), discussions with ICCO on how to develop a new strategy, and ICCO flexible funding to hold an Annual General Meeting. A parallel development was that the context for post-conflict development in Liberia was changing(moving from relief to reconstruction, changing the nature of development goals and orientation). As such, the role of NAWOCOL has changed. This is related to NAWOCOL being an umbrella organisation for women groups in Liberia with various 'constituencies' in the different Liberian counties. In recent years these women groups have increasingly been decentralising operations and focusing on their own counties leading to less efforts to maintain NAWOCOL. The diversification of funding stemmed from discussions with ICCO and the other LCDGP members, and a successful subsidy negotiation with the government of Liberia. The last key change at NAWOCOL meant that the management was becoming better in multi-tasking, and this was steered by necessity due to high staff turnover, and a number of trainings organised by the LCDGP coalition. As such the role of the MFSII partner in the capacity changes at NAWOCOL have been influential. However, it was noted that these issues were fragile, and depend much on the participation of the current director in the future. This is a highly uncertain factor as it became clear later that the director found another job for a different organisation.

It should be noted that this endline assessment was carried out just before the Ebola virus epidemic and crisis hit Liberia as of July 2014. The effects of the epidemic have heavily impacted the staff and operations of all assessed organisations, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. As such the evaluation team acknowledges that the assessment described in this endline may not fully resemble the current situation in early 2015.

2 Context and General Information about the SPO – NAWOCOL

2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

Country	Liberia
Consortium	ICCO Alliance
Responsible Dutch NGO	Inter Church Cooperation Organisation (ICCO)
Project (if applicable)	Developing the hidden potential of rural women and girls for an inspired future
Southern partner organisation	National Women's Commission of Liberia (NAWOCOL)

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation components:

Achievement of MDGs and themes	
Capacity development of Southern partner organisations	x
Efforts to strengthen civil society	

2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The history of Liberia is a turbulent history. Settled by freed slaves from the United States around 1822, the newly formed state proclaimed independence in 1846. The Liberian state slowly expanded from the coast into the hinterlands and, though the state was founded on principles of freed slaves, the upholding of settler rights increasingly led to the suppression of indigenous peoples. In 1980 a coup d'état took place which ended the more than 100 year rule of the settler party (Pajibo, 2012; Richards et al., 2005). The military government, led by former sergeant Samuel K. Doe, suspended the constitution and instituted a repressive political system. In 1989 the invasion of Charles Taylor triggered the civil war in Liberia which lasted on and off between 1989 and 2003. The war, which was characterized by great terror and gruesome atrocities, counted many different fighting groups and changing alliances. Eventually the war ended with the departure of Charles Taylor, the institution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 (Pugel, 2009). After the war ended in 2003, with the intervention of a 15,000 man UN force, a peace-building process started and is still ongoing (Richards et al., 2005).

Since the end of the civil war, the Liberian government has formulated the 'Agenda for Transformation' (AfT) as a five-year development strategy from 2012 to 2017. It followed the three–year (2008-2011) Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which transitioned Liberia from post-conflict emergency reconstruction to economic recovery. The AfT was considered a first step toward achieving the goals set out in Liberia RISING 2030, Liberia's long-term vision of socio-economic transformation and development. The AfT articulates precise goals and objectives and corresponding interventions that should move Liberia closer toward structural economic transformation, prosperity and inclusive growth.

Perhaps one of the most critical achievements, of both the Liberian government and UNMIL, has been the maintenance of peace and security. Though Liberia continues to rely on the support the United Nations peacekeepers, it is hoped that the government will gradually assume full responsibility for maintenance of security for the coming years. This fragile peace has allowed Liberians to return to their farms, start businesses, return to their country from abroad, and witness an increase in flows of Foreign Direct Investment to Liberia. To revitalize the economy, the three-pronged economic strategy of the PRS focused on (i) rebuilding critical infrastructure; (ii) reviving traditional resource sectors; and (iii) establishing a competitive business environment.

The challenges Liberia is facing are daunting however. Starting from a state of post-conflict instability, extremely weak state institutions, and an economy left in shambles by nearly two decades of violence, further issues relate to minimal reconciliation efforts, high unemployment levels, low levels of education and limited access to healthcare. Within the field of governance and justice Liberia has much work to do. In the post-conflict period reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts have mostly been steered by international initiatives and forces such as the United Nations (Pajibo, 2012). The Truth and Reconciliation Committee, instituted to move on the path towards reconciliation rather than justice, has noted that those who committed war crimes in the civil war should be held accountable. This has not been the case, and the current political establishment has not acted on this view. The security and police sector are currently undergoing training and reform to take over the role of maintaining peace in the country. This is a difficult process, as for instance the police are often considered as predators rather than protectors. Access to justice is limited and trails often take long as only a limited number of cases are concluded each year (Human Rights Watch Liberia country chapters 2014).

Liberia is currently still receiving large amounts of international aid and budget support, and the transition to strengthen the main productive sector, agriculture, is still very much in a preliminary stage (Solà-Martin, 2012). According to the African Economic Outlook 2014, more than 70% of households in Liberia are engaged in rice production. However, since 1980 yields have not increased substantially and more than half of the country's rice is imported. Economic growth has thus far been heavily dependent on the natural resource sector, including goods such as ores, lumber, rubber and palm oil exports. In recent years the services sector has also been growing significantly, even though it is noted that the slow withdrawal of the UNMIL forces in 2015 will affect the demand for these services. It was reported that the informal economy, which reflects a large proportion of Liberian economic activity, has grown even though this has not translated into a decrease in poverty (African Economic Outlook 2014).

Major economic constraining factors include the lack of electricity and basic infrastructure. Until now infrastructure and basic services saw more than US$500 million of direct investment, with key components of infrastructure (including airports, seaports, and roads) renovated or reconstructed. Plans are made to build a large hydropower dam to improve access to electricity. However, these investments alone will not be sufficient to diversify the Liberian economy, nor create jobs for the roughly 500,000 Liberians who will graduate from secondary and post secondary institutions in the next 5 to 10 years. The Liberian government has worked out a plan to establish a competitive business environment for firms in Liberia. It has reformed the Tax Code and the Investment Code, making them more competitive and beneficial to growth. It has streamlined business registration processes; established a one-stop-shop for customs clearing; and started implementing proactive industrial policies as a way of facilitating the growth of local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES). The Government also made it a priority to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment, which is necessary for growth. Further, it maintained a cash-based balanced budget; significantly increased government revenue; moved toward multi-year financial planning; and achieved US$4.9 billion of cumulative debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. These and follow-up actions are creating the right incentives for further growth in employment, GDP, and public and private investment.

Ebola outbreak

West Africa is currently experiencing the largest outbreak of Ebola ever recorded. In Liberia, the disease was reported in Lofa and Nimba counties in late March 2014. In July, the health ministry implemented measures to improve the country's response. On 27 July, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberian president, announced that Liberia would close its borders, with the exception of a few crossing points such as the airport, where screening centres would be established. Public gatherings were banned, schools and universities were closed, and the worst affected areas in the country were placed under quarantine.

In August, President Sirleaf declared a national state of emergency, noting that it might require the "suspensions of certain rights and privileges". The National Elections Commission announced that it would be unable to conduct the scheduled October 2014 senatorial election and requested postponement, one week after the leaders of various opposition parties had publicly taken different sides on the issue. In late August, Liberia's Port Authority cancelled all "shore passes" for sailors from ships coming into the country's four seaports. As of 8 September, Ebola had been identified in 14 of Liberia's 15 counties.

Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future. UN agencies such as the World Bank and international NGOs like Plan International, etc., have begun thinking post-Ebola, and have, therefore, embarked on conducting research and studies on the impact of Ebola on communities and the country, resilience of communities and the health care system, weaknesses in the health care system, etc.

As of January 2015 the Ebola epidemic seemed to be stabilising in Liberia. According to Medecins sans Frontieres the count is now around 8,157 cases and 3,496 deaths registered during the entire epidemic in Liberia (MSF Ebola crisis update 13-01-2015). This stabilisation means that the amount of new cases coming in has decreased significantly to around one case per week in Monrovia, but it is essential to not let the epidemic resurge. Not only Ebola patients have faced difficult times: the crisis has meant that general access to healthcare is even worse than before, As the Special Representative of the UN Secretariat in Liberia noted: rebuilding the country after the Ebola crisis will mean that the factors that caused the virus to spread so quickly need to be urgently addressed. This includes weak trust among the Liberian people, badly functioning basic services such as healthcare and education, lack of accountability and an over-centralized government (UN Special Representative Karen Landgren, 20-01-2015).

As it is with all sectors of Liberian society, this Ebola outbreak is testing the resilience of the SPOs to the highest limits. The SPOs are responding by readjusting their regular programmes by designing new strategies and realigning their resources to join the fight against the deadly Ebola virus disease. This is coming in the forms of Ebola awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for victims and survivors, provision of support to community care centres (CCCs), and procurement and distribution of sanitizing supplies to communities.

NAWOCOL

NAWOCOL is an inclusive membership organisation, which organises activities for women and girls to empower them. The organisational structure of NAWOCOL is constituted by a general assembly (all of the member organisations); a board of directors, in charge of making policy and supervising the activities; and an operations management team, in charge of supervision of the day-to-day activities.

In order for NAWOCOL to succeed in its programme expansion endeavour, the board of directors and its current chairperson who is a founding member or the organisation, strongly believe that the SPO had to engage relevant agencies of government such as the Ministries of Gender and Development, Education, Health, Justice, Youth and Sports for partnership and support for the achievement of its key objectives.

This effort and the funding from the government have been very useful in NAWOCOL’s new shift to counselling Ebola survivors and affected families. The organisation notes that it has shifted its attention from prevention, mainly to counselling since the scars that haunt families after deaths or survival can damage the fabric of the Liberian family long after Ebola has been eradicated.

One of the main reasons for the change of focus also is that five of the members of the SPO died from Ebola in four affected counties including Bong, Bomi, Grand Cape Mount, and Greater Monrovia. The SPO has been engaged in counselling of families and also men who survived Ebola and are capable of re-infecting their wives or spouses if they do not adhere to the mandatory sexual abstinence for 60 days.

In this direction, NAWOCOL used a portion of the related government funding and donated U$2,000.00 worth of mattresses, buckets and sanitizing items to the Island Clinic Ebola Treatment Unit on Bushrod Island and the Women Training Centre in Kakata, Margibi County, respectively. The donation was in line with the organisation’s objectives to keep women healthy and provide them knowledge and skills in various disciplines that would make meaningful contributions in society.

2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2005

What is the MFS II contracting period: 2012 - 2014

Did cooperation with this partner end? NO

If yes, when did it finish? N/A

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: N/A

If not, is there an expected end date for the collaboration? 2015

2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

History

NAWOCOL was founded in 1991 at the peak of the civil crisis in Liberia. Its sole intent was to rescue women and girls from the scourge of rape and distress caused by the ravages of war and the loss of their husbands and breadwinners, who had either been killed or were in hiding. The main idea of NAWOCOL was for women to be provided counselling with the help of UNICEF and other partners. In 1992 NAWOCOL started to implement pilots, and it became functional and operating. In the same year, they started with psychosocial counselling, micro-finance and empowerment of abused women and girls. The counselling and empowerment programme went on continuously up to 1995. In addition to counselling, NAWOCOL introduced empowerment programmes in 1992, called AWAG programme. The AWAG programme involved training in sustainable activities, such as microfinance, tailoring skills, agriculture and other relief activities. NAWOCOL also provided relief assistance in the form of legal aid and medical welfare to women and children. After 1995 NAWOCOL started to expand its operations to other parts of the country, out of Monrovia. Agriculture was added to the programme in 1996. They had an EWAC programme focussing on abused women and girls. Subcomponents of the EWAC programme were microfinance, empowerment, skills training, medical aid, and relief. During the war years - mid-1990s, NAWOCOL had their presence almost in all frontline towns and villages in Liberia assisting refugee children and women. Some of the programmes included micro-loans for women and agriculture. One big town enjoying this presence was Danane in Ivory Coast in 1996. NAWOCOL also had a big office in Ivory Cost in 1996. Given that most women in the war moved across the border of Ivory Coast to seek refuge, NAWOCOL followed and provided skills to these Liberian women across the borders. Because of the war, NAWOCOL provided services on both sides of the border, with its central office in Ivory Coast.

In talking about the activities of NAWOCOL throughout the years, it is important to stress that NAWOCOL is an umbrella of member organisations. At its peak, it had 102 member organisations. In the last years, many member organisations became autonomous and dropped out; NAWOCOL now has about 32 member organisations. Around 2000 was the time that many member organisations became autonomous/independent from NAWOCOL (early 2000) and changed their status to community-based organisations and sometimes full-fledged NGOs. This movement was due to the end of the war and emergency activities during that period. It also stemmed from the fact that many of the groups become empowered and had solicited funding from various sources on their own.

NAWOCOL contributed immensely to peace building and reconciliation in Liberia through their programmes started since 2006. With funding from ICCO and Kerk in Actie, the group repatriated displaced people from Grand Gedeh and Nimba county and even trained Liberian women that were settled in the town of Danane in Ivory Coast. To foster goodwill and peace amongst different tribes, NAWOCOL used skill training and brought in women from all tribes and walks of life to participate and interact together in activities. Such programming was one way to guide way to help in counselling and healing of wounds. It was used in times with a lot of hate between tribes, so bringing different women together to interact, talk and share with each other would help. NAWOCOL was one of the first organisations with literacy training in rural areas, to help women to write their names. Also HIV/AIDS components were added to the programme. This was all part of the peace building project of ICCO from 2005/2006. An important mechanism to work was to build trust in various communities, to get tribes working together, for example in communal farming.

In 2009/2010, NAWOCOL provided agricultural programmes to empower women. These women were encouraged to open joint bank accounts. In 2005/2006, the objective of the programmes was to build trust between ethnic communities by using the Kuu system that is a form of peace building and reconciliation initiative.

Vision

NAWOCOL's vision is a peaceful Liberia with tenets such as equality, fair play and justice, where women and girls have access to political and economic opportunities and are robustly visible.

Mission

NAWOCOL's mission is to advocate and ensure that women are brought into the decision-making processes. The mission of NAWOCOL is still linked to the vision of making women and girls resourceful in campaigning their own development to be involved in decision-making at all levels.

Strategies

NAWOCOL's operational strategy was mobilising resources at national level from the offices based on needs from member organisations in the counties, in order to implement projects, technical and financial support, and support them from the back donor: from donor to NAWOCOL, from NAWOCOL to grassroots communities in the counties, with technical and financial support to them. In the next strategic plan (2014-2016) the following themes are to be addressed:

- Women Economic and Social Empowerment
- Women Political Empowerment and Development
- Women and Natural Resources governance
- Women Access to Justice
- Women and HIV/AIDS

3 Methodological approach and reflection

3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[1].

[1] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **“What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”**

In terms of the attribution question (2), ‘process tracing’ is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change.

Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II

supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design: mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the

Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

4 Results

4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of NAWOCOL that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by ICCO.

Table 1

Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline

Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention	Objectives	Activities	Timing and duration	Budget
Financial support for organising the Annual General Meeting in 2014	Strategizing and amending constitution	3-day conference in Monrovia	March 18-20, 2014	$13.408 Dollars
Visit of SPO directors to Bamako in Mali	Strategy sessions for the LCDGP	One week visit	September 2013	
Training with Programme and Financial staff members of the LCDGP	Understanding ICCO guidelines and policies	1-day Refresher session	March 2014	$ 7.000 Dollars (LCDGP General budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)
Start-up activities FED Bridging Phase: FED-Cluster Value chain stakeholder mapping exercise	Create FED partners' awareness of value chain stakeholders in Liberia	Two-day workshop as part of the start-up phase	February 6-7, 2014	$14.600 Dollars (for entire FED-cluster start-up phase 2013-2014)
Partner/Cluster Coordination Meetings	Interaction and planning with LCDGP partners	Meetings held in Monrovia	2013-2014	$ 7.000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)
ICCO monitoring visits	Visits for monitoring and discussion purposes	Discussions on funding, sustainability, business development and organisational strengthening	Throughout 2012 and 2013 - latest in March/April 2014	

Source: CFA support to capacity sheet, SPO support to capacity sheet, AGM Financial Report, LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report 2013; LCDGP Budget Revised June 20 2014 RHRAP

4.2 Changes in capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also Appendix 3.

4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

Summary of the capability to act and commit



Leadership has considerably improved since the baseline due to having a new acting director who is very well connected and has brought back momentum into the organisation. The board restructured and has, in collaboration with the new acting director and with learning from the 5C baseline assessment, been able to provide better strategic guidance. A strategic plan has been developed since the baseline. However, the strategies in the new strategic plan are not well articulated, and not clearly based on good situation analysis and adequate monitoring and evaluation.

In terms of staff training NAWOCOL is in a difficult position since there are not enough funds to employ staff permanently but rather project based. For that reason, more staff have left the organisation since the baseline. A financial officer is new to the organisation. Remaining staff is mainly managerial and these are doing multitasking. They do reflect the objectives of the organisation, but it is not clear whether there is a clear organisational structure that also reflects this. Staff remaining in the organisation to have the necessary knowledge and skills in relation to NAWOCOL's work. But there is inadequate capacity to write winning proposals and generate funding for the organisation. ICCO, who was the main funder of NAWOCOL, has been slowly withdrawing funding, which has left the organisation in a difficult situation since there is no capacity to generate new funds. NAWOCOL has been able to generate some funds from the government of Liberia, but otherwise is still trying to seek funds from other organisations. The board is now more actively involved in writing proposals and the new acting director is also very active, but there are no clear funding procedures.

One staff member is being trained in terms of monitoring and evaluation by a M&E consultant, was providing support to the organisation to develop its monitoring and evaluation system. The main problem is not having enough staff due to lack of funding. There are no particular incentives for staff, since people are mainly hired on the basis for a contract for a specific project.

Note: after the endline assessments in the acting executive director, who brought back momentum into the organisation, has found work at another organisation and it is expected that this will have serious implications for the future organisational capacity.

Score: from 1.6 to 2 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to adapt and self-renew



NAWOCOL is making efforts to develop its M&E system with the help of an M&E consultant, always also working with a staff member who is now assigned with M&E tasks. The M&E framework describes a more comprehensive M&E system, where not only outputs, but also outcomes are being addressed, which can be used to help inform operational, strategic decision-making. A database is also currently being set up. In terms of the internal culture of critical reflection and sharing of ideas there hasn't been much change since the baseline but the situation is generally okay in the sense that people feel free to share their ideas. NAWOCOL has limited responsiveness to their stakeholders and general public: there's no real change since the baseline. Overall this capability has improved slightly, mainly due to having support from an M&E consultant in setting up their monitoring and evaluation system.

Score: from 2.4 to 2.9 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to deliver on development objectives



NAWOCOL has operational plans in place. However, the main problem that NAWOCOL is facing is lack of funding and this affects their potential and capacity to deliver outputs in line with their mandate. There are very few reports that describe the process and conditions with which the development objectives are being carried out. Since NAWOCOL is still in the process of developing its monitoring and evaluation system, there is no formal system in place yet to assess beneficiary needs, efficiency and quality of their work, although they do look at how best they can use the minimal resources that they have. During the baseline a number of indicators could not be assessed, this accounts to a large extent the score change.

Score: from 1.75 to 2.25 (slight change)

Summary of the capability to relate



The capability to relate has slightly improved mainly due to having an acting Executive Director who is very active and well networked. This has improved linkages with other stakeholders like the government of Liberia, who has been able to provide them with some funding. Internal relationships facilitate open communication with communication is not formalised, neither is engagement with the beneficiaries.

Score: from 2.25 to 2.75 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to achieve coherence



NAWOCOL has a vision and mission in place and recently, also a strategic plan has been developed. However, these do not seem to be regularly discussed. The organisation partly adheres to its constitution. The focus of the institution is on women. But cross gender activities are now also encouraged in the organisation. Whilst project activities seem to be complimentary lack of funding can also affect this complementarity. NAWOCOL now does have some operational guidelines in place, like the financial policy and an operational manual, but personnel policy is still weak which is related to lack of staffing.

Score: from 1.82 to 2.3 (slight improvement)

4.2.2 Key organisational capacity changes - general causal map

During the endline workshop at the SPO, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in the organisation since the baseline. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organisational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the endline workshop. The discussion resulted in a ‘general causal map’ which is summarised below. The detailed general causal map (both as a visual and well as a narrative) is described in Appendix 3. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organisational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of SPO staff present at the endline workshop. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink.

The director took the time to say that indeed quite a few things had changed in the last two years. She stressed the fact that the NAWOCOL office had been refurbished, new operational documents had been developed (such as operational manuals, staff contracts and an amended constitution), and that a new strategy was being developed building on the recommendations from the Assembly General Meeting (AGM). On a programme implementation level it seemed that NAWOCOL had to make some adaptations in terms of amount of people reached and in which areas. Due to the reduction in ICCO funding the director said that NAWOCOL was not able to implement the project (Rural Women and Girls Capacity Development Projects and School Based Palaver Management Club) in Lofa, and therefore was only able to implement it in Kakata, Margibi county. Also, it was said that the amount of people working with the programme was halved to 50 people instead of 100 due to lack of funds. Some of the activities NAWOCOL engaged in during the past two years: working with women in small businesses and peace-building activities with youth in 5 schools in Kakata (please see the Annex C SPO Support to capacity sheet for more information). Some of the key changes related to organisational capacity (there were a great deal more changes, but these related to project activities and impacts):

- Office equipment was bought through a Government of Liberia subsidy.
- Assembly General Meeting was held in 2014, and led to amending the strategic plan, the constitution and the operational manual .
- Board recommended/ and elected new board members and became smaller (from 15 to 7 people).
- Structure of NAWOCOL revised, and strategy developed and approved by the AGM.
- Huge staff turnover, a major constraint for NAWOCOL.
- Low donor funding.
- Developed policy documents for NAWOCOL: in March 2014.
- Enhanced network with WONGOSOL- Women NGO secretariat; African Women Development Fund is supporting NAWOCOL until the end of July 2014.

The key organisational changes that NAWOCOL has experienced since the baseline in 2012 focus on three issues: a new organisational paradigm shift [1], search for more diverse funding [2], and a management team that is now better at multi-tasking [3]. In the causal map these key changes are further discussed. When discussing how NAWOCOL has changed since the baseline three key influencing factors surfaced. One of the main issues that greatly impacted NAWOCOL in the past 2-3 years is that funding has been quite low, especially **funding** from ICCO. The staff of NAWOCOL called this funding fatigue in general within the donor community [18]. The LCDGP was launched in 2013 and since then the acting director said that it is difficult to get ICCO to fund the whole project proposal. NAWOCOL is now active in the Fair Economic Development cluster of the LCDGP [17]. Another issue that is impacting NAWOCOL is a **changing context for post-conflict development**, moving from relief to reconstruction, changing the nature of development goals and orientation [13]. Furthermore, the role of NAWOCOL has changed. This is related to NAWOCOL being an umbrella organisation for women groups in Liberia with various 'constituencies' in the different Liberian counties. In recent years these women groups have increasingly been decentralising operations and focusing on their own counties leading to less efforts to maintain NAWOCOL [15]. These two last aspects have influenced the new paradigms and direction of NAWOCOL.



NAWOCOL places more focus on the natural resource management sector, governance issues related to that, and HIV/AIDs prevention [4]
Focus now also addresses cross-gender participation in all her projects – so not purely women and girls [5]
Organisational and financial sustainability [19]
New organisational paradigm shift [1]
Diversification of funding sources [2]
Management has become better at multitasking [3]
New revised 3-year strategic plan developed Constitution revised [6]
Operational manual revised [7]
Board restructured From 15 to 7 people 2014 [8]
NAWOCOL received a GoL Support subsidy worth 39,750 USD 2013-2014 [20]
Increased financial accountability [22]
Project with African Women Development Fund in HIV/AIDS and Teenage Pregnancy prevention in Bong and Grand Geddeh Counties 2013 – July 2014 10,000 USD [24]
Huge staff turnover, remaining staff: from 10 to 4 [28]
Skills in standardized report writing (both financial and narrative) [30]
Skills in proposal writing; sourcing funding; crisis management [32]
Engagement with WONGOSOL and WIPNET to address project-based capacity gaps when needed [35]
Less engagement with NARDA for capacity building– NAWOCOL not able to pay for membership [36]
Need for strategic and operational documents [9]
Assembly general meeting (AGM) in March 2014 [14]
Established a good funding relationship with the Government of Liberia [21]
Finalized audit report for 2012-2013 on the Rural Women Capacity development project in 2014 [23]
Discussions with ICCO on financial sustainability 2013 [10]
The director attended strategic meeting in Mali with LCDGP coordinators Sept 2013 [11]
Flexible funds: support to organise AGM [16]
Maintained networking connections with WONGOSOL [25]
Partnership with NACP for HIV/AIDS and Teenage Pregnancy prevention materials 2013-2014 [26]
Less able to pay staff [29]
PMC conducted training for the ICCO supported programme managers and financial managers in 2014 [31]
PMC conducted training in proposal writing for organisational heads 2014 [33]
LCDGP consortium organised by ICCO: NAWOCOL is sub-lead for the FED cluster since 2013 [17]
MFSII Baseline in June 2012 [12]
Change in country context from relief to reconstruction [13]
Decentralizing Womens organisations in the various counties [15]
Donor fatigue: decrease in ICCO funding since 2012 [18]
ICCO ROWA capacity assessment in Jan 2012 [34]

One of the main themes of change at NAWOCOL was the **'paradigm shift'** [1], in which the organisation aimed at charting a new course of action and to amend the constitution since the baseline in 2012. These issues had been long overdue according to the management of NAWOCOL. Due to the decreased levels of funding [18], the trends within Liberian development contexts from relief to reconstruction [13], and the changing relations with the County level women organisations [15], NAWOCOL staff said that they needed to head towards a new paradigm. These trends were a main underlying reason for NAWOCOL to become a more development service-delivery type of organisation rather than a women group umbrella organisation. NAWOCOL, with support from external parties, developed a new draft strategic plan [6], which was mainly based on the changing country contexts from relief to reconstruction. This draft strategic plan shows that NAWOCOL intends to move towards five focus areas [4]: Women Economic and Social Empowerment; Women Political Empowerment and Development; Women and Natural Resources governance; Women Access to Justice; Women and HIV/AIDS. However, how these foci are to be addressed has not been described in the strategic plan yet. The new strategic plan [4] captures the political context of the country, Resolution 1325 and the social and economic context related to the concessional communities. It was noted that NAWOCOL had changed to focusing more on natural resource management and governance, but also on issues related to HIV/AIDS prevention. For example, NAWOCOL intends to address issues relating to community residents who have not been included in the financial benefits from the concessional communities. Targeting has also changed. The director called this a 'cross-gender participation' approach which not only targeted women and girls, but also boys and men [5].

The second main change in the organisation since the baseline referred to the **efforts to diversify funding sources**. This was needed to contribute to their organisational and financial sustainability. One of the signals that financial sustainability had improved was that in the past year the NAWOCOL office was refurbished and new equipment such as laptops, printers, tables and a generator were bought [19]. This has been the direct result of NAWOCOL managing to successfully apply for the Government of Liberia subsidy [20]. Another factor that contributed to diversification of funding was the effort made by management to develop more sound financial accountability [22]. Another opportunity that came up was in the HIV/AIDS prevention sector. NAWOCOL was able to do a small project with the African Women Development Fund in HIV/AIDS and Teenage pregnancy [24]. This project started in 2013 and ended in July 2014. The amount of funds were said to be around 10,000 US dollars and came about through mediation of WONGOSOL [25].

Since the baseline, the management has **become better in multi-tasking** [27]. This has been related to the fact that many staff members have left the organisation since the baseline in 2012 [28]. The management has been taking care of projects through filling in separate tasks themselves and hiring specialists to fill in when needed. This could be considered as a way to ensure sustainability of the organisation [19]. Since 2012 NAWOCOL staff has come down from 10 persons to 4 persons, due to the decreased ability to pay these staff members [29], which is a result of decreased donor funding [18]. In the baseline it was noted that these staff members were often working on a voluntary basis, now many of these have left the organisation.

5 Discussion and conclusion

5.1 Methodological issues

The management of NAWOCOL had trouble filling in the formats requested by the Liberia 5C evaluation team, including the support to capacity sheet. Eventually the support to capacity was filled in but the information was more relevant for a project impact assessment.

The Liberia 5C evaluation team planned to conduct a two-day workshop with NAWOCOL but upon the request of the chairperson of the board of directors of NAWOCOL, the 5C evaluation team only conducted a one-day workshop with NAWOCOL with the acting Executive Director and two members of the board of directors to gather data from them for the MFS II endline process. The main activity of the workshop involved the participants individually reflecting on and writing down on sticky notes the changes that had occurred in the capacity of NAWOCOL since the baseline in June 2012, discussing and agreeing on the 'outcome areas' under which to organize the sticky notes, identifying the capacity development interventions carried out by NAWOCOL and ICCO to develop the capacity of NAWOCOL, and other related factors.

The evaluation team conducted individual interviews with the acting Executive Director, and the two members of the board of directors to get their individual perspectives on each of the capacity development indicators of NAWOCOL. The plan of the evaluation Team to also conduct interviews with two of NAWOCOL's external partners (Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL) and the Ministry of Gender and Social Protection) did not come to fruition owing to the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) at the time of completion of the fieldwork of the MFS II Endline process in Liberia in July 2014.

The endline workshop process showed organizational weaknesses within the NAWOCOL organization. The staffs were either new or substituted, and did not have knowledge about the many issues within the organization. The individual interviews were important in getting further information.

All in all, the information received from NAWOCOL staff was based on information provided by a few remaining staff but, in combination with the information from the relevant documentation and information from the CFA, it provided a relatively clear picture of the organisation's capacity since the baseline in 2012.

Since the endline workshop the evaluation team has experienced trouble reaching the organisation. The CFA mentioned problems of the same nature, while reports requested for on numerous occasions were not sent.

5.2 Changes in organisational capacity

NAWOCOL seemed to be recovering since the baseline. This was evident during the endline workshop. The offices of the SPO are refurbished and leadership was present and working. The past executive director was let go due to an extended sick leave. The Board Chair and the new Executive Director seem to be working together, which is very important. There have been some trends seen that indicate the organisation has made some steps since the baseline. In almost all indicators slight improvement was detected (see figure on the next page).

The capability to act and commit showed progress in the indicators on leadership and strategic guidance due to positive developments regarding the presence of the active director and the reconstitution of the Board (brought back from 15 to 7 people with different backgrounds). In the area of funding sources no real capacity change could be demonstrated: though NAWOCOL is eagerly seeking additional funds. Besides a government subsidy no substitution for the decreasing ICCO funds has been found yet. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew positive developments were that

NAWOCOL has hired a consultant to help with setting up an M&E system and writing the new M&E protocol. The greatest difference in indicators can be seen in the capability to deliver on development objectives. This is largely due to the fact that it has now been possible to get a better idea of the operational plans at NAWOCOL, and to see what outputs have been delivered. This is only slightly better than in the baseline though: NAWOCOL has an issue with providing reports and plans. The indicators within the capability to relate have not changed significantly. For example, the networking options of NAWOCOL are largely based on the connections that the director has. In the capability to achieve coherence a positive note might be seen in that NAWOCOL is seeking to explore a new strategic direction and has some operational documentation place.



When engaging in discussions with members of NAWOCOL, funding came up as a key factor that has affected the work of NAWOCOL in the past two years: decreasing direct funding for the ICCO project has turned into partial programmatic funding from the side of ICCO, which has led to a smaller project area and less beneficiaries being reached. Another issue that is impacting NAWOCOL is a changing context for post-conflict development, moving from relief to reconstruction, changing the nature of development goals and orientation. This has an impact on the role of NAWOCOL as a women's umbrella organisation. NAWOCOL is an umbrella organisation for women groups in Liberia with various 'constituencies' in the different Liberian counties. In recent years these women groups have increasingly been decentralising operations, receiving their own funds, and focusing on their own counties, leading to less efforts to maintain NAWOCOL. Now the Ebola outbreak has taken place in Liberia, NAWOCOL seems to be fully active in that field and it is not certain where this might take the organisation.

A workshop was held with three members of the NAWOCOL management. Some of the above mentioned issues also came up but were further discussed. It was discussed what, according to NAWOCOL, where the key changes in the organisation since the baseline in 2012. A key organisational capacity change that was seen in the endline assessment by NAWOCOL staff was the new organisational strategic direction NAWOCOL was working on. A number of issues came together here. The crafting of a new strategic plan, and although belated, shifts NAWOCOL's focus from being an umbrella organisation to implementing programmes under five different themes directed at its target groups of women and girls. Other dynamics include the employment of the new Executive Director and the reduction in the number of the board of directors. The board of directors of the organisation stood at about fifteen members, one representing each county. Currently the new board is smaller and more experienced in lobbying, financing and other technical areas related to the development of the SPO. This arrangement proved difficult in holding timely meetings. Many of these issues came up during the

Annual General Meeting in 2014, and during this time the constitution was adapted. The organisation of the Annual General Meeting was financed by ICCO.

The current members of NAWOCOL say that they have built capacity through trainings and events in reporting, proposal writing and strategizing with the LCDGP and ICCO. As such, the role of the CFA has been small, but still influential considering the fact that NAWOCOL is highly dependent on ICCO and LCDGP support. When certain expertise is needed, consultants and external experts are hired - as such an M&E consultant was asked to help with setting up an M&E system, and another expert was asked to help write the new strategy. As such, the management has rather been more involved in multi-tasking as less staff members are now active at the organisation. The SPO operates with a low level of staffing, with staff only employed or contracted for project implementation. This is in direct relation to the drop in funding opportunities and the withdrawal of ICCO funding. Attempts have been made to diversify sources of funding through other projects. NAWOCOL was opportune to receive a subsidy from the government of Liberia. The funding was used to upgrade the office, buy equipment and develop a brochure that showcased NAWOCOL and its activities. A brochure was also developed as a communications tool that NAWOCOL says it will use to help in promoting itself amongst its stakeholders and beneficiaries.

On the whole the future of NAWOCOL is insecure, especially if the Ebola outbreak is taken into account. There is a need for a number of concrete issues: the strategy still needs to be further developed, the board needs to demonstrate an effective function, the management needs to remain active and prove to deliver and report on operations. At the moment these issues are questionable: though the director of the organisation has proved to be an energising factor in the past years it is uncertain whether this will remain so. She has expressed the intention to accept other work opportunities. Should the director definitely leave, it can be doubted if the organisational capacity will remain the same.

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Guidelines and formats for the 5C endline study

5c_endline_draftreport_country_SPO_26112014

Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Liberia_NAWOCOL_ICCO

Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA

Annex C_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Liberia_NAWOCOL

Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Liberia_NAWOCOL_SAMFU

Annex F_5c endline self-assessment sheet_management_Liberia_NAWOCOL_Kandakai

Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_selected indicators_Liberia_NAWOCOL_Delphine

Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_NAWOCOL Bram

List of 5C indicator descriptions

Partner Documents

2012, 2013 RURAL WOMEN PROJECT
5C_Baseline_report_Liberia_NAWOCOL_19012013_MR_CK
AGM FINANCIL REPORT
AGM of NAWOCOL
AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENT1
BRIEFING ON LCDGP STRATEGIC PLAN VALIDATION PROCESS
CSO Assessment_Tool_FINAL pdf
Employment Contract- NAWOCOL -Final
Feedback to the PMC-June
FINAL- consolidated- Partners'capacity assessment report
FINAL TOR FOR PMC-Final
FINAL TOR FOR TPs- Final
ICCO ANNUAL REPORT NARRATIVE
ICCO PROPOSAL-2012-Lofa original final
Institutional Support to LCDGP Partners
LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report
LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO
LCDGP GRANT AGREEMENT 2013-2015
LCDGP Project Plan- Final
NAWOCOL Constitution
NAWOCOL Contract Sheets
NAWOCOL General Assembly List
NAWOCOL Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 2014
Nawocol revised-2012
NAWOCOL Strategic Plan 2014 - 2016 to be finalized shortlly by the staff
perspective_Liberia_NAWOCOL_ICCO
PMC FINAL REPORT

List of Respondents

NAWOCOL staff:

Lorpu Kandakai	Chair of the NAWOCOL board
Delphine Joekai	Programme Coordinator and Acting Director
Mariam Z. Brown	Chair of the National Assembly of NAWOCOL

CFA:

Lindora Diawara	ICCO ROWA Programme Officer for Liberia
Allen Lincoln	PMC coordinator of the LCDGP

Other partners:

James Makor	Executive Director of Save My Future Foundation (SAMFU)

Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[2] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

[2] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?

What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?

List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*

- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ....
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ....
- o **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ....
- o Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;

- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

Step 5. ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

> General causal map
>
> During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

Step 6. ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

Step 7. ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;

- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

Step 8. ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

Step 9. ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

Step 10. ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

Step 11. ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

Step 12. Provide the ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

Step 13. ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

Step 14. ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

Step 15. ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which ‘theories’ are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of ‘explaining outcome process tracing’, since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the

purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

ETHIOPIA

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia

Capability to:	AMREF	CARE	ECFA	FSCE	HOA-REC	HUNDEE	NVEA	OSRA	TTCA
Act and commit	5	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	3
Deliver on development objectives	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	4	2	3	4	2	5	3	3	3
Relate	3	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
Achieve coherence	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2
SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia

Ethiopia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
AMREF	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	AMREF NL	Yes
CARE	Dec 31, 2015	Partly	Yes	Yes	Yes – slightly	CARE Netherlands	No - not fully matching
ECFA	Jan 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Child Helpline International	Yes
FSCE	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands	Yes
HOA-REC	Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes - slightly	ICCO	No - not fully matching
HUNDEE	Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Yes
NVEA	Dec 2015 (both)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN)	Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE
OSRA	C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE
TTCA	June 2015	Partly	Yes	No	Yes	Edukans Foundation	No - not fully matching

INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India[3]

Capability to:	BVHA	COUNT	DRISTI	FFID	Jana Vikas	Samarthak Samiti	SMILE	SDS	VTRC
Act and commit	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	5
Deliver on development objectives	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	1	4
Relate	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

SPOs selected for process tracing – India

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BVHA	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simavi	Yes; both capabilities
COUNT	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Woord en Daad	Yes; both capabilities
DRISTI	31-03-2012	Yes	Yes	No	no	Hivos	No - closed in 2012
FFID	30-09-2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

[3] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Jana Vikas	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF							No – delayed baseline
RGVN							No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS)	2013 possibly longer	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Hivos	No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS)	Dec 2013 intention 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - not fully matching focus
Smile	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Wilde Ganzen	Yes; first capability only
VTRC	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Red een Kind	Yes; both capabilities

INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia

Capability to:	ASB	Daya kologi	ECPAT	GSS	Lem baga Kita	Pt. PPMA	Rifka Annisa	WIIP	Yad upa	Yayasan Kelola	YPI	YRBI
Act and commit	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	5	4
Deliver on development objectives	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	3	1	2	4	2	3	4	4	1	1	4	3
Relate	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
ASB	February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hivos	Yes
Dayakologi	2013; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No: contract ended early and not matching enough
ECPAT	August 2013; Extension Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	Yes
GSS	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No: contract ended early
Lembaga Kita	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No - contract ended early
Pt.PPMA	May 2015	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	IUCN	Yes, capability to act and commit only
Rifka Annisa	Dec, 31 2015	No	Yes	No	Yes	Rutgers WPF	No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO
WIIP	Dec 2015	Yes	Not MFS II	Yes	Not MFS II	Red Cross	No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Yayasan Kelola	Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)	Yes	Not really	Yes	Not really	Hivos	No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos
YPI	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rutgers WPF	Yes
YRBI	Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes
Yadupa	Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now	Yes	Nothing committed	Yes	Nothing committed	IUCN	No, since nothing was committed by CFA

LIBERIA

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia

Capability to:	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Act and commit	5	1	1	1	3
Deliver on development objectives	3	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	2	2	2
Relate	1	2	2	2	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8
SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia

Liberia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BSC	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	SPARK	Yes
DEN-L	2014	No	No	Unknown	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
NAWOCOL	2014	Yes	No	No	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
REFOUND	At least until 2013 (2015?)	Yes	No	Yes	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
RHRAP	At least until 2013 (2014?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study
In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

5.

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).



Figure 1 *An imaginary example of a model of change*

Step 5. Identify ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9
Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)

Part of the model of change	Key questions	Type of evidence needed	Source of information
Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change	Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related	Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?	Describe where you can find this information
Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding	Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?	Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training Content evidence: what the training was about	Example: Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

Step 6. ***Collect data*** *to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

Step 7. ***Assess the quality*** *of data and* ***analyse data****, and develop the* ***final detailed causal map*** *(model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included) **Description of causal relation**	**Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)**	**Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation**	**Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak**	**Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected**
e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice	e.g. Confirmed	e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training		

*Step 8. **Analyse and conclude** on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and

SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

Capacity is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

Capabilities are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

Competencies are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

1. The capability to act and commit;
2. The capability to deliver on development objectives;
3. The capability to adapt and self-renew;
4. The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
5. The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

Note: after the endline assessment, the acting Executive Director, who has been very supportive to the organisation, has now left NAWOCOL, due to the lack of funding. She now works for another organisation, and now supports NAWOCOL on a consultancy basis. It is not clear what the effect will be on the organisational capacity, but it is expected to have big implications in terms of organisational capacity.

Capability to act and commit

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

This is about leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation.

Description of the endline situation:

The programme coordinator took up the role of the new acting executive director. She is well connected within the NGO sector and has brought back some momentum into the organisation. She has been making great efforts to get NAWOCOL back on track, since previous leadership left the organisation (baseline situation). As a result of the efforts directed at this exposure of NAWOCOL, the organisation has improved considerably since the baseline in 2012. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that it has been able to attract funding from ICCO and the Government of Liberia through the Ministry of Gender and Development for project implementation and institutional support, respectively.

The new acting executive director has been able to effectively participate in many stakeholder meetings and as a result, visibility and viability of NAWOCOL has improved. The new acting Executive Director has been able to sell NAWOCOL to various stakeholders. The organisation has created brochures and with the new strategic plan is making strides and getting funding to initiate project activities.

The board of directors has been supporting the efforts of the new acting executive director behind the scene.

Score: from 1 to 3 (considerable improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions

Description of the endline situation:

There are huge capacity issues being faced by NAWOCOL now, which were inherited due to bad governance and leadership.

The main leadership change since the baseline is formally having a new acting executive director. In addition to that the board has restructured from 15 people (based on the number of counties) to 7 people with the aim to become more efficient. One example of this is the effort that the new board is now exerting in helping to streamline the employment process and keep only those personnel needed for work in recurring project areas. The board has also helped in the identification of gaps. Furthermore, a draft strategic plan has been developed, and which addresses training and vision and mission.

The 5C baseline assessments has also helped NAWOCOL to retrospect and to craft new policies and guidelines for the future.

Score: from 1 to 2 (improvement)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

This is about staff turnover.

Description of the end line situation:
Since the baseline in 2012 even more staff left the organisation, whilst others still work on a voluntary basis. Many of the old staff members have left due to the lack of funding. Many of the new staff members are hired on a project basis. Hiring is by project demand and qualification based on project need. Remaining staff is doing more multitasking.

NAWOCOL hired an external auditor to audit performance for the project that ended under the ICCO cluster arrangement; the results of the audit have provided important insights about the SPO's weaknesses and recommendations for improvement. The audit results led NAWOCOL to hire a new finance officer in order to improve financial management capacity and to improve overall credibility.

Score: from 2 to 1.5 (slight deterioration)

1.4. Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

Observable indicator: Staffs have copy of org. structure and understand this

Description of the endline situation:
The staffs of NAWOCOL are not as large as it used to be before now. The SPO is composed of only a small core group (mainly managerial) with a basic organisational structure. Other staff are hired as consultants when projects are being funded. The board has assumed a lot of responsibilities and the new acting executive director deals mainly with communications, administration and programming. The workload is hectic but that has to be the way it is until funding can start again.

The current core group though reflects the objective of the organisation, with staff assigned particularly to women and girls issues. There is no a formal organisational structure developed that fully reflects the current situation.

Score: from 2 to 1.5 (slight deterioration)

1.5. Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL almost closed its doors, mainly because of having an unclear strategy. Originally, the organisation was an umbrella organisation that sought funding for its smaller units. As these units got

bigger and more autonomous, the need for NAWOCOL was reduced and NAWOCOL did not re-invent itself until recently.

With the crafting of a draft strategic plan, pushed by the acting director who is aware of the issues, NAWOCOL is working to implement projects geared towards its target groups. However, what is still lacking is an adequate monitoring and evaluation arm of the organisation that will determine situations and measure impact of the programmes on target beneficiaries.

Whilst there is a new draft strategic plan, the current strategies are not well articulated, and not clearly based on good situation analysis and adequate monitoring and evaluation.

Score: from 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.

Description of the endline situation:
Most of the current projects and activities are in line with the new draft strategic plan. Governance issues have been included in the strategic plan, as more donors seem to be interested in that.

A new finance officer has been employed and as mentioned before, this will help in accounting for donors' funds. The new strategic plan has greatly helped the SPO in the advancement of its activities and prospects for sourcing of funding. The day-to-day operations are aligned with the strategic plan.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

This is about whether staffs have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL is mainly involved with women and girls and it is important that the staff have the skills around gender sensitive issues and the rights of both genders. Gender issues are prioritized at all planning sessions and in planning documents. Most of the staff are acquainted with issues around HIV/AIDS, family planning, reproductive health and gender based violence issues.

There is a programming weakness, staff responsible to write proposals have not developed sufficient capacity to write winning proposals. Proposal writing is left with only one or two main staff members.

NAWOCOL has resolved to allow the old non-performing staffs to leave voluntarily, and hitherto, only hire or employ qualified and competent staff. However, NAWOCOL does not have enough funds to hire qualified staff. The only new staff has been a financial officer. NAWOCOL mainly hires people/consultants for undertaking activities. The main issue is not having enough staff to carry out the work and relying on mainly consultants for this purpose.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities

Description of the endline situation:
Whilst the draft strategic plan addresses the need to identify gaps in training and training resources, there is no training plan in the organisation in line with the vision and mission statements of the NAWOCOL and no development programme for staff. This is also due to the drop in funding for the organisation. Some training and refresher sessions (on proposal writing and reporting) have been organised on behalf of the LCDGP in which mostly the acting director has been involved.

In line with the deficiencies identified within the organisation, NAWOCOL is making efforts in training its staff in monitoring and evaluation. An M&E consultant has been working with the M&E officer at NAWOCOL to improve M&E skills. Two trainings were held on M&E for the M&E officer to participate.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL Staff rarely feel motivated and encouraged in the performance of their duty. There was no regular and on-going supervisory support and guidance for staff of the organisation. The intention stated by the acting director to move to a new job opportunity demonstrates the fragility of organisation incentives.

Nowadays people are hired only on the basis of having a project. There are no additional incentives for existing staff.

Score: from 1 to 1 (no change)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.

Description of the endline situation:
Funding for NAWOCOL is drying up, especially from foreign funders like ICCO, who have been decreasing funding since before the baseline and have announced to stop funding in 2014. This is the main funder of the organisation. In the past 2 years NAWOCOL has tried to identify multiple funding sources. They started working with Ministry of Internal affairs and the Ministry of Gender amongst other international NGOs for which they were looking up to for funding.

Since the baseline in June 2012, NAWOCOL was able to access a subsidy from the Government of Liberia and the AWDF. The board and management of NAWOCOL lobbied members of the National Legislature and the Ministry of Gender and Development to include some money in the national budget to support the work of NAWOCOL. As a result of this lobbying funds were allocated in the 2012/2013 national budget for NAWOCOL. NAWOCOL used some of those funds to refurbish its office and also applied some to project activities in Grand Gedeh County. The main hurdle is for the organisation to develop the capacity to write proposals to seek and respond to requests for proposals for projects.

Score: from 1 to 1 (no change)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.

Description of the endline situation:
The previous board was not involved in finding funding, or rarely involved in finding funding. The capacity of the new board allows it to assist in the process of lobbying and even writing proposals for finding funding. The current board chair is heavily involved in that endeavour.

Several capacity building workshops have been held to help the organisation write proposals, improve reporting. But basically there is no coherent funding strategy following the development of the strategic plan – and the organisation does not have the money to hire someone to help to do that.

The new executive director is using her connections and capacity to source funding for the organisation. It is through her instrumentality that the organisation was able to source recent funding from the government.

Score: from 1 to 2 (improvement)

Summary Capability to act and commit
Leadership has considerably improved since the baseline due to having a new acting director who is very well connected and has brought back momentum into the organisation. The board restructured and has, in collaboration with the new acting director and with learning from the 5C baseline assessment, been able to provide better strategic guidance. A strategic plan has been developed since the baseline. However, the strategies in the new strategic plan are not well articulated, and not clearly based on good situation analysis and adequate monitoring and evaluation.

In terms of staff training NAWOCOL is in a difficult position since there are not enough funds to employ staff permanently but rather project based. For that reason, more staff have left the organisation since the baseline. A financial officer is new to the organisation. Remaining staff is mainly managerial and these are doing multitasking. They do reflect the objectives of the organisation, but it is not clear whether there is a clear organisational structure that also reflects this. Staff remaining in the organisation to have the necessary knowledge and skills in relation to NAWOCOL's work. But there is inadequate capacity to write winning proposals and generate funding for the organisation. ICCO, who was the main funder of NAWOCOL, has been slowly withdrawing funding, which has left the organisation in a difficult situation since there is no capacity to generate new funds. NAWOCOL has been able to generate some funds from the government of Liberia , but otherwise is still trying to seek funds from other organisations. The board is now more actively involved in writing proposals and the new acting director is also very active, but there are no clear funding procedures.

One staff member is being trained in terms of monitoring and evaluation by a M&E consultant, was providing support to the organisation to develop its monitoring and evaluation system. The main problem is not having enough staff due to lack of funding. There are no particular incentives for staff, since people are mainly hired on the basis for a contract for a specific project.

Note: after the endline assessments in the acting executive director, who brought back momentum into the organisation, has found work at another organisation and it is expected that this will have serious implications for the future organisational capacity.

Score: from 1.6 to 2 (slight improvement)

Capability to adapt and self-renew

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organisational).

Description of the endline situation:
The situation in terms of monitoring and evaluation is gradually improving in NAWOCOL since the baseline. A Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant has been hired to develop the M&E system at NAWOCOL, and currently an M&E framework is being developed. The efforts are geared toward increasing the understanding of output, and outcomes for sustainable impact using monitoring and evaluation. The organisation has a staff member being trained that will be dedicated to monitoring and evaluating the organisation's activities. They have no funds to attract a new M&E staff member.

The M&E Consultant is working with the new NAWOCOL M&E Officer to develop a monitoring and evaluation framework and a monitoring and evaluation protocol. Under the new board and management and with LCDGP initiatives, NAWOCOL has some guidance for reporting and has developed data collection tools for training related activities (disaggregated by gender), assessments and survey. Other disaggregation processes such as thematic areas are not standardized and work is being done to improve the system. The organisation conducts some form of feedback gathering in accordance with its proposals. NAWOCOL also conducts evaluations through beneficiary feedback on a periodic basis. NAWOCOL has a good reporting structure that can support an effective M&E system. Currently, this reporting system is being used to generate various reports for donors, though with some difficulties in monitoring and evaluation.

An excel database is being developed for managing the data collected through trainings and other activities beyond training. The database(s) will help the projects store and analyze data collected as part of project implementation.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL is now in the stage of trying to train staff in anticipation of developing an M&E framework. There is now a staff member who is dedicated to M&E and being trained by the M&E consultant. There were two sets of training held for the M&E officer at NAWOCOL with specific look at the processes involved in monitoring and evaluation.

There are several staff members who contribute to reporting on project performance. NAWOCOL has Animators who carry out community education and report to the Supervisors. The supervisors report to the Project Officer who further report to the Project Coordinator. The project staff showed strong interest in supporting an M&E system even though the M&E capacity of the organisation is still underdeveloped.

NAWOCOL still needs to further improve on their M&E competencies, since these are just gradually being developed with the help of the M&E consultant.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.

Description of the endline situation:
M&E for future strategies is being planned for and included in the current strategic plan 2014 to 2016. NAWOCOL is planning for the use of the Result Based Monitoring and Planning System. This will ensure that all programmes are planned and implemented in a rational manner that focuses on

continued monitoring and a periodic evaluation of the programme and projects being implemented. The outcome and impact will be monitored at various phases and stages.

Monitoring will involve data collection and analysis on the progress of the Strategic Plan and Annual Work Plan implementation. The results from the analysis will be used for decision-making and communicated to donors/ partners, beneficiaries, government and other stakeholders. A monitoring and evaluation unit will be established.

The Strategic Plan will be evaluated after the implementation of programme and activities for the period of two and a half years. A participatory midterm evaluation involving all stakeholders will be carried out. Annual Review of the strategic plan will be conducted during or before each year end retreat to determine constraints or opportunities.

The M&E framework (2014) is also being developed and aims to focus not only on outputs, but also on outcomes. M&E is currently being established and has yet to be implemented.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.

Description of the endline situation:
Since March, two informal meetings between the board and the personnel were held. Meetings are few and far between and since staff levels are low, general meetings are rarely held. Management and staffs are working actively to improve internal communication and interaction to enhance the sharing of ideas and learning from each other for the good of the organisation.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed and used.

Description of the endline situation:
Staff and members are comfortable to share their views, as was evident during the workshop. According to the board chair, they share ideas to make their work easy and manageable. They like to share ideas with staff - keep an open atmosphere. The three staff members that remained proposed new ideas - and were active with proposal writing, but they are now all left the organisation.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organisation.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL's visible participation in WONGOSOL and other networks, through the efforts of the new executive director attendance at meetings has improved visibility and they are now on a fast track in

terms of networking. There is an open flow of communication in the network which helps the organisation in identifying new funding sources and strategies in obtaining funding.

There is no formal system for tracking the environment and a lot of it is done on the basis of phoning local contacts.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.

Description of the endline situation:
Meetings are held with stakeholders and affected groups, which are allowed to make inputs and project updates to be communicated to stakeholders through radio programming.

The objective of the stakeholders' engagement is to create visibility about the project, build support and local ownership for the project. To achieve this purpose, NAWOCOL has held two meetings with 20 stakeholders, which included local government officials, market superintendent of Kakata, District Education Officer, Principals of 5 public and private schools (four high schools and one junior high), teachers, business-women engaged in small and medium size businesses and student leadership of the target schools.

NAWOCOL is on the mailing lists of MOGD and WONGOSOL and is even highly visible at the Capitol Building.

Score: from 2.4 to 2.9 (no change)

Summary capability to adapt and self-renew
NAWOCOL is making efforts to develop its M&E system with the help of an M&E consultant, always also working with a staff member who is now assigned with M&E tasks. The M&E framework describes a more comprehensive M&E system, where not only outputs, but also outcomes are being addressed, which can be used to help inform operational, strategic decision-making. A database is also currently being set up. In terms of the internal culture of critical reflection and sharing of ideas there hasn't been much change since the baseline but the situation is generally okay in the sense that people feel free to share their ideas. NAWOCOL is responsive to their stakeholders and general public, but there's no real change since the baseline. Overall this capability has improved slightly, mainly due to having support from an M&E consultant in setting up their monitoring and evaluation system.

Score: from 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

Capability to deliver on development objectives
3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staffs use it in their day-to-day operations.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL has an operational manual. Every project has a budget and a work plan. These plans show where all activities are located and the resources required. New operational plans are very clear, and based on the strategic plan. Due to the limitations in funding, each project is executed on a precise budgeting arrangement. This arrangement makes the operational plans clear and staff members fully understand this.

.: from ? (Could not be identified during the baseline) to 3,5

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.

Description of the endline situation:
Adequate resources are used in high priority areas. Limited resources have impacted the work. If donor provides funding, there are administration costs, wages. Due to the limitations in funding, each project is executed on a precise budgeting arrangement. So similar to the situation during the baseline. The issue is not so much about being cost-effective but rather not having enough funds to carry out the work they want to do. NAWOCOL had to downsize its target areas due to lack of funds.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL has a very weak capacity that contributes to its unpreparedness to deliver its mandate. This is mainly related to lack of funding. Due to this situation NAWOCOL had to downsize its targets areas.

Score: from ? (Not clear during the baseline) to 2

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL has a strategic plan which guides the operations. They engage network members in the counties to discuss project activities. NAWOCOL also gathers information and uses it to help with proposal development.

The organisation uses mobile phones to call and do periodic checks on the status of project implementation. However, there is no systematic collection of information to verify that services meet beneficiary needs.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.

Description of the endline situation:
Monitoring efficiency is underdeveloped. NAWOCOL uses self-appraisal methods in the field, but there aren't any external actors to assess whether that work is efficient. Target groups are monitored based on the amount of inputs they have received, this check and balance ensures that the targets receive the required inputs. However, there is no system in place to assess efficiency.

Score: from 1 to 1 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL does not have an effective monitoring system that will compile information in order to analyze efficiency requirements and quality of work. Staff has made efforts to make choices in terms of what to focus on with little funding, which is demonstrated by focusing on one instead of two districts.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

Summary of capability to deliver on development objectives
NAWOCOL has operational plans in place. However, the main problem that NAWOCOL is facing is lack of funding and this affects their potential and capacity to deliver outputs in line with their mandate. There are very few reports that describe the process and conditions with which the development objectives are being carried out. Since NAWOCOL is still in the process of developing its monitoring and evaluation system, there is no formal system in place yet to assess beneficiary needs, efficiency and quality of their work, although they do look at how best they can use the minimal resources that they have. During the baseline a number of indicators could not be assessed, this accounts to a large extent the score change.

Capability to relate
4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL interacts and engages stakeholders through the Annual General Meeting. During the AGM they invite all stakeholders, such as representatives from the Liberian counties, and get their views on issues affecting the umbrella organisation. In 2014 the AGM was held after being long overdue, and largely discussed an amendment in the constitution and the development of the new strategic plan. They are trying to maintain this pattern/culture through which stakeholders are encouraged to be engaged or connected to the organisation. The change in the organisational strategy to focus to a more service-delivery oriented organisation, and the smaller board will hopefully increase engagement.

Through the efforts of the new acting executive director, the SPO is engaged and connected by ensuring attendance to stakeholder regular meetings and reporting to the board on activities that lead to creating a situation where the SPO is involved with other like-minded organisations.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL has built a coalition with other organisations and is in contact with public and key policy makers. Partnership/networking mostly reduces overlap of services to target beneficiaries and the organisation taps into local and national resources to achieve its aims and objectives.

The leadership is a part of many networks-organisations and women supported groups. NAWOCOL has strengthened its partnership with the Government of Liberia through the subsidy to women empowerment projects, through which it received the subsidy that helped NAWOCOL to refurnish their office. NAWOCOL networks with the government, the LCDGP, the Ministry of Gender and Development, and with all women's NGOs through WONGOSOL, Liberian gospel group.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.

Description of the endline situation:
NAWOCOL had community animators stationed in the project area but they had to pull them out because of lack of funding. Now it is a challenge because they only visit project areas when they are implementing or want to implement.

Secondly, M&E is in its infancy in the organisation and current projects are not being monitored using an established system.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

4.4. Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

How do staffs at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?

Description of the endline situation:
Board members are wholly involved in policy formulation and partially involved in fund raising, advocacy and public relations in the organisation. Staff members are comfortable to share their views, but many have left the organisation due to lack of funding, or they are working on a voluntary basis. Sadly, internal and external communication channels are not well defined.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

Summary capability to relate
The capability to relate has slightly improved mainly due to having an acting Executive Director who is very active and well networked. This has improved linkages with other stakeholders like the government of Liberia, who has been able to provide them with some funding. Internal relationships facilitate open communication with communication is not formalised, neither is engagement with the beneficiaries.

Score: from 2.3 to 2.8 (slight improvement)

Capability to achieve coherence

5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staffs discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.

Description of the endline situation:

The organisation has a written constitution that has been approved and accepted by most members of NAWOCOL, most recently during the AGM in March 2014. NAWOCOL has a clearly written mission, vision and value statements. All board members and employees of NAWOCOL understand the mission and vision statements of the organisation.

When asked if new board members and employees are given orientation about the constitution, there was not a sure answer. This suggests that there is a need for staff and even board members to fully understand the constitution and new vision and mission of the organisation.

After several strategic discussions on the future of the NAWOCOL during the baseline period, the organisation developed a three-year Strategic Plan that aligns with government’s Agenda for Transformation and emerging economic and political dynamics of the country.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.

Description of the endline situation:

Now there is an operational manual - just completed it and adopted it in the AGM. Since the AGM there has been no active work on this. Intend to use it for new staff - introduce them to the organisation, dos and don'ts, what the institution stands for. Rules of employment are on a contractual basis.

Now there is also a financial policy is in place, but the organisation is not adequately staffed and has a weak personnel policy. The job description is available to some staff but the personnel policy and manual is not available to all staff. Financial and purchasing systems are rarely managed by separate personnel and there is not a proper financial forecast system in place. It is hoped that with the employment of a new financial person, these will be taken care of.

There is a system for tracking the organisation’s expenditure and funds. As is the standard banking practices, all checks have multiple signatories, and there is a regular financial system in place for auditing. Financial documents are filed properly and NAWOCOL funds are kept secure in the bank.

Score: from 1 to 2 (improvement)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.

Description of the endline situation:

The organisation partly adheres to its constitution. The focus of the institution is on women. But cross gender activities are now also encouraged in the organisation's new strategy.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: ‘The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts’

This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.

Description of the endline situation:
Some of the projects did support each other in the past; for example, the economic empowerment projects and HIV/AIDs interventions are complementary. Another mutually supportive project is the peace building and HIV/AIDS project. These two are complementary since HIV/AIDS is a stability issue in a country like Liberia with a weak health system. However, with the weaning depletion of funding, NAWOCOL may likely in the future start to take on projects that do not complement each other.

Score: 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

Summary capability to achieve coherence
NAWOCOL has a vision and mission in place and recently, also a strategic plan has been developed. However, these do not seem to be regularly discussed. The organisation partly adheres to its constitution. The focus of the institution is on women. But cross gender activities are now also encouraged in the organisation. Whilst project activities seem to be complimentary lack of funding can also affect this complementarity. NAWOCOL now does have some operational guidelines in place, like the financial policy and an operational manual, but personnel policy is still weak which is related to lack of staffing.

Score: from 1.8 to 2.3 (slight improvement)

Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

Below you can find a description of the key changes in organisational capacity of NAWOCOL since the baseline as expressed by NAWOCOL staff during the endline workshop. First, a description is given of how this topic was introduced during the endline workshop by summarising key information on NAWOCOL from the baseline report. This information includes a brief description of the vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, staff situation, clients and partner organisations. This then led into a discussion on how NAWOCOL has changed since the baseline.

The evaluation team visited NAWOCOL in Monrovia on the 3rd of July 2014. The workshop started with a delay, as the members of the NAWOCOL team requested us to come at 11.00. The evaluation team was notified that we could unfortunately only do the workshop for one day instead of two as planned, as the two board members and the director had other pressing matters. On the phone, the director explained that she was currently moving to a new job at the Women in Peace-building Network (WIPNET), so she was only able to meet us for one day. One of the most obvious changes we noted before the workshop started was that the office had be refurbished extensively. In 2012 NAWOCOL did not have decent tables and chairs, and there was no power. These positive attributes had been realised recently, due to the government subsidy that NAWOCOL received.

Baseline information recap
The evaluation team explained the purpose of the research and said that the effort was to look at the key changes in organisational capacity that have occurred in the past 2 years since the baseline. NAWOCOL is an inclusive membership organisation, which organises activities for women and girls to empower them. The vision of NAWOCOL is "a peaceful Liberia with tenets such as fair play, equality and justice, where women and girls have equal access to political and economic opportunities". The NAWOCOL mission: "to make women and girls resourceful in championing their own development at all levels of society". In the baseline it was also asked what the focus of NAWOCOL was. The primary focus was the empowerment of rural women and girls, and with a programme management focus on inclusive economic development.

Organisational structure of NAWOCOL:

- General assembly (all of the member organisations)
- Board of directors, in charge of making policy and supervising the activities
- Operations management team, in charge of supervision of the day-to-day activities.

Regarding the staff situation, until 2004 NAWOCOL had up to 50 staff members. Since then, the organisation has experienced a 'drastically low number of staff' and the amount of staff has since then been as low as five. This was due to the reduction of funding opportunities. In the baseline year in 2012 there was a high staff turnover since most of them were not being paid.

The clients or beneficiaries of NAWOCOL included many women and children, particularly those who were abused during the war. The main and only funding partner was ICCO, since 2005. In 2007 NAWOCOL partnered with Women Campaign International (WCI) and before 2004 with a series of UN organisations and USAID. Partners that were working with NAWOCOL during the time of the baseline were National African Research and Development Agency (NARDA) and the Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL), as a capacity building partners. In terms of outreach, NAWOCOL was engaged in a mix of national and sub-national activities.

Key changes at NAWOCOL

The current participants acknowledged that this was indeed how it stood at NAWOCOL in 2012. The director took the time to say that indeed quite a few things had changed in the last two years. She stressed the fact that the NAWOCOL office had been refurbished, new operational documents had been developed (such as operational manuals, staff contracts and an amended constitution), and that a new strategy was being developed building on the recommendations from the Assembly General Meeting (AGM). On a programme implementation level it seemed that NAWOCOL had to make some adaptations in terms of amount of people reached and in which areas. Due to the reduction in ICCO funding the director said that NAWOCOL was not able to implement the project (Rural Women and Girls Capacity Development Projects and School Based Palaver Management Club) in Lofa, and therefore was only able to implement it in Kakata, Margibi county. Also, it was said that the amount of people working with the programme was halved to 50 people instead of 100 due to lack of funds. Some of the activities NAWOCOL engaged in during the past two years: working with women in small businesses and peace-building activities with youth in 5 schools in Kakata (please see the Annex C SPO Support to capacity sheet for more information).

The evaluators asked the members of the workshop to take some time to write down some key changes that had occurred at NAWOCOL in the past 2 years since the baseline. These were later sorted into organisational capacity themes. Some of the key changes related to organisational capacity (there were a great deal more changes, but these related to project activities and impacts):

- Office equipment was bought through a Government of Liberia subsidy.
- HR capacity enhanced for effective operations, through trainings by ICCO and the Programme Management Committee (PMC) of the LCDGP.
- Assembly General Meeting was held in 2014, and led to amending the strategic plan, the constitution and the operational manual .
- Board recommended/ and elected new board members and became smaller (from 15 to 7 people).
- Structure of NAWOCOL revised, and strategy developed and approved by the AGM.
- A brochure of NAWOCOL activities was developed (copy made available).
- Invited to international conference of the LCDGP in Mali in September 2013 due to NAWOCOL being one of the sub-leads of the ICCO consortium and held a key position in the development of that strategic plan in the PMC.
- Compliance audit was done in 2013
- Enhanced network with WONGOSOL- Women NGO secretariat.
- Huge staff turnover, a major constraint for NAWOCOL.
- Low donor funding.
- Developed policy documents for NAWOCOL: in March 2014.
- African Women Development Fund is supporting NAWOCOL until the end of July 2014.

The key organisational changes that NAWOCOL has experienced since the baseline in 2012 focus on three issues: a new organisational paradigm shift [1], search for more diverse funding [2], and a management team that is now better at multi-tasking [3]. In the causal map these key changes are further discussed. When discussing how NAWOCOL has changed since the baseline three key influencing factors surfaced. One of the main issues that greatly impacted NAWOCOL in the past 2-3 years is that funding has been quite low, especially **funding** from ICCO. The staff of NAWOCOL called this funding fatigue in general within the donor community [18]. The LCDGP was launched in 2013 and since then , the acting director said that it is difficult to get ICCO to fund the whole project proposal. NAWOCOL is now active in the Fair Economic Development cluster of the LCDGP [17]. Another issue that is impacting NAWOCOL is a **changing context for post-conflict development**, moving from relief to reconstruction, changing the nature of development goals and orientation [13]. Furthermore, the role of NAWOCOL has changed. This is related to NAWOCOL being an umbrella organisation for women groups in Liberia with various 'constituencies' in the different Liberian counties. In recent years these women groups have increasingly been decentralising operations and focusing on their own counties leading to less efforts to maintain NAWOCOL [15]. These two last aspects have influenced the new paradigms and direction of NAWOCOL.

In the causal maps the attempt is made to trace back key changes in organisational capacity to related activities, factors and actors. At the top of the visual the main changes in terms of organisational capacity are placed (yellow cards). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the key organisational capacity changes mentioned above. Key activities and trainings have been noted in brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The bottom of the causal map shows the most important underlying causes, opportunities and constraints that have influenced these three key changes in organisational capacity. Key influencing causes and external developments that have substantially impacted the organisation are listed in the round boxes at the bottom in light green or in pink if they have had a negative influence.

The narrative discusses each of these three key organisational capacity changes, explaining how these changes have come about. Please read the visual from the top down, and from left to right.

New organisational paradigm shift

One of the main themes of change at NAWOCOL was the 'paradigm shift' [1], in which the organisation aimed at charting a new course of action and to amend the constitution since the baseline in 2012. These issues had been long overdue according to the management of NAWOCOL. Due to the decreased levels of funding [18], the trends within Liberian development contexts from relief to reconstruction [13], and the changing relations with the County level women organisations [15], NAWOCOL staff said that they needed to head towards a new paradigm. These trends were a main underlying reason for NAWOCOL to become a more development service-delivery type of organisation rather than a women group umbrella organisation. NAWOCOL, with support from external parties, developed a new draft strategic plan [6], which was mainly based on the changing country contexts from relief to reconstruction. This draft strategic plan shows that NAWOCOL intends to move towards five focus areas [4]:

- Women Economic and Social Empowerment
- Women Political Empowerment and Development
- Women and Natural Resources governance
- Women Access to Justice
- Women and HIV/AIDS

However, how these foci are to be addressed has not been described in the strategic plan yet. The new strategic plan [4] captures the political context of the country, Resolution 1325 and the social and economic context related to the concessional communities. It was noted that NAWOCOL had changed to focusing more on natural resource management and governance, but also on issues related to HIV/AIDS prevention. For example, NAWOCOL intends to address issues relating to community residents who have not been included in the financial benefits from the concessional communities. Targeting has also changed. The director called this a 'cross-gender participation' approach which not only targeted women and girls, but also boys and men [5].

In order to document and organise the new paradigm, and to facilitate organisational sustainability [19], there was an increased need to have the organisational documentation updated. The first documents that were adapted were the draft strategic plan and the constitution [6]. The strategy was drafted in 2012, and was used as a working document since then. In 2014 more efforts were made to develop the new strategic plan. The operational manual was also said to have been updated in 2014y [7].

The new paradigm also became apparent in the restructuring of the board [8]. The changing relations with the various women groups in the counties meant that these groups were becoming more independent and therefore NAWOCOL was becoming more obsolete. NAWOCOL now has different board member criteria: they need to be 'gender-aware professionals'; they no longer have to be purely representatives from the various women member groups in the Liberian counties. It was also determined to bring the amount of board members of NAWOCOL from 15 to 7.

A major influence that helped NAWOCOL to concretise their visions was through the ICCO team: the ICCO ROWA team came to Liberia (ICCO programme coordinator and the ICCO finance person from Mali, in 2013) and noticed that NAWOCOL did not have key strategic and operational documents such as a strategic plan and a financial manual [9]. The NAWOCOL management told the visitors that they would get these documents. The team from ICCO told NAWOCOL that new funding sources needed to be identified and they encouraged NAWOCOL to write other proposals. These discussions with ICCO on organisational sustainability [10], and also through the work with the LCDGP [11], helped NAWOCOL to realise that they needed to update their strategic and operational documents [9].

The participants of the endline workshop stated that through the engagement with the PMC and the fact that NAWOCOL was invited to go to Mali to attend the LCDGP strategic meeting helped them to define what they needed to work on, and how they wanted to work in the future [11]. The MFS II baseline assessment in 2012 [12], also made staff realise the need for updating their strategic and operational documents: "this led us to analyse our achievements and helped us to know how to press forward. We said that we were going to ask for government support (in this case, the government subsidy granted to NAWOCOL)".

Many of these changes, specifically the new strategic plan, revised constitution and changed NAWOCOL board, were discussed in the Assembly General Meeting, which was held on March 18th 2014 [14]. At the AGM various representatives of women groups from the member counties were invited to come to Monrovia. NAWOCOL said that one of the main things they requested funding for from ICCO was to organise their Assembly General Meeting (AGM). This has been long overdue as many of the women groups in the various counties of Liberia had been decentralised and have started their own independent organisations [15]. Therefore it was essential to organise this in order to come up with new strategies and to revise the constitution. When NAWOCOL had the last convention in 2006, NAWOCOL had a wide-reaching organisational structure and many members, and after that meeting there has not been an assembly. To organise the Assembly in March 2014, the flexible funds from the LCDGP learning trajectory were used, amounting to about 2,200 Euros of those funds [16] (according to the CFA). The AGM financial report Statement of Receipts and Payments for the period 18th - 20th of March 2014, states that the whole three days of the AGM cost about 13,408 US dollars. The flexible funds were granted by ICCO as part of the initiation of the LCDGP coalition since 2013. NAWOCOL is the sub-lead of the cluster engaged with fair economic development [17]. The coalition was initiated as part of the programmatic approach of ICCO, and partly sought to tackle decreasing funds in that way [18].

Diversification of funding sources

The second main change in the organisation since the baseline referred to the efforts made by NAWOCOL to diversify its funding sources. This was needed to contribute to their organisational and financial sustainability. One of the signals that financial sustainability had improved was that in the past year the NAWOCOL office was refurbished and new equipment such as laptops, printers, tables and a generator were bought [19]. This has been the direct result of NAWOCOL managing to successfully apply for the Government of Liberia subsidy worth 39,750 US dollars [20]. In order to receive this government subsidy, the NAWOCOL management was challenged to establish a good relationship with the Government of Liberia, especially the Ministry of Gender and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare [21]. Discussions with ICCO on finding additional funding sources, so as to improve their financial sustainability have helped NAWOCOL to pursue this subsidy [10].

Another reason that contributed to diversification of funding was the effort made by management to develop more sound financial accountability [22]. The director felt that one important thing that was done in this area was that an audited report had been produced in April 2014 on the Rural Women Capacity development project expenditures from 2012-2013 [23]. When reading the audit report however, it does not exactly become clearer how well the funds from the project have been managed. With the ICCO funded consortium LCDGP discussions were held on how the organisational finances could be improved, through financial management, new project proposals and sources of funding, so as to create a more financially sustainable outlook for the organisation [17].

Another opportunity that came up was in the HIV/AIDS prevention sector. NAWOCOL was able to do a small project with the African Women Development Fund in HIV/AIDS and Teenage pregnancy [24]. This project started in 2013 and ended in July 2014. The amount of funds were said to be around 10,000 US dollars and came about through mediation of WONGOSOL [25]. NAWOCOL has been able to maintain its contact with the Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia, even though relations with a similar partner, NARDA, have deteriorated. Also, NAWOCOL was asked to join a partnership with the National AIDS/STI Control Programme (NACP), guided by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, on

HIV and teenage pregnancy [26]. The director received some training on these topics, and the NACP gave NAWOCOL teenage pregnancy prevention materials to use in the target communities.

Management has become better at multitasking

Since the baseline, the management has been more and more involved in multi-tasking [27]. This has been related to the fact that many staff members have left the organisation since the baseline in 2012 [28]. The management has been taking care of projects through filling in separate tasks themselves and hiring specialists to fill in when needed. This could be considered as a way to ensure sustainability of the organisation [19]. Since 2012 NAWOCOL staff has come down from 10 persons to 4 persons, due to the decreased ability to pay these staff members [29], which is a result of decreased donor funding [18]. In the baseline it was noted that these staff members were often working on a voluntary basis, now many of these have left the organisation. The evaluation team suggested to interview previous staff members of NAWOCOL, but these suggestions were advised against by the NAWOCOL management. In response to this the workshop participants said that management was more involved in multi-tasking than before.

Whilst the management was pushed to do multitasking, they have also been able to improve this capacity by attending different trainings in 2013 and 2014. Managements got some practice and gained some knowledge on standardized narrative and financial report writing [30]. The PMC of the LCDGP did a training for programme management and financial staff on reporting (both financial and narrative reporting) in 2014 [31]. This training was attended by the new person who replaced the former financial manager of NAWOCOL. NAWOCOL management also developed some capacity on how to write proposals, how to find new ways for sourcing funding, and how to manage crises [32]. This was through a second training on proposal writing by the fundraising experts on the PMC of the LCDGP in 2014 [33].

The trainings were the result of being part of the LCDGP, but also the ICCO-ROWA capacity assessment that was carried out in January 2012 and that showed some of the capacity gaps at NAWOCOL [34].

In the discussion it was asked whether NAWOCOL staff engaged with any training to do their activities with the target communities (the business women and peace-building among youth in schools around Kakata). The director said that the women's training in business development was done by a small-business development management expert from WONGOSOL. The peace building activities trainer was from WIPNET [35]. The board member, who is also the chair for the Assembly General, said that in terms of staff capacity building there has been some training from NARDA in the past. However, now it seems that NAWOCOL no longer goes to meetings of NARDA or participates in their trainings because NAWOCOL did not pay its contribution to the NARDA network for a while. It was said to be 300 dollars a year but the members of NAWOCOL did not think it was worth it, as there have not been any extra projects or promising activities coming out of this network membership [36].


NAWOCOL places more focus on the natural resource management sector, governance issues related to that, and HIV/AIDs prevention [4]
Focus now also addresses cross-gender participation in all her projects – so not purely women and girls [5]
Organisational and financial sustainability [19]
New organisational paradigm shift [1]
Diversification of funding sources [2]
Management has become better at multitasking [3]
New revised 3-year strategic plan developed Constitution revised [6]
Operational manual revised [7]
Board restructured From 15 to 7 people 2014 [8]
NAWOCOL received a GoL Support subsidy worth 39,750 USD 2013-2014 [20]
Increased financial accountability [22]
Project with African Women Development Fund in HIV/AIDS and Teenage Pregnancy prevention in Bong and Grand Geddeh Counties 2013 – July 2014 10,000 USD [24]
Huge staff turnover, remaining staff: from 10 to 4 [28]
Skills in standardized report writing (both financial and narrative) [30]
Skills in proposal writing; sourcing funding; crisis management [32]
Engagement with WONGOSOL and WIPNET to address project-based capacity gaps when needed [35]
Less engagement with NARDA for capacity building– NAWOCOL not able to pay for membership [36]
Need for strategic and operational documents [9]
Assembly general meeting (AGM) in March 2014 [14]
Established a good funding relationship with the Government of Liberia [21]
Finalized audit report for 2012-2013 on the Rural Women Capacity development project in 2014 [23]
Discussions with ICCO on financial sustainability 2013 [10]
The director attended strategic meeting in Mali with LCDGP coordinators Sept 2013 [11]
Flexible funds: support to organise AGM [16]
Maintained networking connections with WONGOSOL [25]
Partnership with NACP for HIV/AIDS and Teenage Pregnancy prevention materials 2013-2014 [26]
Less able to pay staff [29]
PMC conducted training for the ICCO supported programme managers and financial managers in 2014 [31]
PMC conducted training in proposal writing for organisational heads 2014 [33]
LCDGP consortium organised by ICCO: NAWOCOL is sub-lead for the FED cluster since 2013 [17]
MFSII Baseline in June 2012 [12]
Change in country context from relief to reconstruction [13]
Decentralizing Womens organisations in the various counties [15]
Donor fatigue: decrease in ICCO funding since 2012 [18]
ICCO ROWA capacity assessment in Jan 2012 [34]

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

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The Centre for Development Innovation works on processes of innovation and change in the areas of food and nutrition security, adaptive agriculture, sustainable markets, ecosystem governance, and conflict, disaster and reconstruction. It is an interdisciplinary and internationally focused unit of Wageningen UR within the Social Sciences Group. Our work fosters collaboration between citizens, governments, businesses, NGOs, and the scientific community. Our worldwide network of partners and clients links with us to help facilitate innovation, create capacities for change and broker knowledge.

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Endline report – Liberia, REFOUND
MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Sam Gotomo (ME)
Bram Peters (CDI)
Cecile Kusters (CDI)
Stanford Peabody (ME)
Musu Washington Gopeya (ME)

Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
Making Enterprises

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, December 2014

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This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Liberia, REFOUND. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Keywords: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

Report CDI-15-008

Contents

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The Liberia 5C evaluation team

List of abbreviations and acronyms

5 C	Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities
Causal map	Map with cause-effect relationships. See also ‘detailed causal map’.
Causal mechanisms	The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, the Netherlands
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
CRC	Constitutional Review Committee
CSDF	County Social Development Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
Detailed causal map	Also ‘model of change’. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question).
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
FED-cluster	Fair Economic Development-Cluster (part of the LCDGP)
General causal map	Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception.
ICCO	Dutch Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation
ICCO-ROWA	ICCO Regional Office West Africa
LCDGP	Liberian Community Development and Governance Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFS	Dutch co-financing system
MIS	Management Information System
NARDA	New African Research and Development Agency
NEC	National Elections Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OD	Organisational Development
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Process tracing	Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms
REFOUND	Rural Empowerment Foundation
SDI	Sustainable Development Initiative
SPO	Southern Partner Organisation
ToC	Theory of Change
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre

1 Introduction & summary

1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

- What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
- To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: REFOUND, in Liberia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

This report contains the organisational capacity component of the MFS II endline study in Liberia, concerning the Rural Empowerment Foundation (REFOUND). The endline discovered that REFOUND has had limited improvements in organisational capacity since the baseline. Within the capability to act and commit, very little change was seen: in the areas of leadership, staff capacity, funding possibilities, little progress has been made and the fragility of the staff situation and incentives make this even more uncertain. The capability to adapt and self-renew has not changed. Slight deterioration was witnessed within the capability to deliver on development objectives because it was unclear how cost-effectively resources were monitored and how programme outputs were implemented. Some improvement was seen in the capability to relate, as networking within Bong County has increased and some small projects have come forth through these attempts. The capability to achieve coherence was slightly improved through the drafting of a new strategic direction.

The evaluators considered it important to note down the SPO’s perspective on what they experienced as the most important changes in the organisation since the baseline. SPO staff members noted key changes at the organisation to be that staff capacity was worked on (but challenges are there), the development of a new strategic direction and programmatic approach, and active networking in Bong County. A key driving factor that influenced many changes at REFOUND was noted to be that decreasing funding from ICCO has impacted the organisation heavily. A high staff turnover was seen as a main negative result of that. The new ICCO-funded LCDGP coalition has meant that less funding is available, but some trainings and learning sessions have been organised that have led to more attention to staff capacity. A need to find other projects followed from active networking in Bong County and engagements with other smaller projects in the area. These new projects have influenced the development of a new strategic direction for REFOUND. As such, the MFSII funded interventions were present, but less influential in the current organisational changes.

It should be noted that this endline assessment was carried out just before the Ebola virus epidemic and crisis hit Liberia as of July 2014. The effects of the epidemic have heavily impacted the staff and operations of all assessed organisations, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. As such the evaluation team acknowledges that the assessment described in this endline may not fully resemble the current situation in early 2015.

2 Context and General Information about the SPO – REFOUND

2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

Country	Liberia
Consortium	ICCO Alliance
Responsible Dutch NGO	ICCO
Project (if applicable)	Strengthening Rural Women Capacity Towards Self-Reliance
Southern partner organisation	Rural Empowerment Foundation (REFOUND)

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation components:

Achievement of MDGs and themes	
Capacity development of Southern partner organisations	x
Efforts to strengthen civil society	

2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The history of Liberia is a turbulent history. Settled by freed slaves from the United States around 1822, the newly formed state proclaimed independence in 1846. The Liberian state slowly expanded from the coast into the hinterlands and, though the state was founded on principles of freed slaves, the upholding of settler rights increasingly led to the suppression of indigenous peoples. In 1980 a coup d'état took place which ended the more than 100 year rule of the settler party (Pajibo, 2012; Richards et al., 2005). The military government, led by former sergeant Samuel K. Doe, suspended the constitution and instituted a repressive political system. In 1989 the invasion of Charles Taylor triggered the civil war in Liberia which lasted on and off between 1989 and 2003. The war, which was characterized by great terror and gruesome atrocities, counted many different fighting groups and changing alliances. Eventually the war ended with the departure of Charles Taylor, the institution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 (Pugel, 2009). After the war ended in 2003, with the intervention of a 15,000 man UN force, a peace-building process started and is still ongoing (Richards et al., 2005).

Since the end of the civil war, the Liberian government has formulated the 'Agenda for Transformation' (AfT) as a five-year development strategy from 2012 to 2017. It followed the three–year (2008-2011) Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which transitioned Liberia from post-conflict emergency reconstruction to economic recovery. The AfT was considered a first step toward achieving the goals set out in Liberia RISING 2030, Liberia's long-term vision of socio-economic transformation and development. The AfT articulates precise goals and objectives and corresponding interventions that should move Liberia closer toward structural economic transformation, prosperity and inclusive growth.

Perhaps one of the most critical achievements, of both the Liberian government and UNMIL, has been the maintenance of peace and security. Though Liberia continues to rely on the support the United Nations peacekeepers, it is hoped that the government will gradually assume full responsibility for maintenance of security for the coming years. This fragile peace has allowed Liberians to return to their farms, start businesses, return to their country from abroad, and witness an increase in flows of Foreign Direct Investment to Liberia. To revitalize the economy, the three-pronged economic strategy of the PRS focused on (i) rebuilding critical infrastructure; (ii) reviving traditional resource sectors; and (iii) establishing a competitive business environment.

The challenges Liberia is facing are daunting however. Starting from a state of post-conflict instability, extremely weak state institutions, and an economy left in shambles by nearly two decades of violence, further issues relate to minimal reconciliation efforts, high unemployment levels, low levels of education and limited access to healthcare. Within the field of governance and justice Liberia has much work to do. In the post-conflict period reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts have mostly been steered by international initiatives and forces such as the United Nations (Pajibo, 2012). The Truth and Reconciliation Committee, instituted to move on the path towards reconciliation rather than justice, has noted that those who committed war crimes in the civil war should be held accountable. This has not been the case, and the current political establishment has not acted on this view. The security and police sector are currently undergoing training and reform to take over the role of maintaining peace in the country. This is a difficult process, as for instance the police are often considered as predators rather than protectors. Access to justice is limited and trails often take long as only a limited number of cases are concluded each year (Human Rights Watch Liberia country chapters 2014).

Liberia is currently still receiving large amounts of international aid and budget support, and the transition to strengthen the main productive sector, agriculture, is still very much in a preliminary stage (Solà-Martin, 2012). According to the African Economic Outlook 2014, more than 70% of households in Liberia are engaged in rice production. However, since 1980 yields have not increased substantially and more than half of the country's rice is imported. Economic growth has thus far been heavily dependent on the natural resource sector, including goods such as ores, lumber, rubber and palm oil exports. In recent years the services sector has also been growing significantly, even though it is noted that the slow withdrawal of the UNMIL forces in 2015 will affect the demand for these services. It was reported that the informal economy, which reflects a large proportion of Liberian economic activity, has grown even though this has not translated into a decrease in poverty (African Economic Outlook 2014).

Major economic constraining factors include the lack of electricity and basic infrastructure. Until now infrastructure and basic services saw more than US$500 million of direct investment, with key components of infrastructure (including airports, seaports, and roads) renovated or reconstructed. Plans are made to build a large hydropower dam to improve access to electricity. However, these investments alone will not be sufficient to diversify the Liberian economy, nor create jobs for the roughly 500,000 Liberians who will graduate from secondary and post secondary institutions in the next 5 to 10 years. The Liberian government has worked out a plan to establish a competitive business environment for firms in Liberia. It has reformed the Tax Code and the Investment Code, making them more competitive and beneficial to growth. It has streamlined business registration processes; established a one-stop-shop for customs clearing; and started implementing proactive industrial policies as a way of facilitating the growth of local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES). The Government also made it a priority to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment, which is necessary for growth. Further, it maintained a cash-based balanced budget; significantly increased government revenue; moved toward multi-year financial planning; and achieved US$4.9 billion of cumulative debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. These and follow-up actions are creating the right incentives for further growth in employment, GDP, and public and private investment.

Ebola outbreak

West Africa is currently experiencing the largest outbreak of Ebola ever recorded. In Liberia, the disease was reported in Lofa and Nimba counties in late March 2014. In July, the health ministry implemented measures to improve the country's response. On 27 July, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberian president, announced that Liberia would close its borders, with the exception of a few crossing points such as the airport, where screening centres would be established. Public gatherings were banned, schools and universities were closed, and the worst affected areas in the country were placed under quarantine.

In August, President Sirleaf declared a national state of emergency, noting that it might require the "suspensions of certain rights and privileges". The National Elections Commission announced that it would be unable to conduct the scheduled October 2014 senatorial election and requested postponement, one week after the leaders of various opposition parties had publicly taken different sides on the issue. In late August, Liberia's Port Authority cancelled all "shore passes" for sailors from ships coming into the country's four seaports. As of 8 September, Ebola had been identified in 14 of Liberia's 15 counties.

Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future. UN agencies such as the World Bank and international NGOs like Plan International, etc., have begun thinking post-Ebola, and have, therefore, embarked on conducting research and studies on the impact of Ebola on communities and the country, resilience of communities and the health care system, weaknesses in the health care system, etc.

As of January 2015 the Ebola epidemic seemed to be stabilising in Liberia. According to Medecins sans Frontieres the count is now around 8,157 cases and 3,496 deaths registered during the entire epidemic in Liberia (MSF Ebola crisis update 13-01-2015). This stabilisation means that the amount of new cases coming in has decreased significantly to around one case per week in Monrovia, but it is essential to not let the epidemic resurge. Not only Ebola patients have faced difficult times: the crisis has meant that general access to healthcare is even worse than before, As the Special Representative of the UN Secretariat in Liberia noted: rebuilding the country after the Ebola crisis will mean that the factors that caused the virus to spread so quickly need to be urgently addressed. This includes weak trust among the Liberian people, badly functioning basic services such as healthcare and education, lack of accountability and an over-centralized government (UN Special Representative Karen Landgren, 20-01-2015).

As it is with all sectors of Liberian society, this Ebola outbreak is testing the resilience of the SPOs to the highest limits. The SPOs are responding by readjusting their regular programmes by designing new strategies and realigning their resources to join the fight against the deadly Ebola virus disease. This is coming in the forms of Ebola awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for victims and survivors, provision of support to community care centres (CCCs), and procurement and distribution of sanitizing supplies to communities.

REFOUND

The deadly Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak that started in Liberia back in February of this year and which has engulfed the entire country, has posed a lot of hindrances and constraints on the operations of the organisation. Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future.

REFOUND is a presently in a devastating situation due to the Ebola outbreak. Donors are holding back funding and scaling down operations in Liberia. REFOUND depends solely on grant funding for its operation, therefore, the organisation cannot operate effectively in the midst of the current Ebola outbreak.

During the baseline in 2012, REFOUND operated in a more healthy and effective work environment with no disruption. The organisation was funded primarily and fully by ICCO unlike the situation of the end line where is there is lack of funding and a situation of Ebola Virus Disease that has caused a wreck in the socio-economic, cultural, and political context of Liberia.

As a result of the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in Liberia REFOUND is jointly working with community based organisations and the Bong County Ebola task force within Bong County on a voluntary basis to carryout awareness on the Ebola virus.

The Ebola virus outbreak has greatly affected the capacity of the organisation. Currently, there is no source of funding for REFOUND, previous projects have been halted and ICCO has announced in June to withdraw further funds from Liberia. REFOUND, Development Education Network of Liberia (DEN-L), Foundation for International Dignity (FIND), Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (CJPS), Bong County Youth Association, Bong County YMCA amongst other local organisations have pulled up non-financial resources and expertise to carry out awareness in Bong County on the Ebola Virus Disease.

After the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease in Liberia REFOUND has a plan of diverting its focus to working on community empowerment programmes, governance and health issues, food security and livelihood.

2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2005

What is the MFS II contracting period: 2012-2014

Did cooperation with this partner end? NO

If yes, when did it finish? N/A

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: N/A

If not, is there an expected end date for the collaboration? 2015

2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

History
REFOUND first started in Gbarnga, Bong County in 2002 to address the plight of street children. The name of the organisation was initially Rural Endowment Foundation in 2002 at the inception but later in 2003 it was changed to Rural Empowerment Foundation. This change was because they wanted to move from the aspect of children to the larger community. The idea was to move from helping only street kids to helping the wider community, for instance, widows. Since then the vision and mission has changed further.

Vision
The vision of REFOUND is to promote community-based peace and conflict management and reconciliation activities to enhance peaceful co-existence.

Mission
The mission of REFOUND is to "empower local communities through sustainable economic initiatives". The focus areas of REFOUND were: promoting peace and conflict-resolution activities; and self-help initiatives for economic development of women and youth to reduce poverty. From 2005, REFOUND, with support from ICCO, has engaged women's groups in Suakoko and Zota districts in the area of agricultural production.

Strategies
REFOUND seeks to develop and empower young people and local communities as a basis for promoting self-initiatives through training, peace building and poverty reduction. In the baseline it was unclear what strategies REFOUND was using to address the vision and mission. Currently a new strategic plan is under development stating that REFOUND, in an effort to align its programs with the National Government development agenda, has formulated the strategic plan focusing on three thematic areas or priorities:

1. Economic Empowerment and Food Security for rural women
2. Policy analysis, Assessment and documentation
3. Good Governance and Democratic Empowerment

3 Methodological approach and reflection

3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[1].

[1] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design: mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

4 Results

4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of REFOUND that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by ICCO.

Table 1
Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline

Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention	Objectives	Activities	Timing and duration	Budget
Project cycle/ Financial Software training with staff	Training in Financial management and budget	Short training provided by DEN-L consultant	2013	$750.00 Dollars
Partner/Cluster Coordination Meetings	Interaction and planning with LCDGP partners	Meetings held in Monrovia	2013-2014	$500.00 Dollars
Start-up activities FED Bridging Phase: FED-Cluster Value chain stakeholder mapping exercise	Create FED partners' awareness of value chain stakeholders in Liberia	REFOUND management attended a two-day workshop as part of the start-up phase	February 6-7, 2014	$14.600 Dollars (for entire FED-cluster start-up phase 2013-2014)
ICCO monitoring visits	Visits for monitoring and discussion purposes	Discussions on funding, sustainability, business development and organisational strengthening	Throughout 2012 and 2013 - latest in March/April 2014	

Source: CFA support to capacity sheet, REFOUND Expenditure plan 2013, LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report 2013, LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO 2013

4.2 Changes in capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities (4.2.1). This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also appendix 3. In addition to this staff present at the endline workshop were asked to indicate what were the key changes in the organisation since the baseline. The most important is key organisational capacity changes have been identified, as well as the reasons for these changes to come about. This is described in a general causal map, both as a visual as well as a narrative. The summary results are described in 4.2.2 whilst the detailed general map is described in appendix 4.

4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

Capability to act and commit



The leadership of REFOUND cannot be considered to have significantly improved its capacity since the baseline. The main changes have been that the Board, that has been reconstituted and is hoped to bring more guidance than the previous Board. A new strategic plan has been developed that tries to focus on 3 issues: gender economic development, policy advocacy, and democratic governance. Some issues were still unclear, and these related to how the organisation functions daily, how finances are monitored, and fully detailed reports were not available. This is not very different from the baseline. The main issue that is challenging REFOUND is that many staff members have left, current staff members are practically volunteering as they are paid whenever a project is on hand, which affects staff motivation. The current staff members have been engaging in limited trainings from ICCO and from organisations within the local network, though it cannot be said for sure whether performance has improved. Funding procedures could potentially be guided by the new strategic plan in the future but for now REFOUND relies on ad hoc short-term projects that come along.

Score: from 2 to 2.1 (hardly a change)

Capability to adapt and self-renew



In the years since the baseline not much has been done to improve M&E competencies or develop an M&E system. Most feedback and monitoring activities still take place through informal meetings and assessment trips. The management and board have attempted to list the strengths and weaknesses of REFOUND, but it is unclear whether critical reflection on the meaning of this analysis is actually taking place.

The networking activities of the director let the organisation stay in touch with what is happening in society, and the current role of Chair of CSO groups in Bong County allows REFOUND to join higher level meetings. Though some small and short-term projects have been taking place, partners of REFOUND still found it difficult to give information about the organisation.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

Capability to deliver on development objectives



REFOUND has worked on its strategic plan, and has sought to apply the programmatic way of thinking in that strategy. However, when looking at the lack of operational documentation and limited financial accountability, it can be doubted whether REFOUND has been able to deliver on its development objectives. Lack of funding is part of the issue, but the problems related to reporting and the provision general documentation show that REFOUND has trouble managing its projects coherently.

Score: from 2.4 to 2 (slight deterioration)

Capability to relate



REFOUND seems to be quite active within networks in Bong County. The election of REFOUND to be the chair of CSOs in that area has allowed the organisation to maintain and build new regional contacts. Some small projects have come out of that engagement in the past year. It is unclear how stakeholders have actively influenced the policies of REFOUND - the strategic plan does suggest that certain focus areas originate from interactions with other groups. Internally, not much seems to have changed: informal meetings with beneficiaries and with staff guide internal communication, but is the evaluation team's perception that the director seems to mostly decide on the way forward. Also lack of funding has limited the frequency of visits to beneficiaries.

Score: 2.1 to 2.3 (very slight improvement)

Capability to achieve coherence



In many aspects the situation is the same as during the baseline. Though the strategy has now been developed it is unsure how the vision and mission statements are still fully connected to this. The strategic plan and the administrative policies guide REFOUND in a sense, but most activities are quite ad hoc. The diversity of small projects being undertaken besides activities for ICCO does not suggest that REFOUND fully knows where it is headed. Lack of funding is seriously affecting the work of REFOUND and thus the extent to which project activities can be complementary.

Score: from 2.25 to 2.5 (very slight improvement)

4.2.2 Key organisational capacity changes - general causal map -

During the endline workshop at the SPO, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in the organisation since the baseline. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organisational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the endline workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is summarised below. The detailed general causal map (both as a visual and well as a narrative) is described in appendix 4. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organisational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of SPO staff present at the endline workshop. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink.

Most of these changes were written down by the executive director and are described below:

- The Executive Director and the finance/administrative officer underwent two trainings in program and finance in 2013.
-
- The Board was reconstituted in January 2014
- New strategic plan was developed in March 2014
- REFOUND heads CSO in Bong County
- Three staff left REFOUND in April 2013, and a fourth member, a programme officer became part of the Board.
- Administrative policy was revised in June 2014 (made available to the evaluation team)
- There were two audits commissioned (one was seen by the evaluation team)

- REFOUND acquires capacity to coordinate and facilitate the constitutional review process in Bong County. This was in cooperation with the Constitutional Review Committee.
- Skills were acquired in monitoring and tracking of Bong County's social development funds
- Strategic LCDGP plan validated during a series of meetings in Monrovia.
- REFOUND was accredited by NEC in 2013, to conduct 2014 voters' civic education for the 2014 midterm elections.

A key factor that has heavily influenced the organisational capacity and the activities of REFOUND since 2012 has been the decreasing level of funding from ICCO. ICCO is the main funder of REFOUND and has been supporting them since 2005 [1]. Members of REFOUND at the workshop noted that 'fallow periods' (periods in which they were not paid) in between the transformation from bilateral relations to the bridging phase (January 2012 - November 2012) [2], and now to the LCDGP (November 2013 - June 2014) led various staff to stop working at the organisation and find other means of employment. The formation of the LCDGP has been something that REFOUND seems to be struggling with, since it is mostly related to less funds being available, and funds being unpredictable [3] (according to the executive director). Due to the decreasing amount of funding, as well as subsequent delays in funding, REFOUND has been seeking additional projects and funding sources [4], but the negative effect is that 4 staff members have left the organisation [5]. Many of these projects are in the region of Bong County, where REFOUND is actively networking to get new projects [6].

During the discussions at the workshop it was difficult to agree on a number of themes or labels that would characterize the discussions. The research team divided the subjects in three categories: 'staff capacity was worked on, but challenges are there'; 'development of a new programmatic approach'; and 'networking in Bong County'.

The discussion that **staff capacity was worked on** [7] was given substance by the statements made by the finance/administrative officer and the executive director that they had improved some of their personal knowledge and skills in the past two years. They both felt that they had enhanced their financial reporting competencies [8], through enhanced knowledge of project budget management [9], and knowledge about managing donor funds [10]. On other skills and capacity gains, the director felt that he increased his knowledge on programme management [15] during a training provided by the Programme Management Committee of the LCDGP. He said that he had learned a number of approaches that helped him manage his programme. He said that in this training a number of issues were discussed: stakeholder mapping, value chains, and timely reporting. A third issue that the staff of REFOUND have been working on was the issue of human rights, and currently staff are doing occasional awareness raising of human rights issues in the communities that REFOUND is active in [22]. This is related to members of REFOUND acquiring ideas on how to incorporate human rights within their programmes [23]. Within their own target communities they tried to inform beneficiaries of their rights, to help to resolve disputes and to highlight rights violations. A question was asked in follow-up: how are you applying the knowledge from the Human Rights training in your communities? This approach is used by the organisation in some individual cases, for example in case of issues of rape. Another example that the director mentioned was a case where community members held a man prisoner. But the REFOUND staff acknowledged that they did not have a consistent approach to human rights abuses. A final additional skill that was acquired was the tracking and monitoring of County concession funds [30].

An issue that seems to impact the staff capacity at REFOUND was mentioned by a new staff member who indicated that REFOUND's management had trouble paying her wages [25]. The civic/gender officer said she was hired as a civic education and gender officer for a small project that REFOUND is taking part in: the facilitation of a Bong County Constitutional Review. This project involved soliciting suggestions from citizens in Jorquelleh and Kpaai districts. This project gave her some experience in facilitating these discussions on constitutional reform [26]. This programme had its disadvantages though: due to delays in payment from the CRC it was not possible to pay the staff working on the project at the moment, according to the director. This was a negative effect of being involved as staff member in REFOUND and this could seriously affect staff capacity of REFOUND, since other staffs have also left the organisation after working for a long time as volunteers. REFOUND has tried to get new staff [14] but these problems in paying staff members still remain.


Staff capacity worked on, but challenges are there [7]
Development of new strategic direction and programmatic approach [28]
Active networking in Bong County [38]
Enhanced financial reporting [8]
Enhanced knowledge on programme management [15]
Occasional awareness raising on HR targeting individual clients [22]
Staff member mentions that she has not been paid since Feb 2014 [25]
Development of new Strategic Plan 2014 - Incorporating experiences with recent projects. [29]
REFOUND was accredited by the National Elections Commission to conduct voter civic education in 2014. Was done in 2013 [33]
Expectations that this current new board will guide policy formulation and strategic directions [34]
Increased access to higher level key stakeholders and duty bearers due to being the reference point for the CSOs in Bong County [39]
Knowledge about project budget management [9]
Knowledge about managing donor funds [10]
Knowledge on value chain development and the use of market analysis [16]
Enhanced learning on stakeholder coordination and networking [17]
Relevance of certain key stakeholders recognized [18]
REFOUND staff acquired skills in HR based programming [23]
REFOUND acquires experience in facilitating constitutional reform processes [26]
Acquired skills in tracking and monitoring county concession implemented projects [30]
Board reconstituted (5 people appointed by management) in 2014 [35]
Since december 2013 REFOUND was elected to be the chairgroup of the CSOs of Bong County [40]
Finance training in 2013 By DEN-L consultant [11]
Briefing/training by SDI in Feb 2014 [31]
REFOUND: In order to address needs and contemporary reality [12]
ICCO funding through institutional support funds (LCDGP) 750 dollars according to REFOUND expenditure plan 2013 [13]
Training in project management with NARDA through the LCDGP in 2013 (attended by REFOUND management) [19]
Search for Common Ground identified REFOUND activities and involved them in a Human Rights monitoring training October 2013 [24]
REFOUND facilitating the review of the constitution in Bong County and solicits suggestions from citizens in Jorquelleh and Kpaai districts [27]
CSDF Monitoring project with Sustainable Development initiative started in Feb. 2014 [32]
Old board did not give guidance to management [36]
Old board had overstayed its term [37]
LCDGP need to formulate and use reporting template FED Cluster coordination need [20]
REFOUND: Goal to enhance management capacity in service delivery [21]
New employees recruited May 2013 – finance officer Jan 2014 Civic education/ gender officer [14]
Staff turnover (3 staff left in April 2013) [5]
Search for other projects [4]
LCDGP coalition and strategic plan validation in Nov 2013 [3]
Long fallow periods between one project and another Jan 2012 – Nov 2012 Nov 2013 – June 2014 [2]
Networking activities in Bong County [6]
Decreasing ICCO programme funding since end of 2011 Decrease in overal funds [1]

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The director mentioned that a key issue key issue the organisation is heading towards relates to a **new strategic direction and a new programmatic approach** [28]. He said that he had been working on the new strategic plan to develop slightly new focus areas [29]. The three new focus areas of REFOUND are: Economic development and gender; Policy advice; Democratic governance. Especially the issue within this strategic plan on democratic governance and policy advice focus of REFOUND is new. The new plan was developed in March 2014. The idea is that the directors' new strategic plan is heading for a more programmatic approach. He mentioned that he wanted to move from project planning to programme planning in order to get a new organisational direction and ensure financial sustainability. He also wanted to do this to get more structure in organisational management, especially regarding issues relating to payments and other management issues. A number of previous project experiences influenced this strategic adaptation.

An important part of the discussion in the development of the general causal map was that REFOUND is quite an **active networking organisation in Bong County** [38], and is well known as a Civil Society Organisation since 2005. REFOUND has recently become the chair of the CSOs of Bong County since December 2013 [40]. The director said that REFOUND was elected to be chair by the present CSOs. REFOUND is an active member of this network. He felt that this role was important to REFOUND, as it gave them a better presence in the community, and enabled more possibilities for networking and engaging with other donors. However, when the evaluation team sought to find partners to interview about REFOUND it was not very clear who would be considered a close partner.

5 Discussion and conclusion

5.1 Methodological issues

The Liberia 5C evaluation team conducted a two day workshop with three subgroups of REFOUND staff including management, finance, and project implementation. The Project Officer/Field supervisor was out of office at the time of the endline evaluation, on personal business in Monrovia because, according to him, “due to lack of funding REFOUND is not paying me, therefore, I have to seek other means for survival”. The project officer joined the endline evaluation process when the workshop was in progress on the second day. During the workshops, the finance and project staffs of REFOUND talked less and listened more. The Executive Director dominated the discussions because he possesses all of the information, as he was the sole full time employee of REFOUND at the time of the endline evaluation. Interviews with their organization development consultant and the acting chairman of the board of directors of REFOUND were used as opportunities to clarify any issues coming out of the discussions of the workshops and the interviews with two subgroups of the staffs of REFOUND – management and projects/finance combined, respectively.

With REFOUND, the few people that participated in the workshops and interviews seemed to be new “at will” workers that did not have knowledge of the organisational capacity issues. The Executive Director in this case, the only full time employee of REFOUND, responded to all of the questions. The two major figures of REFOUND – the program development consultant and the organization development consultant at the time of the baseline in June 2012 – were absent during the workshops, but were subsequently interviewed as acting chairman of the board of directors of REFOUND and organization development consultant, respectively. Two partners of NAWOCOL were interviewed in the area of Gbargna, but neither of the two partners were able to give substantial information on REFOUND.

The Executive Director of REFOUND did not fill out and submit the Support to capacity sheet to the Liberia 5C evaluation team as requested before commencement of the endline evaluation, neither did he submit the legal and policy documents, audit report, project proposal and budget, and financial reports that the evaluation team requested repeatedly. However, due to persistent demand for the documents by the evaluation team during the workshops, he provided some of the documents and submitted a preliminary Strategic Plan.

All in all, eventually adequate information has been collected so as to carry out data analysis.

5.2 Changes in organisational capacity

In the assessment of the 5 capabilities it became clear that no significant growth in capabilities were seen at REFOUND. Some small improvement was seen in the capabilities to relate and to achieve coherence, but the capability to deliver on development objectives had slightly deteriorated (see figure next page). Within the capability to act and commit scarce change was seen: in the areas of leadership, staff capacity, funding possibilities, little progress has been made and the fragility of the staff situation and incentives make this even more uncertain. Within the indicator about leadership it was discovered that the leadership of REFOUND cannot be considered to have significantly improved its capacity since the baseline. The main changes have been that the Board has been reconstituted in order to give more guidance than the previous Board. Funding sources were sought within the context of Bong County through local networking, but at the time of the endline no solution was found to substitute the decreasing ICCO funding. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew no real changes were seen. Regarding issues related to M&E REFOUND has not especially built its systems or skills - most monitoring activities are still very informal and scarcely documented. Deterioration was witnessed within the capability to deliver on development objectives because it was unclear how cost-effectively resources were monitored and how programme outputs were implemented. Operations regarding REFOUNDs participation in the LCDGP programme are vague, lacking funding, clear operational plans, with scarce reporting and accountability. Some improvement was seen in the capability to relate, as networking within Bong County has increased and some small projects have come forth through these attempts. The capability to achieve coherence was slightly improved through the drafting of a new strategic direction.



At REFOUND in the baseline it was noted that the organisation had been a partner of ICCO for a long time. In the transition from bilateral funding to the bridging phase and subsequently to the programmatic funding of the LCDGP the dependency on ICCO for funds has led to a number of problems within the organisation. In the baseline some of these issues were already present: the organisation seemed to be wrestling with the right way to formulate strategy and methods to implement those strategies. In the baseline it was also signalled that REFOUND was having trouble retaining staff members.

During the endline workshop the members of REFOUND brought forward that the key changes at the organisation were the development of staff capacity, the development of a new strategic direction, and increased networking in Bong County. The staff capacity had been worked on through some trainings done through the LCDGP partners - a training on value chain development and stakeholder mapping, and a training in financial management. This last training was planned through the provision of 3000 dollars in ICCO flexible funding for capacity building initiatives. The idea of the flexible funds was that this amount would be made available by ICCO to give some attention to capacity issues in absence of the Learning Trajectory materialization. Another training that REFOUND received was on human rights monitoring, provided by Search for Common Ground.

The strategic plan has been adapted with the idea to form a new organisational direction and to follow a more programmatic approach. This entails three relatively new focus areas and a perspective that a programmatic approach for REFOUND might ensure a new organisational direction and financial sustainability. This is in contrast with the ad hoc way the organisation is operating now, dependent on smaller temporary projects. The experiences with these small projects, such as with the Constitutional Review Committee and the Sustainable Development Initiative, have provided ideas to use for the new strategic plan. A new development that also influences the new strategic direction is the fact that the board has been reconstituted.

The most positive events that has taken place have been around networking with other local CSOs in Bong County. REFOUND has been able to engage in a number of new, smaller projects that were slightly outside of the strategies. Also, REFOUND has become the Chair of the Bong CSOs, which means that REFOUND has access to higher level stakeholders such as members of the government of Liberia, and the UN, through being the reference point of Bong CSOs.

From the side of ICCO it was said that REFOUND has been unresponsive throughout 2013 and 2014. The CFA wrote that many aspects of the work of REFOUND were unclear and that they needed to substantiate and make accountable the claims about the measure of success of their projects. ICCO has thus had significant issues when it comes to monitoring the REFOUND projects' outcomes and impact. The formation of the LCDGP has not done much to motivate REFOUND to become more active and accountable - the decrease in funding (also having to actively search for more funding to fulfil the project objectives) and the sporadic attempts of the PMC to bring REFOUND to engage in a more collaborative and programmatic approach have yielded little apparent results. Finally, it should be noted that the Ebola outbreak has heavily impacted Bong County. This has had implications for the operations of the organisation and the environment in which it operates: the consequences are yet uncertain.

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Guidelines and formats for the 5C endline study

5c_endline_draftreport_country_SPO_26112014
Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Liberia_REFOUND_ICCO
Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Liberia_REFOUND_ICCO
Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Liberia_REFOUND(John M. Willie)
Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Liberia_REFOUND_Mrs Rennie
Annex F_5c endline self-assessment sheet_management_Liberia_REFOUND version 2
Annex F_5c endline self-assessment sheet_management_Liberia_REFOUND_Dumoe
Annex G_5c endline self-assessment sheet_programme staff_Liberia_REFOUND
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_REFOUND Bram
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_REFOUND(Sam Gotomo)
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_REFOUND_Stanford
List of 5C indicator descriptions

Partner Documents

5C_baseline_report_Liberia_REFOUND_19012013_MR_CK
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES-4
Annual Update E1
BRIEFING ON LCDGP STRATEGIC PLAN VALIDATION PROCESS
CSO Assessment_Tool_FINAL pdf
Feed back on Indicators 1.4 and 1.5
Feedback to the PMC-June
FINAL- consolidated- Partners'capacity assessment report
FINAL TOR FOR PMC-Final
FINAL TOR FOR TPs- Final
Institutional Support to LCDGP Partners
LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report
LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO
LCDGP GRANT AGREEMENT 2013-2015
LCDGP Project Plan- Final
PMC FINAL REPORT
REFOUND 2012-13 Final Report
REFOUND 2012-13 Financial Report
REFOUND EXPENDITURE PLAN 2013
REFOUND STRATEGIC PLAN 2

List of Respondents

REFOUND staff:

Stephen J. Mulbah Jr.	Executive Director
Marsay Conneh	Civic/Gender Officer
Jerry Z. Koiwu	Finance/Administrative Officer
Jallah Sonneh	Programme Officer

CFA:

Lindora Diawara	ICCO ROWA Programme Officer for Liberia
Allen Lincoln	PMC coordinator of the LCDGP

Partner respondents:

G. Martin Dumoe	Acting Board Chair of REFOUND
John M. Willie	Deputy Secretary General, Liberia National Federation of Cooperative Societies
Anita K. Rennie	County Coordinator for the Ministry of Gender in Bong County

Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[2] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[2] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?

What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?

List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - o -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - o -1 = A slight deterioration
   - o 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - o +1 = Slight improvement
   - o +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ....
   - o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ....
   - o **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ....
   - o Don't know.

Step 2. ***Review*** *the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

Step 3. ***Send the formats*** *adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

Step 4. ***Collect, upload & code the documents*** *from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;

- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

Step 5. ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:
- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

Step 6. ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

Step 7. ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

Step 8. ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

Step 9. ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

Step 10. ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

Step 11. ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

Step 12. Provide the ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

Step 13. ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

Step 14. ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

Step 15. ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which ‘theories’ are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of ‘explaining outcome process tracing’, since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing
Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on

17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

ETHIOPIA

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia

Capability to:	AMREF	CARE	ECFA	FSCE	HOA-REC	HUNDEE	NVEA	OSRA	TTCA
Act and commit	5	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	3
Deliver on development objectives	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	4	2	3	4	2	5	3	3	3
Relate	3	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
Achieve coherence	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia

Ethiopia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
AMREF	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	AMREF NL	Yes
CARE	Dec 31, 2015	Partly	Yes	Yes	Yes – slightly	CARE Netherlands	No - not fully matching
ECFA	Jan 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Child Helpline International	Yes
FSCE	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands	Yes
HOA-REC	Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes - slightly	ICCO	No - not fully matching
HUNDEE	Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Yes
NVEA	Dec 2015 (both)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN)	Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE
OSRA	C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE
TTCA	June 2015	Partly	Yes	No	Yes	Edukans Foundation	No - not fully matching

INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India[3]

Capability to:	BVHA	COUNT	DRISTI	FFID	Jana Vikas	Samarthak Samiti	SMILE	SDS	VTRC
Act and commit	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	5
Deliver on development objectives	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	1	4
Relate	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

SPOs selected for process tracing – India

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BVHA	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simavi	Yes; both capabilities
COUNT	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Woord en Daad	Yes; both capabilities
DRISTI	31-03-2012	Yes	Yes	No	no	Hivos	No - closed in 2012
FFID	30-09-2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

3 RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Jana Vikas	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF							No – delayed baseline
RGVN							No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS)	2013 possibly longer	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Hivos	No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS)	Dec 2013 intention 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - not fully matching focus
Smile	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Wilde Ganzen	Yes; first capability only
VTRC	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Red een Kind	Yes; both capabilities

INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia

Capability to:	ASB	Daya kologi	ECPAT	GSS	Lem baga Kita	Pt. PPMA	Rifka Annisa	WIIP	Yad upa	Yayasan Kelola	YPI	YRBI
Act and commit	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	5	4
Deliver on development objectives	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	3	1	2	4	2	3	4	4	1	1	4	3
Relate	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
ASB	February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hivos	Yes
Dayakologi	2013; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No: contract ended early and not matching enough
ECPAT	August 2013; Extension Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	Yes
GSS	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No: contract ended early
Lembaga Kita	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No - contract ended early
Pt.PPMA	May 2015	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	IUCN	Yes, capability to act and commit only
Rifka Annisa	Dec, 31 2015	No	Yes	No	Yes	Rutgers WPF	No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO
WIIP	Dec 2015	Yes	Not MFS II	Yes	Not MFS II	Red Cross	No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Yayasan Kelola	Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)	Yes	Not really	Yes	Not really	Hivos	No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos
YPI	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rutgers WPF	Yes
YRBI	Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes
Yadupa	Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now	Yes	Nothing committed	Yes	Nothing committed	IUCN	No, since nothing was committed by CFA

LIBERIA

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia

Capability to:	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Act and commit	5	1	1	1	3
Deliver on development objectives	3	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	2	2	2
Relate	1	2	2	2	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia

Liberia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BSC	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	SPARK	Yes
DEN-L	2014	No	No	Unknown	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
NAWOCOL	2014	Yes	No	No	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
REFOUND	At least until 2013 (2015?)	Yes	No	Yes	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
RHRAP	At least until 2013 (2014?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the ‘Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective’ for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

Step 4. Construct the ***detailed, initial causal map*** *(theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).



Figure 1 *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9
Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)

Part of the model of change	Key questions	Type of evidence needed	Source of information
Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change	Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related	Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?	Describe where you can find this information
Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding	Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?	Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training Content evidence: what the training was about	Example: Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

Step 6. ***Collect data*** *to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

Step 7. ***Assess the quality*** *of data and* ***analyse data****, and develop the* ***final detailed causal map*** *(model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included) **Description of causal relation**	**Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)**	**Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation**	**Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak**	**Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected**
e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice	e.g. Confirmed	e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training		

Step 8. ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick’s model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and

SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

Capacity is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

Capabilities are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

Competencies are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

Appendix 3 Results - changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

Capability to act and commit

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

This is about leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation.

The Board of Directors of REFOUND was restructured and is more involved in the activities of the organisation. The executive leadership is not responsive and accountable; due to lack of funding the number of management staff has reduced to one person, which is the Executive Director.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions

REFOUND has formulated a new strategic plan to provide strategic directions for the organisation.

Based on the new strategic plan developed, a couple of new focus areas, particularly economic related, gender, policy advocacy, and democratic governance were incorporated into REFOUND's work. These new areas are the result of a change/shift from project to programme planning. In the baseline it was noted that REFOUND seems to have difficulties to turn strategies into operations. This still seems to be the case when reading the new strategy.

ICCO indicated that they have requested a copy of the new strategic plan but REFOUND has not acknowledged the mails sent or share copy of the plan with ICCO. This has led to ICCO uncertainty about REFOUND. The new strategic plan was shared with the evaluation team.

The restructured Board of Directors provided guidance for the strategic planning process.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

This is about staff turnover.

The issue of staff turnover at REFOUND is notable and it is very high (now 4 main staff compared to 8 during the baseline in 2012) due to lack of funding, thus leading to the incapability of maintaining qualified staff. Due to the level of staff turnover, the endline assessment at REFOUND did not have the required number of staff participation.

Score: from 2 to 1 (deterioration)

1.4. Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

Observable indicator: Staff have copy of org structure and understand this

The Board of Directors has been restructured and new officers have been appointed. The management is led by the executive director and per available projects, staff members are hired. There are core staff members that run the organisation from time to time with or without projects, including the executive director and acting chairman of the board of directors. The management spoke of an organogram being designed to inform the members of the organisation. However, the evaluation team did not observe such a document. In the administrative policies of REFOUND there are guidelines to the work of the Board, Management team, project staff and beneficiaries.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.5. Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.

The board of directors has approved the strategic plan, and management is now contemplating on programme development for implementation. Situational analysis has informed the strategic plan, as well as a SWOT analysis. The focus of the REFOUND strategic goals is threefold:

1. Contribute to the achievement of economic growth through food security of poor and vulnerable populations in rural communities in Bong County
2. To increase community participation and involvement in the implementation of national policies
3. Expand access to justice and enhance the protection of human rights//good governance and democratic empowerment.

The latest news from September 2014 is that REFOUND is working with communities to prevent the spread of the Ebola virus through awareness raising. At the time of the baseline the request for 86,000 USD was made, but 30,000 USD for implementation from November 2012 to November 2013 was made available. This amount did not support the activities outlined in the 86,000 USD proposal.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.

The day-to-day field operations of REFOUND are less often due to decrease in funding and less activities.

Score: from 2 to 1.5 (slight deterioration)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.

The capacity assessment done in the baseline in 2012 identified skills needed to be addressed by REFOUND.

Through funding provided by ICCO’s flexible funding mechanism, both the Executive Director and the new Finance Officer received some training in financial reporting and project management. They received additional trainings and workshops in concessional community tracking and monitoring and human rights-based monitoring.

The Executive Director holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics and Rural Development, the Project Officer has a degree in management, the Project Officer has a vocational training in agriculture, and the field staff has experience in working with women’s groups.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

This is about whether offered appropriate training opportunities

REFOUND has not had much opportunities for training staff mainly because they cannot maintain adequate staff with long term obligations; most of the staff are project related and contractual.

The Search for Common Ground (SFCG), the Rights and Rice Foundation (RRF), the Sustainable Development Institute (SDI), the National Election Commission (NEC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) provided few additional trainings: programme and finance training; training in constitutional reform, Human rights monitoring, Monitoring and tracking utilization of funds emanating from both the annual social contributions made by concessions that are exploiting the natural resources of Bong County and the County Development Funds provided by the Government of Liberia through the national budget, by the local government of Bong County. These training were made accessible as a result of Networking.

Through funding provided by ICCO's flexible funding mechanism, both the Executive Director and the new part time Finance Officer received some training in financial reporting and project management. They also participated in a one day training meeting for Programme and Finance Officers to increase awareness regarding ICCO's operational policies and procedures. They received additional trainings and workshops in concessional community tracking and monitoring and human rights-based monitoring. ICCO also provided training at CARI in agricultural planting skills for both REFOUND field staff and beneficiaries in 2013.

Score: from 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.

As a result of the decreased in ICCO funding, staff are mostly volunteering and are offered stipends, which are lower than before. Staff members who are volunteering on the short-term projects are not getting regular stipends and this does not motivate them; what keeps them working or visiting the office is the hope of getting paid at the end of the few short-term projects.

It is also established that out of the two new staff hired only 1 has benefited from finance and programme management training offered by ICCO.

Score: from 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.

REFOUND's areas to source funding from have been diversified through the new strategic plan. Proposals were submitted to companies and organisations like AcelorMittal Liberia Limited, Green Hill Quarry Community Agriculture Cooperative Project, etc.

The involvement of REFOUND in the activities of the Civil Society Coalition of Bong County has provided networking opportunities with United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), National Election Commission (NEC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Constitution Review Committee (CRC), and Sustainable Development Institute (SDI) and these networking opportunities has led to the organisation accessing short term funding from different sources for implementation.

This information needs to be balanced to consider the withdrawal of funding by ICCO, the only long-term funder of REFOUND.

Score: from 1 to 1.5 (slight improvement)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.

REFOUND has formulated a strategic plan that summarizes the institution's priorities and approach towards funding. Funding opportunities and partners are mostly located in Bong County through local networking and proposal writing.

The draft strategic plan is available but due to the lack of capable and full-time staff it is not certain if staff members have read or understood the plan or procedures of REFOUND.

Score: from 1 to 1.5 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to act and commit

The leadership of REFOUND cannot be considered to have significantly improved its capacity since the baseline. The main changes have been that the Board, that has been reconstituted and is hoped to bring more guidance than the previous Board. A new strategic plan has been developed that tries to focus on 3 issues: gender economic development, policy advocacy, and democratic governance. Problems related to unclear organisational structure, lack of financial accountability, and unreliable reporting have not clearly been resolved. The main issue that is challenging REFOUND is that many staff members have left, current staff members are practically volunteering as they are paid whenever a project is on hand, which affects staff motivation. The current staff members have been engaging in limited trainings from ICCO and from organisations within the local network, though it cannot be said for sure whether performance has improved. Funding procedures could potentially be guided by the new strategic plan in the future but for now REFOUND relies on ad hoc short-term projects that come along.

Score: from 2 to 2.1 (hardly change)

Capability to adapt and self-renew

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organisational).

Comparable to the situation of the baseline, REFOUND does not have a system for Monitoring and Evaluating projects or programmes. REFOUND engages in informal monitoring and assessment trips to the beneficiary communities. Due to the decrease in ICCO funding, nothing has been done to put in place a Monitoring & Evaluation mechanism because adding the Monitoring & Evaluation component requires funding.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.

The director of REFOUND holds a basic understanding of M&E. Through funding provided by ICCO's flexible funding mechanism, both the Executive Director and the new part time Finance Officer received some training in financial reporting and project management. They received additional trainings and workshops in concessional community tracking and monitoring and human rights-based monitoring. There is no person specifically designated to carry out M&E tasks.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.

Since REFOUND does not yet have a M&E system in place, the systematic data is gathered to inform strategic and future decisions, although feedback from beneficiaries provides some input. This has not changed since the baseline.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

This is about whether staff talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staff are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.

Information provided by REFOUND's staff interviewed shows that the organisation convenes periodic meetings with the different stakeholder of the organisation, including the board of directors, management team, project staff, and beneficiaries. These meetings are held at different time intervals and are done formally.

The management of REFOUND also holds briefing meetings periodically with the board of directors during project implementation to update them on progress and discuss challenges to find solutions. In the strategic plan, a SWOT analysis is performed but this does not address possible pathways forward.

Due to the lack of minutes of these meetings the evaluation team could not ascertain the holding of the meetings nor the improvements made as a result of the meetings, if any.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed and used.

Feedback sessions are held for both junior and senior staff. These sessions provide the opportunity for staff to freely discuss issues about the organisation. These meetings are part of the culture of REFOUND. These sessions are held when the organisation is actively running and implementing programmes and projects. During the period since the baseline, many staffs have left the organisation, and new staff members may not be able to actively contribute to the direction of the organisation due to lack of experience.

Score: from 3.5 to 3 (slight deterioration)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organisation.

Analogous to the baseline, REFOUND still have the same ways for networking and keeping track of the environment, except for now there is much less funding.

REFOUND is engaged with more regional networks and has engaged with some higher-level stakeholders. As a result of high level of participation in coordination meetings, REFOUND chairs the Bong County coalition of Civil Society Organisations and follows trends and activities in the environment which they work. This also facilitated REFOUND to identify new entry points and advocacy intervention possibilities. However, there is no formal system to track the environment since there is no M&E system in place.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.

REFOUND now have a stronger engagement with other actors in programmatic areas as per the strategic plan and has increased its interaction with other organisations and sector ministries of the Government of Liberia. However, the partners that were interviewed still did not have a very good idea of the activities of REFOUND. Interaction with partners from the LCDGP coalition seems to have been limited as well, besides a few small trainings and meetings. As such, REFOUND is involved in the new LCDGP sector pillar, with economic development. They had a LCDGP meeting where stakeholder mapping exercises were done. These helped to improve the relations with stakeholders. The relationship with other stakeholders led to REFOUND heading the CSO group in Bong County.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

Summary of the capability to adapt and self-renew

In the years since the baseline not much has been done to improve M&E competencies or develop an M&E system. Most feedback and monitoring activities still take place through informal meetings and assessment trips. The management and board have attempted to list the strengths and weaknesses of REFOUND, but it is unclear whether critical reflection on the meaning of this analysis is actually taking place.

The networking activities of the director let the organisation stay in touch with what is happening in society, and the current role of Chair of CSO groups in Bong County allows REFOUND to join higher level meetings. Though some small and short-term projects have been taking place, partners of REFOUND still found it difficult to give information about the organisation.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

Capability to deliver on development objectives

3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.

The strategic plan of REFOUND has just been developed to influence operations. However, since there is no project except for the few collaborative short-term projects, it is difficult to establish if operational work plans inform or are line with day-to-day operations. The strategic plan contains at the same time a budget estimate for the costs in order to achieve the strategic objectives.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.

The financial reports of REFOUND are void of details of expenditures and supporting documentation. This posed a challenge to the evaluation in terms of having access to credible financial data from REFOUND to be able to conduct simple cost-benefit analysis to ascertain the cost-effective use of resources.

This is an issue that the CFA – ICCO – has been grappling with since engaging with REFOUND, which consequently resulted to ICCO progressively decreasing funding to REFOUND due to lack of transparency and accountability.

Score: from 3 to 1 (considerable deterioration)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.

REFOUND has gotten smaller, though not sustainable, grants from the National Election Commission (NEC) / the United Nations Development Programme, the Constitution Review Committee, and the Sustainable Development Institute through partnership to keep them in the limelight of service delivery and through this they were able to hire two new staff on a short-term voluntary basis. The lack of funding is affecting service delivery at REFOUND.

Score: from 2.5 to 1.5 (deterioration)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs

A REFOUND beneficiary needs assessment template has been developed though there is no M&E system in place to inform it. The assessment template was formulated to be able to get substantial details on beneficiaries and to effectively implement project activities. Most information is still gathered informally.

It was indicated that REFOUND carried out an assessment of the economic livelihood activities in one of its project areas using this needs assessment template.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.

It is not clear how REFOUND monitor's efficiency at this point but staff indicated that the situation is the same as the baseline.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available

Situation is the same as the baseline: there is no system in place to balance quality with efficiency. Budgets are not adequately substantiated and reported upon.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

Summary of the capability to deliver on development objectives

REFOUND has worked on its strategic plan, and has sought to apply the programmatic way of thinking in that strategy. However, when looking at the lack of operational documentation and limited financial accountability, it can be doubted whether REFOUND has been able to deliver on its development objectives. Lack of funding is part of the issue, but the problems related to reporting and the provision general documentation show that REFOUND has trouble managing its projects coherently.

Score: from 2.4 to 2 (slight deterioration)

Capability to relate

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.

As head of the Bong County Coalition of Civil Society Organisations, REFOUND interacts with major stakeholders, especially in the organisation's programmatic areas. Staff and beneficiaries were involved in the drafting the new strategic plan.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.

It was proven that REFOUND showed excessive strength in partnering, advocacy and networking. With this strength REFOUND is heading the biggest network in Bong County, the coalition of civil society organisations in Bong County. This position was merited from its ability to network and cooperate with local stakeholders. REFOUND is a prominent Civil Society Organisation in Bong County, because of the role they play as chair of the Civil Society Organisations in Bong County.

They maintained partnership with the 2 government-related external partners that participated in the baseline in June 2012 (Cooperative Development Agency and Ministry of Gender and Development); both were available and participated in the endline. The Cooperative Development Agency was found to be proactively involved in providing technical support and management advice; while the Ministry of Gender and Development is passively involved.

REFOUND is not involved with international networks, their area of operation is limited to Bong County and the networks within Bong County.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.

REFOUND visits project areas and gives updates at county development sectors and pillar meetings during implementation. Funding somewhat affects the frequency of visits to target groups.

This is mainly about M&E, which is not institutionalized within REFOUND at this time, also due to lack of funding and staff capacity.

Score: from 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

4.4. Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

How do staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?

In the absence of funding this is difficult to establish. REFOUND has three staff members, excluding the Executive Director; one them is volunteering. It was indicated that during project implementation, there are meetings held every morning to share information about projects and issues concerning the organisation. New staff were not able to contribute very much to the assessment of REFOUND's capacity.

Score: 2 to 1.5 (slight deterioration)

Summary of the capability to relate

REFOUND seems to be quite active within networks in Bong County. The election of REFOUND to be the chair of CSOs in that area has allowed the organisation to maintain and build new regional contacts. Some small projects have come out of that engagement in the past year. It is unclear how stakeholders have actively influenced the policies of REFOUND - the strategic plan does suggest that certain focus areas originate from interactions with other groups. Internally, not much seems to have changed: informal meetings with beneficiaries and with staff guide internal communication, but it seems the director decides on the way forward mostly. Also lack of funding has limited the frequency of visits to beneficiaries.

Score: 2.1 to 2.3 (very slight improvement)

Capability to achieve coherence

5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.

In March 2014 REFOUND drafted a new strategic plan with input from the board, staff members and beneficiaries. This plan is available and shared with some of REFOUND stakeholders. The strategic plan has not been shared with ICCO who has requested it frequently.

Policy documents have also been updated in line with the vision and mission. The vision and mission of REFOUND has not been updated or changed.

Score: from 2 to 3 (improvement)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.

REFOUND is not fully functional due to less funding and lack of projects.

The organisation has policy documents that spell out the roles and responsibilities of the board, management team, and staff members.

The administrative policy and other policy documents have been crafted and updated and made available to staff and stakeholders as indicated during the endline assessment. These documents are guides to all staffs of REFOUND, but there is still uncertainty about the usage of these documents presently due to low funding and lack of capable staff.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.

REFOUND's vision and mission has not changed but it was indicated that the focus has shifted from project to programme implementation. Projects are formulated based on the focus of the new draft strategic plan. Operations and strategies have some connection to the vision and mission as indicated during the endline assessment. The mission of 'Empowering local Communities through Sustainable Economic Initiatives' may need to be adjusted to be more specific.

Score: from 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.

Due to lack of funding and M&E application this has remained unchanged since the baseline. Lack of funding is seriously affecting the work of REFOUND -which is now not fully functional or actively running projects- and thus the extent to which project activities can be complementary. .

Score: from 2 to 1.5 (slight deterioration)

Summary of the capability to achieve coherence

In many aspects the situation is the same as during the baseline. Though the strategy has now been developed it is unsure how the vision and mission statements are still fully connected to this. The strategic plan and the administrative policies guide REFOUND in a sense, but most activities are quite ad hoc. The diversity of small projects being undertaken besides activities for ICCO does not suggest that REFOUND fully knows where it is headed. Lack of funding is seriously affecting the work of REFOUND and thus the extent to which project activities can be complementary.

Score: from 2.25 to 2.5 (very slight improvement)

Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

Below you can find a description of the key changes in organisational capacity of REFOUND since the baseline as expressed by REFOUND staff during the endline workshop. First, a description is given of how this topic was introduced during the endline workshop by summarising key information on REFOUND from the baseline report. This information includes a brief description of the vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, staff situation, clients and partner organisations. This then led into a discussion on how the organisation has changed since the baseline.

On Wednesday 25th and Thursday 26th of June 2014, the evaluation team visited the Rural Empowerment Foundation (REFOUND) in Gbargna, Bong County. The following staffs were present at the workshop:

- Stephen J. Mulbah, Jr. Executive Director
- Marsay Conneh Civic/Gender Officer
- Jerry Z. Koiwu Finance/Administrative Officer
- Jallah Sonneh Programme Officer (joined on the second day)

The only staff members that had been present during the baseline were the executive director and the programme officer. The other two staff members present at the workshop (the finance/administrative officer; since May 2013) and the civic/gender officer; since January 2014) had joined the organisation after 2012. Unfortunately the new staff members could not say much about the changes since the baseline, and the programme officer was mostly involved with fieldwork and monitoring of the project, so most of his insights were on an individual level and output oriented.

Key organisational changes at REFOUND

The REFOUND staff agreed that information that was presented by the evaluators as a recap of the 2012 situation in terms of vision, mission, strategies, staff situation, clients and partner organisations, was still correct. Staff indicated that the only change was that in terms of target communities, saying that they were focusing on Jorquelleh and Zota (not Suakoko) districts. They also said that the main difference now is that the staff composition has changed: now 4 main staff, instead of the 8 people mentioned in the baseline.

Then a discussion was held around the major changes that had occurred at REFOUND in the past two years, since the baseline in 2012. The staffs were also asked to provide dates with each of these changes. Most of these changes were written down by the executive director and are described below:

- Management (the Executive Director and the finance/administrative officer) underwent two trainings in program and finance in 2013. Alvin Zawolo, a programme officer at DEN-L, offered the finance training. Programme training was offered by NARDA and the PMC of the LCDGP.
- The Board was reconstituted in January 2014
- New strategic plan was developed in March 2014 (made available to the evaluation team)
- REFOUND heads CSO in Bong County
- Three staff left REFOUND in April 2013, and a fourth member, a programme officer became part of the Board
- New staff recruited in May 2013 and January 2014: Finance and gender officers. The civic/gender officer indicated that these new staff members have received erratic payments since February 2014.
- Administrative policy was revised in June 2014 (made available to the evaluation team)

- There were two audits commissioned, one in February and one in May 2014. Audits were commissioned by ICCO on the activities under the bridging phase of the LCDGP, and activities done with the LCDGP (these documents were not available).
- REFOUND acquires capacity to coordinate and facilitate the constitutional review process in Bong County. This was in cooperation with the Constitutional Review Committee.
- Skills were acquired in monitoring and tracking of Bong County's social development funds. In cluster arrangement with other organizations and in partnership with SDI. Training held at DEN-L by SDI. Part of the training included resource mapping and introduction of different tools to monitor and track, and the development of templates to be used in monitoring and tracking. February 2014.
- Rights and Rice provided training in monitoring, tracking and dispute resolution in communities for community human rights monitoring. REFOUND uses this information to inform communities on their rights and for example provides information on human rights violations such as rape (October 2013).
- Strategic LCDGP plan validated during a series of meetings in Monrovia. The meetings ended in November 2013.
- REFOUND was accredited by NEC in 2013, to conduct 2014 voters' civic education for the 2014 midterm elections. REFOUND applied and after a review of documents was accredited by NEC.

The general causal map was developed based on the discussions that the evaluation team had with the REFOUND staff on the changes that took place in REFOUND since the baseline, and in particular the organisational capacity changes and how these changes had come about what they had led to. A key factor that has heavily influenced the organisational capacity and the activities of REFOUND since 2012 has been the decreasing level of funding from ICCO. ICCO is the main funder of REFOUND and has been supporting them since 2005 [1]. Members of REFOUND at the workshop noted that 'fallow periods' (periods in which they were not paid) in between the transformation from bilateral relations to the bridging phase (January 2012 - November 2012) [2], and now to the LCDGP (November 2013 - June 2014) led various staff to stop working at the organisation and find other means of employment. The formation of the LCDGP has been something that REFOUND seems to be struggling with, since it is mostly related to less funds being available, and funds being unpredictable [3] (according to the executive director). Due to the decreasing amount of funding, as well as subsequent delays in funding, REFOUND has been seeking additional projects and funding sources [4], but the negative effect is that 4 staff members have left the organisation [5]. Many of these projects are in the region of Bong County, where REFOUND is actively networking to get new projects [6].

During the discussions at the workshop it was difficult to agree on a number of themes or labels that would characterize the discussions. The research team divided the subjects in three categories: 'staff capacity was worked on, but challenges are there'; 'development of a new programmatic approach'; and 'networking in Bong County'.

Below each of these key changes are further discussed, with reference to the general causal map visual. The numbers in the narrative refer to information organised visually in the general causal map on the next page. Main capacity themes (in yellow boxes) are noted on top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the outcomes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The bottom of the causal map shows the most important underlying causes, opportunities and constraints that have influenced the organisation. Certain key influencing causes and external developments that have substantially impacted the organisation are listed in the round boxes at the bottom in light green.


Staff capacity worked on, but challenges are there [7]
Development of new strategic direction and programmatic approach [28]
Active networking in Bong County [38]
Enhanced financial reporting [8]
Enhanced knowledge on programme management [15]
Occasional awareness raising on HR targeting individual clients [22]
Staff member mentions that she has not been paid since Feb 2014 [25]
Development of new Strategic Plan 2014 - Incorporating experiences with recent projects. [29]
REFOUND was accredited by the National Elections Commission to conduct voter civic education in 2014. Was done in 2013 [33]
Expectations that this current new board will guide policy formulation and strategic directions [34]
Increased access to higher level key stakeholders and duty bearers due to being the reference point for the CSOs in Bong County [39]
Knowledge about project budget management [9]
Knowledge about managing donor funds [10]
Knowledge on value chain development and the use of market analysis [16]
Enhanced learning on stakeholder coordination and networking [17]
Relevance of certain key stakeholders recognized [18]
REFOUND staff acquired skills in HR based programming [23]
REFOUND acquires experience in facilitating constitutional reform processes [26]
Acquired skills in tracking and monitoring county concession implemented projects [30]
Board reconstituted (5 people appointed by management) in 2014 [35]
Since december 2013 REFOUND was elected to be the chairgroup of the CSOs of Bong County [40]
Finance training in 2013 By DEN-L consultant [11]
Briefing/training by SDI in Feb 2014 [31]
REFOUND: In order to address needs and contemporary reality [12]
ICCO funding through institutional support funds (LCDGP) 750 dollars according to REFOUND expenditure plan 2013 [13]
Training in project management with the FED-cluster through the LCDGP in February 2014 (attended by REFOUND management) [19]
Search for Common Ground identified REFOUND activities and involved them in a Human Rights monitoring training October 2013 [24]
REFOUND facilitating the review of the constitution in Bong County and solicits suggestions from citizens in Jorquelleh and Kpaai districts [27]
CSDF Monitoring project with Sustainable Development initiative started in Feb. 2014 [32]
Old board did not give guidance to management [36]
Old board had overstayed its term [37]
LCDGP need to formulate and use reporting template FED Cluster coordination need [20]
REFOUND: Goal to enhance management capacity in service delivery [21]
New employees recruited May 2013 – finance officer Jan 2014 Civic education/ gender officer [14]
Staff turnover (3 staff left in April 2013) [5]
Search for other projects [4]
LCDGP coalition and strategic plan validation in Nov 2013 [3]
Long fallow periods between one project and another Jan 2012 – Nov 2012 Nov 2013 – June 2014 [2]
Networking activities in Bong County [6]
Decreasing ICCO programme funding since end of 2011 Decrease in overal funds [1]

Staff capacity was worked on, but challenges are there

The discussion that staff capacity was worked on [7] was given substance by the statements made by the finance/administrative officer and the executive director that they had improved some of their personal knowledge and skills in the past two years. They both felt that they had enhanced their financial reporting competencies [8], through enhanced knowledge of project budget management [9], and knowledge about managing donor funds [10]. This knowledge was provided in training on finance in 2013 for the new finance officer, and provided by a consultant from DEN-L [11]. The director of REFOUND said it was important to do this because of contemporary needs to have an informed financial officer in order to address contemporary realities [12] and the need for better financial reporting towards donors. This training was funded by money initially set aside for the LCDGP learning trajectory [13]. Instead of the learning trajectory, ICCO made available 3000 dollars in flexible funding. From these funds REFOUND used 750 dollars to organise this training. The director also said that he felt training in financial management would be good to get the finance officer fully capable to perform his role as finance officer. This was because this current finance officer had been hired since May 2013 [14].

On other skills and capacity gains, the director felt that he increased his knowledge on programme management [15] during a training provided by the Programme Management Committee of the LCDGP. He said that he had learned a number of approaches that helped him manage his programme. He said that in this training a number of issues were discussed: stakeholder mapping, value chains, and timely reporting. He said that as a consequence of these trainings he was more knowledgeable in:

- Value chain development and the use of market analysis [16]
- How stakeholder coordination and networking can enhance service delivery and programme support [17]
- Understanding the relevance of including certain key stakeholders [18].

This training, in 2014 (according to REFOUND staff it was in 2013, but other SPOs indicated this training to be on the 6th and 7th of February 2014), was facilitated by NARDA in cooperation with the Programme Management Committee of the LCDGP [19]. The reason that this training was given was related to the way the LCDGP members had formed new clusters. REFOUND was part of the Fair Economic Development (FED) Cluster. As part of the coalition plans it was felt that reporting should be improved, and that a consolidated reporting template needed to be developed [20]. The director added that he felt that he needed to attend these trainings in order to enhance the REFOUND management capacity [21].

A third issue that the staff of REFOUND have been working on was the issue of human rights, and currently staff are doing occasional awareness raising of human rights issues in the communities that REFOUND is active in [22]. This is related to members of REFOUND acquiring ideas on how to incorporate human rights within their programmes [23]. Within their own target communities they tried to inform beneficiaries of their rights, to help to resolve disputes and to highlight rights violations. A question was asked in follow-up: how are you applying the knowledge from the Human Rights training in your communities? This approach is used by the organisation in some individual cases, for example in case of issues of rape. Another example that the director mentioned was a case where community members held a man prisoner. But the REFOUND staff acknowledged that they did not have a consistent approach to human rights abuses. This knowledge was generated through training in October 2013 in the Human Rights-based approach by Search for Common Ground, through the Rights and Rice Foundation [24]. This was not a project, but a training given by Rights and Rice Foundation, with the idea that the CSOs being trained will incorporate this approach within their own work. Some of the topics that were discussed were how to use human rights in monitoring and dispute-resolution.

An issue that seems to impact the staff capacity at REFOUND was mentioned by a new staff member who indicated that REFOUND's management had trouble paying her wages [25]. The civic/gender officer said she was hired as a civic education and gender officer for a small project that REFOUND is taking part in: the facilitation of a Bong County Constitutional Review. This project involved soliciting suggestions from citizens in Jorquelleh and Kpaai districts. This project gave her some experience in facilitating these discussions on constitutional reform [26]. This project with the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), with the Government of Liberia was set to run from March 2014 to end of July 2014

(5 months) [27]. The idea for REFOUND is that they coordinate and facilitate constitutional review processes in Bong County. This programme had its disadvantages though: due to delays in payment from the CRC it was not possible to pay the staff working on the project at the moment, according to the director. This was a negative effect of being involved as staff member in REFOUND and this could seriously affect staff capacity of REFOUND, since other staffs have also left the organisation after working for a long time as volunteers. REFOUND has tried to get new staff [14] but these problems in paying staff members still remain.

A final additional skill that was acquired was the tracking and monitoring of County concession funds [30]. The Sustainable Development Initiative (SDI) invited REFOUND, among other NGOs, to participate in this project, building on REFOUNDs contacts in the organisations focus areas. They gave REFOUND a short training in February 2013 on how to map these funds, how to monitor, and what tools can be used for this [31]. This experience was initiated through a programme that SDI was running in concessionary communities in order to monitor County Social Development Funds (CSDF) [32].

New strategic directions and programmatic approach

The director mentioned that a key issue he is working on relates to a new strategic plan and a new programmatic approach [28]. He said that he had been working on the new strategic plan to develop slightly new focus areas [29].

Three new focus areas of REFOUND are:

1. Economic development and gender
2. Policy advice
3. Democratic governance

Especially the issue within this strategic plan on democratic governance and policy advice focus of REFOUND is new. The new plan was developed in March 2014. The idea is that the directors' new strategic plan is heading for a more programmatic approach. He mentioned that he wanted to move from project planning to programme planning in order to get a new organisational direction and ensure financial sustainability. He also wanted to do this to get more structure in organisational management, especially regarding issues relating to payments and other management issues. Regarding the new focus areas for REFOUND, the director said that he had tried to incorporate experiences from the (small) other projects which REFOUND was engaged in. The Search for Common Ground project [24] and the project with the Constitutional Review Committee [27] have already been mentioned. REFOUND staff also said that they had been working with tracking and monitoring of county concession funds with SDI [32]. The REFOUND staff mentioned that this was interesting for them, giving them more ideas for their strategic plan, and gave them tracking and monitoring skills in county concession implemented projects.

Another project that influenced the formulation of the new strategic direction of REFOUND was the project with the National Elections Commission [33]. REFOUND was accredited by the National Elections Commission to conduct voter civic education in 2014. In order to do this the REFOUND staff received a short constitutional review training in 2013. Through that session they received license accreditation to do civic voter education. This programme will be for 3 months (leading up to the mid-term senate elections).

A key aspect in this new programmatic approach was the role of the board. The board had been reconstituted with new people whom were expected to do more in the areas of lobbying and fundraising. It was also expected that the board would now guide REFOUND in new policy formulation and strategic directions [34]. The board had been reconstituted, and five new people were elected to be part of the executive management [35]. The board has only recently (in 2014) been reconstituted and they seem to want to be more active, but they do not have any real activities ongoing yet. A former board member of REFOUND has become acting chairperson of the board. The reasons for this were that the previous board had overstayed its term [36], and it was felt by the director of REFOUND that they were not doing enough to help REFOUND to get new projects [37].

Also, being engaged in a wide network helped REFOUND to formulate its strategic directions [39].

Active networking in Bong County

An important part of the discussion in the development of the general causal map was that REFOUND is quite an active networking organisation in Bong County [38], and is well known as a Civil Society Organisation since 2005. This was illustrated on the workshop day: a group of UN representatives visited the REFOUND office to do a civil society assessment. The members of REFOUND stressed that every time there is a stakeholder meeting, REFOUND is actively part of it [39]. REFOUND has recently become the chair of the CSOs of Bong County since December 2013 [40]. The director said that REFOUND was elected to be chair by the present CSOs. REFOUND is an active member of this network. He felt that this role was important to REFOUND, as it gave them a better presence in the community, and enabled more possibilities for networking and engaging with other donors. One example of this networking is that every second Thursday different CSOs will come together to discuss on issues that are arising. After some probing REFOUND staff were able to mention a number of activities and projects that occurred due to networking in Bong County. The active networking is mainly due to the fact that REFOUND has made efforts as chair of CSOs in Bong County. However, when the evaluation team sought to find partners to interview about REFOUND it was not very clear who would be considered a close partner.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

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Endline report – Liberia, RHRAP
MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Sam Gotomo[2]
Bram Peters[1]
Cecile Kusters[1]
Stanford Peabody[2]
Musu Washington Gopeya[2]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 Making Enterprises

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, January 2015

Report CDI-15-010

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This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Liberia, RHRAP. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Keywords: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

Report CDI-15-010

Contents

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The Liberia 5C evaluation team

List of abbreviations and acronyms

5 C	Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities
AFELL	Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia
Causal map	Map with cause-effect relationships. See also ‘detailed causal map’.
Causal mechanisms	The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome
CAC	Citizen Action Committee
CAFOD	Catholic Agency For Overseas Development
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, the Netherlands
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
Detailed causal map	Also ‘model of change’. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question).
CJS	Criminal Justice Sector
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FIND	Foundation for International Dignity
General causal map	Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception.
ICCO-ROWA	ICCO Regional Office West Africa
IFES	International Federation for Electoral Systems
IREX	International Research & Exchanges Board
LCDGP	Liberian Community Development and Governance Programme
LEITI	Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFS	Dutch co-financing system
MIS	Management Information System
NARDA	National African Research and Development Agency
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OD	Organisational Development
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Process tracing	Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms
SIT	School for International Training (in the USA)
SPO	Southern Partner Organisation
ToC	Theory of Change
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre

1 Introduction & summary

1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

1. Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;
2. Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);
3. Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: RHRAP in Liberia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities , and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

This report contains the organisational capacity component of the MFSII endline study in Liberia, concerning the Rural Human Rights Activist Programme (RHRAP). The endline discovered that RHRAP has been maintaining its capabilities largely at the same levels as during the baseline. Within the capability to act and commit, enhanced factors were improved staff training and attention to skills transfer, but these positive factors were somewhat offset by a fragile staff situation. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew, steps were made regarding the engagement with target groups and gathering information from the project environment. The capability to relate has slightly improved due to more engagement within the Liberian development environment in search for funds and new partnerships. However, engagement within current partnerships has not significantly changed the way in which organisational policies and strategies are developed. The capability to deliver on development objectives and the capability to achieve coherence have not changed, though within the latter capability a new strategic plan is currently being developed.

The evaluators considered it important to note down the SPO's perspective on what they experienced as the most important organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline. SPO staff members noted key changes in the organisation to be that programme implementation capacity was better through improved staff skills and knowledge and better field monitoring, that network and coalition participation had increased, and that fundraising capacity had improved. Important underlying factors that played a role in these development were that RHRAP management were motivated to work on staff capacity for future sustainability, a reduction in funds from ICCO, the director's completion of a Master-study in Conflict Transformation and Peace-building in the United States, and maintenance of ties with other (potential) network partners.

The two organisational capacity changes that were focused on through process tracing, were 'Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector' (within the capability to act and commit) and 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising' (within the capability to act and commit). The first organisational capacity change was improved due to a combination of a collaborative approach for human rights -based monitoring and improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector. Key underlying factors that led to these improvements were the training of trainers on this topic in 2012 funded by ICCO (MFS II), a realisation that more dialogue is needed to achieve goals, but also previous experience with human rights monitoring and instruments through trainings and projects before the baseline. The improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring can to a considerable extent be attributed to MFS II capacity development support by ICCO, though it was seen that RHRAP staff had previous experience and knowledge on this topic as well, which also played an important role. The second capacity change, on slightly improved fundraising capacity, involved improved capacity to write proposals, becoming more visible, and increased awareness surrounding issues of sound strategy and programme documents, building credible relationships with donors, and getting involved in more networking and partnerships. Important driving factors for these developments were reduced funding from ICCO and the institution of the LCDGP coalition in 2013. The slightly improved capacity for fundraising can only be partly attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions by ICCO: these were mostly reflected in improving the visibility of RHRAP, knowledge on proposal writing and awareness on building credible relationships with donors.

It should be noted that this endline assessment was carried out just before the Ebola virus epidemic and crisis hit Liberia as of July 2014. The effects of the epidemic have heavily impacted the staff and operations of all assessed organisations, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. As such the evaluation team acknowledges that the assessment described in this endline may not fully resemble the current situation in early 2015.

2 Context and General Information about the SPO – RHRAP

2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

Country	Liberia
Consortium	ICCO Alliance
Responsible Dutch NGO	Inter Church Cooperation Organisation (ICCO)
Project (if applicable)	Initiative for Human Rights Promotion/Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme
Southern partner organisation	Rural Human Rights Activists Programme (RHRAP)

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation components:

Achievement of MDGs and themes	
Capacity development of Southern partner organisations	x
Efforts to strengthen civil society	

2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The history of Liberia is a turbulent history. Settled by freed slaves from the United States around 1822, the newly formed state proclaimed independence in 1846. The Liberian state slowly expanded from the coast into the hinterlands and, though the state was founded on principles of freed slaves, the upholding of settler rights increasingly led to the suppression of indigenous peoples. In 1980 a coup d'état took place which ended the more than 100 year rule of the settler party (Pajibo, 2012; Richards et al., 2005). The military government, led by former sergeant Samuel K. Doe, suspended the constitution and instituted a repressive political system. In 1989 the invasion of Charles Taylor triggered the civil war in Liberia which lasted on and off between 1989 and 2003. The war, which was characterized by great terror and gruesome atrocities, counted many different fighting groups and changing alliances. Eventually the war ended with the departure of Charles Taylor, the institution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 (Pugel, 2009). After the war ended in 2003, with the intervention of a 15,000 man UN force, a peace-building process started and is still ongoing (Richards et al., 2005).

Since the end of the civil war, the Liberian government has formulated the 'Agenda for Transformation' (AfT) as a five-year development strategy from 2012 to 2017. It followed the three–year (2008-2011) Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which transitioned Liberia from post-conflict emergency reconstruction to economic recovery. The AfT was considered a first step toward achieving the goals set out in Liberia RISING 2030, Liberia’s long-term vision of socio-economic transformation and development. The AfT articulates precise goals and objectives and corresponding interventions that should move Liberia closer toward structural economic transformation, prosperity and inclusive growth.

Perhaps one of the most critical achievements, of both the Liberian government and UNMIL, has been the maintenance of peace and security. Though Liberia continues to rely on the support the United Nations peacekeepers, it is hoped that the government will gradually assume full responsibility for maintenance of security for the coming years. This fragile peace has allowed Liberians to return to their farms, start businesses, return to their country from abroad, and witness an increase in flows of Foreign Direct Investment to Liberia. To revitalize the economy, the three-pronged economic strategy of the PRS focused on (i) rebuilding critical infrastructure; (ii) reviving traditional resource sectors; and (iii) establishing a competitive business environment.

The challenges Liberia is facing are daunting however. Starting from a state of post-conflict instability, extremely weak state institutions, and an economy left in shambles by nearly two decades of violence, further issues relate to minimal reconciliation efforts, high unemployment levels, low levels of education and limited access to healthcare. Within the field of governance and justice Liberia has much work to do. In the post-conflict period reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts have mostly been steered by international initiatives and forces such as the United Nations (Pajibo, 2012). The Truth and Reconciliation Committee, instituted to move on the path towards reconciliation rather than justice, has noted that those who committed war crimes in the civil war should be held accountable. This has not been the case, and the current political establishment has not acted on this view. The security and police sector are currently undergoing training and reform to take over the role of maintaining peace in the country. This is a difficult process, as for instance the police are often considered as predators rather than protectors. Access to justice is limited and trails often take long as only a limited number of cases are concluded each year (Human Rights Watch Liberia country chapters 2014).

Liberia is currently still receiving large amounts of international aid and budget support, and the transition to strengthen the main productive sector, agriculture, is still very much in a preliminary stage (Solà-Martin, 2012). According to the African Economic Outlook 2014, more than 70% of households in Liberia are engaged in rice production. However, since 1980 yields have not increased substantially and more than half of the country's rice is imported. Economic growth has thus far been heavily dependent on the natural resource sector, including goods such as ores, lumber, rubber and palm oil exports. In recent years the services sector has also been growing significantly, even though it is noted that the slow withdrawal of the UNMIL forces in 2015 will affect the demand for these services. It was reported that the informal economy, which reflects a large proportion of Liberian economic activity, has grown even though this has not translated into a decrease in poverty (African Economic Outlook 2014).

Major economic constraining factors include the lack of electricity and basic infrastructure. Until now infrastructure and basic services saw more than US$500 million of direct investment, with key components of infrastructure (including airports, seaports, and roads) renovated or reconstructed. Plans are made to build a large hydropower dam to improve access to electricity. However, these investments alone will not be sufficient to diversify the Liberian economy, nor create jobs for the roughly 500,000 Liberians who will graduate from secondary and post secondary institutions in the next 5 to 10 years. The Liberian government has worked out a plan to establish a competitive business environment for firms in Liberia. It has reformed the Tax Code and the Investment Code, making them more competitive and beneficial to growth. It has streamlined business registration processes; established a one-stop-shop for customs clearing; and started implementing proactive industrial policies as a way of facilitating the growth of local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES). The Government also made it a priority to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment, which is necessary for growth. Further, it maintained a cash-based balanced budget; significantly increased government revenue; moved toward multi-year financial planning; and achieved US$4.9 billion of cumulative debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. These and follow-up actions are creating the right incentives for further growth in employment, GDP, and public and private investment.

Ebola outbreak

West Africa is currently experiencing the largest outbreak of Ebola ever recorded. In Liberia, the disease was reported in Lofa and Nimba counties in late March 2014. In July, the health ministry implemented measures to improve the country's response. On 27 July, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberian president, announced that Liberia would close its borders, with the exception of a few crossing points such as the airport, where screening centres would be established. Public gatherings were banned, schools and universities were closed, and the worst affected areas in the country were placed under quarantine.

In August, President Sirleaf declared a national state of emergency, noting that it might require the "suspensions of certain rights and privileges". The National Elections Commission announced that it would be unable to conduct the scheduled October 2014 senatorial election and requested postponement, one week after the leaders of various opposition parties had publicly taken different sides on the issue. In late August, Liberia's Port Authority cancelled all "shore passes" for sailors from ships coming into the country's four seaports. As of 8 September, Ebola had been identified in 14 of Liberia's 15 counties.

Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future. UN agencies such as the World Bank and international NGOs like Plan International, etc., have begun thinking post-Ebola, and have, therefore, embarked on conducting research and studies on the impact of Ebola on communities and the country, resilience of communities and the health care system, weaknesses in the health care system, etc.

As of January 2015 the Ebola epidemic seemed to be stabilising in Liberia. According to Medecins sans Frontieres the count is now around 8,157 cases and 3,496 deaths registered during the entire epidemic in Liberia (MSF Ebola crisis update 13-01-2015). This stabilisation means that the amount of new cases coming in has decreased significantly to around one case per week in Monrovia, but it is essential to not let the epidemic resurge. Not only Ebola patients have faced difficult times: the crisis has meant that general access to healthcare is even worse than before, As the Special Representative of the UN Secretariat in Liberia noted: rebuilding the country after the Ebola crisis will mean that the factors that caused the virus to spread so quickly need to be urgently addressed. This includes weak trust among the Liberian people, badly functioning basic services such as healthcare and education, lack of accountability and an over-centralized government (UN Special Representative Karen Landgren, 20-01-2015).

As it is with all sectors of Liberian society, this Ebola outbreak is testing the resilience of the SPOs to the highest limits. The SPOs are responding by readjusting their regular programmes by designing new strategies and realigning their resources to join the fight against the deadly Ebola virus disease. This is coming in the forms of Ebola awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for victims and survivors, provision of support to community care centres (CCCs), and procurement and distribution of sanitizing supplies to communities.

RHRAP
The operations of RHRAP have slowed down due to the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease that started in February of this year in Liberia. The Ebola outbreak has led to wreck in the economy of Liberia. It has also caused a limited movement of people from one location to another and has led to people relating to strangers in a feared manner.

The limitation of movement has greatly hindered the work of RHRAP, which is a local non-governmental institution providing service to a large number of people in different localities. The organisation is struggling amidst the outbreak of this deadly disease and the lack of incentive to carry out their work effectively. However, they are optimistic that the situation will subside soon and they will focus on providing psychosocial support for orphans who were victims of this tragic situation. They are also considering working on economic impact mitigation for survivors and awareness on the effect of stigmatization.

2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2005

What is the MFS II contracting period: 2012 - 2015

Did cooperation with this partner end? NO

If yes, when did it finish? N/A

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: N/A

If not, is there an expected end date for the collaboration? 2015

2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

History

RHRAP is a human rights and peace organisation that was established in December 1997 by a group of activists who believed that the message of human rights should be spread into the rural areas so as to educate the rural inhabitants on issues of human rights, peace and social developments. It is a non-profit, non-governmental and non-political organisation. For the past years of existence, RHRAP education and advocacy work has focused on promoting the criminal justice system, accountability in the extractive sector, as well as peace building and conflict transformation in rural communities using various methodologies.

Vision

RHRAP envisages Liberia as a place where there is rule of law, lasting peace, stability amongst its people.

Mission

To build an environment where human rights and democratic principles will take firm roots and flourish at all levels within the Liberian society.

Strategies

- 2005 - Peace Building project (ICCO funded)
- 2009 - RHRAP developed a strategic plan and focused on capacity building through the ICCO funding.
- 2011- focused on refugees at the Ivorian and Liberian borders (Refugees intervention programme).
- 2012 - ICCO partners in Liberia developed a joint strategic plan.

The organisation was supported by ICCO to work in maximum security prisons and detention centres in Lofa and Bong Counties, engaging the criminal justice system and working with communities on these topics. Since the baseline in 2012, RHRAP achieved a breakthrough with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Justice, which spells out the working relationship between RHRAP and the Government of Liberia, as it relates to prison services and conditions. This has given RHRAP more access to all prisons and prison authorities in Gbarnga.

RHRAP plays a strategic role in the partnership with ICCO. Since 2013 RHRAP has been the contract holder for the whole LCDGP coalition, constituting of 20 partner organisations, and as cluster lead for the Democratisation cluster (one of the three LCDGP themes). This followed the start of the LCDGP in various phases since the bridging phase from bilateral to programmatic funding in 2012.

In the new strategic plan for 2015-2017 it is envisaged that RHRAP addresses a the following themes:

- Natural Resource Advocacy:
- Transparency and Accountability;
- Co-existence through participation;
- Environmental protection focusing on Large Volume Waste Management.

Human Rights Protection and Promotion:

- Promoting Criminal Justice System;
- Decentralization and Promoting Citizens Participation;
- Youth Programme;
- Women, Children: which will be headed by a newly created RHRAP Women & Children Protection Division.

Peace Building and Conflict Transformation:

- Conflict Mitigation;
- Promoting Peaceful Elections;
- Reconciliation and Reintegration;
- Community Organizing and Empowerment.

3 Methodological approach and reflection

3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[1].

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See

[1] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design: mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

4 Results

4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the RHRAP that have taken place since the baseline are described. The information is based on the information provided by the CFA.

Table 1
Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline in 2012

Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention	Objectives	Activities	Timing and duration	Budget
Training on the Criminal Justice System in Liberia	Improve knowledge about the Liberian Justice systems, procedures and prison monitoring	3-day training	14-16 September 2012	$ 3,000 Dollars
Support to build RHRAP website	Build a website to improve RHRAP visibility	Financial support	2013	$ 2,000 Dollars
Fundraising training with the LCDGP partners	Improve ideas and skills in proposal writing and fundraising	Short training	February 28th 2014	$ 7000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)
Training with Programme and Financial staff members of the LCDGP	Understanding ICCO guidelines and policies	1-day Refresher session	March 2014	$ 7000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)
Visit of SPO directors to Bamako in Mali	Strategy sessions for the LCDGP		September 2013	
Field visits from ICCO to Liberia	Visits for monitoring and discussion purposes	Discussions on funding, sustainability, business development and organisational strengthening	Throughout 2012 and 2013 - latest in March/April 2014	
Coordination meetings	Sharing of information among partners and groups (programmatic cross learning in the LCDGP	Interactions among members of the LCDGP and the Programme Management Committee (PMC)	Throughout 2013- 2014	$ 1520 Dollars (2013) $ 7000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)

Source: CFA support to capacity sheet, SPO support to capacity sheet; LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO; LCDGP Budget Revised June 20 2014 RHRAP

4.2 Changes in capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also Appendix 3.

4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

Summary capability to act and commit



In the past years since the baseline there has been some change in the leadership of RHRAP. A lot of operational leadership tasks have been fulfilled by the administrative officer and senior programme officer, due to partial absence of the director during his studies. Also, many inputs on the direction of the projects are from staff member inputs during critical decision-making meetings. Members of the RHRAP management team are able to communicate effectively and easily; the office is small and everyone is aware of the projects that are running and the proposals that are out. The current Executive Director still plays an indispensable role in the organization - it would be tough if he decided to leave the organization, as it seems like he is the person that networks and shares the vision of RHRAP. In the past two years there have been some positive developments in terms of staff capacity building- RHRAP staff members had access to a number of trainings to improve their programme related skills. However, when it comes to the capacity gaps that were identified during the baseline, related to skills in fundraising and M&E much can still be done.

Funding remains a challenge for RHRAP: a number of RHRAP staff has left due to this lack of funding while others continue at heavily decreased wages. This is still the main incentive for staff, even though they have been motivated through getting more responsibilities in their jobs and through improved internal communication.

Whilst the organisational structure reflects the objective of the organisation, reality is that some of these functions are not present due to lack of funding. In 2014 the LCDGP coalition funding procedures have been explored along the Resource Mobilization strategy, and a collective proposal has been written to OSIWA. These efforts have been increasing in 2014 and it is hoped that a focus on increasing board engagement, building staff fundraising capacities, improving visibility and matching entrepreneurial and civil society spirit will help the LCDGP increase its programmatic funding. RHRAP has been working on visibility through website and media engagement, staff proposal writing capacity and networking (see the process tracing outcome on fundraising). Through new strategic directions RHRAP hopes to open up new funding possibilities as well but the outcome is yet unsure.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.3 (very minor improvement)

Summary of the capability to adapt and self-renew



Since the baseline situation a comprehensive M&E system and a designated M&E position has not been instituted, and a focus on the more long-term outcomes and impacts is still missing. However, some steps have been made to build the capacity of staff in M&E, and methods for gathering information from the field have been improved through open questionnaires with beneficiaries and evaluative round table discussions guided by force field analysis. An M&E template has been organised that provides a strategic matrix with indicators. Within the organisation the staff members feel free to contribute and share ideas. Through engagement with a wide range of organisations in society such as donors such as IREX and NED, and partners within the LCDGP they get inputs on their activities in strategies. Within the communities the CAC structure serves to connect RHRAP to local issues and provide feedback on the ongoing programmes.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.4 (slight improvement)

Summary for capability to deliver on development objectives



Similar to the baseline, RHRAP has operational plans and work plans, but now also an M&E template and the interaction with the CACs seems to have increased RHRAPs connection and interaction with community beneficiaries and duty bearers in Bong County. Due to decreasing funds RHRAP is currently only active in Bong County, and many staff members operate on a semi-volunteer basis. This has some impacts on the delivery and quality of outputs. RHRAP increasingly includes the local government in the feedback loop by including them in the evaluation of project activities, which can provide feedback on the efficiency and quality of the work of RHRAP. RHRAP is also making efforts to ensure that project activities are more consistent with the strategic plan, but funding constraints affect the actual implementation of project activities. It is unclear how the organisation balances quality with efficiency, particularly with the funding constraints, which also affects staff leaving the organisation.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

Summary of capability to relate



RHRAP works with ICCO funding since the baseline in 2012, and is included in both the ‘cluster arrangement’ and a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP). Within this coalition RHRAP works with FIND on monitoring prisons, courts, arrest proceedings, and situations at various detention sites in Gbarnga and Bong Mines Township. RHRAP also helps to document issues concerning domestic violence occurring in Gbarnga City, Bong County, for intervention by AFELL; and RHRAP is partnering with FIND for the development of a training manual.

Engagements with donors and networks are ongoing, though the names of the organisations have changed since the baseline. Regarding cooperation with stakeholders and beneficiaries a slightly emphasized component is the increased outreach to government agencies and cooperation with local duty-bearers. The director does play an instrumental role in this respect - his vision on the direction of RHRAP steers engagement with potential partners and beneficiary areas.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.6 (very minor change)

Summary of capability to achieve coherence



Regarding the vision, mission and strategies, RHRAP has not changed much in the past years since the baseline. In the past year however, the organisation's focus has been changing due to changing contexts in the direction of natural resource sector advocacy. This signals that RHRAP is urgently searching for niches in which to maintain relevancy and adapt to the changing funding situation. This means that it is essential that RHRAP have a sharp vision and coherent strategic plan to guide its operations for the coming years. Operational documents have been updated.

Score: from 3.7 to 3.7 (no change)

4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

During the endline workshop at the SPO, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the main changes in organisational capacity since the baseline and why these changes have taken place. The discussion was visualised in a general causal map as can be seen below. The narrative for the general causal map is also described below. It gives a more general picture of what were seen as important changes in the organisation since the baseline, and how these changes have come about. It tells the more general story about the organisational changes in the SPO. Please refer to the appendix 4 for further details and descriptions. Whilst the general causal map is mainly based on discussions during the endline workshop, additional information is added from additional sources. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink.

The key changes that occurred in RHRAP since the baseline:

- RHRAP was chosen to serve as the lead organisation for the ICCO Democratisation cluster (August 2013) and has taken over the responsibility to manage ICCO funds for all partners in Liberia (October 2013).
- RHRAP was chosen to work on a project with the International Federation for Electoral Systems (IFES) - June 2014.
- Staff numbers reduced from 9 to 5. In July 2013 RHRAP added a new finance officer to the team.
- The RHRAP website was launched in May 2013.
- The director of RHRAP received his graduate degree in May 2014 from the School for International Training (SIT) in Conflict Transformation and Peace-building.

- Better programme implementation and monitoring, even though activities in Lofa County could not be continued due to lack of funding.
- Better proposal writing and more fundraising activities.
- Management expressed that intentions to work on staff capacity had increased.
- RHRAP leadership among Civil Society Organisations increased.
- Management team had become more effective.

A number of more specific key organisational capacity changes were identified during the workshop: RHRAP has built its programme implementation capacity [1], the RHRAP network and coalition participation has increased [2] and fundraising capacities have improved [3].

The staff members felt that they had increased their **capacity to implement their programmes** throughout the past two years [1]. Three main factors were seen to influence this capacity: negatively, a precarious staff situation; improved staff skills and knowledge; and better field monitoring. The first two components are strongly related to staff competences. Improved programme implementation capacity was mainly reflected in the fact that work with the Prisons and the CACs in Bong County was seen to be relatively successful according to RHRAP staff and the CFA (RHRAP Learning and Sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014; Annex B Support to Capacity sheet CFA perspective LD and AL) [4]. This gave the members of RHRAP the idea that the CAC structures in place would be able to keep up human rights activities should RHRAP withdraw. RHRAP did an IFES programme (which they implemented in June 2014) which made use of the Citizen Action Committees in their electoral activities. Not all of the planned work could be implemented due to lack of funding. For example the monitoring of the Criminal Justice System (ICCO funded) had to be limited to Bong, whilst Lofa County could not be included due to lack of funds [5] (Information from RHRAP website, accessed 23-05-2014). RHRAP is using the CAC structure in other proposals, for example to OSIWA regarding a project on equitable revenues of the extractive sector (RHRAP OSIWA proposal template).



- IFES programme uses CAC structure - Confidence in CAC as exit strategy - CAC structure used in other RHRAP proposals [4]
But: not able to work in Lofa county due to lack of funds [5]
Perceived leadership among CSOs on human rights monitoring and advocacy, but also on natural resource and extractive industry advocacy [30]
Slightly improved capacity for fundraising [3]
Better programme implementation capacity [1]
Network/coalition participation increased [2]
Many links to fundraising capacity here, but discussed in the process tracing causal map.
Precarious staff situation [6]
Improved staff skills and knowledge [13]
Better field monitoring [25]
Increased interaction within the LCDGP [31]
Due to RHRAP performance trust and credibility has been created [33]
Junior financial officer and junior programme officer mostly active on a volunteer basis [7]
Current director looking for new opportunities after his Master [11]
Improved team and programme management skills [14]
Knowledge and skills for engaging with Citizen Action Committees [17]
Changed monitoring processes [26]
RHRAP contract holder for all partners within the LCDGP coalition and cluster lead since August 2013 [32]
RHRAP is secretary of the Child Coalition of Liberia Represented by Junior programme officer, May 2014 [35]
RHRAP was encouraged to apply to an IREX project [36]
Member of the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa Dec 2013 [37]
New staffmember: Finance officer July 2013 [8]
In-service training by director and other senior staff for younger staff [15]
Facilitation, proposal writing, community awareness and advocacy skills Junior programme officer [18]
Training on Criminal Justice System for the ICCO programme in Sept 2012 [23]
Open-ended and oral evaluations developed after 2012 [27]
Use of Force Field analysis (FFA) From Global Fund for Children since Dec 2012 [28]
Sound and revised organisational policies [34]
Staff turnover from 9 to 5 staff members since 2012 [9]
SIT Conflict Transformation and peacebuilding master in the United States Director [12]
IREX training trajectory 2012-2014
Improving inclusivity of local civil society actors in peace-building training June 2014 [21]
LCDGP coalition started 2013 following the bridging phase in 2012 [24]
Training in M&E by LIPA by senior programme officer in June 2013, financed by the RHRAP administrative budget [29]
Reduction in donor funding, especially main funder ICCO Since 2012 [10]
RHRAP management feels that it needs to improve staff capacity for sustainabilty [16]
Good ties with IREX [20]
In the ACT Alliance with FinChurch Aid 2012-2013 [22]

A sensitive dynamic that has negatively impacted the organisation as a whole related to the fact that RHRAP is currently in a precarious staff situation [6]. Since the baseline the number of staff at RHRAP has decreased from 9 to 5 people [9] due to decreasing amounts of funding [10]. Improved staff skills [13] was related to gains made for different staff members in terms of team and programme management skills [14], which were said to have improved in the past years since the baseline. One of the reasons included the efforts by the director and other senior staff to hold in-house trainings for junior members [15]. A second component of programme management skills of RHRAP staff members was that they improved knowledge and practical skills that helped them in interacting with the Citizen Action Committee structures that were set up in various project communities [17]. The final component was that RHRAP had become better at tracking what is happening in the field, conceptualized as field monitoring [25]. The main reason they felt that this was the case was due to a slightly changed monitoring process, with more of a focus on including communities in the process of monitoring [26].

A second major discussion that was ongoing in terms of organisational capacity changes, related to the perceived **increased network and coalition participation** of RHRAP [2]. This network and coalition participation has mainly come to expression in that RHRAP staff felt that their organisation has taken an increased leadership role among CSOs in Liberia on the issues of human rights monitoring and democratization, but also increasingly on the topics of natural resource and extractive industry advocacy [30]. In the course of the LCDGP coalition formation, RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP has increased. RHRAP plays a strategic role for the LCDGP as contract holder for the whole LCDGP coalition and as cluster lead for the Democratisation cluster (one of the three LCDGP themes) [32]. This followed the start of the LCDGP in various phases since the bridging phase in 2012 [24], and since the first partner that ICCO envisioned for this role did not live up to the responsibilities. Related to this, RHRAP management felt that RHRAP performance had exhibited trust and credibility in the past two years [33]. This was mostly due to the LCDGP key role, but the director also said that recently they had made an effort to update organisational documentation such as the financial policy, personnel policy, and start writing a new strategic plan [34]. RHRAP has also made contact with a number of newer partners and potential donors.

The third key organisational capacity change that took place in the organisation since the baseline, and according to RHAP staff present at the endline workshop, was an improved capacity to raise funds. Since this is also an area selected for process tracing so as to deal with the attribution question please find a detailed causal map in 1.3.2.

A reduction in donor funding since 2012, especially from main funder ICCO [10], has negatively impacted on the organisation, but meanwhile RHRAP management realised the need to improve staff capacity so as to ensure sustainability of the organisation, and maintaining good relationships with IREX, Global Fund for Children and FinChurchAid has also contributed to some of the positive changes in the organisation since the baseline in 2012.

4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs have been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 and appendix 2 on the methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. The following outcome areas have been identified under the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. Also the MFS II capacity development interventions that could possibly be linked to these outcome areas are described in the table below. For RHRAP it was decided to focus on two outcomes within the 'capability to act and commit' due to the focus of the organisation and the kind of support by the CFA: ‘improved capacity to for human rights based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector’; and ‘slightly improved capacity for fundraising'. Each of these key organisational capacity changes is further described below. For the detailed description of these changes and related factors, activities and actors please see appendix 5. This also includes detailed sources of evidence.

Table 2

Information on selected capabilities, outcome areas and MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline

Capability	Outcome area	MFS II supported capacity development interventions (2)
Capability to act and commit	Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector	• Training in Liberian Justice systems, procedures and prison monitoring - 14-16 September 2012
Capability to act and commit	Slightly improved capacity for Fundraising	• Support to build RHRAP website in 2013 with ICCO flexible funds • Proposal writing training with LCDGP members in February 2014 • Training with Programme and Financial staff members of the LCDGP on ICCO guidelines and policies March 2014 • Monitoring visits and discussions in 2012 and 2013 • Visit of SPO directors to Bamako in September 2013

4.3.1 Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector

RHRAP has a long experience in terms of monitoring human rights, in general, but also within the criminal justice system, and many activities have been undertaken in the past (well before the baseline) to strengthen the capacity of RHRAP staff members in this area (in the causal map, see the brown boxes at the bottom of the visual below). The capacity to monitor human rights in the criminal justice system has been built upon since the baseline in 2012 [1], mainly in relation to the ICCO funded project 'Monitoring and Promoting of the Criminal Justice System in Gbarnga, Bong County', initiated in 2012. Training in this topic was done in September 2012 for RHRAP staff for this programme [15]. Citizen Action Committees were established, which included zonal heads in Gbarnga, where groups of active citizens are involved in discussions with duty-bearers in the criminal justice sector. By having Citizen Action Committees, prominent citizens and leaders are involved in mediating and educating community members, engaging in dialogue with police and justice departments, and accurately communicating to RHRAP about what is going on in Gbarnga [2]. RHRAP has been able to successfully organise trainings for community leaders to advocate for issues relating to the criminal justice system, and other stakeholders such as police and court officials have been able to attend these meetings. Relations between these different stakeholders have improved according to RHRAP staff [3]. Furthermore, RHRAPs increased competencies in monitoring human rights in the criminal justice system, has led to improvements relations and activities within the Bong County prisons [4]. For example, inmates are more successfully accessed and have been given two cell phones to communicate with their family members. In addition to this, working relations with detention officers are more positive.

In the following section the main reasons for improved capacity of RHRAP staff rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector (CJS) [1] are explained: improved collaborative approach for HR-based monitoring that guides the work of RHRAP [5], and specific knowledge on HR-based monitoring in the CJS [12]. Since the former mostly guides the work of RHRAP, and is embedded within the programmatic objectives, the evaluation team needed to weigh how much engagement in this collaborative approach has actually strengthened capacity for human rights based monitoring. In the next section some aspects of RHRAPs collaborative approach that have strengthened capacity is discussed, even though many dimensions can be traced to before the baseline.

RHRAP members stated that a key aspect of their improved capacity involved a **more collaborative approach than before** [5]. This also meant specifically involving government as well. With the ICCO project, RHRAP was working on human rights promotion. Before RHRAP had access to the prisons, they could do only low-profile monitoring, but with this project they gained access to prisons for more monitoring. Before this ICCO funded project, RHRAP worked with the Carter Centre on monitoring prisons, and staff members already had the basic skills to monitor prison conditions. With this ICCO funded project, the level of monitoring human rights in the prisons has been up-scaled. Thus it can be noted that experience gained in the course of the programme may have slightly influenced and improved RHRAP staff capacity. A second dimension which helped RHRAPs collaborative approach was through building better relations with prison correction officers, court officials and police officers [6]. These stakeholders were more approached using dialogue rather than only activism. This was partly at the beginning of the programme, but also due to previous experiences and trainings before the baseline. The trainings and experiences mentioned in the introduction of this section showed that RHRAP already had knowledge on international human rights and the associated instruments [9], and experience in human rights monitoring and promotion [10]. This knowledge and experience originated from trainings and projects from before the baseline.

The second major category that contributed to an increased capacity for human rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice System was the generation of additional **knowledge for HR-based monitoring** for RHRAP's work [11]. This can be divided into knowledge on how to train community members [12]; knowledge on the alignment of Liberian and human rights law [17]; and knowledge on how to accurately report on prison conditions [18]. One of the key themes within the improved knowledge capacity of the project relating to the Criminal Justice System in Bong County is the interaction with community members and the need to educate them on this system [12]. Key the senior programme officer and the administrative officer showed they had taught to community members in the past two years were: technical knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian law [13]; and knowledge on how to facilitate interrelations between, and understanding the roles of, the 3 major offices of the criminal justice system: correction officers, judiciary and police officers [14].


Established the Citizen Action Committee structure for accurate information about the CJS in Gbarnga since 2013 [2]
Organised trainings for community leaders to advocate for themselves, leading to better relationship management between stakeholders of the CJS in Bong County [3]
Positive relations with duty bearers in Gbarnga and activities in Bong Prisons [4]
Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the Criminal Justice Sector [1]
Improved collaborative approach for HR-based monitoring [5]
Improved knowledge for HR-based monitoring [11]
Knowledge on how to train community members on the criminal justice system [12]
Knowledge on alignment of Liberian and international law [17]
Competencies on how to accurately report on prison conditions [18]
Creation of peaceful working relations with correction officers, judiciary and police officers [6]
Collaboration with the Justice Ministry Since 2012 [7]
Knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian Law [13]
Knowledge on explaining the roles of the 3 components of CJS– police, court, prison [14]
Comprehensive use of monitoring tools – comparing docket information with admittances [19]
Knowledge on how to check conditions, admittments and detention statutes [20]
Since June 2014 Interagency monitoring and fact-finding of prisons and courts [22]
For the RHRAP programmes dialogue with various stakeholders was needed to achieve goals [8]
Training of Trainers in promoting the Criminal Justice system in Liberia. Provided by the Liberia National Law Enforcement Agency (LINEA) Sept 2012 [15]
Weekly fact-finding and monitoring of courts and prisons since 2012 [21]
Started programme on Monitoring and Promoting of the Criminal Justice System in Gbarnga, Bong County in 2012 Funded by ICCO [16]
RHRAP has knowledge of (international) human rights and associated instruments [9]
Previous knowledge and experience in HR monitoring and promotion [10]
Previous experience with the Justice and Peace Commission prison monitoring 2001 [23]
Peacebuilding and HR training by the International Human Rights Internship programme 2002
Monitoring and Reporting Carter Center 2002
Human Rights Monitoring: fact-finding and documentation Carter Center 2002 Amnesty Internationa 2008 Augustus Menyongai
Reporting human rights violations and abuses Amnesty International 2006 Sandee Cole
Human Rights promotion in post-conflict societies African Democracy Forum 1996 Lorma
International Human Rights standards 1994 Amnesty International Lorma
Methodology and approaches in monitoring the basic rights – Amnesty International 2008 Sandee Cole

Furthermore, RHRAP staff members have improved their competences to align Liberian and international human rights law [17]. At this training Liberia's constitutional provisions relating to the administration of justice as well as the major classes of human rights violations was discussed, and this sought to bring out the overlapping tools and provisions [16]. In addition to this, the many trainings and programmes in the past have also improved RHRAP's competencies in this area. These improved competencies have helped RHRAP to perform their activities in Bong County, and to work on issues that were both listed in the Liberian law book as well as in international human rights law, with the intention of bringing different stakeholders together with community members. The RHRAP staff added that they already had previous knowledge and experience that they could build upon regarding these aspects [9]/ [10].

Competences of RHRAP staff to report prison conditions more accurately have also improved [18]. This prison reporting was improved throughout the multiple visits that the RHRAP monitoring officers made to the Gbarnga Prison. In the narrative report to ICCO of 2012 it was written that ICCO visitors had made a short stop there and RHRAP was commended for its work with the inmates and the detention officers. This was caused, on the one hand, by various prison monitoring tools and information collection, such as comparing docket information with the list of admittances [19]. On the other hand, competences have improved by having more knowledge and skills to monitor work of the prisons more comprehensively, through checking conditions of prisoners, the way prisoners are admitted and by going through the detention statutes [20]. The monitoring of prisons has been something that RHRAP has some experience in: in 2001 RHRAP worked along with the Justice and Peace Commission in Bong, Cape Mount, Loaf, and Margi counties. So RHRAP did already have some informal connections before the baseline [23]. Weekly fact-finding and monitoring of courts and prisons have helped improving these types of knowledge.

4.3.2 Slightly improved capacity for fundraising

The capacity to raise funds was a key issue the organisation was dealing with, and striving to improve at during the time of the endline process [1]. This slightly improved change in organisational capacity is reflected mainly in the fact that both the CFA as well as the SPO gave attention to this issue. It was further elaborated on during the process of process tracing.

Decreasing funding from the main funder ICCO [2] was discussed as a serious issue during the endline process, but hopes were still high that ICCO would continue with the LCDGP in the near future. The issue of funds has been an issue for some time, even before the baseline in 2012 when it became clear that ICCO had fewer funds. In the LCDGP coalition built by ICCO the idea was to apply the programmatic approach in 3 clusters. In the Democratization cluster a programme in which RHRAP was the lead was set up, and was urged to search for additional funds to fulfil the full programme. In 2012 the funding outlook seemed good; two programmes (ACT Alliance and ICCO) were taking place. However, this led to a withdrawal of two smaller donors, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Global Fund for Children (GFC), who said that RHRAP had surpassed over their funding threshold policy. These two funders only support small civil society organisations that do not have access to larger funding amounts. For RHRAP members this led to a double feeling - on a positive note they can show to other potential funders that they are able to handle large amounts of money, but on a negative note they could not access funds from NED and GFC in 2013. However, since the end of 2013 both ACT Alliance and AusAID have stopped funding RHRAP (AusAID due to decrease in Australian government spending).

The RHRAP staff members were sure that in the past two years their fundraising capacity had changed for the better, but larger programme funding was not yet realised. Funding diversity was not achieved yet [3]. A new idea currently under development is to get a proposal writer and grant seeker on board to seek opportunities for RHRAP. This person would help RHRAP to access funding through networking in return for a fee. This idea was still being developed at the time of the endline, but was discussed earlier in some RHRAP board meeting minutes in January 2014.

There are five key areas related to a slightly improved fundraising capacity. Improved capacity to write proposals [5] and more visibility for RHRAP [20] seemed to be the most substantiated and changed since the baseline in 2012. The other three revolved more around awareness and engagement with others: awareness of the importance of having a sound strategic plan and programme documents [28]; awareness of the need to build credible and trustworthy relationships with funders [33]; and engagement in more networking and partnerships [37]. These underlying changes are further explained below.

The first issue that RHRAP said they became better at was **proposal writing** [5]. This was due to having more members of staff involved in proposal writing; having improved knowledge on proposal writing techniques; actively using field data; and understanding the background of the funder better. All staff has been involved in proposal writing; whilst the director and the junior programme officer were quite active with this, others were involved in the brainstorm and review process [6]. Using a projector that they got from the NED some years ago they look at the document together to make changes. The members of RHRAP said that they had received knowledge on different proposal writing techniques [7], through a range of interventions that took place since the baseline. In 2014 the LCDGP a collective Resource Mobilization strategy was developed [10]. However, this seemed to be going slowly when the research team reviewed the documentation. The Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP) Strategic Plan development lasted for nearly two years to have a coherent plan. The clearest outcome of this process has been a collective proposal that was written to the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) to get extra funds for the LCDGP. This was presented to OSIWA in June 2014. Results from this bid are still pending. According to the director, the master degree education at the School for International Training in the US helped him with the writing of proposals, by using theories and tools for proposal writing [11]. He also mentioned that the RHRAP proposals are now SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic/relevant, and timely) [12].

RHRAP has increased its **visibility**, which can be seen in increased information sharing of their programme on their website [21] and attending as many meetings as possible; enhanced communication and showcasing towards donors and non-governmental organisations; as well as publishing activities toward broader society and the international community [20]. To further contribute to visibility, posters, brochures and billboards have been produced to promote RHRAP activities [24]. In the LCDGP narrative report to ICCO, the LCDGP partners had 10 plastic posters and 2500 small posters and stickers made depicting the objectives and activities of partners in the 'Democracy Cluster' of the LCDGP.

Awareness on having a sound strategic plan and solid programme documents was another aspect that RHRAP members realized [28]. It was said that in order to be able to get funding as an organisation you need to be able to hand in the necessary documents such as operational policies, employment contracts, rules and regulations, financial policies. This need to develop and amend the above mentioned issues related to the director's discovery of the importance of these aspects, in his discussions with ICCO and during his studies in the United States at the SIT [32]. He learned many of these things at the School for International Training in the United States, and was implementing these ideas in his fundraising activities.


More proposals out, but more funding yet to come in [3]
Slightly improved capacity for fundraising [1]
Improved capacity to write proposals [5]
RHRAP has become more visible [20]
Increased awareness on having sound strategy and programme documents [28]
Awareness in building credible and trustworthy relations with donors [33]
Slightly more networking and partnerships [37]
Staff involvement in proposal writing [6]
Improved knowledge on proposal writing techniques [7]
Active use of information from the field through Force Field Analysis and feedback questionnaires [14]
Understand the funder background; communicate about proposal; precise budgeting [16]
Website online since 2013 [21]
Presentations, Brochures, factsheets, T-shirts produced in 2013 [24]
Adequate policy and strategy documentation [29]
Awareness of a sharp situational analysis for new strategic plan [30]
Realization of the need to present staff CVs [31]
Audited financial reports for ICCO (2013) and ACT Alliance (2013) [34]
Improved understanding ICCO funding priorities,reporting guidelines and project cycle approaches [36]
Fundraising/proposal writing training provided for LCDGP members, in Feb 2014 Junior officer attended Facilitation by RHRAP director [8]
LCDGP resource mobilization strategy and OSIWA proposal process RHRAP named contacting agent. June 2014 [10]
RHRAPs proposals are now SMART – a requirement of many funders [12]
Better field monitoring [15]
Flexible ICCO funds [22]
Publication of RHRAP activities and workshops in Liberian newspapers – more actively since 2013 [25]
RHRAP director gave a presentation at the World Justice Forum in the Netherlands [27]
Training in 'understanding ICCO reporting guidelines' March 2014 [32]
Short project with AusAID in 2013 [38]
Strategizing with FIND and AFELL on collaborative fundraising [39]
Visit to ICCO Bamako September 2013 [9]
RHRAP encouraged to use SMART methods by ICCO consultant visiting in 2012 [13]
Fundraising training (on USAID proposal development) by IREX 2012-2013 Junior programme officer and other field officers [17]
Knowledge on the different requirements of international funding procedures (EU for example) [18]
Executive Director awareness of funding procedures after his Master in the US [32]
RHRAP is contract holder and cluster lead for the Democratization Cluster for the LCDGP Nov 2013 [35]
Membership of the IANRA Membership of the Child Coalition of Liberia [40]
Good relationship with IREX Since 2013 [41]
RHRAP Executive Director attended SIT in the US and graduated with a masters in Conflict transformation in May 2014 [11]
Webinar training with 'Funds for NGOs' in 2012 – Director [19]
Bridging project in 2012 ICCO [23]
LCDGP grant signed in 2013 [26]
Less funding partners for RHRAP: ICCO funds decrease [2]

Staff members indicated that they were aware of the importance of having a **credible relationship with donors** [33]. The members of RHRAP said that building this relationship was important because they realised that it is essential to show results to funders. According to RHRAP staff financial audits that were done for ICCO and the ACT Alliance had helped to build up trust with the funders [34]. This responsibility has given the RHRAP members the feeling that this is a consequence of being a reliable partner of ICCO, and they said that this responsibility reinforced a more credible relationship with other donors. Another factor that contributed to improved awareness was an improved understanding the ICCO funding priorities and perspectives, which was necessary in order to develop and stimulate consolidated reporting guidelines for the LCDGP [36].

RHRAP staff noted that in the past two years the organisation has paid more attention to **networking and building new partnerships** [37]. There have been more networking activities, but clear and significant examples of concrete programmes and projects that came out of the new networks and partnerships are yet to fully materialize. RHRAP members stated that in the past couple of years RHRAPs standing among civil society has been positively improving, saying that other organisations in Liberian civil society often liaise with RHRAP. Due to networking activities of the director a project with AusAID was organised [38]. This project was unfortunately cut short in 2013. In the course of this LCDGP process RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP had increased. An example mentioned is that they are talking with the Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) to explore collective fundraising efforts [39]. This has not developed beyond talks, but the director said that a working relationship with these organisations would definitely be in the advantage of RHRAP, as they are all three working with human rights issues.

On the whole, a reduction in funding, especially from ICCO [2], has forced RHRAP to engage in efforts to improve upon its fundraising capacity. Some of the major underlying activities that have helped in this process include a variety of trainings in fundraising. ICCO funded a number of trainings deemed valuable by the RHRAP staff through the PMC of the LCDGP [8]/ [32], and a visit to ICCO in Bamako which partly addressed sustainability strategies [9]. Furthermore, extra experience was gained by the director through his studies in the United States where he explored conflict transformation programme management and proposal formulation [11], and through the webinar via the Funds for NGO's website [19]. Staff members were able to attend a training provided by IREX in fundraising as part of a training trajectory in 2012-2013 [17].

5 Discussion and conclusion

5.1 Methodological issues

Prior to conducting the fieldwork of the endline process, the Liberia 5C evaluation team requested and received some documents from RHRAP, including the Support to capacity sheet, training and capacity building reports, project proposal and budgets, audited financial reports, strategic plan, etc. These documents were uploaded to NVivo 10 software, coded and analyzed, and the initial ‘causal map’ and narrative description of capacity changes and ‘outcome areas’ were identified.

The Liberia 5C evaluation team conducted three one-day workshops with three subgroups of the staffs of RHRAP including management, finance, and project management. The data generated from the activities of the workshops, which involved individual staffs of RHRAP reflecting on and writing down on sticky notes all changes in the capacity of the organization since the baseline in June 2012, discussing and agreeing on the ‘outcome areas’ under which the changes were organized, identifying the related factors and capacity development interventions implemented by the SPO and the CFA, identifying the source(s) of funding support for the interventions implemented, attributing the changes in capacity of RHRAP to specific factors and capacity development interventions implemented by RHRAP and ICCO, as well as to the specific source(s) of funding.

The evaluation team also individually interviewed RHRAP’s staff members that participated in the workshops, using questionnaires based on the 5C indicators of RHRAP, to gather additional data to complement and triangulate the data gathered from the workshops. The interviews were important in getting balanced information from participants that may have been lost during the workshop. During the workshop, the Executive Director in some instances spoke lengthily on issues that may have needed the input of other staffs. Making notes and then using the interviews to capture missing or additional information was important.

It is also important to note that in some cultural environments, staff will not speak about certain subjects, leaving the leader to speak entirely. In such case, it is important to note such questions and answers and follow up with interviews or advise staff about the importance of speaking and getting the information out. This was the case to a certain extent at RHRAP, especially as the evaluation team delved into the specific components of the process tracing outcomes.

The evaluation team also planned interviews with two of RHRAP’s external partners – IFES and IREX – but the planned interviewed did not materialize due to the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

On the whole, there was adequate information available for data analysis. The organisational capacity changes identified for ‘process tracing’ were determined through discussions with the CFA and SPO but for example the capacity for human rights based monitoring was specified to include 'the criminal justice sector' during the workshop.

5.2 Changes in organisational capacity



In the past chapters the capability changes were mapped through the 5C model. In the diagram on this page it can be seen that RHRAP capabilities have remained largely the same since the baseline in 2012. Some small changes have occurred in the capability to adapt and self-renew, and some very minor improvements in terms of capability to act and commit, and the capability to relate. Key improved indicators within the capability to adapt and self-renew concern the application of M&E, M&E competencies, critical reflection and systems for tracking the environment. Especially when it comes to engaging with the target groups of RHRAP and gathering information from the project environment some steps have been made. This has been worked on through other means of surveying respondents, using the CAC structure for evaluative round table discussions and using an indicator matrix to assess activities.

The way changes have been small can be exemplified by the indicators within the capability to act and commit. For RHRAP key indicators that exhibited positive changes were that staff training and skills had been worked on in the past two years. Trainings and skills transfer were noted as important by RHRAP staff members, but these positive changes were somewhat off-set by a fragile staff turnover situation. A similar balance could be seen within the capability to relate: though engagement within the environment and the search for new networks and partners is ongoing, engagement within current partnerships have not significantly changed the way in which organisational policies and strategies are developed. Since the indicators for engagement within the organisation and with the target groups were scored at 4 in the baseline, the endline evaluation team felt this score did not significantly improve.

There were a number of organisation capacity-related changes that had occurred since the baseline which were discussed extensively during the endline process. RHRAP staff members noted that programmes had been implemented better due to gains made in staff skills and knowledge and through better field monitoring. This is in line with the above mentioned changes in terms of monitoring and evaluation in the capability to adapt and self-renew and improved staff knowledge and skills in the capability to act and commit. Key efforts that influenced this were a couple of trainings done related to their area of focus, such as the training on Criminal Justice Systems in 2012, but also more general training such as the director's studies in the United States, M&E training for the senior programme officer, IREX trainings and training on inclusivity of local civil society actors in peace-building processes. Fundraising competencies have been improved on, but this will be discussed more in 5.3.

Parallel to this, important network participation efforts had been made: through interaction with partners of the LCDGP, exhibiting trust and reliability in fulfilling the contract with ICCO and through exploring other potential partners and relations, RHRAP has become more active in participating in networks. The key underlying factor that stimulated RHRAP to more actively participate in networks was the fact that ICCO funding has become less and that there is a need for RHRAP to be able to diversify funding and programmes, and for staff capacity to do this. The relations with for example IREX, AusAID and the FinChurchAid have been positive in the past and it is hoped that new opportunities will arise through those channels as well.

From what the evaluation team has seen, RHRAP has been a key partner of ICCO since 2005. RHRAP was chosen to be the contractual partner on behalf of the LCDGP in 2013 and the CFA has expressed confidence in the organisation. In the baseline it was written that most of the attention to organisational capacity development would be on the capability to act and commit. The support of ICCO and the activities within the LCDGP have played a role, especially regarding the Criminal Justice training to build staff skills for programme implementation, and through networking connections with other LCDGP members. Other influences of ICCO come back in the indicators on staff skills and fundraising capacity. The interventions that influenced these are discussed in 5.3.

5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development to MFS II

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were possibly related to these capabilities. ‘Process tracing’ was used to get more detailed information about the changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development interventions. The organisational capacity changes that were focused on were:

- 'Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the CJS';
- 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'.

Both of these organisational change areas fall in the capability to act and commit. There are no organisational capacity changes identified in the capability to adapt and self-renew because no MFS II interventions to strengthen the capability to adapt and self-renew were planned at baseline. The organisational capacity change areas that were chosen are based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO and CFA. These organisational capacity changes are further discussed below.

Comments on intervention designs and SMART formulations
In the next section reflections will be made about the way in which interventions were designed. As a guideline SMART formulations are used to assess this. It is clear though that in some cases the expected objectives were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). During the baseline the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions. So whilst the MFS II supported capacity development interventions have taken place, no decisive judgement can be made on whether these interventions were implemented as designed, since the design was not known during baseline, and has not been described as SMART objectives. Per intervention more specific objectives will be noted if they became clear from training reports.

The following issues are discussed for each of these MFS II funded activities:

1. **Design**: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
2. **Implementation**: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
3. **Reaching objectives**: the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);
4. **Attribution**: the extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on ‘process tracing’).

"Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the CJS"

Training on the Liberian Criminal Justice Sector in September 2012
This was the only MFS II funded capacity development intervention by ICCO.

Design
In the baseline report it was written that RHRAP would undergo training with the immediate objective: "at least 10 staff members trained and acquired enhanced knowledge and understanding in prison monitoring, reporting, documentation and human rights education etc". The long-term objective was to have "well trained and equipped staff".

In other programme documentation and interviews done with CFA and SPO it became clear that this capacity development intervention was intended to be useful as a training on the criminal justice system as well as project orientation for staff members, which is relevant to the work of RHRAP and to staff members, since they needed to the enhance their knowledge and skills on this topic. The rationale of the training was to build the capacities of staff of the organization on legal proceedings that would enable them be knowledgeable of the procedure regarding arrest, detention, and the revised penal Code of Liberia as it relates to the criminal justice system of the state. In the RHRAP proposal for 2012-2013 it was stated that "as a tradition, RHRAP will organize two (2) in-service trainings, three (3) days each for its staffs that are responsible for the implementation of this two years programme. The training will focus on Paralegal Training of Trainers (TOT), Prison Monitoring, Reporting and Documentation and General Human Rights Education which will help the staff to maximal desire results of the programme."

As such the immediate objectives were to some extent formulated according to SMART definitions (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Specific have been made the number of staff, "at least 10 staff", and the topics to be discussed. The long-term effect was vaguer and quite broad: when is the goal reached that a staff member is exactly 'well-trained and equipped'? It should be noted however that the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for the SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation
The training on the Liberian Criminal Justice Sector which was carried out in September 2012 was facilitated by two attorneys of law. It was planned for during the baseline and has been implemented as such. Only 1 (September 2012) and not 2 sessions have taken place. The training dealt with topics such as the Police Charge of Quarters (the major guidelines for police action), the Criminal Justice terminology, the rights of the defendant and the jurisdiction and limitations of the Magisterial Court. The training focused less on educational methods. The trainers discussed technicalities of the criminal justice system, how it works, and what different processes take place.

Reaching objectives
Whilst not having SMART objectives it was difficult to assess this issue, but a few things can be said about the more concrete results of the training.

The key outcomes described in the training report were that:

- Staff was exposed to new method of prison monitoring and documentation;
- Minds enrichment on the revised penal code was realized;
- Staff gained knowledge on the various terms and procedures of the courts;
- Staff exposed to the jurisdiction and limitation of each court in Liberia;
- Exposure to criminal procedures law was realized.

As such the immediate objectives were reached: at least 10 staff members attended, and the topics were addressed. Staff had learned from the training, demonstrated by a number of reports about the CACs, prison visitations, and RHRAPs community engagement where topics addressed in the training were being addressed. The training could have focused more on educational methods though. The training did indeed contribute to more well-trained and equipped staff according to a general definition.

Attribution of observed results to MFS II interventions
Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the Criminal Justice System in Liberia is due to an improved collaborative approach for human rights-based monitoring but more importantly to improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring (see also section 4.3). Whilst the improved collaborative approach for human rights based monitoring cannot be attributed to the MFS II capacity development interventions by ICCO, the improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring can be considerably attributed to MFS II capacity development support by ICCO.

ICCO supported a training specifically related to the RHRAP programme on the Liberian Criminal Justice sector which has been helpful to build the knowledge of RHRAP staff. This training improved the knowledge on HR-based monitoring. The improved knowledge can be greatly attributed to the MFS II funded training on the Liberian criminal justice system that took place in September 2012, since this training mainly affected RHRAP staff knowledge on how to train community members on the criminal justice system and on the knowledge to align Liberian and international law. The competencies to accurately report on prison conditions cannot be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development support by ICCO.

Key issues the senior programme officer and the administrative officer showed they had taught to community members in the past two years were: technical knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian law; and knowledge on how to facilitate interrelations between, and understanding the roles of, the 3 major offices of the criminal justice system: correction officers, judiciary and police officers.

The improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice System can also be attributed to other factors, including the fact that RHRAP staff members had extensive previous knowledge (through trainings and courses before the baseline) and experience from earlier projects, such as a project with the Justice and Peace Commission on prison monitoring in 2002.

'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'
The MFS funded capacity development interventions by ICCO included:
- Website development in 2013;
- Proposal writing training with LCDGP members in February 2014;
- Training with members of the LCDGP on ICCO guidelines and policies in March 2014.

Each of these capacity development interventions is further discussed below.

Website development in 2013

Design
The idea behind the website development was to enhance communication and increase visibility of RHRAP mostly towards funders, and to give RHRAP a platform to communicate on what they do. Already this was described as a requested intervention by RHRAP in the baseline, and therefore it was relevant to the organisation’s needs. The immediate objectives in the baseline were "one website developed and functional". The long-term objective was defined as the CFA was: "enhanced communication and increase in visibility for RHRAP, mostly towards funders, and to give RHRAP a platform to communicate on what they do". According to RHRAP it was hoped that: "the development of the website where information of RHRAP Programme activities is placed will contribute to Resource Mobilization".

These objectives were relevant for RHRAP because both RHRAP and ICCO described the need for fundraising activities in the baseline report.

The objectives of this capacity development intervention were not particularly SMART as it was neither clearly defined in the documentation how the website should function (just that it could be made), nor was defined how the outcomes would be measurable. For example, in the baseline assumptions were stated that 'regarding the fact that website development and hosting is very broad in the way it is put, if RHRAP does not ensure that there are trained staff to manage the website, there would be some challenges regarding the operationalisation of the website'. This issue does not seem to have been addressed by either the CFA or SPO. Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation

The evaluation team has seen that the website is currently functioning, and that it gives a good overview of the activities and projects that RHRAP has been undertaking. The website was developed in July 2013 and has been functioning since then, even though RHRAP stated to have had some technical problems with it regarding the uploading of documents and information. The issues have been resolved for now. Therefore the website has been implemented as planned, according to the immediate objectives.

Reaching objectives

On this intervention the CFA wrote that it helped to be visible, but was not sure about specific effects from the website. When aligned to the objectives, it can be said that the website was made and therefore achieved its objective. The more long-term goal is more difficult to assess. RHRAP staff expressed that the website has been useful to show the projects they are implementing and to draw attention of other partners and funders. It was said that RHRAP programme activities are gradually being exposed to both national and international communities. Thus from a RHRAP perspective the website intervention has helped them in their efforts to raise funds. Indeed, within the overall capacity to raise funds the website played a role in creating more visibility of the organisation, which fed into an increased capacity to raise funds. However, it could be considered as only one of the five contributing factors and due to the limited evidence of effects, and parallel attention to publishing RHRAP activities in newspapers, this visibility contributed only slightly to this, organisational change capacity.

Proposal writing training with LCDGP members in February 2014

Design

In line with the LCDGP Resource Mobilization Plan, a project proposal development refresher and orientation workshop was organized by the Resource Mobilization subsector. This proposal writing training was part of the ongoing strategy to strengthen the capacity of the LCDGP partner organizations. It could not be assessed whether the training was well-designed based on the documentation of the organisations. In the baseline report the CFA wrote that the immediate objective related to fundraising was a "percentage increase in the fundraising venture with at least three proposals sent out for solicitation". The long-term objective was an increase in income. The interventions on fundraising was stated to be relevant to RHRAP, as in the baseline it was recorded that the organisation requested fundraising support in the form of fundraising training, website development and said it was also engaging in webinar training with 'Funds for NGOs'.

The immediate objective is relatively SMART, denominating a minimum number of proposals. However, the long-term objective is quite open and unrealistic to be based on a single proposal-writing training. Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation

The training brought together 19 programme officers. Areas of focus during the training included but were not limited to the following: general introduction of proposal writing including gathering of background information, concept development, the programme and expenses/budget. Other aspects of proposal writing highlighted also included the components of a proposal, i.e., the executive summary, statement of need, project description, organizational information and conclusion. The training was planned for during the baseline and has also been implemented as described in the Resource Mobilization Plan. The director of RHRAP was one of the facilitators of the session.

Reaching objectives

Improved proposal writing was seen as one of the contributing aspects to the slightly improved fundraising capacity of RHRAP. Key issue that was a part of this was that the members of RHRAP gained more knowledge on proposal writing techniques. This can be directly linked to the training in proposal writing. The immediate objective to send out at least three proposals has been reached:

proposals were sent to OSIWA, NED, the US Democracy and Rights Fund. The long term goal has not been reached yet: decreasing income seems the trend at RHRAP in 2014. Considering the role of the director in this training as facilitator it might be said that this was not necessarily a key training for him. For the junior staff member the training was probably more valuable, but it should be noted that this officer also received additional training from IREX on fundraising as well.

Training with members of the LCDGP on ICCO guidelines and policies in March 2014

Design

The reason for the session was the lack of adherence to contract terms and conditions. In the baseline this capacity intervention was not mentioned, and the need arose as the LCDGP was set up. The long-term objective stated in the baseline was general (related to staff capacity building in general) and said that staff members should be well trained and equipped. As such this training was quite relevant for the LCDGP partners. The working session was organised to enhance partnership development, and to make sure partners adhere to contracts. The evaluation team cannot say whether the training was designed according to SMART principles: it is likely that a session on ICCO policies and reporting may have helped to smooth procedures though it probably would not solve the general issues such as funding and programme alignment within the LCDGP which heavily concerned the partners. The training was only somewhat relevant for RHRAP: though both the CFA and the SPO stated that the relationship was good, the CFA noted that reporting could be better - timelier and more accurate. As such the long term objective was not formulated in a SMART way during the baseline. Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation

This was a one day working session/training for programme and finance officers of LCDGP partners. The idea was to increase awareness regarding ICCO's operational policies and procedures. In this session cluster members had the opportunity to share their experiences with each other as well as have their inputs into the decision making process of the D Cluster which is helping to bridge the communication gaps between and amongst cluster members including the Lead.

So whilst the MFS II supported capacity development interventions have taken place, no judgement can be made on whether this intervention was implemented as designed, since the design was not known during baseline, and has not been described as SMART objectives.

Reaching objectives

The LCDGP bridging report noted "significant increased understanding about the LCDGP between and amongst partners themselves, which have helped in addressing some of the growing concerns about the LCDGP as well as the Democratisation cluster (RHRAP is also within this cluster). This contributed to partner’s abilities in writing and submitting reports to the Leads of the D Cluster in line with programme objectives making it much easier for consolidation of reports". The CFA wrote that reporting was gradually improving according to terms of contract, and an increase in the submission of reports was seen.

Though the session was initiated to build a better connection between LCDGP partners, it was linked to fundraising capacity by the RHRAP staff.

Attribution of observed results to MFS II interventions

In the baseline report RHRAP members expressed the need for more attention to funding and resources, and staff capacity. It was seen that some steps were made in these areas, with the support of ICCO, within the capability to act and commit. The RHRAP staff was sure that in the past two years their fundraising capacity had changed for the better, but larger programme funding was not yet realised. Funding diversity was not achieved yet. Fundraising capacity had been slightly improved due to five main capacity changes: improved capacities to write proposals and more visibility for RHRAP were the two that were the most substantiated and changed. The other three revolved more around awareness and engagement with others: awareness of the importance of having a sound strategic plan and programme documents; awareness of the need to build credible and trustworthy relationships with funders; and engagement in more networking and partnerships.

The visibility of RHRAP can be completely attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions by ICCO: on the one hand the website, which has been a priority for the organisation as well as the LCDGP. On the other hand, RHRAP and the LCDGP have been active in producing posters, factsheets and t-shirts. RHRAP has also actively sought publications of activities in Liberian newspapers. Furthermore, RHRAP visibility can be attributed to the presentation that the director did in the Netherlands at the World Justice Forum (this activity was not supported by MFS II).

The other key issue to which the slightly improved capacity for fundraising can be attributed is the improved capacity to write proposals. This can be partly attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions by ICCO, mainly through the improved knowledge on proposal writing skills, and the improved awareness of the need to build trustworthy relationships with donors. The improved knowledge on proposal writing skills can be partly attributed to the MFS II funded training on proposal writing in February 2014 which brought together 19 of the LCDGP programme officers. This helped to generate providing technical skills and knowledge on how to go about this. However, there were more changes to which improved capacity to write proposals can be attributed: being able to write SMART proposals, active use of field information, understanding the funder background, and active involvement of all staff in the process. An ICCO consultant that visited RHRAP in 2012 gave the director some advice on this. Other MFS II funded capacity development interventions helped with these changes such as the director's training in the USA, or the inspiration gained from the website 'Funds for NGOs'. These can be considered as non-MFS II factors. Also, other factors such as the need to develop SMART proposals, needing to understand funder backgrounds, actively using information from the target areas were developed through the directors training at SIT, earlier discussions and engagements with ICCO. The refresher session has meant that RHRAP is more aware about the funder background, and that ICCOs funding priorities and reporting standards were better understood. It was already noted by the CFA that RHRAP has been relatively trustworthy on ICCO protocols.

All in all, the slightly improved capacity for fundraising can be partly attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions by ICCO, in particular in relation to improving the visibility of RHRAP through the website and Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials (all MFS II funded) and in relation to improved knowledge on proposal writing, which can considerably be attributed to MFSII funded capacity development interventions by ICCO through the funding for website development, the proposal writing training. Awareness on building credible relations with donors can be partly attributed to the training on ICCO guidelines in March 2014, but also to the more general relationship that RHRAP has with ICCO as contract holder and cluster lead. The other two components that led to a slightly improved are only minimally attributable to ICCO interventions. Building more partnership and networking has both been within the LCDGP coalition and was stimulated by ICCO, but also to other alliances and funders in general. Awareness on having sound strategy and programme documents was mostly linked to the studies of the director in the US.

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5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_RHRAP_Coaching P and F officer

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5c endline_questionnaire_training_participant_perspective_Liberia_RHRAP_Coaching P and F officer_Menyongai

5c_endline_draftreport_country_SPO_26112014.docx

Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Liberia_RHRAP_ICCO

Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Liberia_RHRAP_ICCO

Annex C_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Liberia_RHRAP

Annex F_5c endline self-assessment sheet_management_Liberia_RHRAP

Annex G_5c endline self-assessment sheet_programme staff_Liberia_RHRAP

Annex I_5c endline self-assessment sheet_admin HRM staff_Liberia_RHRAP

Annex I_5c endline self-assessment sheet_admin HRM staff_Liberia_RHRAP

Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_programme staff_selected indicators_Liberia_RHRAP_Sumo

Annex O_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_admin and HRM staff_selected indicators_Liberia_RHRAP_Kotati

Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_RHRAP Bram

Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Liberia_RHRAP Sam

List of 5C indicator descriptions

Training overview table RHRAP

Partner Documents

5C_baseline_report_Liberia_RHRAP_19012013_MR_CK

72-03-04-011- RHRAP

ACT Audited scan Report

Arrest Powerpoint Presentation for RHRAP

AusAID-Peace-Building-Programme-In-Concessional-Communities

BRIEF SUMMARY OF RHRAP STAFF MEETING MINUTES

BRIEFING ON LCDGP STRATEGIC PLAN VALIDATION PROCESS

CAPACITY BUILDING TRAINING FOR RHRAP STAFF

Copy of RHRAP Financial Report to ICCO Dec 31-2013

Copy of RHRAP REVISED BUDGET TO ICCO & KIA 2012-2014

CSO Assessment_Tool_FINAL pdf

Email correspondence Sandee - RHRAP 06-05-2014

feedback on RHRAP's Project Update

Feedback to the PMC-June

FINAL- consolidated- Partners'capacity assessment report

FINAL TOR FOR PMC-Final

FINAL TOR FOR TPs- Final

FIRST QUARTERLY BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING MINUTES
ICCO Financial Report Dec 31-2013
Information on RHRAP website
Input CDI for country baseline report_06022013_Liberia
Institutional Support to LCDGP Partners
IREX presentation_Attributes of an Effective Local Organization v2
LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report
LCDGP Communication Plan
LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO
LCDGP GRANT AGREEMENT 2013-2015
LCDGP GRANT AGREEMENT 2013-2015
LCDGP Project Plan- Final
LCDGP RESOURCE MOBILIZATION STRATEGY
LETTERS FROM MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Overview of the Liberian Criminal Justice System
PMC FINAL REPORT
Proposal Template for Special Election Grants 2-17 FINAL RHRAP
Proposal Writing Training
REPORT TO ICCO 72-03-04-011
Response to Lindora's Feedback
RHRAP 4 Years Strategic Plan (2010-2014)
RHRAP BUDGET TO OSIWA
RHRAP EVALUATION FORM (Autosaved)
RHRAP FINANCIAL POLICY
RHRAP -ICCO Audit #72-03-04-011 copy
RHRAP Learning and Sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014
RHRAP LETTER TO JUSTICE MINISTRY (2)
RHRAP MONITORING AND EVALUATION TEMPLATE
RHRAP Narrative Report to ICCO 2013
RHRAP ORGNAIZATIONAL CHART
RHRAP OSIWA proposal template
RHRAP PERSONNEL POLICY
RHRAP PROPOSAL FOR US DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FUND
RHRAP Proposal TO ICCO & KIA 2012-2013
RHRAP Proposal to NED 2014-2015
RHRAP Proposal to OSIWA
RHRAP SCANNED CONTRACT COPY-ICCO & KIA 2012-2014-1
RHRAP SP October 27-2014
RHRAP Work Plan August 2012-July 2013
RHRAP Work Plan September 2013- August 2014
STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS (2)

List of Respondents

RHRAP staff:

Lorma Baysah	Executive Director
Sandee Cole	Senior Administrator
Augustus Menyongai	Senior Programme Officer
Kotati King	Finance Officer
Sumo Harris	Junior Programme Officer

CFA:

Lindora Diawara	ICCO ROWA Programme Officer for Liberia
Allen Lincoln	PMC coordinator of the LCDGP

Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[2] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

6. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
7. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
8. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
9. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
10. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

[2] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

16. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
17. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
18. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
19. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
20. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
21. Interview the CFA – CDI team
22. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
23. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
24. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
25. Interview externals – in-country team
26. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
27. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
28. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
29. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
30. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

Step 1. Provide the ***description of indicators*** *in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?

What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?

List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - o -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - o -1 = A slight deterioration
   - o 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - o +1 = Slight improvement
   - o +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*

- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ....
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ....
- o **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ....
- o Don't know.

Step 2. ***Review*** *the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

Step 3. ***Send the formats*** *adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

Step 4. ***Collect, upload & code the documents*** *from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;

- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

Step 5. ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

> General causal map
>
> During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

Step 6. ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

Step 7. ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;

- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

Step 8. ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

Step 9. ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

Step 10. ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11. **Upload and auto-code all the formats** collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which ‘theories’ are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of ‘explaining outcome process tracing’, since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the

purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

ETHIOPIA

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia

Capability to:	AMREF	CARE	ECFA	FSCE	HOA-REC	HUNDEE	NVEA	OSRA	TTCA
Act and commit	5	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	3
Deliver on development objectives	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	4	2	3	4	2	5	3	3	3
Relate	3	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
Achieve coherence	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia

Ethiopia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
AMREF	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	AMREF NL	Yes
CARE	Dec 31, 2015	Partly	Yes	Yes	Yes – slightly	CARE Netherlands	No - not fully matching
ECFA	Jan 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Child Helpline International	Yes
FSCE	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands	Yes
HOA-REC	Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes - slightly	ICCO	No - not fully matching
HUNDEE	Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Yes
NVEA	Dec 2015 (both)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN)	Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE
OSRA	C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE
TTCA	June 2015	Partly	Yes	No	Yes	Edukans Foundation	No - not fully matching

INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India[3]

Capability to:	BVHA	COUNT	DRISTI	FFID	Jana Vikas	Samarthak Samiti	SMILE	SDS	VTRC
Act and commit	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	5
Deliver on development objectives	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	1	4
Relate	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

SPOs selected for process tracing – India

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BVHA	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simavi	Yes; both capabilities
COUNT	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Woord en Daad	Yes; both capabilities
DRISTI	31-03-2012	Yes	Yes	No	no	Hivos	No - closed in 2012
FFID	30-09-2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

[3] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Jana Vikas	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF							No – delayed baseline
RGVN							No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS)	2013 possibly longer	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Hivos	No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS)	Dec 2013 intention 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - not fully matching focus
Smile	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Wilde Ganzen	Yes; first capability only
VTRC	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Red een Kind	Yes; both capabilities

INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia

Capability to:	ASB	Daya kologi	ECPAT	GSS	Lem baga Kita	Pt. PPMA	Rifka Annisa	WIIP	Yad upa	Yayasan Kelola	YPI	YRBI
Act and commit	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	5	4
Deliver on development objectives	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	3	1	2	4	2	3	4	4	1	1	4	3
Relate	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6
SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
ASB	February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hivos	Yes
Dayakologi	2013; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No: contract ended early and not matching enough
ECPAT	August 2013; Extension Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	Yes
GSS	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No: contract ended early
Lembaga Kita	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No - contract ended early
Pt.PPMA	May 2015	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	IUCN	Yes, capability to act and commit only
Rifka Annisa	Dec, 31 2015	No	Yes	No	Yes	Rutgers WPF	No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO
WIIP	Dec 2015	Yes	Not MFS II	Yes	Not MFS II	Red Cross	No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Yayasan Kelola	Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)	Yes	Not really	Yes	Not really	Hivos	No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos
YPI	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rutgers WPF	Yes
YRBI	Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes
Yadupa	Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now	Yes	Nothing committed	Yes	Nothing committed	IUCN	No, since nothing was committed by CFA

LIBERIA

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia

Capability to:	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Act and commit	5	1	1	1	3
Deliver on development objectives	3	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	2	2	2
Relate	1	2	2	2	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia

Liberia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BSC	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	SPARK	Yes
DEN-L	2014	No	No	Unknown	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
NAWOCOL	2014	Yes	No	No	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
REFOUND	At least until 2013 (2015?)	Yes	No	Yes	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
RHRAP	At least until 2013 (2014?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

5.

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the ‘Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective’ for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.

The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).



Figure 1 *An imaginary example of a model of change*

Step 5. Identify ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9
Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)

Part of the model of change	Key questions	Type of evidence needed	Source of information
Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change	Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related	Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?	Describe where you can find this information
Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding	Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?	Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training Content evidence: what the training was about	Example: Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

Step 6. ***Collect data*** *to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

Step 7. ***Assess the quality*** *of data and* ***analyse data****, and develop the* ***final detailed causal map*** *(model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included) **Description of causal relation**	**Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)**	**Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation**	**Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak**	**Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected**
e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice	e.g. Confirmed	e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training		

Step 8. ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and

SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

Appendix 2 information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research programme on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

Capacity is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

Capabilities are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

Competencies are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

1. The capability to act and commit;
2. The capability to deliver on development objectives;
3. The capability to adapt and self-renew;
4. The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
5. The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

Appendix 3 Results - changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

3.1 Capability to act and commit

3.1.1 Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.

Description of the endline situation:
Since the baseline in 2012, there have been some changes in the leadership of RHRAP. A lot of operational leadership tasks have been fulfilled by the administrative officer and senior programme officer, due to partial absence of the director during his studies. Also, many inputs on the direction of the projects are from staffs' inputs during critical decision-making meetings. Members of the RHRAP management team are able to communicate effectively and easily; the office is small and everyone is aware of the projects that are running and the proposals that are out.

Whilst other staff have taken up responsibilities during the absence of the executive director, he plays an indispensable role in the organization regarding networking, designing new programmes, working on strategic directions (descriptions about changes in the organisational capacity; see later sections of this report). The CFA noted that though the leadership was absent for some time during the past 2 years he has shown key skills and networking capacities, and the CFA noted that his leadership is generally ok.

In relation to the future strategic guidance of the organization it would be tough if the current Executive Director decided to leave the organisation, as it seems like he is the person who networks and shares the vision of RHRAP. Due to his recently completed study in the US he has increased his general capacity, but also his personal career prospects - he mentioned that he was actively looking for other. It became clear during the endline evaluation that the junior programme officer was being sent to trainings and given room to develop - it might be hoped by RHRAP's management that he would be able to pick up leadership tasks if the current director leaves.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.1.2 Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions

Description of the endline situation:
The current management team of RHRAP has responsibility for both strategic and operational leadership. It is highly probable that operational leadership has been prioritized at the expense of strategic leadership. There are plans that by December of 2014, the board of directors of RHRAP will be restructured. At this time the board of directors will be designed to have more people available and more qualified people.

The board of directors is the influencer and motivator on how work is performed at RHRAP. Operations are based on the advice and direction of the board of directors. The current director of RHRAP stated that he was working on a new strategic plan for the coming 4 years, and revealed that more focus will lie on natural resources and extractive sector advocacy. Regarding these trends it is important that there is a strong board of directors to negotiate and discuss tricky issues with regard to a new strategic plan and contracting for project management and service delivery.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

3.1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

This is about staff turnover.

Description of the endline situation:
After the baseline in 2012, RHRAP received grants from different funding partners, both for project implementation and institutional support. The funding for institutional support has been used for staff costs and office maintenance. However, since one other programme with the ACT Alliance has ended and another programme with AusAID was cut short, the funding outlook has deteriorated somewhat. In 2012, the news of Dutch government funding cuts led to significantly less funding from ICCO for RHRAP to hire more people. The organization has lost two staff members since the baseline in 2012, and had size down operations in some areas.

RHRAP is highly dependent on grant funding and doesn't have the capacity to retain staffs using regular payment of salaries as a motivating factor. At present there are eight staff members at RHRAP; two were in the field and one was away to visit family at the time of the endline evaluation. It was noted, however, that these field staff and junior programme officer receive significantly less pay than was given before in that type of position.

RHRAP is trying to put in place an intervention strategy by which it can retain its staff. This strategy involves employment of qualified staff for programme areas, payment of project staffs according to qualifications, specialized training, and work experience.

Score: 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

3.1.4. Organizational structure: 'Existence of clear organizational structure reflecting the objectives of the organization'

Observable indicator: Staffs have copy of org structure and understand this

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has a five-member board of directors, which is the highest decision-making body of the organization. Currently, RHRAP has 8 staff members that are trained in various areas including human rights protection and promotion, peace building and conflict transformation, and project and financial management. Amongst the 8 staff RHRAP has 2 females and 6 males. There are 4 core staffs that run the day-to-day activities of the organization, and 4 field staff members composed of volunteers/contractors. A majority of the staff are field staff based on projects and on contractual basis; and RHRAP currently has four core staffs, but there used to be six.

The organizational chart of RHRAP shows that an executive director governs RHRAPs day-to-day activities. The board guides management in terms of policy and strategy. There is then a finance officer, administrator, and a senior project officer on the second tier. On the third tier are the office assistant and monitors, and a secretary. Though the chart is clear, due to funding issues, not all the positions represented are occupied.

The role of the junior programme officer described earlier is a bit ambivalent - though he seems to be placed on one of the lower tiers, he has been instrumental in many activities and has been sent to many trainings. This would suggest that his position might become more and more important.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.1.5 Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.

Description of the endline situation:
In terms of overall organization, there are governance and leadership challenges that somehow limit RHRAP's performance and sustainability. RHRAP's current executive director and many of the other executive directors and founders of other like-minded organizations have good networking skills for the organization, but when they leave, the organization does not work very well, partly because strategies and systems are not well articulated. It was said during the endline that current junior staff were being trained to take over in the future.

The absence of clearly articulated strategies leave a vacuum, which should be filled by systems put in place using the strategies. In the absence of the relevant strategies, gaps are seen when certain operational leaders are absent. This was evident when the current Executive Director of RHRAP travelled to the United States after the baseline to study for his Master's degree.

It was apparent during the endline workshop that the old strategic plan would not be able to guide RHRAP's future operations. However, the director did have clear intentions and ideas for the new strategic plan.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.

Description of the endline situation:
Since the baseline in 2012, RHRAP has been able to stick to its strategic plan, evidenced by the fact that the priorities captured in the strategic plan are the things that the organization has been doing before, and those are the same things envisaged by the organization when the strategic plan was developed. Work plans were based on the strategic plan as well.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.1.7 Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

This is about whether staffs have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has made an effort to increase its capacity by training its staffs in particular areas related to its mandate. Most of the training has been geared towards human rights monitoring. For example, from September 14-16-2012, staffs of the Rural Human Rights Activists Programme from Montserrado, Bong and Nimba Counties converged on the provisional capital of Bong County, Gbarnga City, to attend a three-day capacity building Training of Trainers (TOT) workshop.

The management of RHRAP also sought opportunities for staffs from all levels of the organization to receive training to enhance staffs' capacity. ICCO has provided fundraising training to the Executive Director, Finance Officer, Programme Officer, and the Administrator, at the PMC level of the LCDGP. Staff members of RHRAP have also been able to attend trainings given by IREX (topics such as community mobilisation, advocacy and reconciliation) and LIPA (monitoring and evaluation).

RHRAP is gradually shifting its focus to accountability in the extractive sector. Two of the core staff members had some training in these areas via the programme with AusAID addressing concessional community advocacy. The two individuals attended sessions at the National Endowment for Democracy studying easy reporting standards. There has been a major change in report writing and facilitation by the staffs since these trainings.

It was noted that in the baseline gaps existed in M&E, IT and fundraising. These gaps still largely exist and more training is needed in that capacity. Most fundraising skills and ideas for instance greatly lie with the current director.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.1.8 Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP staff members have benefited from several training opportunities since the baseline, though staff members expressed the need for more opportunities. Some trainings that various staff members benefited from include:

- RHRAP's current Executive Director earned a Master's Degree in Peace Building and Conflict Transformation from the School for International Training (SIT), formally known as World Learning based in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA.
- RHRAP's core staff received trainings in Organizational Development, reporting and fundraising organized through the LCDGP in Liberia.
- The Executive Director did a webinar on Fundraising for Non-profit organizations.
- Trainings were received from IREX for various programme and field staff.

Opportunities for the training of RHRAP's staffs outside of Liberia are still a major challenge, as this involves funding. RHRAP has accessed training opportunities locally through the sponsorship of ICCO and IREX; and they are continuing in-service training and mentoring as the key driver for building the capacity of staffs. As the Executive Director has just returned from SIT with an MA in Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation, RHRAP is going to make sure that he provides in-service trainings on a regular basis to the staffs.

The management of RHRAP is actively seeking scholarships and access to local training opportunities. For example, they are engaging WANEP to see if it is possible for them to admit one or two staffs to their Peace Education training in Ghana in September 2014. They are also engaging the West African Civil Society Institute (WACSI) in Ghana to provide training in financial management, policy engagement and advocacy.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.1.9.1 Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.

Description of the endline situation:
After the baseline in 2012 funding for RHRAP has dropped. RHRAP sourced funding from ICCO, Global Fund for Children, ACT Alliance, and NED. Administrative costs were covered and some of the funds were used for paying staff salaries and fringe benefits.

After the baseline in 2012 the human resources were good - RHRAP started working in Nimba County sharing offices with SEARCH, a resident local NGO. By the end of 2102 and to the middle of 2013, things started slowing down due to drop in ICCO funding; and NED said that with the level of funding that RHRAP was now receiving from ICCO, RHRAP had exceeded the funding threshold of NED for national NGOs, and therefore, were no longer eligible to receive funding from NED, so they withdrew their funding from RHRAP. Also, the ACT Alliance programme drew to a close, and the AusAID programme was cut short. This drop in funding led to some staff leaving the organisation. Also, the director is looking for a better-paid job in another organisation after his training on peace building and conflict transformation.

Main incentives now come through the giving of responsibility to staff members and sending them to trainings and events. There has been more improvement when it comes to freedom at work and opportunities for staffs to receive training at the local level. One of the factors that have influenced the change is staff motivation during regular meetings. Staffs are constantly informed that they are vital to RHRAP and that they are not just ordinary people.

A negative outlook has been, however, that ICCO has notified RHRAP and the coalition of NGOs that are jointly implementing the LCDGP that they are pulling out of Liberia and Sierra Leone; and other funding partners have also either reduced or withdrawn funding to RHRAP.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

3.1.9.2 Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.

Description of the endline situation:
Since the baseline in 2012 the major source of funding for RHRAP has been the ICCO/MFS II funding mechanism for the LCDGP. Since then RHRAP has been successful in diversifying its funding sources by receiving funding from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), now the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), for the project entitled “Promoting Accountability in Concessional Communities”, which is a peace building project focused on concession-affected communities in Bomi, Gbarpolu, and Grand Cape Mount Counties in western Liberia. This project is empowering residents of mining communities at various levels, to peacefully engage stakeholders for their participation in the management of, and benefits from, natural resources extracted from their communities. This project was cut short. In 2014 a short project from IFES was done.

Currently, RHRAP has sent out an increasing number of project proposals with the aim of raising additional funds to fill the funding gap in its current project that is already partially funded by ICCO under the LCDGP. RHRAP has also held fundraising meetings separately with the German International Technical Cooperation (GIZ) and Trocaire for funding. Results are still pending from these meetings.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.1.9.3 Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has been key in working through the LCDGP coalition; and they have developed a new strategic plan for the RHRAP, which will be launched in December 2014. RHRAP led the process of developing a joint programme for Liberia, the LCDGP, and did a lot of work in twelve working sessions with the LCDGP coalition, working on a consolidated budget of USD 4 million for ICCO and other donors to fund over a 3-year period (2013-2015). The LCDGP coalition envisaged ICCO contributing about US$600,000 to the budget and other interested donors contributing USD 3.4 million. Recently, in 2014, the LCDGP partners have been developing a collective Resource Mobilization strategy which provides guidelines for getting more funds. This includes increasing board engagement, building staff capacity for fundraising, improving visibility, and matching the entrepreneurial and civil society development spirit.

RHRAP has become more vigorous in fundraising. The new website is expected to help with the visibility of the organisation. The Executive Director has been talking with many potential partners in the US, using RHRAP’s history working with ICCO and other funding partners to attract new funding - showing other potential funding partners that RHRAP is capable of effectively managing relatively large programme budgets.

RHRAP is using its new strategic focus to seek funding. Proposals have been sent to other donors such as OSIWA but there has been little response thus far. At RHRAP’s level they considers this as a great opportunity. This has influenced the movement of carrying a fundraising document that was sponsored by another donor. RHRAP is a member of a web-based network called “fundsforngos.org”, which regularly sends them information on funding opportunities in the form of Calls for Proposals. RHRAP has also engaged NED, IREX, and IFES through written communications and has also had meetings with them. Through those engagements RHRAP was able to send the proposals that these potential funding partners asked to present.

RHRAP has further engaged with other funding partners and through this engagement they got to know that RHRAP is a viable organization, and as a result of those relationships, those partners have reposed confidence in the capabilities and abilities of RHRAP to effectively plan and implement social development programmes and projects. It was noted that ICCO had some discussions with RHRAP on alternative means for funding, such as the development of 'human rights products or services', which might be developed to raise funds. These did not especially come up during the endline assessment.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.1.10 Summary capability to act and commit

In the past years since the baseline there has been some change in the leadership of RHRAP. A lot of operational leadership tasks have been fulfilled by the administrative officer and senior programme officer, due to partial absence of the director during his studies. Also, many inputs on the direction of the projects are from staff member inputs during critical decision-making meetings. Members of the RHRAP management team are able to communicate effectively and easily; the office is small and everyone is aware of the projects that are running and the proposals that are out. The current Executive Director still plays an indispensable role in the organization - it would be tough if he decided to leave the organization, as it seems like he is the person that networks and shares the vision of RHRAP. In the past two years there have been some positive developments in terms of staff capacity building- RHRAP staff members had access to a number of trainings to improve their programme related skills. However, when it comes to the capacity gaps that were identified during the baseline, related to skills in fundraising and M&E much can still be done.

Funding remains a challenge for RHRAP: a number of RHRAP staff have left due to this lack of funding while others continue at heavily decreased wages. This is still the main incentive for staff, even though they have been motivated through getting more responsibilities in their jobs and through improved internal communication.

Whilst the organisational structure reflects the objective of the organisation, reality is that some of these functions are not present due to lack of funding. In 2014 the LCDGP coalition funding procedures have been explored along the Resource Mobilization strategy, and a collective proposal has been written to OSIWA. These efforts have been increasing in 2014 and it is hoped that a focus on increasing board engagement, building staff fundraising capacities, improving visibility and matching entrepreneurial and civil society spirit will help the LCDGP increase its programmatic funding. RHRAP has been working on visibility through website and media engagement, staff proposal writing capacity and networking (see the process tracing outcome on fundraising). Through new strategic directions RHRAP hopes to open up new funding possibilities as well but the outcome is yet unsure.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.3 (very minor improvement)

3.2 Capability to adapt and self renew

3.2.1 M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).

Description of the endline situation:
To ensure the proper implementation of its projects RHRAP carries out regular monitoring of its project activities; this in order to keep track of progress towards achievement of the project objectives. RHRAP currently has an M&E template that is being used as a guiding document. As part of the M&E template RHRAP has a strategic matrix with activities and quantitative indicators. Monitoring entails field visitations in the projects' targeted communities. At the end of each activity, RHRAP provides open-ended programme evaluation questionnaires and Round Table Discussions to the project beneficiaries in the Citizen Action Committees (CACs). The director noted that for the round table discussions Force Field analysis is being used. Using the expected outputs of the project, and situation expected at the end of the project, questions are asked.

With these two methods, the monitoring of the project at every level, and then the evaluation with stakeholders and participants, the quality and efficiency of project deliverables at some reasonable levels are evaluated. However, it seems that a comprehensive system for M&E is not in place at the moment, and there is no specific staff member focused on M&E. The focus, however, still seems to be on activities and outputs and not outcomes and impact. There seems to be no difference with the baseline situation.

RHRAP has also adopted the "Force Field Analysis" method for listing, discussing, and assessing the various forces for and against the changes that their programmes and projects aim to make in the communities and sectors of Liberia society that they are targeting specifically. This helps them to look at the big picture by analysing all of the forces impacting on the changes and weighing up the pros and cons. Having identified these, they then develop strategies to reduce the impact of the opposing forces and strengthen the supporting forces.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.2.2 M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.

Description of the endline situation:
Individual competencies for performing M&E functions have been built on slightly. RHRAP's programme and project staffs acquired knowledge and skills on Monitoring &Evaluation from training that they received in Liberia from the Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA) and through the support of ICCO and IREX. Also within the organisation knowledge is shared among senior and junior staff members. However, there is still no dedicated M&E person at the organisation.

RHRAP has prepared a plan to setup a Monitoring & Evaluation department in the organization. An M&E template guides the officers of RHRAP in their work. The CFA noted that RHRAP did reasonably decent monitoring and reporting but that they should become more comprehensive in terms of monitoring results and outcomes rather than just reporting on outputs and processes.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

3.2.3 M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has developed a Monitoring & Evaluation template, and is working with FIND, a coalition partner of the LCDGP, in exchanging ideas and planning together, and also is in a peer review (working in different areas) agreement. The organization uses questionnaires and roundtable discussions to monitor performance every 6 months. The key participants of the roundtable discussions are the leaders of the beneficiary communities of their project, who in turn later share the information with community members.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

3.2.4 Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.

Description of the endline situation:
Staff stated that there had been a slight improvement in this area. Besides the administrator, junior staff members draw up agendas for regular staff meeting and also conduct these meeting. Staff members share information, learn from each other and complement the efforts of each other. There is a cordial working relationship amongst staffs.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.2.5 Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed and used.

Description of the endline situation:
Staff is encouraged to share their ideas for strategic planning, programming, and project implementation. Staffs are involved in proposal writing, work plan preparation, writing and validating reports as well as in critical decision-making meetings

RHRAP organizes staff retreats at the end of their fiscal year, and during the staff retreats the management team and project staffs reflect on past activities and plan for the next fiscal year. All staffs actively participate in this reflection and consultation process.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.2.6 System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP employs a two-tier system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment.

At the first tier, RHRAP networks with a diverse group of stakeholders including a) a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the predominantly ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP), b) the ACT Alliance (Action of Churches Together

Alliance), c) the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Liberia, and d) bilateral relationships with resident funding agencies and international development organizations and NGOs, including ICCO.

At the second tier tracking of trends and developments in the operating environment happens through conducting needs assessments and the setting up of Citizens Action Committees (CACs) in RHRAPs project communities. The CACs help RHRAP with interaction with community members, particularly at the grassroots level. The setting up of the CACs has made communication and engagement with their project communities easier and better. The CACs, which includes local government leaders, youth and women leaders, are major stakeholders in RHRAP's project communities. RHRAP collaborates with the CACs in monitoring implementation of its project. They also involve the CACs in round table discussions to evaluate their project.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.2.7 Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP conducts meetings with beneficiaries in their project communities and incorporates the feedback of the beneficiaries of their project into their implementation strategies to improve performance and results.

RHRAP has successfully secured access to the Liberia justice system by consummating a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Justice to work with them to improve the criminal justice system of Liberia. Through its human rights programme RHRAP provides a means of communication for inmates and prison authorities.

For sustainability purposes RHRAP has also successfully facilitated the establishment of Citizens Action Committee (CACs), which are run by the leaders of the project communities to help in safeguarding the rights of the primary beneficiaries of their project.

Furthermore, RHRAP networks with the group of stakeholders as discussed in the previous indicator and hereby are able to get input from the stakeholders for RHRAPs activities and strategies

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

3.2.8 Summary of the capability to adapt and self-renew

Since the baseline situation a comprehensive M&E system and a designated M&E position has not been instituted, and a focus on the more long-term outcomes and impacts is still missing. However, some steps have been made to build the capacity of staff in M&E, and methods for gathering information from the field have been improved through open questionnaires with beneficiaries and evaluative round table discussions guided by force field analysis. An M&E template has been organised that provides a strategic matrix with indicators. Within the organisation the staff members feel free to contribute and share ideas. Through engagement with a wide range of organisations in society such as donors such as IREX and NED, and partners within the LCDGP they get inputs on their activities in strategies. Within the communities the CAC structure serves to connect RHRAP to local issues and provide feedback on the ongoing programmes.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.4 (slight improvement)

3.3 Capability to deliver on development objectives

3.3.1 Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staffs use it in their day-to-day operations.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has a clear operational plan for its projects, but this was being updated at the time of the baseline to readjust it to the changing funding situation. RHRAP has the flexibility of making adjustments to its operational plan or work plans in terms of the changing context, including reduction in funding and grant funding opportunities.

It is not clear concerning how effectively work plans are implemented in day-to-day activities due to the lack of fully funded projects. However, it is worth noting that when there are fully funded projects, RHRAP carries out day-to-day activities in line with clear operational plans.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.3.2 Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has a good track record for sound financial management, transparency and accountability. During the past projects RHRAP worked strictly within the approved budgets of the projects. Audits have been done for RHRAPs activities with ICCO in 2013 and with the ACT Alliance in 2013.

It seemed that an example of cost-effective resource use was the training on the Criminal Justice System in 2012: members of FIND were also present. For the rest, it is not clear at this point whether resources are used cost effectively due to the drastic reduction of funding from ICCO, but it does seem that additional funding is needed if RHRAP wants to be able to operate in Lofa County. Currently RHRAP is only able to work in Bong County on the LCDGP project.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.3.3 Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.

Description of the endline situation:
The drastic reduction of funding from ICCO coupled with the withdrawal of funding by NED is a major challenge for RHRAP to effectively carry out its operational plan to deliver planned outputs.

Before the reduction of funding, the human rights project of RHRAP was effective in the area of geographic coverage and service delivery. The issue of staff turnover also has adverse effects on the delivery of the services offered by the organization.

Score: from 3.5 to 3 (slight deterioration)

3.3.4 Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP conducted needs assessment with beneficiaries and other stakeholders. The Project Management Committee (PMC) of the LCDGP, and eminent community residents (zonal heads, community leaders, respectable members of the communities, etc.) are also actively involved in the need assessment. They provide inputs to RHRAP for project development and implementation.

In an effort to complement the relevance and effectiveness of its human rights project, RHRAP successfully facilitated establishment of Citizens Action Committees (CACs) for the involvement of citizens of its project communities in the criminal justice system. The CACs are charged with the responsibility of organizing activities that help improve the criminal justice system in Bong County, and lobby with the courts for the release of people unlawful imprisoned.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.3.5 Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio’s)'

This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.

Description of the endline situation:
It was indicated that project beneficiaries and communities are now more involved with project implementation, and this has led to the assessment of outputs in relation to inputs.

The assessment of outputs is based on beneficiaries’ accounts of the activities implemented, and not on cost-benefit analysis or objective comparison of achievement of milestones against planned targets.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

3.3.6 Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP is yet to develop a method of balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work. However, the participatory project monitoring strategy that RHRAP has designed and is using cannot be used as a proxy indicator for assessment of the efficiency and quality of their work.

RHRAP works in line with its strategic plan and operational guidelines. RHRAP is now negotiating inclusion of 5% of project budgets as the ‘negotiated indirect cost rate‘ (NICRA) to be used as unrestricted funds that the organization could invest to build the institutional capacity of RHRAP. If successfully negotiated and approved, NICRA funds could be use to retain the additional expertise that may be required, i.e., M&E and community-driven development (CDD) specialists to boost and ensure quality service delivery.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

3.3.7 Summary for capability to deliver on development objectives

Similar to the baseline, RHRAP has operational plans and work plans, but now also an M&E template and the interaction with the CACs seems to have increased RHRAPs connection and interaction with community beneficiaries and duty bearers in Bong County. Due to decreasing funds RHRAP is currently only active in Bong County, and many staff members operate on a semi-volunteer basis. This has some impacts on the delivery and quality of outputs. RHRAP increasingly includes the local government in the feedback loop by including them in the evaluation of project activities, which can provide feedback on the efficiency and quality of the work of RHRAP. RHRAP is also making efforts to ensure that project activities are more consistent with the strategic plan, but funding constraints affect the actual implementation of project activities. It is unclear how the organisation balances quality with efficiency, particularly with the funding constraints, which also affects staff leaving the organisation.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.4 Capability to relate

3.4.1 Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP works with ICCO funding since the baseline in 2012, and is included in both the 'cluster arrangement' and a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP). Together with LCDGP members for instance, a collective funding proposal was made to OSIWA as part of a collective Resource Mobilization Strategy. RHRAP has also forged bilateral collaborative relationships various other funding partners, and the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Liberia.

Besides its board of directors that RHRAP engages in formulation of policies and strategic planning, it is not clear how RHRAP engages both its funding and operational partners in formulating its policies and strategies.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.4.2 Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP is currently the Lead Agency for 10 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working together in the Democratization Cluster of the Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP) in Liberia, supported by ICCO and KIA Netherlands, which is an added advantage for RHRAP in terms of networking and collaboration. RHRAP is working in collaboration with the Association of Female Liberian Lawyers (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) on the MFS II funding mechanism with ICCO as the co-financing agency. RHRAP and FIND collaborate in monitoring prisons, courts, arrest proceedings, and situations at various detention centres in Gbarnga and Bong Mines Township. RHRAP also helps to document issues concerning domestic violence occurring in Gbarnga City, Bong County, for intervention by AFELL; and RHRAP is partnering with FIND for the development of a training manual.

RHRAP is collaborating with the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI), the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy (MLME) on information dissemination through meetings and roundtable forums relative to natural resource management (NRM) in Liberia. RHRAP is also in partnership with the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Liberia, which is aimed at putting in place mechanisms that would help buttress the government's efforts in improving the criminal Justice system, particularly in Gbarnga, Bong County, Liberia.

RHRAP is also a new and the only member of the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa (IARNA) from West Africa. The IARNA is a coalition of CSOs from South, Central and East Africa with headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa, that are working on issues including advocacy on natural resource management in Africa. The organization is also a member of the Africa Democracy Forum (ADF). Nationally, RHRAP is part of a Child Rights Coalition, the LCDGP, the Decentralization Platform, and internationally a part of the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.4.3 Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP tries to maintain intensive presence in its project communities, as well as with funding partners and other civil society and government stakeholders.

There has been a high level of engagement between RHRAP and its target groups. Beneficiary communities through CAC structures fully participate in needs assessments and provide pertinent information to RHRAP for the organization to incorporate in its strategies and project activities.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.4.4 Relationships within organisation: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

How do staffs at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has a hierarchical organization structure. Information flows from top to bottom, and relationships are shaped in that manner.

Notwithstanding the hierarchical organization structure, the management team and the project staffs seem to have good team relations and free communication between the two levels of staffing – management and project teams – but when it comes to strategizing and decision-making the Executive Director exercises pre-eminence.

RHRAP's staffs communicate mostly through meeting and emails.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.4.5 Summary of capability to relate

RHRAP works with ICCO funding since the baseline in 2012, and is included in both the 'cluster arrangement' and a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP). Within this coalition RHRAP works with FIND on monitoring prisons, courts, arrest proceedings, and situations at various detention sites in Gbarnga and Bong Mines Township. RHRAP also helps to document issues concerning domestic violence occurring in Gbarnga City, Bong County, for intervention by AFELL; and RHRAP is partnering with FIND for the development of a training manual.

Engagements with donors and networks are ongoing, though the names of the organisations have changed since the baseline. Regarding cooperation with stakeholders and beneficiaries a slightly emphasized component is the increased outreach to government agencies and cooperation with local duty-bearers. The director does play an instrumental role in this respect - his vision on the direction of RHRAP steers engagement with potential partners and beneficiary areas.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.6 (very minor change)

3.5 Capability to achieve coherence

3.5.1 Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staffs discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.

Description of the endline situation:
The vision, mission, and strategies of RHRAP have not changed; they are visibly displayed in all of the offices and at all workshops for all staffs, beneficiaries, and partners to know what RHRAP are all about.

In response to the changing context as it relates to the natural resource sector, RHRAP is expanding its human rights focus strategically, to include monitoring of natural resource management, focusing on advocacy, lobbying, and monitoring of the impacts of concessions, both positive and negative, on affected communities.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.5.2 Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP has modified its strategic plan (at least, is currently doing so), financial policy, personnel policy, and employment contract templates. An M&E template is being used.

RHRAP’s Annual Report has also been published as a means through which the visibility of RHRAP can be increased and enhanced.

Because of the findings of the baseline, there was a decision to modify the strategic plan, personnel and finance policies, including the terms and conditions of contracts for management and project staffs, respectively. For example, the management staffs get fixed term (annual) renewable employment contracts, whereas project staffs get definite term contracts based on the life spans of projects.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.5.3 Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.

Description of the endline situation:
RHRAP’s strategic plan and intervention projects are line with its vision and mission.

Project proposals are designed and written based on the strategic plan, but this focus has been changing somewhat in the recent year. In response to the changing context as it relates to the natural resource sector, RHRAP is expanding its human rights focus strategically, to include monitoring of natural resource management, focusing on advocacy, lobbying, and monitoring of the impacts of concessions, both positive and negative, on affected communities.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.5.4 Mutually supportive efforts: ‘The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts’

This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.

Description of the endline situation:
The drastic reduction of funding from ICCO combined with the withdrawal of funding from RHRAP by the NED is clearly currently driving RHRAP in more than one strategic direction. This has serious implications in terms of RHRAP’s ability to remain focused on its vision, and to develop and maintain a portfolio of projects that provide opportunities for mutually supportive efforts.

The venturing of RHRAP to partnering with IFES to participate in the updating of voter’s rolls for the mid-term elections, and its endeavours to enter the natural resource management sector are very clear signs that the organization is desperately searching for funding to remain alive and maintain its relevance.

Score: from 3.5 to 3 (slight deterioration)

3.5.5 Summary of capability to achieve coherence

Regarding the vision, mission and strategies, RHRAP has not changed much in the past years since the baseline. In the past year however, the organisation’s focus has been changing due to changing contexts in the direction of natural resource sector advocacy. This signals that RHRAP is urgently searching for niches in which to maintain relevancy and adapt to the changing funding situation. This means that it is essential that RHRAP have a sharp vision and coherent strategic plan to guide its operations for the coming years. Operational documents have been updated.

Score: from 3.7 to 3.7 (no change)

Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

Below you can find a description of the key changes in organisational capacity of RHRAP since the baseline as expressed by RHRAP staff during the endline workshop. First, a description is given of how this topic was introduced during the endline workshop by summarising key information on RHRAP from the baseline report. This information includes a brief description of the vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, staff situation, clients and partner organisations. This then led into a discussion on how the organisation has changed since the baseline. A number of issues that came up in this discussion were zoomed in on more specifically in the process tracing causal maps. See appendix 5 for details.

Key changes at RHRAP
A brainstorm was held on staff's perception on the key changes that occurred in RHRAP since the baseline:

- RHRAP was chosen to serve as the lead organisation for the ICCO Democratisation cluster (August 2013) and has taken over the responsibility to manage ICCO funds for all partners in Liberia (October 2013).;
- RHRAP was chosen to work on a project with the International Federation for Electoral Systems (IFES) - June 2014;
- In July 2013 RHRAP added a new finance officer to the team;
- Staff numbers reduced from 9 to 5;
- The RHRAP website was launched in May 2013;
- The director of RHRAP received his graduate degree in May 2014 from the School for International Training (SIT) in Conflict Transformation and Peace-building;
- Better programme implementation and monitoring, even though activities in Lofa County could not be continued due to lack of funding;
- Better proposal writing and more fundraising activities;
- Management expressed that intentions to work on staff capacity had increased;
- RHRAP leadership among Civil Society Organisations increased;
- Management team had become more effective;
- Improvement in financial systems.

The brainstorm on key changes in the organisation led to one more structured session on identifying the key changes in organisational capacity of RHRAP since the baseline and reasons for these changes. Part of these discussions overlap with the discussions on changes that were explored more in detail (process tracing) for the purpose of answering the attribution question. Especially the issue around fundraising capacity has been more deeply looked at and therefore left out of this general causal map of changes that occurred in the organisational capacity of RHRAP. For more details please see 4.3.

Key changes in RHRAPs organisational capacity - General causal map
In the causal maps the attempt is made to trace back key capacity outcomes to competencies and activities, and to factors and causes. At the top the main capacity competencies and outcomes are positioned. These main capacity themes (in yellow boxes) and some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the outcomes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The bottom of the causal map shows the most important underlying causes, opportunities and constraints that have influenced the organisation. Certain key influencing causes and external developments that have substantially impacted the organisation are listed in the round boxes at the bottom in light green.

The narrative discusses the key capacity themes at the top first, with a short reference to the key influencing causes that impacted most of the factors in the middle. Consequently, per capacity theme the factors will be addressed from the top down, and from left to right.

A number of more specific key capacity outcomes were identified during the workshop: RHRAP has built its programme implementation capacity [1], the RHRAP network and coalition participation has increased [2] and fundraising capacities have improved [3]. In the following sections the general causal map results are brought forward. In this exploration of the general changes in the organisation issues related to fundraising capacity have been left out. This is more extensively discussed in the process tracing visual and narrative. This to decrease the amount of double information presented. Key influencing factors that have led RHRAP activities related to the self-identified need to build staff capacity and the decreasing funding from ICCO since before 2012 which has led RHRAP to engage more in fundraising activities and in networking with other potential partners. The members of RHRAP said that many of the activities have importantly contributed to the capacity to raise funds.

Please note that the numbers in the visual and the narrative below correspond to each other.



- IFES programme uses CAC structure - Confidence in CAC as exit strategy - CAC structure used in other RHRAP proposals [4]
But: not able to work in Lofa county due to lack of funds [5]
Perceived leadership among CSOs on human rights monitoring and advocacy, but also on natural resource and extractive industry advocacy [30]
Slightly improved capacity for fundraising [3]
Better programme implementation capacity [1]
Network/coalition participation increased [2]
Many links to fundraising capacity here, but discussed in the process tracing causal map.
Precarious staff situation [6]
Improved staff skills and knowledge [13]
Better field monitoring [25]
Increased interaction within the LCDGP [31]
Due to RHRAP performance trust and credibility has been created [33]
Junior financial officer and junior programme officer mostly active on a volunteer basis [7]
Current director looking for new opportunities after his Master [11]
Improved team and programme management skills [14]
Knowledge and skills for engaging with Citizen Action Committees [17]
Changed monitoring processes [26]
RHRAP contract holder for all partners within the LCDGP coalition and cluster lead since August 2013 [32]
RHRAP is secretary of the Child Coalition of Liberia Represented by Junior programme officer, May 2014 [35]
RHRAP was encouraged to apply to an IREX project [36]
Member of the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa Dec 2013 [37]
New staffmember: Finance officer July 2013 [8]
In-service training by director and other senior staff for younger staff [15]
Facilitation, proposal writing, community awareness and advocacy skills Junior programme officer [18]
Training on Criminal Justice System for the ICCO programme in Sept 2012 [23]
Open-ended and oral evaluations developed after 2012 [27]
Use of Force Field analysis (FFA) From Global Fund for Children since Dec 2012 [28]
Sound and revised organisational policies [34]
Staff turnover from 9 to 5 staff members since 2012 [9]
SIT Conflict Transformation and peacebuilding master in the United States Director [12]
IREX training trajectory 2012-2014
Improving inclusivity of local civil society actors in peace-building training June 2014 [21]
LCDGP coalition started 2013 following the bridging phase in 2012 [24]
Training in M&E by LIPA by senior programme officer in June 2013, financed by the RHRAP administrative budget [29]
Reduction in donor funding, especially main funder ICCO Since 2012 {10]
RHRAP management feels that it needs to improve staff capacity for sustainabilty [16]
Good ties with IREX [20]
In the ACT Alliance with FinChurch Aid 2012-2013 [22]

Improved programme implementation capacity

The staff members felt that they had increased their capacity to implement their programmes throughout the past two years [1]. Three main factors were seen to influence this capacity: negatively, a precarious staff situation; improved staff skills and knowledge; and better field monitoring. The first two components are strongly related to staff capacity. Improved programme implementation capacity was mainly reflected in the fact that work with the Prisons and the CACs in Bong County was seen to be relatively successful according to RHRAP staff and the CFA (RHRAP Learning and Sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014; Annex B Support to Capacity sheet CFA perspective LD and AL) [4]. This gave the members of RHRAP the idea that the CAC structures in place would be able to keep up human rights activities should RHRAP withdraw. RHRAP did an IFES programme (which they implemented in June 2014) which made use of the Citizen Action Committees in their electoral activities. On a side note, not all of the planned work could be implemented due to lack of funding. For example the monitoring of the Criminal Justice System (ICCO funded) had to be limited to Bong, whilst Lofa County not be included due to lack of funds [5] (Information from RHRAP website, accessed 23-05-2014). RHRAP is using the CAC structure in other proposals, for example to OSIWA regarding a project on equitable revenues of the extractive sector (RHRAP OSIWA proposal template).

Precarious staff situation

However, a sensitive dynamic that has negatively impacted the organisation as a whole, but which seemed sensitive, related to the fact that RHRAP is currently in a precarious staff situation [6]. Throughout the discussion it became clear that the new financial officer, just out of university, is mostly being employed on a volunteer basis. Similarly, RHRAP is barely able to offer the last junior officer compensation. This officer has been given increasingly important roles in the organisation and is often sent to trainings to give him incentives. Also the fact that a number of the field staff of RHRAP, who attended the Criminal Justice Systems training, have not been able to work shows the difficulty RHRAP now has to pay its employees [7]. In July 2013 the new junior financial officer was hired [8]. This was to replace the previous junior financial officer who went to a better paid job. Since the baseline the number of staff at RHRAP has decreased from 9 to 5 people [9] due to decreasing amounts of funding [10]. An element that also may impact the future staff situation at RHRAP is the stated intent of the director to seek other opportunities [11], having just finished his Master in conflict transformation and peace-building at SIT in the United States [12].

Improved staff skills

Improved staff skills [13] related to gains made for different staff members in terms of team and programme management skills [14], were said to have improved in the past years since the baseline. One of the reasons included the efforts by the director and other senior staff to hold in-house trainings for junior members [15]. It was said that this ongoing way of internal trainings took quite practical expressions, by getting these young members to lead the agenda or take notes, but also giving them some information about advocacy or human rights for instance. Something that helped when it came to these in-house trainings was that the director did his master degree in the United States. He said that he often tried to make time to share the benefits of his education with the other staff. He also said that his education in conflict transformation and peace building gave him in practical experience he could use to manage RHRAP, both in terms of programme management and in terms of advocacy [12]. The administrative officer mentioned that more of these internal training efforts took place after the baseline workshops and the baseline report: the management of RHRAP felt that more efforts should be made to work on staff skills [16]. He said: "After the baseline we had series of meetings on this. We felt that we needed more staff skills and training. We worked on different ideas on what kind of trainings that might be needed and we should try to get when funds are there. For instance, someone wanted training in M&E in South Africa, and we still hope that we will be able to get funding for that soon." Unfortunately the M&E training in South Africa did not take place.

A second component of improved knowledge and skills of RHRAP staff members was that they improved knowledge and practical skills that helped them in interacting with the Citizen Action Committee structures that were set up in various project communities [17]. Specifically, knowledge and skills for working with the CACs, and general programme management skills were built for the junior programme officer. This officer has been attending a series of trainings with the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) in the past years since 2012. The most noteworthy outcome was that the junior staff member has become good at facilitation, worked on community organising, and advocacy issues [18]. The staff members of RHRAP explained that he and some of the other field officers (some of which no longer work at RHRAP) were part of a whole training trajectory at IREX [19]. The most recent training mentioned was the training the junior programme officer had by IREX in organising community sessions and community awareness raising. This training was in May 2014. Note: the training overview sheet filled in by RHRAP management earlier other trainings from IREX included: Proposal and Report Writing (October 2012), Advocacy and Reconciliation Training (February 2013), and Election Process and Constitutional Review (February 2014) (Training overview table RHRAP). IREX has been an important mentoring organisation for RHRAP since the last couple of years (2011/2012) [20]. The director said that these trainings are extra important as the junior programme officer still needs to build his skills as a recent graduate [16].

A training that the members of RHRAP mentioned that helped them in their engagement with the CACs was a training done recently in improving inclusion of local society actors in peace building [21]. The training was about sensitizing and providing skills for peace-building. The most recent attention for peace building was made extra relevant due to violent strikes in Bong County during the Unity Party convention. The staff members of RHRAP acknowledged that this training was too recent to have learning implemented in their programmes. However, they saw valuable lessons to be used when engaging with the CACs. The training was sponsored by the Lutheran Church of Liberia and was done on the 24th and 25th of June in 2014 as part of their Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Programme. This training came about because RHRAP had partnered with the organisation providing the training on a project in Nimba County with Fin Church Aid and Act Alliance funding [22].

The training that was done with ICCO funds on the Criminal Justice Highway in 2012 was not mentioned during this time at the workshop but has been added to the general causal map, since it came up in discussions within the process tracing examination of human rights monitoring competencies [23]. This training was part of the programme with ICCO as part of the bridging phase in 2012 [24].

Improved field monitoring

The fourth component that was mentioned by the senior programme officer was that RHRAP had become better at tracking what is happening in the field, conceptualized by the research team as field monitoring [25]. The main reason they felt that this was the case was due to a slightly changed monitoring process, with more of a focus in including communities in the process of monitoring [26]. One of the ways in which community members can provide feedback is using open-ended questionnaires instead of closed question formats (RHRAP Evaluation Form). The RHRAP staff said this was working well because now community members are able to give more open feedback. After every activity these questionnaires were given to the residents to evaluate the programme. The senior programme officer added that now the RHRAP field officers pay more attention to during oral feedback sessions, since many community members cannot write [27]. In April 2014 a learning and sharing session was held in Gbarnga (RHRAP Learning and sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014). A second aspect was the use of Force Field Analysis for facilitation of the field monitoring sessions. The director mentioned that this method was adapted from the Global Fund for Children and RHRAP has been using it since the end of 2012 to guide the meetings with community members [28]. The senior programme officer was able to attend a training in monitoring and evaluation at the Liberian Institute for Public Administration (LIPA) [29]. This training was financed through the RHRAP administrative budget. At this training issues that were discussed included: What do we monitor? What are the processes involved? If one is evaluating a process - when will you do that and how will you do that? This training led the programme officer and the RHRAP management to look at new ways to allow the beneficiaries themselves to formulate their perspectives. He said that now the data collection is no longer being done by the project officers, but by the beneficiaries doing self-assessments. However, how this new knowledge has been structurally adapted to RHRAPs programme cycle is unclear.

Network and coalition participation increased

A second major discussion that was ongoing related to the changes in the organisation related to the perceived increased network and coalition participation of RHRAP [2]. This topic will be briefly discussed in this general causal map, but will also come back in the process tracing discussion on fundraising capacity. This network and coalition participation has mainly come to expression in that RHRAP staff felt that their organisation has taken an increased leadership role among CSOs in Liberia on the issues of human rights monitoring and democratization, but also increasingly on the topics of natural resource and extractive industry advocacy [30].

In the course of the LCDGP coalition formation RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP has increased. One example mentioned was that they were talking with the Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) (both part of the LCDGP as well) to explore collective fundraising efforts [31]. RHRAP plays a strategic role for the LCDGP as contract holder for the whole LCDGP coalition and as cluster lead for the Democratisation cluster (one of the three LCDGP themes) [32]. This followed the start of the LCDGP in various phases since the bridging phase in 2012 [24], and since the first partner that ICCO envisioned for this role did not live up to the responsibilities.

Related to this, RHRAP management felt that RHRAP performance had exhibited trust and credibility in the past two years [33]. This was mostly due to the LCDGP key role, but the director also said that recently they had made an effort to update organisational documentation such as the financial policy, personnel policy, and start writing a new strategic plan [34].

Several other dynamics were taking place the last two years. RHRAP is active as secretary for the Child Coalition of Liberia [35], the junior programme officer plays an active role in that capacity and he was one of the people at RHRAP who showed initiative in this. In the context of this, he helped with the preparation of a joint proposal with the Child Coalition, with partners such as Defence of the Children International. The result of this proposal is still pending. IREX has been also increasingly approached to help RHRAP with new initiatives, and through personal contacts has encouraged RHRAP to write proposals for their tenders [36].

After some networking in the United States the director [12] came into contact with the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa (IANRA) [37] and RHRAP became a member of that African network in December 2013. It is not yet certain what has come out of the membership of that network.

Appendix 5 Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

During the endline process, key organisational capacity changes have been identified in the following capabilities: capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew. These two capabilities have been chosen for the purpose of process tracing since these are the two capabilities that have most frequently been targeted by the CFAs. The organisational capacity changes that have been identified are based on a potential link with MFS II supported capacity development activities in these two capabilities, and on a variety of sources (secondary data as well as endline workshop data). The process tracing methodology has been adapted to the purpose of this evaluation and to investigate closely the underlying causes for these identified organisational capacity changes, and the extent to which these changes can be attributed to MFS II supported organisational capacity strengthening activities.

For RHRAP the following organisational capacity changes have been identified for the purpose of understanding the attribution:

- Capability to act and commit: 'Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the CJS'; 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'

Below you will find a description of the detailed causal maps that have been developed for each of the above mentioned organisational capacity changes. In each of the causal maps, attribution to MFS II supported capacity development interventions and to other factors and actors is described. The causal maps are described both as a visual as well as a narrative. Numbers in the visual correspond to numbers in the narrative.

Capability to act and commit - outcome area 'Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector'

RHRAP has a long experience in terms of monitoring human rights, in general, but also within the criminal justice system, and many activities have been undertaken in the past to strengthen the capacity of RHRAP staff members in this area (in the causal map, see the brown boxes below: these have not been numbered due to the fact that this took place before the baseline):

- Peace-building and HR training - International Human Rights Internship programme 2002
- Monitoring and Reporting - Carter Center 2002
- Human Rights Monitoring: fact-finding and documentation - Carter Center 2002, Amnesty International 2008 (senior programme officer)
- Practice and approaches in monitoring the basic rights – Amnesty International 2008 (administrative officer)
- Reporting human rights violations and abuses - Amnesty International 2006 (administrative officer)
- Human Rights promotion in post-conflict societies - African Democracy Forum 1996 (director)
- International Human Rights standards - Amnesty International 1994 (director)

The capacity to monitor human rights in the criminal justice system has been built upon since the baseline in 2012 [1], mainly in relation to the ICCO funded project 'Monitoring and Promoting of the Criminal Justice System in Gbarnga, Bong County', initiated in 2012. As part of this programme Citizen Action Committees were established, which included zonal heads in Gbarnga, where groups of active citizens are involved in discussions with duty-bearers in the criminal justice sector. By having Citizen Action Committees, prominent citizens and leaders are involved in mediating and educating community members, engaging in dialogue with police and justice departments, and accurately communicating to RHRAP about what is going on in Gbarnga [2]. RHRAP has been able to successfully organise trainings for community leaders to advocate for issues relating to the criminal justice system, and other stakeholders such as police and court officials have been able to attend these meetings. Relations between these different stakeholders have improved according to RHRAP staff [3]. Furthermore, RHRAPs increased competencies in monitoring human rights in the criminal justice system, has led to improvements relations and activities within the Bong County prisons [4]. For example, inmates are more successfully accessed and have been given two cell phones to communicate with their family members. In addition to this, working relations with detention officers are more positive.


Established the Citizen Action Committee structure for accurate information about the CJS in Gbarnga since 2013 [2]
Organised trainings for community leaders to advocate for themselves, leading to better relationship management between stakeholders of the CJS in Bong County [3]
Positive relations with duty bearers in Gbarnga and activities in Bong Prisons [4]
Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the Criminal Justice Sector [1]
Improved collaborative approach for HR-based monitoring [5]
Improved knowledge for HR-based monitoring [11]
Knowledge on how to train community members on the criminal justice system [12]
Knowledge on alignment of Liberian and international law [17]
Competencies on how to accurately report on prison conditions [18]
Creation of peaceful working relations with correction officers, judiciary and police officers [6]
Collaboration with the Justice Ministry Since 2012 [7]
Knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian Law [13]
Knowledge on explaining the roles of the 3 components of CJS– police, court, prison [14]
Comprehensive use of monitoring tools – comparing docket information with admittances [19]
Knowledge on how to check conditions, admittments and detention statutes [20]
Since June 2014 Interagency monitoring and fact-finding of prisons and courts [22]
For the RHRAP programmes dialogue with various stakeholders was needed to achieve goals [8]
Training of Trainers in promoting the Criminal Justice system in Liberia. Provided by the Liberia National Law Enforcement Agency (LINEA) Sept 2012 [15]
Weekly fact-finding and monitoring of courts and prisons since 2012 [21]
Started programme on Monitoring and Promoting of the Criminal Justice System in Gbarnga, Bong County in 2012 Funded by ICCO [16]
RHRAP has knowledge of (international) human rights and associated instruments [9]
Previous knowledge and experience in HR monitoring and promotion [10]
Previous experience with the Justice and Peace Commission prison monitoring 2001 [23]
Peacebuilding and HR training by the International Human Rights Internship programme 2002
Monitoring and Reporting Carter Center 2002
Human Rights Monitoring: fact-finding and documentation Carter Center 2002 Amnesty Internationa 2008 Augustus Menyongai
Reporting human rights violations and abuses Amnesty International 2006 Sandee Cole
Human Rights promotion in post-conflict societies African Democracy Forum 1996 Lorma
International Human Rights standards 1994 Amnesty International Lorma
Methodology and approaches in monitoring the basic rights – Amnesty International 2008 Sandee Cole

Key aspects of RHRAPs work that came up related to the capacity doing their work in HR-based monitoring in the criminal justice:

1. RHRAP's improved collaborative approach;
2. Improved knowledge for human rights-based monitoring:
3. Better knowledge and skills to train community members on the criminal justice system contents and procedures, while other stakeholders were invited;
4. Improved knowledge on how to align Liberian law and international human rights law in order to protect and monitor human rights;
5. RHRAP has more knowledge to accurately report on the Gbarnga prison conditions.

In the following section this list is separated into two main components: improved collaborative approach for HR-based monitoring that guides the work of RHRAP, and specific knowledge on HR-based monitoring in the CJS. Since the former mostly guides the work of RHRAP, and is embedded within the programmatic objectives, the evaluation team needed to weigh how much engagement in this collaborative approach has actually strengthened capacity for human rights based monitoring. In the next section some aspects of RHRAPs collaborative approach that have strengthened capacity is discussed, even though many dimensions can be traced to before the baseline.

Improved collaborative approach

RHRAP members stated that a key aspect of their improved capacity involved a more collaborative approach than before [5]. This also meant specifically involving government as well. With the ICCO project, RHRAP was working on human rights promotion. Before RHRAP had access to the prisons, they could do only low-profile monitoring. But with this project they gained access to prisons for more monitoring. The ministry of justice provided a letter so that RHRAP is able to officially enter the prisons. Before this ICCO funded project, RHRAP worked with the Carter Centre on monitoring prisons, and staff already had the basic skills to monitor prison conditions. With this ICCO funded project, the level of monitoring human rights in the prisons has been up-scaled. Thus it can be noted that experience gained in the course of the programme may have slightly influenced and improved RHRAP staff capacity.

A second dimension which helped RHRAPs collaborative approach was through building better relations with prison correction officers, court officials and police officers [6]. These stakeholders were more approached using dialogue rather than only activism. This was something RHRAP was striving more for in its work since recent years. To help with that the RHRAP director wrote various letters to different departments of the Justice Ministry: the office of the attorney general and the bureau of corrections and rehabilitation [7]. In the letter he wrote that:

"[]...RHRAP programme activities will concentrate on organizing workshops on fundamental human rights issues in line with our statutory laws governing the country that will help to enhance the capacity of community leaders, court and correction officers in improving the justice system. RHRAP programme also focuses on improving relationships between community residents and criminal justice system workers. It will also include prisons and courts visitations where some psychosocial counselling will be carried out to reduce some psychosocial problems facing inmates. RHRAP will also host continuous dialogues with the Ministry of Justice and relevant government agencies on core issues in improve detention centres."

Both of these departments asked RHRAP to contact another department initially, but it seemed that this communication paid off in the end. However, in these letters (dated 20th of September and 10th of October 2012), it is also shown that this collaboration with the Ministry of Justice did not exist before the project started in 2012. So this collaboration is something that has occurred later than the baseline.

For this component RHRAP had increasingly realised that for their human rights programmes dialogue was needed with various stakeholders to achieve their goals [8]. This was partly at the beginning of the programme, but also due to previous experiences and trainings before the baseline. The trainings and experiences mentioned in the introduction of this section showed that RHRAP already had knowledge on international human rights and the associated instruments [9], and experience in human rights monitoring and promotion [10].

Improved knowledge for HR-based monitoring

The second major category that contributed to an increased capacity for HR-based monitoring related to the generation of additional knowledge for RHRAP's work [11]. These can be divided into knowledge on how to train community members; knowledge on the alignment of Liberian and human rights law; and knowledge on how to accurately report on prison conditions.

Knowledge on how to train community members on the Criminal Justice System

One of the key focuses within the improved knowledge capacity of the project relating to the Criminal Justice System in Bong County is the interaction with community members and the need to educate them on the this system [12]. Key things the senior programme officer and the administrative officer showed they had taught to community members in the past two years were: technical knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian law [13]; and knowledge on how to facilitate interrelations between, and understanding the roles of, the 3 major offices of the criminal justice system: correction officers, judiciary and police officers [14].

This knowledge was discussed during the training in the Criminal Justice Highway held in Gbarnga Bong County in September 2012 [15]. During this training topics such as the procedures for arrest and detention were discussed, and procedures in the 'correction component' of the criminal justice system (sources: Training documentation provided: Arrest PowerPoint presentation, overview of the Liberian criminal justice system document; questionnaire training participant perspective Liberia RHRAP Staff Training in Criminal Justice System Administrator). It was said that at the beginning of the 'Monitoring and Promoting the Criminal Justice System in Bong County' programme there was a need to get RHRAP staff more knowledgeable about this subject [16]. The rationale of the training was to build the capacities of staff of the organization on legal proceedings (sources: Report to ICCO 72-03-04-011: reference 1; Email correspondence Sandee Cole - RHRAP: reference 1). Also RHRAP reported that due to the training staff knowledge and skills increased on the Liberian Criminal Justice System (source: Support to capacity sheet SPO: reference 1). This is closely related to the expectations from the baseline: "Expected immediate change – at least 10 staff members trained and acquired enhanced knowledge and understanding in prison monitoring, reporting, documentation and human rights education." (source: 5C baseline report Liberia RHRAP 19012013_MR_CK: reference 8). Apparently, "the facilitators in person of Attorney. James T. Fallah and Cecil B. Griffiths both from the Liberia Law Enforcement Agency (LINEA) facilitated the learning sessions with focus on introducing the Criminal Justice High Way. As a result of this training, RHRAP staff skills and knowledge have been enhanced to clearly understand how the Criminal Justice System works based on their performance" (RHRAP Narrative Report to ICCO Dec 2013: reference 1).

Knowledge on the alignment of Liberian law and human rights law

RHRAP staff members have improved their competence to align Liberian and international human rights law [17] due to the training on the Criminal Justice Highway organised by LINEA in September 2012. At this training Liberia's constitutional provisions relating to the administration of justice as well as the major classes of human rights violations was discussed, and this sought to bring out the overlapping tools and provisions [16]. In addition to this, the many trainings and programmes in the past have also improved RHRAP's competencies in this area. These improved competencies have helped RHRAP to perform their activities in Bong County, and to work on issues that were both listed in the Liberian law book as well as in international human rights law, with the intention of bringing different stakeholders together with community members.

The RHRAP staff added that they already had previous knowledge and experience that they could build upon regarding these aspects [9]/[10].

Improved competences to report prison conditions more accurately

Competences of RHRAP staff to report prison conditions more accurately have improved [18]. This prison reporting was improved throughout the multiple visits that the RHRAP monitoring officers made to the Gbarnga Prison. In the narrative report to ICCO of 2012 it was written that ICCO visitors had made a short stop there and RHRAP was commended for its work with the inmates and the detention officers. This was caused, on the one hand, by various prison monitoring tools and information collection, such as comparing docket information with the list of admittances [19]. On the other hand, competences have improved by having more knowledge and skills to monitor work of the prisons more comprehensively, through checking conditions of prisoners, the way prisoners are admitted and by going through the detention statutes [20]. These two aspects have been discussed during the training in September 2012, mainly within the topics of 'Chain of Procedures', use of the 'Detention Book' and 'Crimes and Terms in Prison' (source: Report to ICCO 72-03-04-011: reference 1) [15]. The weekly fact-finding missions by RHRAP at the prison have also contributed to improving these competences [21]. Additionally, since this year, June 2014, interagency monitoring and fact-finding of prisons and courts is being planned by several organisations [22]. This initiative was led by the Rice and Rights Foundation because it was felt that monitoring could be much more effective and up to date this way. When this initiative was started up the most important thing was that every organisation visiting the prisons should look for the same things (a document that RHRAP uses is the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, of the United Nations Convention). The monitoring of prisons has been something that RHRAP has some experience in: in 2001 RHRAP worked along with the Justice and Peace Commission in Bong, Cape Mount, Lofa, and Margibi counties. So RHRAP did already have some informal connections before the baseline [23].

Capability to act and commit - outcome area 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'
The capacity to raise funds was a key issue the organisation was dealing with, and striving to improve at the time of the endline process [1]. This slightly improved change in organisational capacity is reflected mainly in the fact that both the CFA as well as the SPO gave attention to this issue. It was further elaborated on during the process of process tracing.

Decreasing funding from the main funder ICCO [2] was discussed as a serious issue during the endline process, but hopes were still high that ICCO would continue with the LCDGP in the near future. The issue of funds has been an issue for some time, even before the baseline in 2012 when it became clear that ICCO had fewer funds. In the LCDGP coalition built by ICCO the idea was to apply the programmatic approach in 3 clusters. In the democratization cluster a programme in which RHRAP was the lead was set up, and was urged to search for additional funds to fulfil the full programme. In 2012 the funding outlook seemed good; two programmes (ACT Alliance and ICCO) were taking place. This led to a withdrawal of two smaller donors, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Global Fund for Development (GFFD), who said that RHRAP had surpassed over their funding threshold policy. These two funders only support small civil society organisations that do not have access to larger funding amounts. For RHRAP members this led to a double feeling - on a positive note they can show to other potential funders that they are able to handle large amounts of money, but on a negative note they could not access funds from NED and GFFD in 2013. However, since the end of 2013 both ACT Alliance and AusAID have stopped funding RHRAP (AusAID due to decrease in Australian government spending).

The RHRAP staff was sure that in the past two years their fundraising capacity had changed for the better, but larger programme funding was not yet realised. Funding diversity was not achieved yet. The main reasons and proof the director showed was the increased amount of proposals and fundraising activities [3] that RHRAP engaged in during the past months:

- Proposal presented to IREX in 2014 on advocacy in the mid-term elections
- Proposal to the US State Department June 2014 on Peace and Reconciliation with regard to violence.
- Proposal to NED on accountability in the oil sector, June 2014 (options to apply to NED have opened up due to the lowered amounts of funding).
- Mini-grant was received from International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2014 following a proposal to this organisation.
- In June 2013 RHRAP received a grant from AusAID to work in concessional communities (unfortunately this project was cut short as well due to a change in the Australian government).
- A collective LCDGP proposal was written to the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) in June 2014.
- AusAID and IREX have personally encouraged RHRAP to apply for future grants.

A new idea currently under development is to get a proposal writer and grant seeker on board to seek opportunities for RHRAP. This person would help RHRAP to access funding through networking in return for a fee. This idea was still being developed at the time of the endline, but was discussed earlier in some RHRAP board meeting minutes in January 2014 (source: First Quarter Board Meeting, January 2014).

Key components of the fundraising capacity improvements related to five components. Improved capacity to write proposals and more visibility for RHRAP seemed to be the most substantiated and changed. The other three revolved more around awareness and engagement with others: awareness of the importance of having a sound strategic plan and programme documents; awareness of the need to build credible and trustworthy relationships with funders; and engagement in more networking and partnerships. These underlying changes are further explained below.


More proposals out, but more funding yet to come in [3]
Slightly improved capacity for fundraising [1]
Improved capacity to write proposals [5]
RHRAP has become more visible [20]
Increased awareness on having sound strategy and programme documents [28]
Awareness in building credible and trustworthy relations with donors [33]
Slightly more networking and partnerships [37]
Staff involvement in proposal writing [6]
Improved knowledge on proposal writing techniques [7]
Active use of information from the field through Force Field Analysis and feedback questionnaires [14]
Understand the funder background; communicate about proposal; precise budgeting [16]
Website online since 2013 [21]
Presentations, Brochures, factsheets, T-shirts produced in 2013 [24]
Adequate policy and strategy documentation [29]
Awareness of a sharp situational analysis for new strategic plan [30]
Realization of the need to present staff CVs [31]
Audited financial reports for ICCO (2013) and ACT Alliance (2013) [34]
Improved understanding ICCO funding priorities,reporting guidelines and project cycle approaches [36]
Fundraising/proposal writing training provided for LCDGP members, in Feb 2014 Junior officer attended Facilitation by RHRAP director [8]
LCDGP resource mobilization strategy and OSIWA proposal process RHRAP named contacting agent. June 2014 [10]
RHRAPs proposals are now SMART – a requirement of many funders [12]
Better field monitoring [15]
Flexible ICCO funds [22]
Publication of RHRAP activities and workshops in Liberian newspapers – more actively since 2013 [25]
RHRAP director gave a presentation at the World Justice Forum in the Netherlands [27]
Training in ‘understanding ICCO reporting guidelines’ March 2014 [32]
Short project with AusAID in 2013 [38]
Strategizing with FIND and AFELL on collaborative fundraising [39]
Visit to ICCO Bamako September 2013 [9]
RHRAP encouraged to use SMART methods by ICCO consultant visiting in 2012 [13]
Fundraising training (on USAID proposal development) by IREX 2012-2013 Junior programme officer and other field officers [17]
Knowledge on the different requirements of international funding procedures (EU for example) [18]
Executive Director awareness of funding procedures after his Master in the US [32]
RHRAP is contract holder and cluster lead for the Democratization Cluster for the LCDGP Nov 2013 [35]
Membership of the IANRA Membership of the Child Coalition of Liberia [40]
Good relationship with IREX Since 2013 [41]
RHRAP Executive Director attended SIT in the US and graduated with a masters in Conflict transformation in May 2014 [11]
Webinar training with ‘Funds for NGOs’ in 2012 – Director [19]
Bridging project in 2012 ICCO [23]
LCDGP grant signed in 2013 [26]
Less funding partners for RHRAP: ICCO funds decrease [2]

Improvement in proposal writing

The first issue that RHRAP said they became better at was proposal writing [5]. This was due to having more members of staff involved in proposal writing; having improved knowledge on proposal writing techniques; actively using field data; and understanding the background of the funder better.

All staff has been involved in proposal writing; whilst the director and the junior programme officer were quite active with this, others were involved in the brainstorm and review process [6]. Using a projector that they got from the NED some years ago they look at the document together to make changes. They used this approach before the baseline but now more proposals are written than before then.

The members of RHRAP said that they had received knowledge on different proposal writing techniques [7], through a range of interventions that took place since the baseline. In February 2014 the members of the LCDGP gave a short workshop on proposal writing and fundraising. The director of RHRAP was present as a facilitator to this workshop and the junior programme officer attended [8]. This proposal writing training of one and a half day was part of the ongoing strategy to strengthen the capacity of the LCDGP partner organizations. The training brought together 19 programme officers. Areas of focus during the training included but were not limited to the following: General introduction of proposal writing including gathering of background information, concept development, the programme and expenses/budget. Furthermore, the components of a proposal were highlighted, i.e., the executive summary, statement of need, project description, organizational information and conclusion (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 5). A resource document on proposal writing was shared with the research team. This document discusses the components of a proposal and the process of developing a proposal (source: Proposal Writing Training document).

The director said that due to the RHRAP management visit to Bamako from 15-21 September 2013 new ideas for writing proposals were discussed [9]. During this visit issues such as fundraising and project cycle management were discussed by ICCO members. This short capacity training during the visit was given due to perceived lacking skills in project cycle management: the whole cycle was reviewed. Key reasons to discuss this was that RHRAP (and other partners) were about to get a new contract with ICCO (Grant agreement for the LCDGP was signed by the RHRAP director in November 2013). The question was how a Civil Society coalition such as the LCDGP could be able to deliver and sustain the programme. During this visit programmatic officers of the partners of the LCDGP were able to visit and strategize on the LCDGP and discuss collective funding strategies. ICCO thought it wise that there is some practice in this.

In 2014 the LCDGP a collective Resource Mobilization strategy was developed [10] (source: LCDGP Resource Mobilization strategy). However, this seemed to be going slowly when the research team reviewed the documentation. "The Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP) Strategic Plan development lasted for nearly two years to have a coherent plan. This process implementation coordination role was delegated to the Project Management Committee (PMC) and one of the key aspects of this was to 'initiate visibility, communication, documentation and networking of the LCDGP as well as fundraising activities'" (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 5). In the LCDGP bridging report it was stated that the subsector committees for communication and visibility, documentation and networking; and fundraising/resource mobilization completed their work plans and strategies for the bridging phase and received funds to rollout their activities (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 2). During the workshop it became clear that the fundraising strategy and the communication strategy have been developed. The clearest outcome of this process has been a collective proposal was written to get extra funds for the LCDGP was written to Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). This was presented to OSIWA in June 2014. The clearest thing that has come out has been the collective proposal to OSIWA, handed in by the end of June 2014. Results from this bid are still pending.

According to the director, the master's degree education at the School for International Training in the US helped him with the writing of proposals, by using theories and tools for proposal writing [11]. He also mentioned that the RHRAP proposals are now SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic/relevant, and timely) [12]. He said that funders and donor organisations now fully expect this of organisations that try to tender with them. He said he picked this up during discussions with consultants visiting from ICCO in 2012 (he could not remember exactly who it was) [13].

RHRAP staff has more actively been using up to date field data for their proposals [14]. As mentioned in the general causal map, due to changes in the way the field is monitored, and communicated with, getting feedback is more open and flexible [15]. This information has been used more actively in developing proposals - making them more up to date and informed on local dynamics. A second component that is different is the use of Force Field Analysis for facilitation of the field tracking sessions. It was stated that this method was adapted from the Global Fund for Children and RHRAP has been using it since the end of 2012.

A final aspect of proposal writing that came up during the process tracing workshop was the need to understand the background of the funder, to communicate about the pending proposal, and to do precise budgeting, according to the director [16]. The RHRAP junior programme officer and other field officers built knowledge on understanding USAID proposal criteria: to understand how the budgeting system works and how to get future projects with IREX. In the process tracing workshop the director said that a fundraising training by IREX in September 2012 helped the junior programme officer to understand this better [17]. During this conference discussions were held on what the attributes are of an effective local organisation, have sound organisational control systems and adequate organisational management (source: IREX presentation - Attributes of an Effective Local Organisation). The director of RHRAP said he gained knowledge on the different requirements for international funding procedures [18] (for example the European Union) due to a webinar on the website 'Funds for NGO's' in 2012 [19].

Improved visibility of RHRAP

RHRAP has increased its visibility, which can be seen in increased information sharing of their programme on their website and attending as many meetings as possible; enhanced communication and showcasing towards donors and non-governmental organisations; as well as publishing activities toward broader society and the international community [20] (source: CFA Support to Capacity Sheet: reference 1; SPO Support to Capacity: reference 1; Email correspondence with Sandee Cole: reference 1). Improved information sharing and communication was mainly related to having a website in place since 2013, showing RHRAP activities and programmes [21] (source: SPO Support to Capacity: reference 1; www.rhrapliberia.org: accessed 23-05-2014). This website shows the vision, mission and projects that RHRAP is engaged in. It shows the programme that is being done with ICCO in Bong County and there is also a call for funds to expand this project in Lofa County (source: RHRAP website: accessed on 23-05-2014). The director did mention that during the time the research team was visiting RHRAP the website was not working properly. They were taking steps to improve this. RHRAP developed the website with fundraising in mind: that "the development of the website where information of RHRAP Programme activities is placed will contribute to Resource Mobilization" (source: SPO support to capacity sheet, reference 1). The director said he was actively involved in helping to design the website. It was not certain whether the website had directly led to project grants, but it was mentioned that other organisations are contacting RHRAP through their website in order to get more information about their programmes (source: email correspondence with Sandee Cole: reference 1). The website was developed with the use of LCDGP flexible funds, and RHRAP staff said it had cost about 2,000 USD [22]. Up to 3,000 dollars were made available to as part of the bridging phase towards the LCDGP coalition [23]. These funds were intended to substitute the ICCO Learning Trajectory which was supposed to be designed by the Liberian partners. However, throughout the past two years this trajectory had not materialized.

To further contribute to visibility, posters, brochures and billboards have been produced to promote RHRAP activities [24]. In the LCDGP narrative report to ICCO, the LCDGP partners had 10 plastic posters and 2500 small posters and stickers made depicting the objectives and activities of partners in the ‘Democracy Cluster’ of the LCDGP. These small posters carried the messages concerning the work of the D Cluster at all levels. The administrative officer showed the research team three newspapers which described the activities RHRAP had been engaging in (three newspapers reported on the sessions RHRAP did with inmates in Gbarnga prison on 13th June 2013, and on the visit ICCO paid to Liberia and to the Gbarnga Prison on the 17th of June 2013) [25]. This is part of the LCDGP resource mobilization strategy [10], and the LCDGP programme that started in 2013 [26]). RHRAP staff members later mentioned that t-shirts, factsheets and billboards were made to demonstrate their work. The director showed the research team such a factsheet for RHRAP (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 4). Furthermore, a large poster decorated RHRAP office from the World Justice Forum that was held in The Hague in the Netherlands in July 2013. The RHRAP director was given the opportunity to go to the Netherlands after Amnesty International had seen some of their activities with zonal heads and CACs in Bong County and invited RHRAP to participate [27]. The director was able to present the work of RHRAP and therefore contributed to RHRAP visibility. This was partly described in the RHRAP Narrative Report to ICCO 2013 (reference 1) as well.

Increased awareness on having sound strategic and programme documents in place
Awareness on having a sound strategic plan and solid programme documents was another aspect that RHRAP members realized [28]. It was said that in order to be able to get funding as an organisation you need to be able to hand in the necessary documents such as operational policies, employment contracts, rules and regulations, financial policies (sources: RHRAP work plans for 2012-2013 and 2013-2014; organisational chart; monitoring and evaluation template; audit report; strategic plan 2010-2014). Thus, the financial and constitutional policies of the organization were amended. The director said that issues like employment contract, payroll for out-station staffs, rules and regulations of RHRAP, etc. have been amended and because of this RHRAP has sound organizational policies. As he stated: "we developed these structures and policies so that we can meet internationally acceptable standards" [29]. He said that it was realized that a sharp situational analysis for each proposal and strategic plan was needed [30]. This means staying in touch with what is going on in Liberia and in the international development sector. One of the things that are now going to be inserted in the coming strategic plan is a tactical focus on natural resource and extractive sector advocacy. The director said that part of this documentation is presenting the CVs of staff in the correct way, and consequently trying to stimulate staff capacity building in order to improve these CVs [31] He said that concisely presenting these CVs was important because then you can also show to other donors and organisations what kind of skills the staff has. The evaluation team reviewed the documentation (organisational structure, financial and human resource policy) and found only minor changes in these.

This need to develop and amend the abovementioned issues related to the director's discovery of the importance of these aspects, in his discussions with ICCO and during his studies in the United States at the SIT [32]. He learned many of these things at the School for International Training in the United States, and was implementing these ideas in his fundraising activities. The director concluded by saying that "those documents, strategic plans, policies are necessary to sell an organisation. We feel that we are not donor-driven, we have a programme - we are RHRAP and this is what we are capable of doing". The CFA highlighted some of these developments at RHRAP as "increased consciousness/awareness on the need to become more strategic and proactive beyond implementing projects due to the field visits done by ICCO" (CFA Support to Capacity: reference 6). The evidence for this component of fundraising capacity is somewhat limited. However, a recent proposal to OSIWA (June 2014) by RHRAP as an individual organisation on the topic of 'Education and advocacy for the Implementation of Tangible Development Initiatives using Revenues from the Extractive Industry' showed good application of situational analysis and staff CV documentation (source: RHRAP OSIWA proposal).

Awareness in building more credible and trustworthy relationships with donors
Staff indicated that they were aware of the importance of having a credible relationship with donors [33]. The members of RHRAP said that building this relationship was important because they realised that it is essential to show results to funders. According to RHRAP staff financial audits that were done for ICCO and the ACT Alliance had helped to build up trust with the funders. The first audit report accounted for the ICCO project 'Initiative for Human Rights Promotion' in the period August 2012 to September 2013. The second audit report discussed the use of funds throughout the period March 2012 to February 2013 for the ACT Alliance to 'Assist Ivorian Refugees and Host Community Members in Liberia'. In both reports the accountants express the opinion that, according to International Accounting Standards, the statements of income and expenditure fairly reflect the operations within the projects [34]. It was stated in the workshop that such auditing reports were extra important due to the key contributions and activities of RHRAP as the contract holder and the lead for the LCDGP Democratization cluster [35]. This responsibility has given the RHRAP members the feeling that this is a consequence of being a reliable partner of ICCO, and they said that this responsibility reinforced a more credible relationship with other donors.

Another factor that contributed to improved awareness of being trustworthy and credible relationship with funders was an improved understanding the ICCO funding priorities and perspectives, which was necessary in order to develop and stimulate consolidated reporting guidelines for the LCDGP [36]. It seemed to the evaluators that the setting up of the LCDGP was a cumbersome process, and issues were not moving smoothly. To work on this in March 2014 a refresher training in financial and programme management was given to (new) staff members of the LCDGP. The senior and junior programme officer attended as participants [37]. There was a great deal of discussion on the way reports should be made. According to the CFA, in this workshop for finance and programme staff the topic of proposal writing was heavily discussed as well (linked to 'knowledge on proposal writing techniques [7]') (source: Annex B Support to capacity sheet CFA: reference 2). All members of the LCDGP should learn to use the same format, for the general reporting system. Key issues such as limiting the amount of pages, concise reporting, and clarity on expected indicators should be attempted. Prior to the LCDGP there were 20 separate organisations and now they were put in 3 clusters. RHRAP, as main contract holder of the LCDGP was responsible to consolidate these reports [35]. The director's visit to Bamako in September 2013 [9] helped him to get an idea of the perspective and needs of ICCO.

Slightly more networking and partnerships

RHRAP staff noted that in the past two years the organisation has paid more attention to networking and building new partnerships [37]. There have been more activities and attempts made, but clear and significant examples of successful new networks and partnerships seemed limited. RHRAP members stated that in the past couple of years RHRAPs standing among civil society has been positively improving, saying that other organisations in Liberian civil society often liaise with RHRAP. Due to networking activities of the director a project with AusAID was organised [38]. The RHRAP director explained that RHRAP held a project launching which many actors and donors were able to attend. Via a contact and via discussions with AusAID RHRAP was asked to do a project with concessional communities in Gbarpolu County, using the CAC structure. This project was unfortunately cut short in 2013.

In the course of this LCDGP process RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP had increased. An example mentioned is that they are talking with the Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) to explore collective fundraising efforts [39]. This has not developed beyond talks, but the director said that a working relationship with these organisations would definitely be in the advantage of RHRAP, as they are all three working with human rights issues.

After some networking in the United States the RHRAP director came into contact with the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa (IANRA) and RHRAP became a member of that African network in December 2013. It is not yet sure what has come out of the membership of that network. RHRAP is an active member of the Child Coalition of Liberia, and is currently working on a proposal with them [40]. Finally, IREX has been also increasingly approached to help RHRAP with new initiatives, and through personal contacts has encouraged RHRAP to write proposals for their tenders [41].

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

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