

A green semi-truck is driving on a dirt road through a dense palm forest. The scene is captured from a low angle, looking up at the truck. The background is filled with lush green palm fronds, creating a textured, layered effect. The overall color palette is dominated by various shades of green, from deep forest greens to lighter, sunlit greens. The truck is positioned on the left side of the frame, moving towards the right. The text 'READY FOR CHANGE?' is overlaid in large, white, sans-serif capital letters across the center of the image.

READY FOR CHANGE?

Global Goals
at home
and abroad

READYFORCHANGE?

Global Goals at home and abroad

May 2016



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Preface

2015 was a historic year. Throughout the year, world leaders assembled several times to establish a new era of thinking about sustainability. In Addis Ababa the funding of the world's new development agenda was discussed. In New York the Sustainable Development Goals were concluded. And in Paris world leaders showed their commitment to keeping the world livable for future generations.

2016 brings a moment of truth: the world must show real commitment in translating all those ambitions and plans into action. Agenda 2030 testifies to a fundamental change in the global thinking about what sustainable development requires. It requires changes at all levels if we are to make all our policies SDG proof – current and new policies, at home and abroad.

That is why we believe that apparently distinct policy areas and their related institutions have to be understood as interconnected so that they can be mutually aligned. So how are, for instance, trade policies, health and migration interrelated? How do those policy areas influence each other? Times have changed and so have we. In this report we have set the first steps in trying to connect the different SDGs to demonstrate the holistic nature of the challenges that we face.

Ready for Change? Global Goals at home and abroad aspires to contribute to an ambitious and concrete implementation of the SDGs. With the participation of over forty Dutch development organisations, research institutions and environmental organisations, the report analyses existing Dutch and EU policies from an SDG perspective. It brings forward specific policy recommendations about how the Netherlands the EU and its member states can contribute to accomplishing the SDGs, like global health (SDG3), climate change (SDG 13) and peace and security (SDG 16). The themes in this report were selected in light of the policy priorities of the Dutch EU Presidency during the first semester of 2016.

As was pointed out in the Dutch Coherence Monitor 2015 Let's walk the talk together, Dutch and EU policies often have both intended and unintended effects on developing countries. That 2015 joint effort of Partos, Woord en Daad and the Foundation Max van der Stoel seeded a broader collaboration, reflected in the publication that lies in front of you. We consider the implementation of the SDGs as a unique opportunity for more coherence and fairer policies towards developing countries.

We cannot ignore our own responsibility for achieving global sustainable development. For example, the revealed Panama Papers shows us clearly how injustice works: through the facilitation of several EU member states, taxes are dodged on a large scale, even though taxes are such an essential instrument to finance the achievement of the SDGs.

A successful, fair and coherent implementation of the SDGs is not only the responsibility of governments. Civil society organisations, businesses, research institutions, the financial sector, citizens: all have their own role to play in order to make global sustainable development possible. Political and social conviction, dedication and teamwork are needed.

Therefore, we are very grateful for the broad collaboration between over forty organisations and even more people, who carried out to make this publication happen. Let's keep this spirit alive! A special word of thanks goes to the Food & Business Knowledge Platform (F&BKP), Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) and the African Studies Centre, who provided valuable insights and comments for the thematic chapters in this report. Our gratitude goes to Jean Baylock, who did the linguistic editing of this publication.

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Summary: Ready for Change? Key messages to take home

If we take our future seriously, we need to revise our existing policies and to make all our new policies SDG-proof in order to have a positive global impact. This requires fundamental change in the mind set and has far reaching consequences for policy makers. Development cooperation will remain a key instrument in promoting sustainable development, but only alongside changes in other policy areas such as trade, migration and tax.

At the Dutch level that means that sustainable development is no longer only the responsibility of the Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation. The Ministers for Environment, Economic Affairs and other colleagues will have to look into the global impact of their policies.

At the European level this means that the Commissioners for Trade, Agriculture and Migration and other colleagues need to inquire whether their policies meet the ambitions of the SDGs, and not only the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development.

This is the reason why this publication analyses the extent to which existing Dutch and the European policies on, for example, climate change, global value chains and food security are currently contributing to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). How do we reach a point where all our policies have become SDG-proof?

In September 2015 world leaders adopted the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, with a set of 17 SDGs at its heart. The ambitions of Agenda 2030 are clear: ending hunger and poverty and delivering sustainable development, economically, socially and environmentally, while leaving no one behind. This is to be achieved within 15 years. Ambitious, but possible. Agenda 2030 testifies to a fundamental

change in the global thinking about what sustainable development requires, and a profound shift in mind-set lies at the core of its implementation.

Today the world is standing at a crucial crossroads. If we want the world to address the root causes of poverty and the universal need for development that works for all people by 2030, the Sustainable Development Goals need to be implemented in all policies: in government policies, whether European, national or local, in civil society strategies, and in businesses plans, always taking sustainable development as a starting point. There is no time to waste.

The universal approach of the 2030 Agenda requires not only a far-reaching commitment from a wider scope of stakeholders, it also requires broader cooperation between these stakeholders in a more coherent manner. In this publication different dimensions of policy coherence appear. Coherence between:

- *global goals and national contexts*
- *different international agendas and processes*
- *economic, social and environmental development*
- *different sources of finance*
- *actions of multiple stakeholders*

What policy changes are needed to contribute to SDG-proof policies at Dutch and European level,

based upon the principle of policy coherence for sustainable development? In line with the priorities of the Dutch EU Presidency, this publication addresses the following policy areas:

Leave no one behind

This is one of the underlying principles of Agenda 2030. It challenges us to analyse processes of exclusion and inclusion at different levels, e.g. social and economic, and to design specific interventions to ensure that no one is left behind. Instruments for private sector development need to become much more inclusive; relying on an assumed trickle-down effect is no longer possible. Trade agreements should be well designed and be closely monitored; otherwise on-going economic globalisation will exacerbate the fast increasing inequalities. To sum up: all social and economic policies should converge to the single objective of leaving no one behind.

Food security

SDG 2 and other SDGs challenge us to broaden our response to food insecurity in the world. Providing only direct support to small-scale farmers or food aid falls short of the ambition reflected in this goal. We need to look at the global impact of the Dutch and EU's trade and agricultural policies and address negative effects with focused policy measures. Sustainable production and consumption should be promoted both inside and outside Europe. A coherent response to food insecurity thus requires harmonising different international policies and agendas.

Global health

SDG 3 asks for an integrated approach to health issues. That means promoting public health from a health systems perspective. Instead of focusing on individual health projects or policy responses to single diseases, the SDG agenda asks for an inclusive global health policy. Coherence in the area of global health means, to a large extent, linking national policies to global health challenges. Health is also affected greatly by developments in other sectors, such as migration and international trade agreements.

Global Value Chains

SDGs 8, 12 and 15 challenge the private sector and governments to work towards sustainable global value chains in which social and environmental concerns are fully addressed. In several GVCs social rights are violated and damage to the local environment is inflicted at a large scale. Agenda 2030 points towards an approach to GVCs that reconciles the economic, social and environmental interests at stake: to make GVCs economically profitable, socially beneficial, and environmentally sustainable.

Climate change

Together with the Paris agreement on climate change, the SDG agenda, notably SDGs 13 and 7, calls for urgent action at home and abroad. It is impossible to continue an energy policy at home which is based on fossil fuels, while promoting renewables abroad. Our global climate policy and our national energy policy should be in harmony with each other. At the financial level reforms are strongly needed; for example moving away from investing in fossil fuel projects towards renewable energy. At present developing countries bear too large a part of the financial burden of climate change. New and innovative instruments are needed to generate the resources needed for implementing climate policies.

Migration

In the current context with increasing numbers of migrants travelling toward the EU, the migration discourse mainly focuses on controlling the influx of migrants and refugees and whether or not these persons should get leave to stay in Europe or not. SDG 10.7 presents the courageous challenge to execute a balanced agenda facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, in such a way that migrant women, men and children are enabled to positively contribute to inclusive growth and sustainable development.

Peace and security

SDG 16 focuses on peace, security and access to justice. These are fundamental preconditions for sustainable social and economic development. Agenda 2030 is an appeal to everyone to make sure that we do not

protect our own security at the cost of others, or allow security concerns to override development objectives. This means leading by example when it comes to the arms trade. It is also important to make sure development finance in the form of remittances finds its way to developing countries, also to countries where a risk of financing terrorism has been identified.

Tax

SDG 17 sets the ambition of strengthening developing countries' capacity for domestic resource mobilisation. Any policy effort in that direction will only be successful if, in parallel, tax dodging and tax avoidance are addressed. Raising domestic tax revenues and fighting international tax avoidance are fundamental in realizing the SDG agenda. The SDG agenda together with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda are a step forward in the fight for tax justice. In an era of tax havens and tax injustice, a global approach to tax reform and tax transparency is needed.


Finance and partnerships

SDG 17 contains the elements for building a financial and organisational structure to work towards the realisation of the SDGs. Financing the SDG agenda will be a daunting task for multilateral organisations, national governments and other actors. Assuring sufficient levels of ODA is needed, not only to address urgent needs in Least Developed Countries, but also because aid can function as leverage for alternative sources of finance for sustainable development. In terms of organisation, the SDG agenda calls for collaboration and partnerships. A multi-stakeholder approach is required, but should always have a strong focus on development impact and inclusiveness. Governments will have an overall coordinating role to create safe spaces for partnerships and promote coherence among partnerships.

All the above mentioned recommendations try to align concrete Dutch and European policy areas from a policy coherence perspective. An ambitious and coherent implementation of the 2030 Agenda requires first of all a fundamental change of mind set. Together we should strive for broader cooperation between the different stakeholders: at the European Commission in Brussels, the different ministries and local municipalities in EU member states, civil society organisations, research institutions, businesses and financial institutions; always taking policy coherence for sustainable development into account. Furthermore, adequate financial resources are fundamental: upholding Official Development Aid (ODA), with a strong focus on Least Developed Countries, and prioritising work on domestic resource mobilisation is essential, including tax justice and alternative sources of finance. Collaboration is where a sustainable world starts. Let's get ready for change!

chapter

I



Making the Agenda 2030 a reality:

the key role of policy coherence to achieve development

By the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development represents an action plan for people, planet and prosperity. Agreed by UN member states in September 2015, it seeks to transform our common global development pathway. But how will the different policies to reach the Agenda's objectives interact? Potential contradictions within different thematic and policy areas would seriously hamper the realisation of the Agenda, while building synergies across areas would boost the achievement of the Agenda. This is why policy coherence matters.

The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are universal and outline shared responsibilities along the environmental, social and economic pillars of sustainable development. In a significant shift in mindset from the largely 'North-South' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs appeal to the needs of all countries and people and require implementation by all. High-level political backing and the involvement of various stakeholders are crucial for its implementation across Europe and the rest of the world.

The Agenda 2030 represents an integrated approach where the goals and targets connect to each other. Moving on from a 'silo mentality' focused on individual development objectives separately,

now they should be seen as a related and dynamic set of goals that support each other and which can adapt over time.

Reaching the objectives of Agenda 2030 demands coherence of policies and approaches both in their implementation at multiple levels and between various actors, including politicians, policy-makers, civil society and the private sector.¹ In recognition of this, the principle of policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) has been formally recognized and agreed in the Agenda in target 17.14.² It will be an important guiding principle when translating the 17 goals and 169 targets to fit specific national contexts. The new ambitious SDGs bring opportunities for actors to align with the global Agenda and work towards a more sustainable development path. Yet, implementation won't be easy; it will require understanding of how policies interact with objectives across the 17 global goals and better coordination across various policy areas.

The European Union and its member states have in the past aimed to strengthen coherence between policy areas for the benefit of developing countries through what has been commonly described as Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). However due to a tendency to focus too much on technocratic

approaches rather than political aspects, and the absence of strong political sponsorship for PCD, these efforts have not lived up to expectations. The risks won't be any different this time around. If we are to make progress in strengthening policy coherence for sustainable development, we need stronger political leadership and recognition of the political value in implementing the Agenda 2030 coherently.

The Ready for Change publication aims to contribute to the debate about interactions between policies and how they can be adapted in Europe and its member states to support the SDGs. It aims to discuss issues of coherence in implementing the SDGs in the Netherlands and the EU in a number of thematic areas from climate change to migration and development. In this chapter, we delve into some of the conceptual discussions and practical issues surrounding policy coherence for sustainable development.

WHAT IS IN AN ACRONYM? FROM PCD TO PCSD: A CONCEPTUAL EVOLUTION?

Considerations about policy coherence are not entirely new and have existed in different formats and fora.³ However a distinct concept of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) emerged in the context of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union (EU). PCD has generally been accepted to refer to the practice of ensuring that all non-aid policies of developed countries, such as trade, migration, security or agriculture, do not detract from, and ideally are actively supportive of, international development and poverty reduction objectives.⁴

In the European Union, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht already highlighted the need to take into account development objectives in the process of formulating new policies. Then in 2005 the European Consensus on Development achieved agreement at the highest

political level that PCD should play a central role in European development cooperation. PCD has thus been part of the legally binding objectives of EU development cooperation for more than 20 years.⁵ However, this also means that the principle has emerged and evolved in the context of a donor-recipient or North-South paradigm, the same as that which underpinned the MDG framework. PCD has therefore been seen as an obligation and responsibility mainly for donor countries.

A number of mechanisms and tools have been developed by OECD and EU member states to track progress towards PCD, such as assessing concrete PCD commitments, coordination systems, and knowledge and monitoring mechanisms.⁶ However, despite the reiterated political commitments and the institutional frameworks and mechanisms set up, challenges prevail in clarifying and measuring the real impact of EU policies on developing countries. It has not always been easy to reconcile policies with international development objectives, especially in policy areas where the EU and EU member states have strong interests. For example, NGOs continue to point out the incoherence between European humanitarian aid in conflict zones and European arms exports.⁷ They have also stressed that the EU needs to take more seriously its role in fighting illicit financial flows from developing countries, through holding its transnational companies to account and by strengthening transparency and reporting.⁸


The changing global 'development' landscape and the shift of mind-set required by the SDGs have led to renewed conceptual discussions on PCD. The OECD for example has aligned its approach to the universality principle of Agenda 2030 so that policy coherence has 'expanded in many ways and concerns all countries regardless of their development level'.⁹ It presents Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) as an approach and as a policy tool that is valid for all countries, in acknowledgment of the interrelationships among the economic, social, environmental, and governance

dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy making. Its aim is to build capacity so that governments are able to foster synergies and identify trade-offs, to reconcile domestic policy objectives with agreed international objectives and to address potential negative externalities of policies both in the present and the future. The EU similarly emphasises the universal application of policy coherence for sustainable development, although it has still to take a clear official stance on the evolution from the PCD to PCSD concept and the role these concepts play in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.¹⁰

Traditionally PCD has been about considering how policies beyond aid in individual areas may affect poverty reduction in developing countries. The incoherence of how the EU has supported countries with EU aid for agricultural development while at the same time many of these countries' markets have been 'flooded' with heavily subsidized agricultural produce from the EU is one of the most debated and documented of such traditional PCD cases.¹¹ Tensions can also exist between different legitimate security and development objectives. The

unintended negative consequences of legislation against terrorist financing and money laundering on valuable remittances flows to poor countries, such as Somalia, is a case in point.¹²

Going beyond these examples, the evolved concept of PCSD in the post-2015 context seems to put stronger emphasis on integrated and cross-sectoral implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In practice for example, when assessing the consequences of EU policies on food security both within and beyond its borders, one would have to address links between a number of different policy areas including agriculture, trade and energy to name a few. One proposal is to address PCSD issues using a nexus approach where each nexus presents the complex and dynamic interconnections between sectors normally overseen separately. For example, the food/energy/water nexus shows how these areas can be interdependent (e.g. food production requires water, land and energy), but also lead to trade-offs and conflicts (e.g. the trade-off between protecting forests and increasing agricultural land), or may reinforce each other (e.g. water and energy efficiency may reinforce renewable energy targets).¹³



Illustrative interactions between targets in the food/energy/water nexus
 Source: Reproduced with permission from Weitz et al. 2014

LESSONS LEARNT AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRENGTHENING COHERENCE TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The SDG framework presents an opportunity for change: to overcome silos, to think more in terms of synergies and to take into account trade-offs on different dimensions of sustainable development.¹⁴ It provides a strong impetus to engage in more coherent and joined up approaches in support of the SDGs – not least because there is more recognition and emphasis on better coordination and partnership between actors. This publication is an example of how various stakeholders can begin to engage with each other on these particular questions for implementation of the framework in the Netherlands and in Europe.

European stakeholders will still need to fully come to grips with how to reconcile the traditional view of PCD, the new concept of PCSD, and SDG implementation more broadly.

A first issue is to understand what PCSD concretely means for SDG implementation. This relates to the question of whether PCSD is something fundamentally different to the existing PCD agenda. The more traditional PCD approach gives responsibilities to developed countries (and increasingly upper-middle income and emerging economies) for the benefit of poorer developing countries, while PCSD is presented as a guiding principle for SDG implementation by and for all countries. What is the relationship between these concepts? Is it a shift from one to the other or a broadening of the coherence agenda in which they co-exist? Interviews with European policymakers across Directorate Generals of the European Commission covering development cooperation, climate and trade issues reveal that there is still conceptual confusion, in particular because PCSD is part of a considerably broadened development

agenda with an increased number of objectives.¹⁵ Overall the understanding on PCSD seems to be linked more to ‘whole of government’ and integrated or nexus approaches, i.e. better coherence as such in implementing Agenda 2030. However some interviewees noted that the more general PCSD principle provides less concrete, actionable guidance and fewer assigned responsibilities than the EU’s PCD agenda.¹⁶


At the global level, the discussion around the indicator for the PCSD target 17.14 has also revealed that there seems to be big differences in the understanding of what the PCSD principle means in practice and accordingly how to measure progress.¹⁷ As a consequence, some EU and EU member state policy-makers feel that there is a need to keep a focus on specific PCD challenges, which should be identified within the broader Agenda 2030, and on issues where responsibilities and actions can be more clearly established.¹⁸ Some SDG targets already capture some crucial aspects of the ‘traditional’ EU PCD agenda, e.g. in trade, illicit financial flows, remittances, food security or sustainable consumption and production. In the EU, focusing on implementation of these issues within the new agenda can thus help to achieve progress on ‘traditional’ PCD objectives. However at the same time, the broader PCSD lens can help to ensure that coherence with other goals and objectives is guaranteed. In particular, PCSD is seen as a progressive notion that represents an ‘opportunity for PCD to emerge from the growing pains within the EU and OECD, and to play a significant role in marshalling effort toward both global development objectives and enablers of development’.¹⁹

A second aspect to consider is how to deal with the complexity of PCSD as a tool to implement the 2030 Agenda. The PCSD agenda aims to strengthen coherence not only horizontally across different thematic policy domains, but also between different actors and partnerships and at various governance levels from local, national and

regional to international. In the understanding of the OECD, coherence is important on five levels: i) coherence between global goals and national contexts; ii) coherence between international agendas; iii) coherence between economic, social and environmental policy; iv) coherence between different sources of finance and v) coherence between diverse actions implemented by different actors.²⁰

Considering all these different layers when designing or assessing policies may make delivering and assessing progress on PCSD difficult. This is especially the case because, much like PCD, the PCSD concept does not provide guidance for political choices if there are real trade-offs that cannot be easily reconciled or when policies affect the sustainable development prospects of countries or groups differently.²¹ Part of the challenge is to bring policy makers and stakeholders with different worldviews, mindsets and objectives together. While better communication and coordination

structures, as well as increased awareness about the joint goals of PCSD in the post-2015 context, are important to bridge this gap, focusing on institutional coordination structures and institutional mechanisms alone is not sufficient. In fact, the strong emphasis on institutionalising PCD and framing it as a technical undertaking has in the past led to the failure to acknowledge its inherently political nature. The first important change in mindset needed for greater progress on PCSD would be to recognize that strengthening PCSD is about ‘our common and long-term’ development. The universality principle requires a mindset that this agenda is about development here as much as elsewhere and not an agenda for the ‘Global South’ alone. Policies will need to be rethought within this universal paradigm of development and silos need to be overcome. Yet, this is not always easy in practice, as experience from early implementation tests of post-2015 targets in pilot countries shows.²² Progress on PCSD in the EU will succeed only if European leaders are willing to inject political life



The OECD's five complementary levels of coherence for implementing the Post-2015 Agenda

Source: Reproduced with permission from the OECD, 2014b

into the existing structures to strengthen policy coherence and if stakeholders push for PCSD. This publication itself is a good example of highlighting this important issue. Yet, those undertaking the task of achieving better coherence between policies for sustainable development should keep in mind that this must be understood as being fundamentally a challenge of political economy.²³

THE WAY FORWARD IN EUROPE: UNPACKING THE SDG AGENDA

A major task for SDG implementation will be for stakeholders to ‘unpack’ sustainable development from the various boxes in which each pillar has been contained. This will require a shift of both mindset and ways of working, as well as renewed political commitment. Starting from their objectives and institutional responsibility, different line ministries or other implementing stakeholders will have to identify and consider links to other SDG goals and targets through network mapping or other assessment tools.²⁴ To make this work, the design of policies and implementation needs to take into account evidence and knowledge on the existence of interrelationships and causal chains between policy areas and targets, and the nature of the relationships (tension, trade-off or synergies).²⁵ The nexus approach is a viable method for managing the complexity of the agenda by considering policy coordination and coherence in sub-systems of clusters where the components are strongly interrelated such as ‘growth, energy and climate change’ or ‘health, food and nutrition, education and sustainable consumption and production’.²⁶


A number of targets in the Agenda 2030 specify objectives where action, including by European countries, is crucial to achieve the desired benefits for developing or least developed countries. Some of these areas already correspond to existing PCD commitments of the EU, for instance in the area of debt sustainability, reducing transaction costs of migrant remittances or provision of access to affordable and essential medicines to developing countries.²⁷ For an actionable European PCSD agenda, further elaboration of how to achieve these objectives through European policies and the indicators to track them may be needed. A range of actors including policy makers, civil society and private sector can contribute to these discussions.

This publication seeks to make precisely such a contribution. After a clarification of the different roles that actors can play in implementing Agenda 2030 and describing some early practices of implementation, the thematic chapters in this publication outline some of the Interdependencies between policies which have to be better understood and acted upon.

To conclude, more effort and research is required to understand how the EU can track progress towards PC(S)D, adapt the EU’s existing PCD commitments to the new agenda and integrate learning about the impact of policies on various sustainable development dimensions into the policy making cycle through engagement with various stakeholders. The Ready for Change publication is an important contribution towards these efforts.

chapter

2



Ready to change?

European actors and their challenges and opportunities of the 2030 Agenda

By Kaleidos Research

The new Agenda 2030 has turned high-income countries into ‘developing countries’ on many issues such as clean energy and reduction of inequality. It transforms the global development landscape in that the universal nature of the Agenda requires action abroad and at home. It requires a change in the European mind-set. With a new global agenda that combines social and economic development with ecological sustainability, many policy areas and actors that are usually regarded as belonging to separate fields now need to come together. The implementation and contribution to the SDGs will have to take place on the level of EU institutions as well as in EU member states. Implementation of the SDGs is a ‘shared responsibility’.¹

Leaders from all parts of European society have shown support for the new agenda. The prominent delegation to the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 included the Vice-President of the European Commission and many heads of state. As described in the previous chapter, the SDGs provide both opportunities to increase policy coherence for (sustainable) development as well as challenges due to the complex interrelatedness of the goals. In order to contribute to an evidence-based debate on the implementation of the goals, this chapter investigates the different roles that various actors can play with regard to the implementation of the goals. What are the challenges and opportunities for European actors to

contribute to the agenda and what ‘early practices’ can already be identified? In short: is Europe ‘ready to change’?

STATE OF PLAY SDG IMPLEMENTATION

In an ‘ever closer union’ the EU and member states share policy coordination structures on nearly every issue of the SDGs, ranging from a secondary role of the Union in tax policy and education through shared competences in environment and development aid to exclusive competence of the Union in core areas such as external trade policy.² In the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development it is acknowledged that regional frameworks such as the EU ‘can facilitate the effective translation of sustainable development policies into concrete actions at national level’ (par 21), but that each country has ‘primary responsibility for its own economic and social development’ (par 41). Building on existing instruments is encouraged. Taking into account the absence of legally binding targets, the actual implementation of the SDG strategy is a political choice, both at home and abroad.

Within the EU ‘at home’ strategies for sustainable development are already in place, including the Europe 2020 strategy and the EU Sustainable Development Strategy.³ In light of the 2030 deadline of the SDGs the Juncker Commission will ‘set out a new approach’ beyond the 2020 timeframe

taking into account the ‘internal and external implementation’ of the SDGs.⁴ Given the many indicators and targets, Eurostat is planning to play a key role in measuring progress at EU level. With regard to the EU’s ‘abroad’ strategies, the much-awaited EU ‘Global Strategy’ expected in 2016⁵ could be linked up with the UN Agenda 2030. Several actors, including the European Think Tanks Group, have suggested using the SDGs as the basis for the EU Global Strategy as this could strengthen coherent policy-making.⁶

National governments are the primary implementers of the SDGs as the legal entities that have signed the SDGs. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development states that ‘governments have the primary responsibility for follow-up and review at the national, regional and global levels’ (par 47). Successfully carrying out this role requires the development of implementation plans as well as a division of tasks and responsibilities and adequate monitoring of the progress made towards the goals.

The national governments of the EU member states take different approaches towards implementing the SDGs. Some have a wait-and-see attitude; they for instance defer to other urgent priorities such as the current migration crisis or prefer to await the results of the ongoing international process of defining global indicators. Some member states, including Estonia, France and Finland, have reason to speed up as they will be reviewed on their progress on SDG implementation and showcased during the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in July 2016.⁷ Several member states are already quite active with early implementation practices (see boxes ‘early practices’).⁸

Research by the European Sustainable Development Network shows that in most EU member states the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a central role in leading the SDG process. This is the case in Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden. There are also some countries in which the leadership

Early practices I: Who is in charge? ‘Chefsache’?

Seeing the overarching agenda of the SDGs and its many challenges ‘at home and abroad’, some EU member states make their implementation a responsibility at the highest political level. Germany has formally placed responsibility for the implementation of the goals with the Federal Chancellery.¹⁴ In Sweden primary responsibility for the SDGs lies at the level of (the Office of) the Prime Minister.¹⁵ In Finland and the Czech Republic the Prime Minister is important in the setting up of a National Implementation Plan for the Agenda 2030.¹⁶ At the European Commission the First Vice-President Timmermans is responsible for the overall implementation, in cooperation with Vice President Katainen (Jobs, Growth, Investment, and Competitiveness) and HR/VP Mogherini (Foreign Affairs).

is shared with the Ministry for Environment, for instance in Germany and Estonia.⁹ In many countries, the first steps towards implementation of the goals consist of an exploratory process in which knowledge institutes¹⁰, advisory councils¹¹ and CSOs¹² are pointing to the needed changes in government structures and policies in order to transform the goals into actual policies. The report of the Bertelsmann Stiftung ‘Are the Rich Countries Ready’ (2016) is for instance an important building block for assessing the extent to which existing policies of several European member states are aligned with the SDGs. It is clear that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution but that most countries build on existing mechanisms. Countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Italy are for example reviewing their national sustainable development strategies.¹³ The Dutch CSO-initiative

Ready for Change is also an effort to inform the Dutch and EU implementation process from the perspective of policy coherence for (sustainable) development.

ROLES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR VARIOUS ACTORS

In this section we address the roles that can be played by various actors at the EU level as well as at the level of member states. The figure below shows, building on the literature, six broad and interconnected roles (facilitation, financing, enabling, monitoring, communication and advocacy) can be identified for three different groups of actors (public sector, private sector and civil society). Together these form the 'actor-role space' for SDG-implementation.¹⁷


Roles of the public sector

Although much is still unclear about the implementation of the SDGs on the level of EU institutions, a survey among sustainable development policy makers in European countries shows that there are already expectations about the role that

the EU could play.¹⁸ These include:

- *Revising the EU Sustainable Development Strategy;*
- *Taking up a general coordination role;*
- *Integrating the SDGs in the internal and external policies of the EU;*
- *Stimulating and engaging in dialogue with all stakeholders;*
- *Facilitating exchange between member states on good practices for national implementation;*
- *Monitoring and reporting on the SDGs;*
- *Making data accessible;*
- *Supporting member states including financially.*

Taking into account the importance of the Global Partnership to achieve the SDGs, the EU, as well as national and local governments can play a crucial role in facilitating cross-sector collaboration for the SDGs. The public sector is well-placed to connect different stakeholders and stimulate knowledge exchange on cross-sector collaboration. The European Economic and Social Committee has for instance suggested that the EU should set up a European Sustainable Development Civil Society Forum with the goal of involving Europeans in the implementation process.¹⁹



The SDG-implementation pyramid

The potential success of the SDGs largely depends on the monitoring and reporting of SDG progress. It is crucial that governments develop strategies to monitor the SDG process. Both international knowledge institutions, such as Eurostat and the OECD as well as national institutes, such as statistics offices from the Netherlands, UK, Germany, France and Sweden, are playing a crucial role in making the SDGs more measurable as part of the Inter-Agency Expert Group on the Sustainable Development Goals Indicators (IAEG-SDG).²⁰ This includes advising on the development of adequate indicators, revising existing monitoring frameworks to fit data on the SDGs and improving the availability of data.²¹ Innovative methods, such as mobile phone based surveys, should also be considered to collect data. CSOs and the private sector can help to make such technology available and to reach target groups in remote areas.

The financial implementation of the SDGs will be a major challenge, in particular for the public sector. In the MDG-era there was general agreement that fulfilling the international commitment of spending 0.7 per cent of national income of donor countries on development would more or less cover the efforts needed to implement the goals. Although this target was not reached, ODA rose towards USD 135 billion a year in 2015.²² The SDGs however require far more funds than their predecessors; experts estimate implementation of the SDGs could cost up to USD 2-3 trillion a year, around 4 per cent of global GNI.²³ These trillions cannot be provided by national governments alone, but should be collected through innovative financing measures, via blending and taxation as well as through the private sector etc.²⁴ Measures to finance the Agenda 2030 were discussed during the Addis Conference on Financing for Development (2015), where the creation of enabling environments through regulation and public policies for private sector investment was underscored. This means that governments and EU institutions should make efforts to get the private sector on board to contribute to the SDGs.

Local governments and the 'sub-national' level are also encouraged to contribute to the SDG implementation. Research in the Netherlands shows that there is enthusiasm to contribute to the implementation of the agenda particularly around the combination of the local sustainability and international cooperation policy agendas.²⁵ In Austria, a common strategy framework is being prepared in the form of a Federal-State Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development to combine state and federal level. There are different levels of political decentralisation in European member states²⁶ which affects the actual policy 'space' of sub-national actors.

Early practices 2: CSOs 'bring the Global Goals home'

Many Civil Society Organisations have already been active in the negotiation process, but are now also starting to make efforts to 'bring the Global Goals home', to quote the British network, BOND.³⁰ They do this particularly by highlighting the shortcomings in national (and EU) governments' policies in the current context where new policies and structures are needed for the SDGs. One key example of such scrutiny is by the federation of CSOs in Belgium³¹, who are actively campaigning for accountability and incorporation of the concept of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.³² In the Netherlands, a consortium of CSOs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a multimedia platform OneWorld, the employer's organisation VNO-NCW, Global Compact Netherlands and the Dutch Association of Municipalities, have set up a website that brings together Dutch initiatives on the SDGs as well as the latest news on the goals.³³

Roles of civil society and the private sector

Civil Society Organisations and the private sector have a vital role to play in the implementation of the Agenda 2030.²⁷ They are implementers of the goals when carrying out their own projects and activities on sustainable development, both abroad and at home. CSOs are also 'guardians' of the goals and the commitments that were made. The SDGs are not legally binding, and as a result it is crucial that other measures are used to hold governments accountable. Civil society is well suited to promote and ensure accountability (including through parliament) for effective implementation of the commitments made by governments.²⁸ Many CSOs have already been active in the negotiation process and are still playing an advocacy role. As Linda McAvan, chair of the European Parliament's Development Committee, puts it: 'In order for us to succeed, more people across Europe need to know about the goals; they need to be aware of the ambitious agenda we all want to achieve. Policymakers need to be regularly reminded of these goals. The world must not forget about our commitment to the poorest people'.²⁹

So far it has been a challenge to bring the different expert communities together: environment and development aid experts, from CSOs, governments and academia, are not yet used to collaborating with each other. Without broad ownership and support that goes beyond the development sector it will be very hard to implement the agenda in the holistic way that has been envisaged. Nevertheless, some initiatives are taking form and international environmental organisations such as IUCN and WWF have been active in the negotiation process. Environmental CSOs also have a strong track record on participation around international processes such as Rio+20 and the Paris Climate Agreement.

Early practices 3: Global Goals Charter with the private sector and CSOs

In the Netherlands several front runners in the private sector, such as DSM, Unilever, Friesland Campina and Philips signed a special 'Global Goals Charter', which was also presented at the United Nations itself. They see a specific role for businesses in relation to the SDGs by respecting human rights, conserving natural resources, promoting good governance and being transparent by reporting about their impact on society.³⁶ The Charter signatories include over seventy organisations, from business and civil society, universities and trade unions.³⁷ In the Czech Republic a similar initiative has been set up with the aim of involving firms and CSOs in the policy-making process.³⁸

The private sector is also taking up a role in many member states. The World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a global platform of business leaders that actively engages with the SDGs. They have welcomed the SDGs as a framework that includes the private sector as an important stakeholder and have participated in the negotiation process. CSR Europe, the private sector member organisation working on furthering responsible business practices on a European level, has called upon the European Commission to include the SDGs in their forthcoming CSR Strategy. In the Netherlands, the private sector response to the SDGs is also enthusiastic: umbrella organisations

Early practices 4: 'Gap analysis'

In many countries existing mechanisms in government structures and policies are being analysed in order to see what changes are needed for the SDGs. In the Netherlands, for example, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) has compared 41 environmental indicators from the Agenda 2030 with Dutch environmental policy targets.⁴³ Similar processes are taking place within the European Commission as well as in Finland. Like the report of the previously mentioned Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Dutch PBL study not only makes the comparison between policy targets and the SDG indicators, but also assesses the Dutch performance on these targets. This helps to inform policy making on the issues and areas where efforts need to be intensified in order to comply with the Agenda 2030.

in particular see the agenda as 'an agenda of opportunities'.³⁴

In many EU member states, such as the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, businesses are involved in SDG implementation (see box). Such networks do not only work on creating an enabling environment for implementation of the SDGs, they can also help to create tools that can help business to contribute to the SDGs, such as the UN Global Compact. WBCSD and the Global Reporting Initiative together have developed an SDG Compass, that facilitates businesses' assessment on the ways they can best get involved in the Agenda2030.³⁵

The importance of public awareness on the SDGs is acknowledged by many stakeholders.³⁹ Without information about the goals citizens cannot hold their governments to account. Without information, it is also hard for 'unusual suspects', such as Small and Medium Enterprises, local politicians or nationally oriented CSOs, to get on board. In that sense, awareness can be seen as an enabling factor for cross sector collaboration; the goals need to be recognised by those stakeholder as something relevant or interesting before partnerships, within and between sectors, can take flight. As John McArthur and Christine Zhang from the Brookings Institute explained: 'In order to be achieved [the SDGs] will require ample public and scientific debates. Those will need to diffuse much more broadly and deeply than the MDG-linked deliberations of the past 15 years'.⁴⁰

Early practices 5: Future visions and strategies

The SDGs provide concrete goals and targets for 2030. In many EU member states the SDGs can thus be integrated in a long-term National Sustainable Development Strategy.⁴⁴ Slovenia, for example, is developing a national vision 2050 and a strategy which supports the implementation of the SDGs. This includes a 'Horizontal Group' with representatives from ministries and a 'Futures Group' with inclusion of wider stakeholders in academia, business and civil society.⁴⁵

Some communication initiatives have already been taken to inform citizens about the agenda, such as the international Global Goals campaign.⁴¹ Among the recently announced 'SDG Advocates' are renowned Europeans such as Queen Mathilde (Belgium) and Paul Polman (CEO Unilever).⁴²

CONCLUSION: READY TO CHANGE AT HOME AND ABROAD?

The SDGs require a change of the European mindset in action both abroad and at home for sustainable development. The SDGs are no longer only part of the development discourse, like the MDGs, nor are they only part of the environment discourse, like Rio+20. In order to successfully implement the SDGs, a broader recognition is needed of the universal nature of the agenda. It requires different sectors to come together in a global partnership for development. Many actors in Europe can play a role in SDG implementation, from the public sector to the private sector as well as civil society organisations and from local to globally operating actors. It is a 'shared responsibility' between the EU and member states with an absence of legally binding targets. The actual implementation of the SDGs and strategies at home and abroad is therefore a political choice at EU and member state level.

The SDGs offer a whole wealth of opportunities. As the following chapters of this Ready for Change? publication make clear many existing mechanisms are already in place, but more has to be done. Many actors can play a role, from implementation, facilitation,

monitoring, advocacy and communication to financing of the agenda. New actors such as the private sector and local governments are actively seeking to contribute to the agenda. Taking into account the re-orientation of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, PC(S)D mechanisms and the EU Global Strategy as well as national sustainable development strategies, there are many opportunities for all kind of actors to contribute to the implementation of the Agenda 2030. Although the implementation of the SDGs is still in its embryonic phase, initiatives in several member states show that the implementation of the SDGs is under way, that there is a lot of potential in broad civil society to contribute to this process and that steps to align national policies with the SDGs are being taken. This leadership, both from governments and civil society in its broadest sense, is crucial to inspiring change within the EU institutions as well as in EU member states.

chapter

3



Inclusion: Nothing about us without us

'As we embark on this collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind'.¹ General Assembly of the UN, October 21, 2015

Inclusion matters, as reflected in the SDGs and stated as a guiding principle in the pre-amble. Some goals focus on 'reducing inequalities for women and girls' (SDG 5) or among countries (SDG 10). Others aim explicitly at 'inclusion' like SDG 11 (inclusive cities and communities) and SDG 16 (peace, justice and inclusive societies). Nearly all goals end their formulation with for all, and in several SDGs specific vulnerable groups are mentioned: children, women, people with disabilities, elderly, small-scale farmers, pastoralists, fishers, indigenous people, migrants and refugees.

In practice inclusion is not as simple as it may sound. Often marginalised groups are (un)consciously being overlooked, are reinforcing their marginalisation through self-exclusion or are only reached by chance.² Participatory assessments show that interventions often aim at groups that are more easily accessible; a large group of ultra-poor people is often not included, leading to chronic poverty.³

The ones excluded may vary in and between contexts; factors can be related to geography, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, gender, health status, religion, family or a combination of those. Disaggregated data on populations by, for example, gender and age is sparse but needed. Extremely marginalised groups such as children without parental care and victims of human trafficking, are sometimes not even counted because of technical issues or due to political motives, leaving them invisible.⁴ In addition, social norms have been neglected in poverty eradication efforts. These norms can marginalise people and keep them poor, and stigma can be a powerful force for impoverishment.⁵ Exclusion and poverty are correlated. In this chapter we highlight both exclusion and poverty, since we believe action needs to be taken on both perspectives to reverse existing exclusion.⁶ The bottom billion of the world's economic pyramid are not only the poor, but often also the marginalised in society since economic exclusion reinforces social exclusion and vice versa.

SDGs in this chapter

-  5: Gender equality
-  8: Decent work and economic growth
-  10: Reduced inequalities
-  11: Sustainable cities and communities
-  12: Responsible consumption and production
-  16: Peace and justice

The following sections describe this from a social and an economic perspective respectively, followed by policy recommendations for more inclusive action. Economic inclusion is a recurrent theme in this publication. The topic is also addressed in the chapters about food security and global value chains.

SOCIAL INCLUSION

There are many different reasons why people are excluded from their communities but the mechanisms of exclusion are identical. Stigmatisation plays a central role in the process of exclusion. This does not only happen at community level, but also within government, civil society and the private sector. Regardless of why people are stigmatised, the impact on the affected persons and their family is very similar.⁷ The question about how to leave no one behind is not just a technical or organisational one. Exclusion of marginalised groups is strongly related to cultural and political views in society, and very often to discrimination. Inclusion is about removing barriers and changing discriminating systems and negative attitudes. In other words: it is about mindset change on all levels, from systems to individual beliefs and attitudes.

Dutch Policy on Inclusion

In recent years, the Dutch government has made a number of steps to make its policies more inclusive for marginalised groups. The Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation reports annually on the impact of development cooperation policies on the poor.⁸ Reducing inequality is an important objective of the Strategic Partnerships between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs.⁹ In 2015, the Minister developed a special Action Plan on inclusive development.¹⁰ Last but not least, the Voice Fund was launched in 2015, specifically aimed at strengthening discriminated and marginalised groups.¹¹

Internationally, there is a growing recognition of the importance of explicit inclusion of marginalised groups in development policies. Examples are

the United Kingdom (Inclusive Societies Policy), Germany and Austria (Policy for inclusion of people with disabilities), Japan (very well developed system for data disaggregation) and recently the European Commission which commissioned a study on so-called de-institutionalisation in order to develop a strategy for children without parental care outside the EU.

Areas for improvement

Positive steps towards more inclusion have been taken, but there are also areas for improvement. A number of reports point out that there is still a gap between the overall aim of the Dutch government to work on ending of poverty and inclusive development, and the reality. 'Despite the recognition that the effects of economic growth do not automatically trickle down to the poorest groups and that additional efforts are needed to ensure inclusive growth, (Dutch) policy strongly focuses on middle classed and productive sectors, thereby implicitly relying once again on trickle down effects', says the Dutch Inspection for Development Cooperation and Policy Evaluation (IOB) in their Annual Report 2014. IOB states that a clear focus on the most marginalised households will advance the coherence between the Dutch aid and trade agenda.¹² Also the importance of healthcare, vocational training and primary education are mentioned as important conditions for inclusive development, which do not seem to currently have much priority at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹³

Another important element is that inclusion of marginalised groups is not yet systematically included in monitoring and evaluation systems of the ministry, nor in the multi-annual strategic plans of the Dutch Embassies. The same applies to the EU, where they do not walk their own talk on inclusion of people with disabilities.¹⁴

Although differences exist in approaches to ensuring inclusion, there are a number of important commonalities. First of all, policies for inclusion have a twin track approach: a combination of mainstream programmes taking appropriate steps to address the rights of marginalised people, while at the same time targeted initiatives are undertaken to address their specific needs. Next, consultation with people from excluded groups is fundamental, at all stages from design to implementation and evaluation. Finally, data collection is always part of inclusion policies.

A strong focus on inclusion of marginalised groups is not only important from a human rights or social point of view. It is the prerequisite for achieving the SDGs. 'Economic growth that leaves no one behind can deliver sustainable development more quickly. If all groups had benefitted equally from growth since 2000, extreme poverty would be eliminated by 2030'.¹⁵ Furthermore, there is growing evidence that, in the long run, exclusion can carry significant costs for societies.¹⁶ Excluding people from preventive health care services for instance can incur costs later on as diseases progress and become costly to treat. From an economic point of view exclusion of the poorest of the poor is also not sustainable.¹⁷

Creating inclusive societies inevitably requires also financial input, which could pose a challenge, particularly in poorly resourced settings. The good news is that there is evidence that a relatively small extra investment (5 per cent) to remove specific barriers can create huge impact on inclusion of marginalised groups.¹⁸

ECONOMIC INCLUSION

We live in a world with extreme poverty and increasing economic inequalities. Focusing on extreme poverty, the percentage of people living on USD 1,25 a day has significantly decreased. In 1990, nearly half of the population in the developing world lived on less than USD 1,25 a day; that proportion dropped to 14 per cent in 2015.¹⁹ However, because of inflation and its effects on purchasing power, the

World Bank has raised the official poverty line to USD 1,90 a day.²⁰

With regard to economic inequality, Oxfam states that 'In 2015, just 62 individuals had the same wealth as 3.6 billion people, the bottom half of humanity. Since the turn of the century, the poorest half of the world's population has received just 1 per cent of the total increase in global wealth, while half of that increase has gone to the top 1 per cent of the world population. The average annual income of the poorest 10 per cent of people in the world has risen by less than USD 3 each year in almost a quarter of a century'.²¹

Agenda 2030, with its underlying principle of 'leaving no one behind', is intended as a powerful response to economic poverty and inequality: 'We will seek to build strong economic foundations for all our countries. Sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth is essential for prosperity. This will only be possible if wealth is shared and income inequality is addressed'.²² That is a key objective for both the Netherlands and the EU. The European Commission, in its recent 'Trade for All' strategy, underlines inclusiveness.²³ So does the Dutch government, in a letter to Parliament about the Post 2015 agenda.²⁴



Michaela Morosini

EmployAble Light for the World

Anneke Maarse, *Light for the World*

How does this programme contribute to the SDG's?

The EmployAble programme was designed to contribute to quality vocational training for youth with disabilities in Kenya, Ethiopia and Rwanda. Training is not an end in itself; EmployAble, as the name already tells us, aims at creating links between Technical Vocational Education and Training institutions (TVETs) and the labour market, thereby facilitating decent and sustainable (self) employment of youth with disabilities. As such the programme directly contributes to SDG 4 and 8, as well as SDG 1 and 2.

What is a successful method of reaching inclusion in this case of youth with disabilities?

Targeted interventions are needed. By improving awareness, accessibility and skills on inclusion of 7 TVET centres in the EmployAble project, a total number of 273 students with disabilities were enrolled in the 7 TVETs the first pilot year.

EmployAble also invests in awareness raising with potential employers. In Ethiopia we have learned that this works best by engaging them through their

own networks, such as the HR-managers network and the so-called Business and Development platform. Another effective intervention is to expose companies to skilful youth with disabilities through internships or in-company training. The more positive role models there are to show the abilities of youth with disabilities, the more awareness, incentives and motivation will be built among the private sector. Even though EmployAble shows that inclusion of youth with disabilities in skills training and the workplace is possible, supportive policies as well as their reinforcement are needed to scale up these efforts.

How does SDG 17 (partnerships for development) come to live in this programme?

EmployAble is a collaborative action learning program of Light for the World Netherlands, the Agency for Disability and Development in Africa (ADDA) in Kenya, the Ethiopian Centre for Disability and Development (ECDD) and the Umbrella for People with Disabilities in the fight against HIV/AIDS (UPHLS) in Rwanda.

Light for the World is a Dutch development organisation. Its vision is an inclusive society for all where no one is left behind and all persons participate equally in the cultural, social, political and economic environment. Persons with disabilities living in poverty are amongst the most excluded groups in society. They are at the centre of Light for the World's work and they drive the change.

Private sector instruments

There is a growing recognition, that simple economic growth is not necessarily inclusive. Benefits for the middle classes often do not trickle down to poor people. As the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation stated: 'The trickle-down theory is now off once for all. In reality, according to the IMF, one should rather speak about trickle-up: investing in the poorest groups is sound economic policy. High inequality undermines social cohesion and increases the risk for conflicts'.²⁵

Nevertheless, Dutch and EU policy makers have, in recent years, increasingly focused on the role of the private sector in promoting sustainable development. Several new funds and instruments have been created for this purpose. A recent example is the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF), part of which seeks to directly stimulate development of Small and Medium Enterprises in the global South. The question now is: how inclusive are new policy efforts towards inclusive private sector development? In a 2014 study into the full range of Dutch instruments for private sector development, IOB notes that little is known about the poverty impact of these instruments, e.g. income effects for vulnerable groups.²⁶ For newer instruments like DGGF the jury is still out, as evaluations of these instruments are not yet available. A recent report of the Dutch Court of Auditors also notes a wide dispersion of funds for private sector development: only 47 per cent of the countries reached are LDCs or countries in transition towards middle-income status.²⁷

Trade policies

The poverty focus is not only needed at the level of direct support instruments, but also at the level of policies intended to build an enabling environment for the private sector. Regulation of markets, in order to address adverse effects of free trade, is strongly needed. Many people who still live in poverty do not participate in global trade. They operate at subsistence level, or struggle to

make their small enterprise profitable. However, their economic opportunities are to a large extent determined by how well their countries are integrated in global trade.

So far the EU, with which Dutch foreign trade policy is aligned, has tried to mitigate adverse effects of free trade for poorer with special trade regimes like the General System of Preferences (GSP), GSP+ and Everything But Arms.²⁸ The economic impact of these regimes on developing countries has recently been evaluated as positive.²⁹ Now that the EU is about to ratify Economic Partnership Agreements with ACP countries, concerns arise about potential negative impact of increased free trade on insufficiently competitive sectors in ACP countries.³⁰


These concerns ought to provide a strong rationale for a special policy focus on promoting intra-regional trade in Africa and other regions, so as to strengthen the position of relatively poor regions in the global economy. This is of particular importance at a time in which WTO trade negotiations do not offer sufficient perspective for LDCs, and strong players like the EU, the US and others are heading towards regional configurations. In this new landscape LDCs will have to organise themselves and look for different ways to relate to major actors.³¹

The way forward to 2030

- The Dutch government and the EU should promote and facilitate more research and data collection on factors of exclusion. Start with data disaggregation in Dutch and EU policies (at least by gender, age and disability³²) and make it a condition in donor policies.
- The Dutch government should encourage partner countries to include data disaggregation by marginalised groups in existing national censuses by using already tested and recognised methods³³, and include representatives of marginalised groups in data collection (to overcome issues related to stigma and discrimination).
- The Dutch government should give a voice to, and strengthen the claim-making power of, marginalised groups through civil society. Projects aiming to strengthen the voice and claim-making power of these groups should be promoted and funded. Give attention also to claim-making power for families and caretakers of vulnerable groups.
- The Dutch government and the EU must work towards inclusive financial and social systems and structures, both locally and internationally, to ensure that international political and economic structures are inclusive and that all stakeholders are involved in the process.
- The Dutch government and the European Commission's DG DEVCO and DG TRADE should promote pro-poor private sector development in terms of both content and geographic focus.
- The European Commission's DG DEVCO and DG TRADE should promote inclusive international trade, by monitoring the impact of free trade agreements with poorer countries and regions on inclusion. In the spirit of the Commission's Better Regulation approach, monitoring mechanisms should be truly inclusive.
- Aid for Trade efforts from the Netherlands and the EU should benefit LDCs and regional economic organisations in Africa so as to increase intra-regional trade, with the intention that these regional blocs should become stronger internally and more inclusive in order to be stronger on the global scene.

chapter

4



Breaking silos for sustainable and inclusive food security

'We are determined to end hunger and to achieve food security as a matter of priority and to end all forms of malnutrition. (...) We will devote resources to developing rural areas and sustainable agriculture and fisheries, supporting smallholder farmers, especially women farmers, herders and fishers in developing countries, particularly least developed countries'.¹ General Assembly of the UN, October 21, 2015

This quote comes from the United Nations Declaration accompanying Agenda 2030. The international community has committed itself to 'end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and to promote sustainable agriculture by 2030' (SDG 2). SDG 8, 12, 13 and 15, which are all closely related to the second goal, aim furthermore at improving global resource efficiency in consumption and production, decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation, and managing natural resources sustainably.

Contributing to these goals strongly implies both leaving no one behind in a long-term and an ecologically sustainable approach to achieving the right to food²– especially for poorer and vulnerable people such as women and youth. This is not just a bold vision; it is also the commitment of the international community, including the Netherlands and the EU, when expressing the ambition to 'ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property'.³

SDGs in this chapter

-  2: Zero hunger
-  8: Decent work and economic growth
-  12: Responsible consumption and production
-  13: Climate action
-  15: Life on land

CONTRIBUTING TO SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY FOR ALL

Promoting food security has long been one of the priorities of the Dutch development policy⁴, and is also an important element in EU development cooperation.⁵ When analysing SDG 2, three main issues arise which the international community seeks to address: 1) Access to food for all; 2) Sustainable and resilient food production; and 3) Fair food commodity markets. These are closely related to priority areas for the Dutch government during and beyond the Dutch EU presidency. All three key issues relate to areas other than food security (such as global value chains⁶, climate and trade) and therefore stress the need to prioritise policy coherence⁷ regarding an ecologically sustainable and inclusive food production system. Food security cannot be treated as an isolated policy area, and indeed is not approached as such either by the Dutch government or by the EU.⁸ Implementing the SDGs offers therefore momentum to build on, and if necessary adjust, current policies in these three key areas.

1) Access to Food for All

Access to sufficient and healthy food for all (SDG 2.1) that is produced sustainably (SDG 2.4) is one of the biggest challenges of our time. The SDGs directly link this to the need to increase the productivity and income of small-scale food producers, particularly women (...), through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs. Small scale producers, particularly women, are active in local markets and currently provide up to 80 per cent of the food in developing countries. There is growing evidence that small-scale farmers with secured access to resources can get greater yields per unit of land and grow food in a more sustainable way than large farms, increasing their own and societies' access to food.⁹

Whilst most food consumed in developing countries is produced locally, global value chains have important impacts on local value chains and access to food. This can be positive when it comes to providing additional income or access to technology, but risks leading to direct or indirect competition between local and global value chains (food crops for local consumption versus cash crops for export), especially when it comes to scarce natural resources, finance and labour at household level. Women, who are frequently more engaged in local food production, are often disproportionately affected.¹⁰

Global value chains policies

The Dutch government has a strong focus on global value chains¹¹ in many of its policies, driven by economic opportunities, as well as concerns over securing supply for the Dutch and European markets. It also sees global value chains as an opportunity to contribute to food security and sustainable agriculture. Whilst the latter two reasons are often mentioned as a key priority, in practice we find a strong focus on the first two.¹² This contributes to the already growing demand for production in an increasingly natural resource scarce world that lacks strong safeguards to protect small-scale food producers and access to food as a result.

There is increasing recognition that pressure on natural resources needs to be reduced. This requires targeted actions to reduce demand for commodities with a large ecological footprint. Promoting more healthy and sustainable food patterns, less based on animal proteins and soy as also suggested by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 2015) and the Dutch Health Council, is a win-win for food and nutrition security and the environment.

The Netherlands consumes more than three times what it could potentially produce on its own soil.¹³ Although agri-investments promoted by the Netherlands provide important opportunities to some, studies show that small-scale farmers and marginalised groups face pressure on their land, environment and livelihoods as a result.¹⁴ A study about the impact of Dutch investments in the Ethiopian flower sector shows mixed results on local food security.¹⁵

Global and local demands

The risks posed by value chain policies for food security objectives are not monitored and addressed enough at present, whilst opportunities for a balanced and complementary approach to local food markets could be strengthened further. As the Royal Tropical Institute states: 'In many developing countries domestic markets are growing, and offer significantly more potential than export-oriented chains, in terms of their contributions to the local economy, food security and poverty alleviation'.¹⁶ To strengthen their contribution to the SDGs, the Netherlands and the EU will need to carefully consider and address this.

It is essential to identify, discuss and monitor the tensions observed between value chain policies and food security objectives and between global and local demands. A holistic vision and approach¹⁷ to sustainable production and consumption of food and other agricultural/land-based commodities is needed. More emphasis on, and investment in, small-scale sustainable production, local and regional food markets and shorter value chains, combined with promotion of more sustainable consumer choices, can offer solutions to address both policy

incoherencies and market failures and help build truly sustainable value chains, both globally and locally. It explicitly also requires more emphasis on other policy interventions such as improving land governance including through implementation of Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (SDG 5), and increasing public investment in extension services for smallholders and infrastructure for local food markets (SDG 2a).

2) Sustainable and resilient food production

As SDG 2 rightly states, sustainable food production systems and resilient agricultural practices are crucial in achieving worldwide food security, especially for future generations. Goals 2.4 and 2.5 set relevant ambitions by addressing the maintenance of ecosystems, capacity strengthening for adaptation to climate change, improvement of land and soil quality, and the management of genetic diversity of seeds and plants as well as a fair access to seeds by local farmers. The challenge is now to effectively implement these ambitions in Dutch and EU policies to ensure sustainable food production in resilient ecosystems.

Small-scale farmers are at the centre stage of the future food production and possess a rich depth of knowledge and experience about how to sustainably produce food.¹⁸ In order to achieve SDG 2.3, these small-scale and local farmers need to be supported, especially the more vulnerable, including women, indigenous peoples, family farmers and pastoralists. As mentioned in the chapter on climate change, climate financing mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund, in which the Netherlands plays an important role, provide an opportunity to do so.



Agrico's potato project in Kenya

Jacob Mijnheer, Agrico

1. To which SDGs do you aim to contribute with the potato project in Kenya?

The goal of Agrico is to produce potatoes on a large scale, and with that lift up the whole potato chain in Kenya. We do this by investing in storage facilities and machinery, agricultural training and support in marketing. With our project, we aim to reach tens of thousands of small-scale farmers, 60 per cent of whom are women. The farmers can reinvest the profits they have gained in their production. We aim for a win-win situation for small-scale farmers and other players in the chain. With our project, we contribute mainly to SDG 2, and SDG 8. In fact, we indirectly contribute to almost all goals.

2. Which chances do the SDGs offer to Agrico?

Through this project, Agrico will create infrastructure, and local innovation in the potato industry, not only in Kenya, but in the whole of East Africa. This value chain infrastructure will be used to further expand our business. In line with for example SDG 12, we aim to achieve sustainable local production of (seed) potatoes. For us, this is an important basis for a long term business model. For Agrico, strong partnerships throughout the chain are the basis for future business.

3. What is needed to make the SDGs successful, and what is your opinion on the role of private sector vis-a-vis governments?

Exporting potatoes from Kenya initially appeared impossible for phytosanitary reasons. We have addressed this with the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). Subsequently, the Dutch government started a dialogue with the Kenyan government, which led to a bilateral agreement on quality requirements, registration of crop species and protection of species. After that, the potato project was initiated. Throughout this process, there was excellent cooperation between both governments and the private sector. I think this is a good example of how government and private sector can play a role in bringing agricultural production to a higher level, stimulating economic growth, and in ensuring food security. To make the SDGs a success, we need each other.

Agrico (Emmeloord, the Netherlands) is a powerful, cooperative organisation that sells potatoes all over the world, breeds new varieties and develops innovative solutions.

In line with the promise of the SDGs to 'leave no one behind', in combination with Means of Implementation 13.a and the engagements made by EU member states and the Netherlands in the Paris Climate Agreement¹⁹, these small-scale farmers need to benefit greatly from financing mechanisms to strengthen their resilience. These should enable them to apply their extensive knowledge on ecologically sustainable agriculture. Furthermore, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food²⁰ and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure²¹ provide opportunities to put small-scale family farmers and vulnerable land users at the centre of decision-making about their land. Although efforts are being made, both guidelines are not yet implemented in the policies of the Dutch government and the EU.

Ecological sustainable food production

Besides strengthening the resilience of family farmers, guaranteeing a robust ecosystem plays a key role in achieving SDG 2.4 and 2.5. This requires sustainable management that can prevent degradation and regenerate land as well as ecosystems (SDG 15.3 and 15.9), guarantee (agro-)biodiversity and realise a closed nutrient cycle (SDG 12.4, 15.4 and 15.5).²² Climate Smart Agriculture, boosted and promoted by the Netherlands²³, should be based on sound criteria in order to decrease CO₂ emissions.²⁴ Viable examples of these ecologically sustainable food production systems are agro-ecological tea plantations, agro- or analogue forestry and re-greening initiatives.²⁵

In order to achieve ecologically sustainable food production and consumption which can feed the world population without aggravating climate change, Dutch and EU policy instruments need to open up space for the above-mentioned principles. Agro-ecological approaches, such as those described by the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems, promote a holistic approach, while putting priority on the transition towards agro-ecology. This approach, offers a viable,

sustainable and robust food production which can guarantee food security for all and realise the right to food. Close monitoring is crucial for successful implementation of SDGs 2, 12, 13 and 15 on the ground.

3) Trade and fair food commodity markets

Several SDGs have been formulated to make sure that trade agreements contribute to sustainable development and fair markets. SDG 2b is about correcting and preventing trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, SDG Target 17.10 aims to promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system, and with SDG Target 17.11 the international community seeks to contribute to a significant increase in the exports of developing countries.

In 2014, the EU concluded negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements²⁶ (EPAs) with West Africa (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The EPAs have been put forward by the EU as a development tool, and with their character of trade liberalisation they are in line with SDG 2b. However, although many agricultural products are excluded from liberalisation, many stakeholders in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions fear EPAs may harm smallholder farmers and local agribusinesses, as they might have a hard time competing with EU imports as a result of increased access to ACP markets by EU producers.

Studies on the effects of the EPAs on the food security situation in ACP countries differ. A recent study on the EPA EU-SADC found that the agreement may have little impact on the food security situation²⁷, whereas another study on the effects of the EPA EU-EAC on food security, takes a much more critical stance.²⁸ Research on the EPA EU-SADC claims that implementation of the EPA

poses challenges to SADC plans for deeper regional integration.²⁹ This is concerning, as regional trade can contribute to more resilient food systems and enhanced food security.³⁰

As the consequences of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will only become clear once they are being implemented, it is essential to closely monitor the impact of these agreements, including their impact on food security. In line with SDG 17.15, ACP countries should be able to activate safeguard clauses if EPAs turn out to have a negative impact on food security. In reviewing its approach of supporting regional integration, the European Commission has shown it is aware of the importance of integration plans, and expressed the need to address this in political dialogue with developing countries.³¹ This offers opportunities, as the jury is still out on the impact of EPAs on regional integration.

Apart from monitoring the impact of the EPAs, Aid for Trade programmes (in line with SDG 8.a) can provide support to ACP countries to assist them to benefit from the EPAs.³² This includes efforts to build their productive capacity and to diversify and strengthen intra-regional trade in an inclusive manner. This is essential to be able to compete with EU products on the domestic market as well as to meet regulatory and market requirements to enter the European market (so that Non-Tariff Measures³³ do not form an obstacle). This is also acknowledged by the European Commission when stating that 'specific Aid for Trade regional programmes could be designed for trade facilitation and connectivity'.³⁴ We urge them to make this intention a reality.

The way forward to 2030

The Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs and the European Commission's DG Trade and DG DEVCO should make global value chains truly sustainable by jointly:

- Identifying, discussing and monitoring any tensions between global value chain policies and food security objectives, to ensure sustainable and inclusive local food security and food systems are protected and promoted;
- Developing sound criteria for upholding sustainability in global value chain initiatives in line with the right to food, water and land, such as those laid out in OECD guidelines and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure Land Tenure; as well as indicators to monitor and report on this for any policies and initiatives related to global value chains;
- Formulating and implementing a holistic and cross-sectorial food and natural resource policy to promote sustainable and healthy food consumption choices in the Netherlands and the EU, and consequently promote a smaller global footprint.

The Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure and Environment and the European Commission's DG AGRI and DG DEVCO should:


- Prioritise investments and research in local agro-ecological practices which contribute to more sustainable and robust food production systems and also mitigate the effects of climate change (for instance in efforts for Climate Smart Agriculture);
- Put the right to food at the centre of climate financing and investment policies in order to ensure support for small-scale farmers and implement the guidelines of FAO and the Committee on World Food Security on the right to food and governance of tenure

The Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the European Commission's DG AGRI and DG DEVCO should:

- Scale up efforts for the creation of facilities to support regional trade in fostering regional integration as part of the Aid for Trade programme;
- Ensure proper technical and financial support is provided for monitoring the effects of the Economic Partnership Agreements on local food security once ratified as part of Aid for Trade programmes;
- Foster permanent dialogue between political, economic and civil actors in ACP countries around the implementation of the EPAs and the spending of Aid for Trade funds.

chapter

5



Global health starts at home

As the world and its economies become increasingly globalised and disease outbreaks highlight the rapidity with which crisis situations can arise and the cross-border aspects of health, it is necessary to think about health in a global context.

Health is an integral part of the SDGs, both as a goal in itself and as an instrument to achieve other SDGs. SDG 3 aims to ‘ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’. Other SDGs related to health are for example SDG 5 (especially 5.6: ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health) and SDG 10 which aims to reduce inequality within and among countries. This chapter highlights the challenges in global health, such as poor access to health workers and medicines (TRIPS), with a specific focus on health systems and provides recommendations for Dutch and EU policymakers to achieve the SDGs related to health.

Global health refers to ‘health issues which transcend national boundaries and governments and call for actions on the global forces and global flows that determine the health of people’.¹ Universal health coverage is seen as the corner stone to enable the achievement of all targets of SDG 3. Universal health

coverage refers to ‘financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services, medicines and vaccines for all’ (SDG 3.8).

The World Health Organisation (WHO) indicates that a well-functioning health system is built on the availability of trained and motivated health workers, a well-maintained infrastructure, and a reliable supply of medicines and technologies, backed by adequate funding, strong health plans and evidence-based policies.² It is important that health systems in developing countries should be enabled to reach a level of adequacy and resilience that will provide universal coverage sufficient to citizens’ needs.³

SDGs in this chapter

-  3: Good health and well-being
-  5: Gender equality
-  10: Reduced Inequalities
-  17: Partnerships for the goals

Leave no one behind

The world has endorsed the ambition of Agenda 2030 to 'leave no one behind'. A different approach to the concept of inclusion would increase equity. Presently the term inclusion usually refers to ensuring participation of the disabled, or to those affected and infected by HIV. However, there are other groups now excluded from access to good health care, such as the elderly, those with mental health issues, and ethnic minorities, as well as sexual minorities and those affected by diseases that result in stigma and discrimination. All policies should be inclusive, not only of vulnerable groups in relation to HIV and of the disabled, but also of other vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, those with mental health problems, and ethnic and sexual minorities.

Linking the Dutch policy priorities to the SDGs that are related to health issues, three areas are revealed as focus areas for future policy and challenges.

POLICIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE NETHERLANDS

Health beyond the borders of the Netherlands and the EU used to be a domain of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2012, the Ministries of Health and Economic Affairs take an equal share in promoting health and health-related issues, such as anti-microbial resistance (AMR) or access to medicines for everybody. However, global health as such is not being discussed as a policy topic or priority.

1) Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR)

The Netherlands has shown leadership in the areas of SRHR and HIV/AIDS in the past and is well known as a pioneer. The Dutch government's aim is to contribute to reducing maternal mortality rates, curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS and preventing unwanted pregnancies, especially among teenagers. This aims not only to be of direct benefit to people

in developing countries on these issues, but also to boost social and economic progress in these countries.⁴

In the context of its promotion of SRHR, the Netherlands provides technical and financial support through programmes in four areas.⁵ According to a policy evaluation of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SRHR policies have consistently promoted knowledge about SRHR worldwide. The Netherlands has proved to be almost the only donor country that has been addressing taboo issues, such as access to modern contraceptives, including access to safe abortion, and LGBT rights. In addition, the Netherlands has often addressed the more sensitive issues, such as gender inequality, or emphasised in the area of HIV/AIDS the vulnerable position of women and girls.

Although ambitious policies are in place, reducing inequalities has turned out to be difficult to achieve, especially those related to age, sexual orientation and marital status. It appears to have also been challenging to implement interventions such as safe abortion, and realise access to services relating to sexual health, especially for vulnerable people. Furthermore, the above mentioned evaluation has shown that investments in health system strengthening are essential in achieving both the SDGs and Dutch policy ambitions to overcome the existing health gap.⁶ In its current policy on development cooperation, strengthening health systems beyond SRHR is not a priority for the Netherlands.

2) Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)

The Dutch Ministry of Health (MoH) is actively engaged in the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), a joint effort by the United States, South Korea, the WHO, and public and private stakeholders. This agenda aims to accelerate progress towards a safe and secure world free from infectious disease

threats and to promote global health security as an international security priority.⁷ The GHSA includes the need for a rapid response to the increase in the emergence and spread of new microbes and multi-drug resistant bacteria (anti-microbial resistance).

Although this is a very positive development for global health, the latest policy seems to have neglected horizontal strengthening of health systems, resulting in fragmentation of care. The recent outbreak of Ebola has illustrated clearly how arduously achieved progress in women's, children's, and adolescents' health can be seriously compromised when weak health systems are confronted with a crisis.⁸

While the issue of anti-microbial resistance has been put on the political agenda, the Netherlands has not yet a shared policy for better access to medicines and improvement in research and development for medicines. A clear agenda for a global health policy is still needed.

3) International Health Regulations (IHR)

A third area in which the Netherlands has shown leadership is on International Health Regulations. Its aim is to help the international community prevent and respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide.⁹ Working towards compliance with IHR has immediate positive effects for the overall strengthening of health systems. The Netherlands has taken measures to implement and comply with the IHR.

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Health (MoH) should cooperate more closely on the area of reduction of anti-microbial resistance and implementation of the International Health Regulations. The Ministry of Health performs tasks from a national perspective on health and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertakes activities with a view to improving health outcomes abroad. It would be beneficial for the global challenges like the anti-microbial resistance and the International Health Regulations that the MoH has prioritised at national level to be taken on board by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the technical expertise of the MoH could be applied abroad.

NEED FOR A GLOBAL HEALTH STRATEGY

With its experience in SRHR, the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and International Health Regulations (IHR), the Netherlands is well-placed to take a lead in health systems strengthening ambitions for a sustainable impact. Global health in the Netherlands is currently addressed by two ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health. Each has its own mandate, related objectives and ways of working, and it is likely that both ministries would benefit from strong health systems here and abroad. The way forward should be one of shared investments by these ministries and a range of (inter)national actors into health systems strengthening. Additional Dutch ministries (e.g. Defence) can add their expertise and networks; the success of such a collaborative effort by all these actors was recently demonstrated during the Dutch government's response to the Ebola outbreak.

So, a more comprehensive sector wide vision is needed to develop a genuinely coherent global health policy. At present, migration, trade and economic policies may be counterproductive to achieving several health objectives formulated by the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Health. A national Global Health Strategy, linking national policies to global health challenges, could be a step in this direction.



PharmAccess

Alexander Kohnstamm, Pharm Access

To which SDG do you contribute with your organisation?

PharmAccess improves access to healthcare in sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on the private sector, which provides medical care to more than half of the population, mainly the poor. We work in health insurance, quality standards, loans for doctors and mobile digital technology, to reduce risks and increase investments in quality and accessibility. This contributes to SDG 3 (good health and well-being), to SDGs 1 and 10 (no poverty, reduced inequalities) by reducing illness related financial risks and poverty traps, to SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), as well as SDG 16 (inclusive institutions).

How does SDG 17 (partnerships for development) come to life in your programmes?

The PharmAccess approach of reducing risks for all market parties in healthcare is a perfect fit with the SDG 17 targets around mobilizing additional financial resources and promoting investments. Our focus on mobile phone based transaction technology for healthcare, and on innovation through on-the-ground scientific research, serves the SDG 17 target to improve access to science, technology

and innovation. This novel approach has been made possible through a long-term partnership with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as various other African and international partners both on the public and the private side.

What is needed to make the SDGs a real success?

Two things come to mind. First of all, involving the local private sector in delivering socially relevant services and products is crucial. This is a matter of corporate social responsibility, but also of creating an enabling environment for local businesses in healthcare, education, energy and infrastructure. The second is that we should make much better use of technological innovation. Our mobile health wallet for example directly connects all stakeholders – patients, providers, insurers, donors and governments – to make the health sector more effective, efficient and transparent. And it empowers people to pay and save for health through their mobile phones. In addition, we should not forget that adequate public ODA funding remains crucial to attract private investments and stimulate development.

PharmAccess is dedicated to improving access to health care in Africa with innovative financing mechanisms. PharmAccess mobilises public and private resources for the benefit of doctors and patients through health insurance, loans to doctors, clinical standards and quality improvements, private investments and operational research.

POLICY AND CHALLENGES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Improvements in health can be achieved with attention to the issues discussed above, but health is also affected by developments in other sectors. Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development is one of the leading principles of Agenda 2030. Therefore we are looking at health in relation to three policy areas within the scope of EU policy.

1) Migration Policy

Migration policy is one of the most conspicuous policy areas that may impede the achievement of SDG 3. The global economy is projected to create around 40 million new health sector jobs by 2030 mostly in middle- and high- income countries.¹⁰ Despite the anticipated growth in jobs there will be a projected shortage of 18 million health workers to achieve the SDGs in low- and lower-middle income countries.¹¹ This could increase the brain drain of skilled health workers if SDG 8 is not taken on board: promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.¹² The 2015 European Agenda on Migration¹³ should therefore put more emphasis on what is now vaguely identified as 'ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified workers in countries of origin'. Putting such a policy into practice might help towards reducing brain drain in developing countries with fragile health systems, where the Netherlands and the EU have been investing in health system strengthening through capacity building for health training institutions.

2) Refugee Crisis

The current refugee crisis, which has resulted from on-going conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Syria and neighbouring countries, also has health implications. For example, we see a strong impact on the sexual and reproductive health of women and girls. Of the 800 women that die every day as a result of complications during pregnancy or birth,

507 are in armed conflicts or fragile states.¹⁴ Also, practices such as child marriages and female genital mutilation (FGM) occur significantly more often in areas where humanitarian crises are ongoing. And finally, the unmet need for family planning is very high.¹⁵ However, in humanitarian interventions, including those supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, very little attention is paid to specific SRHR issues. Family planning/SRHR services are not considered a basic need. If they are provided, the focus of services is mainly on maternal health. Even though this is also very important, evaluations show that humanitarian programmes focus too little on other family planning services, including safe abortion and on the sexual health of adolescents.¹⁶

3) International Trade Agreements

Regarding international trade agreements, concerns exist that provisions in these treaties, particularly regarding intellectual property rights, may increase prices of medicines and health commodities in countries that struggle to afford them. Agenda 2030 includes a strong political commitment to ending AIDS and leaving no one behind. Implementing the agenda will contribute enormously to achieving healthier lives for all and will support the advancement towards other SDGs. Increasing access to affordable and high quality treatment, including effective medicines for all people in need is an imperative if we want to work towards universal health coverage.

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international agreement administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that sets minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation as applied to nationals of other WTO members. TRIPS flexibilities are perceived as repairs to a system that is based on protecting patents, rather than providing structural solutions to meet the needs of the poor. High-income countries should immediately stop pressuring low-and middle-

income countries to adopt or implement TRIPS-Plus measures in trade agreements that impede access to life-saving treatments for all who need them.

Technical agencies should conduct an analysis of the impact of current intellectual property frameworks, including TRIPS-Plus provisions in Free Trade Agreements, on the availability, affordability and accessibility of treatment and diagnostics for HIV and other health problems in low and middle-income countries. Achieving universal health coverage starts at home. Different programmes supported by the


Netherlands and the EU contribute to global health, but collaboration among the relevant actors, such as Ministry of Health, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others, needs to be strengthened for better results and a more coherent approach to health systems strengthening. The Netherlands and the other EU member states should develop a national Global Health Strategy. It will ensure consistency and coherence and enhance effective cooperation between all national ministries in the EU. This way the Netherlands and the EU can contribute effectively to global health for the benefit of all people.

The way forward to 2030

- All programmes of the European Commission and the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Health, which aim to improve health in developing countries, should pay attention to health system strengthening, including building capable human resources, well-maintained infrastructures, and a reliable supply of medicines and technologies, backed by adequate funding, strong national health plans and evidence-based policies.
- All humanitarian policies and interventions of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs should pay attention to SRHR. SRHR goes beyond maternal health: access to family planning, including safe abortion, essential drugs and commodities and well-trained health staff, comprehensive sexuality education and protection from gender-based violence should also be included.
- The EU and the Netherlands should provide legal and technical assistance to low and middle-income countries to encourage them to make use of TRIPS-flexibilities. EU trade agreements and bilateral treaties with third countries should include guaranteed access to affordable and generic medicines for low and middle-income countries.
- EU member states, including the Netherlands, should develop a national Global Health Strategy, aiming to ensure consistency and coherence and enhance effective cooperation between the national ministries.



chapter 6



Global Value Chains: making sustainability a reality

'Global Value Chains (GVCs) have a high impact on developing countries. The opportunities that come with internationally traded goods can be a blessing. But the damaging effects of unsustainable production are a curse. All too often the curses and blessings are unevenly distributed. The most serious environmental and human rights violations tend to occur at the beginning of the production chain'. Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, December 8, 2015

These words are from the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation speech at the 'EU and Global Value Chains' conference at 8 december 2015.¹ During the Dutch EU Presidency the Netherlands will promote its approach to making GVCs sustainable. The Dutch ambition is a triple win: to make GVCs economically profitable, socially beneficial, and environmentally sustainable.

However, there is still a considerable gap between existing standards and actual practice. To solve this, action is needed both in terms of sustained and practical improvements of the functioning of GVCs and the ability to enforce these improvements when progress is insufficient. Legal mandatory due diligence and liability, access to remedy, and transparency are some of the approaches needed to strengthen implementation of existing guidelines.

SDGs in this chapter



2: Zero hunger



8: Decent work and economic growth



12: Responsible consumption and production



15: Life on land

There are already a number of relevant standards that are embraced by UN member states: the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights², and OECD members: the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.³ There is also an increasing number of sectorial or thematic guidelines at various levels. These standards touch both on the role and obligations of states and those of non-state actors like companies. However these new standards are primarily voluntary, and not enforceable.

In this chapter we will explore how the SDG agenda, in combination with existing standards, obliges us to develop a more coherent GVC policy: no economic gains at the cost of people in poverty or to the detriment of nature. We will do so by giving illustrations of social and environmental challenges in a few value chains. The link between GVCs and local food security is addressed in the chapter on SDG 2.

SOCIAL CHALLENGES: THE CASES OF GARMENTS, NATURAL STONE AND SEEDS

SDG 8.7 focuses on measures to eradicate modern slavery and child labour, while SDG 8.8 focuses on protecting labour rights and promoting safe and secure working environments.

Child labour and modern slavery were already high on the priority list of governments and of various initiatives that aim to tackle these issues in the context of GVCs. Freedom from child labour and forced labour are human rights that should be promoted by all governments. They are part of fundamental labour rights which also include freedom of association, collective bargaining and non-discrimination.

In recent years the focus on these issues has been reinforced by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Both include the

government's duty to protect human rights in a business setting, the responsibility of companies to respect human rights including by active due diligence in their full supply chain and access to remedy for victims of human rights abuses by companies. For companies and their stakeholders there are an increasing number of tools for due diligence in their supply chain, in order to prevent and/or mitigate risks and report on action taken. One such tool on child labour is the ILO-IOE Guidance Tool on Combating Child Labour.⁴

Cotton, vegetable seeds and natural stone industry

An increasing number of reports shows how prevalent child labour and forced or bonded labour are in several GVCs involving a large number of Dutch and European companies. In India's spinning mills around 200.000 girls and young women, working in forced labour conditions, produce garments for consumers. Often they are local migrants and Dalits (so-called 'outcastes').⁵ In India's cotton and vegetable seed industry alone more than 650.000 children are working under very harsh conditions as part of the GVC of Dutch, French, US and Japanese seed companies, frequently including children who have been trafficked.⁶ Debt bondage is endemic in the natural stone industry catering to consumers and 'public markets', e.g. granite used for town squares and public buildings. The case of natural stone is of specific importance in the context of public procurement, either by national, regional or local governments.⁷

Recently a few regulations on supply chain transparency have been enacted with regard to forced labour, including human trafficking. Examples are the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (2012)⁸ and the UK Modern Slavery Act (2015).⁹ Both require large companies to report on modern slavery, including child slavery, in their supply chain, but are still weak on specifying specific risks and the action taken to address them. In addition there is the more general directive of the EU on 'non-financial

reporting' which is now being translated into the national regulations of EU member states.¹⁰ While this means some progress on reporting, it seems the reporting requirement will be limited to very large companies and will not be specific on what to report.

Convenant on Garments and Textiles

In the Netherlands sectoral agreements (so-called Covenants) have been initiated as a matter of government policy, including in the garment, banking, natural stone, food and gold sectors, to deal with human rights violations and environmental impacts in the supply chains of companies operating in the Netherlands. Based on the above-mentioned principles and guidelines, covenants should function as frameworks for public-private cooperation to implement them. This might ultimately be more effective, or at least more encompassing, than the multitude of private and multi-stakeholder initiatives that have been launched. The new Covenant on Garments and Textiles¹¹ is the first such Covenant, and it might both give guidance to new covenants as well as provide an example to improve on (see inspiration). The need of the hour is to create a 'legal backbone' to strengthen such initiatives and make sure companies have an incentive to join. Increasingly, companies themselves are asking for such measures in order to effectively deal with the plethora of demands and pressures from both the public and policy makers, and thus create a 'level playing field'.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES: THE CASES OF PALM OIL AND SOY

Concrete headway can be made in ensuring 'efficiency in use and management of natural resources' (SDG 12.2) and 'sustainable development, including the private sector' (SDG 12.6).

Palm oil

Under the aegis of SDG 12 on sustainable consumption and production patterns, palm oil is an important case. Palm oil is probably one of the fastest growing agro-commodities, with 4-5 per cent annual growth in global demand. It is a major revenue earner for countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. After oil, it is the second largest expense on India's import bill. Forty per cent of global palm oil production comes from smallholder farms. Millions of workers earn a living in this sector, many of them being migrants, women and casual labourers. The sector is facing serious labour issues.¹² Palm oil is one of largest drivers of deforestation and consequently of climate change and land grabbing on a large scale with severe implications for food security (see the chapter on food security).¹³

These negative impacts are partly the result of governments of producing and consuming countries, failing to regulate production and trade of this commodity. In response to public outcry the private sector and NGOs joined hands in developing the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). Their vision is to transform markets to make sustainable palm oil the norm, through self-regulation of the industry and by reaching out to governments and other stakeholders to ensure adequate legal-institutional reform and enforcement. They mainly focus on the domain of land use planning, concession permits, social and environmental safeguards and market regulation. However, RSPO itself is still facing the challenge of addressing serious non-compliance and oversight issues.¹⁴



Dutch Covenant on Garments and Textiles

Gerard Oonk, the India Committee of the The Netherlands

What opportunities do the Sustainable Development Goals offer to make the textile value chain more sustainable?

The SDGs are an extra obligation on policy makers and value chain actors to remove child labour and other labour rights violations from global value chains.

Can you tell something about the new textiles covenant? In what way does it contribute to the goals set in the Agenda 2030?

The Covenant on Garments and Textiles is the outcome of negotiations by three trade associations, government, trade unions and civil society organisations. The core of the covenant is mandatory due diligence by participating companies in all tiers of their supply chain. Participating companies have to identify violations of labour and environmental standards and make an annual improvement plan with specific targets. There are nine thematic areas including all fundamental labour rights, health and safety, living wages, raw materials, environmental issues and animal rights. Part of the Covenant is an analysis of labour issues in global production chains for which a 'road map' with measurable goals will be designed. Trade unions and civil-society organisations will be partners in making sure that local unions and NGOs are directly involved in assessing and remedying violations. Local organisations can submit

a complaint to the independent disputes and complaints commission of the covenant whose decisions are binding and can ultimately lead to arbitration. From the third year onwards, enterprises will have to communicate publicly about their impact.

What is needed to make the covenant a real success?

The Dutch government will give diplomatic and practical support, and strengthen its (fair) public procurement policy. It will also encourage cooperation at the European level including by 'scaling up' national initiatives in e.g. Germany, Denmark, the UK and France. The covenant will only be signed by the organisations involved and the government if, within three months, at least 35 companies, who represent together at least one-third of the sales in the Netherlands, join this initiative. Within a year this needs to be half of the sales.

And who will benefit from it?

Among others, children in producer countries will benefit. In the case of child labour it will be ensured that former slave children will go to school. Where possible, this will be realised through the 'Child Labour Free Zone' approach of the Stop Child Labour coalition, which has been successful in India and various African countries.

The Dutch government, along with a group of trade organisations and NGOs, announced a textile covenant on 9 March 2016. The aim of the covenant is to prevent child labour and improve poor working conditions and low wages in textile producing countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Turkey. The covenant was developed in light of the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh in 2013, where more than a thousand people died.

Soy

Another GVC which merits attention is soy. Implementation of 'responsible and deforestation free' soy production practices would contribute to SDG 2.4 ('sustainable food production') and SDG 15.2 ('sustainable forest management'). With regard to soy, awareness and action is still low in most EU member states.

Due to growth in consumption of animal products, the production and trade of soy has increased considerably in the last decades. Soy production is associated with negative impacts.¹⁵ It is by far the commodity with the largest forest footprint for the Netherlands and Europe. A study commissioned by the European Commission identified that 54 per cent of the imported 'forest footprint' of commodity crops in Europe was caused by soy imports.¹⁶ In Europe 31.6 million tons of soy is imported annually, mostly for use in animal feed.¹⁷

Round Table on Responsible Soy

Initially, the Netherlands was a frontrunner on 'responsible soy'. One of the reasons was that the Netherlands is the second largest importer of soy worldwide, after China. Since 2003 a coalition of Dutch NGOs has worked on creating awareness. In dialogue with companies they played an important role in setting up the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS). The representation of civil society safeguarded the inclusion of environmental and social criteria, and of verification based on independent third party auditing.


In 2011 a commitment was signed by all supply chain actors, including the government-funded Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH), to move to 100 per cent RTRS soy in 2015 for all soy used in the Netherlands.¹⁸ This commitment included soy use for export of animal products, which is 2/3 of production. However, the feed, meat and eggs industries did not keep their promises. They stepped back from the 100 per cent commitment and set up a 'minimum requirement' benchmark that is far below the agreed level of 'responsible and deforestation free soy'. This benchmark still allows 'legal deforestation'.

Apart from the Dutch retail and dairy industry, and a handful of individual companies like Bel Groupe (France), Arla (Denmark and Sweden) and Unilever (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), it is only in Sweden and Switzerland¹⁹ that the private sector has taken considerable steps towards deforestation free and responsible soy. There is still a long way to go.

Very recently, the Netherlands together with other EU member states signed the New York Declaration on Forests (2014)²⁰ and the Amsterdam Declaration (2015)²¹, both aiming at eliminating deforestation in relation to GVCs. The Netherlands, like-minded EU member states and the EU have to make sure that these pledges are respected by all signatories. As with social concerns, environmental concerns in GVCs can only be addressed effectively by introducing more legal mandatory due diligence, liability, access to remedy and transparency.

The way forward to 2030

- The European Commission's DG TRADE and the member states' Ministries of Economic Affairs should create mandatory due diligence for companies with regard to their full supply chain by requiring transparency on 'salient risks' of rights violations and about the impact of measures to prevent and tackle these violations. The UK has made a start with this through its Modern Slavery Act 2015, but the EU should encourage member states to adopt binding acts that require companies to report on specific social and environmental risks as well as ways to address these risks. EU member states should consider introducing similar transparency laws to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in the UK.
- The Dutch government, the EU and other member states need to introduce green and fair public procurement wherever possible. The new EU directive on public procurement has not yet been translated into effective action by member states. Companies with proven records on implementing social and environmental standards based on the OECD Guidelines should be given preference in public procurement. In addition governments should require suppliers to be transparent about the source and the social and environmental impact of their products, as well as on efforts to correct negative impacts.
- The Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, other signatories and the European Commission's DG DEVO, DG ENVI and DG TRADE are requested to take further steps to implement and expand on the promising 'Amsterdam Declaration' on eliminating deforestation from GVCs in general and making palm oil sustainable. In this context the wider adoption and implementation of initiatives that have set credible standards, such as RSPO, RTRS and ProTerra, should be further supported and promoted.
- Within the framework of the Dutch government's commitment to the Amsterdam Declaration a plan of action should be developed to also ensure that Dutch ports, especially the Ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, take appropriate steps to promote preferential treatment of certified sustainable palm oil and soy.
- The Dutch Ministries of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs are requested to enter into bilateral collaborative partnerships with producing countries to develop and implement regulatory measures and safeguards, in order to ensure legality, inclusive development and a more level playing field in the market.
- The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and the EU should ensure that within the framework of the EU's Renewable Energy Directive the relatively large percentage of palm oil which is used as biofuel (7 per cent globally), meets the highest sustainability standards, namely at least RSPO.



chapter
7

Climate change: Let's act together and let's act now

2015 was a landmark year for the global response to climate change. In September the SDGs were adopted, including SDG 13, which calls for 'urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts'. In December the international community concluded the COP21 agenda. Now the momentum needs to be maintained, showing responsibility and taking action.

'Climate change is nature's active response to modern-day life. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is fully committed to the goal of keeping global warming below 2 degrees Celsius. The traditional divide between rich and poor and north and south is no longer all-defining. It is important that each country contributes according to its ability'.¹ These words of Dutch Prime Minister at the COP21 in Paris correspond with the commitment of the global community expressed in SDG 13.

In this chapter we propose policy steps needed after the adoption of SDG 13 and the COP21 agenda. Where possible, linkages will be made with other SDGs, especially SDG 7 on renewable energy.

SDGs in this chapter



7: Affordable and clean energy



13: Climate action

THE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 'AT HOME'

The Netherlands, as a member state of the EU, falls under the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) for COP21 as submitted by the EU. The EU's binding INDC target is a domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of at least 40 per cent by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. Other EU climate and energy goals for the year 2030 are increasing the share of renewable energy to at least 27 per cent of consumption at European level and a nonbinding energy efficiency improvement target of 27 per cent.² These targets will have to be translated to member state level. However, although EU and Dutch policies are grafted onto this ambition, the targets are insufficient to stay below a temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius, let alone 1,5 degrees Celsius, which was formulated as an ambition in the 2015 Paris Agreement. According to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency: 'To arrive at a global emission level by 2030 that would be consistent with the 2 degrees Celsius climate target, with equal costs as a share of GDP for all countries, the EU would need to reduce emissions by 45 per cent to 47 per cent relative to the 1990 level'.³

National Energy Deal

In 2013 the Dutch government presented the National Energy Deal⁴ which aims to push the share of renewable energy from 4 per cent in 2013 to 16 per cent in 2023. The Urgenda lawsuit⁵ and the Post-Paris debate have generated a new dynamic: the Dutch Parliament is keen on shutting down coal plants.⁶ However, sufficiently ambitious plans on energy efficiency and CO₂ reduction are still missing and the Dutch renewable energy plans are not on track.⁷ The Dutch economy still heavily relies on fossil fuels.

In order to achieve agreed climate goals, it is essential for the EU and its member states to present an action plan stating how the international

targets will be achieved at national level. This is of particular importance for the Netherlands, which is running behind on climate action compared to most EU member states. Paradoxically, the Dutch climate action abroad is praiseworthy with its support for renewable energy projects in developing countries.⁸ To achieve SDGs at home, the Netherlands should also show bold action in its domestic energy policy, learning from countries like Denmark and Germany who are well underway with a transition to clean and sustainable energy.⁹

There are examples of Dutch companies that already invest in innovative energy solutions and are leading the way towards the future (see inspiration).

PHASING OUT FINANCING OF FOSSIL FUEL WORLDWIDE

The Netherlands and the EU have committed to phase out public support for fossil fuels.¹⁰ At the same time they continue to support International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) which, for example, invest directly in fossil fuel projects such as off-shore oil and gas exploration, or financial backing for infrastructure projects that support the further development of the supply chain of oil, gas and coal.¹¹

ECAs outstrip all other public financial institutions in financing fossil fuel related investments. Exact figures are hard to come by, but total ECA support for fossil fuel projects by OECD countries amounts to at least USD 8 billion per year.¹² The Dutch ECA Atradius Dutch State Business is one of the larger ECAs in Europe, regularly underwriting significant export transactions in relation to projects in the oil and gas sector.¹³ Though the OECD issued new rules on official support for coal-fired power plants, including restrictions on export credits for the least efficient coal-fired power plants in November 2015¹⁴, these rules remain weak and do not cover all ECA support. Therefore, the Netherlands should contribute to the strengthening of international

regulations to phase out ECA support for fossil fuel investments by introducing methodologies to make explicit the carbon footprint of transactions.

FINANCING THE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

The SDG principle to 'leave no-one behind' signifies a departure from business as usual, not least in the solutions for coping with climate change. It means more funding for adaptation measures, but also targeting the poorest, both for adaptation and mitigation.

Pro-poor adaptation and mitigation

A recent UNEP report indicates that the cost of adapting to climate change in developing countries is likely to reach USD 250 to 500 billion per year by 2050, even if global greenhouse gas emissions are cut to the level required to keep global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius.¹⁵ The portion of international climate finance which is currently available for adaptation to climate change in developing countries is far from adequate. Only 16 per cent of the USD 62 billion of climate finance flows between 2013 and 2014 was directed to adaptation.¹⁶ Scaling up financial flows to adaptation therefore remains a priority.¹⁷ To serve the most vulnerable groups in society, particularly the poor and women, sufficient public funding needs to be made available.¹⁸

While the Netherlands was among the countries successfully pushing for the commitment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to aim for a 50/50 balance between mitigation and adaptation over time, a concrete roadmap is needed for the Netherlands¹⁹ and the EU to ensure adequate public, grant-based adaptation finance as determined in the Paris climate agreement.²⁰ In accordance with the official position of the Dutch government, such a roadmap should respect the principle that climate finance should benefit the poorest and be gender-sensitive.²¹

Targeting the poorest also means that international public climate finance for mitigation should focus on access to decentralised energy.²² Because of its decentralised nature, renewable energy is well suited to serving the billions of people without access to clean, reliable and affordable energy in remote areas, while contributing to mitigation of climate change. It is thus crucial in order to fulfil both SDG 7 on renewable energy and SDG 13 on climate change. Dutch development cooperation policy on access to energy can be seen as an example in this regard, as reviewed in a recent IOB evaluation.²³ The Netherlands should use their experience in pro-poor mitigation to promote an increase in international public climate finance being spent on decentralised energy for the poor from the current level of 3 per cent.²⁴

Additional and innovative sources of climate finance

At the 2009 COP in Copenhagen agreement was reached that new and additional funding should be provided to developing countries, in order to avoid these countries having to pay the bill for climate change that is largely caused by others.²⁵ This commitment to jointly provide USD 100 billion per year by 2020 was reconfirmed in the Paris Agreement. The need for its implementation was further acknowledged in SDG 13.a. However, in the years following Copenhagen, partly as a consequence of budget cuts in development cooperation and political changes, most European countries have departed from their commitment and are providing a large part of their climate finance out of their ODA budgets.



DWA, sustainable energy solutions

Egbert Klop, DWA

To which SDG do you contribute with DWA? What does that look like in practice?

DWA contributes to the search for renewable energy (SDG 7) by providing advice on sustainable energy concepts. Whether or not a concept can be implemented does not just depend on economic criteria, but much more on what is locally achievable: whether materials can be acquired, whether maintenance is possible, whether there is sufficient local knowledge and cultural acceptance.

DWA's specialty is to combine advice and design with the transfer of knowledge. Both should go hand in hand. In the Netherlands we are known for contributing innovative energy solutions to housing projects. Abroad we have been engaging with development organisations like Woord en Daad, in countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. Our contributions in these countries aim at making the energy supply sustainable and secure.

We do not like projects in which DWA is only delivering materials and knowledge. Mutual exchange of knowledge and values is crucial. We also do not aim to bring African partners to a 'Western level' of energy consumption.

DWA (Bodegraven, the Netherlands) is a leading consultancy which provides sustainable energy concepts for housing projects. Their motto is: 'We make sustainability work'.

What opportunities do the SDGs offer for DWA? What is their added value?

DWA has always been working on sustainable energy. We are searching for applicable solutions that have a germ of sustainability. Abstract high-level goals like the SDGs, even though they may be good in themselves, face the risk of remaining just rhetoric. There is a big gap between these goals and everyday reality in the poorest 25 per cent of countries in the world, where people are struggling daily to survive. In those situations the most basic changes are a huge step forward.

What is needed to make the SDGs a success?

In my view four fundamental things are needed. First of all, one needs to make sure that you contribute to training and increasing knowledge in a country or a people, in a structural manner, not just incidentally. Secondly, one needs to build a personal relationship with your counterpart. Thirdly, one needs to provide achievable and appealing sustainable energy solutions. And finally, one needs to be open about failures, willing to learn from these failures and continue the endeavour.

SDG 17.3 requires the international community to 'mobilise additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources'. To avoid crowding out ODA spending on other issues (like health and education) and having developing countries bear the brunt of climate change they did not cause, it is essential that the Netherlands plays an active role in looking for new sources of funding. In early 2016 the Dutch Minister for the Infrastructure and Environment called for a worldwide carbon pricing system.²⁶ At the European level, the Emission Trading System (ETS), which is currently under review, could be part of such a system. In a recent report, the IMF argues along the same lines by advocating for bold steps to live up to the Paris commitments.²⁷ Creating an ETS fund would entail auctioning emission rights at the EU level which would directly contribute to a UN climate fund (e.g. the Green Climate Fund or the Least Developed Countries Fund).²⁸ A 10 per cent, aside of emission rights, would deliver EUR 3.4 billion annually, tripling the European contribution to the Green Climate Fund.

Transparency and accountability

Adequate and predictable climate finance plays a key role in enabling developing countries to effectively deal with climate change. At the moment it is difficult to trace the total amount and use of climate finance. There is an urgent need to increase the level of transparency, in line with the SDG intention to provide 'transparency on implementation' (SDG 13.a). The Dutch government has been a frontrunner by leading the initiative to provide transparency on fast-start finance.²⁹ In its letter to Parliament about the Paris agreement, the government announced it will keep pushing for increased transparency of international climate finance.³⁰

One important aspect of transparency and accountability is to come to an agreed common understanding of what counts as climate finance and how. The Paris agreement stipulates that at the 24th

COP (in 2018) 'modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised' should be presented for adoption. An OECD/CPI report revealed that developed countries use very different approaches as to what is counted.³¹ For example, some countries count non-concessional loans and export credits on equal footing with grants as climate finance. The Netherlands, which has only been counting grants so far, can play a proactive role in Europe and the OECD to ensure that only the grant-equivalent of loans and guarantees should count as international climate finance.

STRUCTURAL SUPPORT VS. EMERGENCY AID



Next to the question of the adequacy of funding, there is a question on how to balance the multiple needs related to climate change. A super El Niño weather system has caused extreme weather in many parts of the world in 2015 and early 2016. Evidence suggests that as the seas heat up due to climate change, the chances of a super El Niño are likely to double.³² As climate-related disasters are becoming more recurrent, there is an urgent need to invest more in adaptation, preparedness and prevention.³³ In 2012 just 1 per cent of total ODA was spent on disaster risk reduction in forty of the world's poorest, most disaster-affected countries.³⁴ Research shows that every euro invested in risk reduction will save EUR 7 spent on emergency aid³⁵ and prevents unnecessary suffering and long term impact from disasters. Improved ecosystem management, improved livelihood strategies and community-based early warning systems are fundamental in dealing with this reality. A clear strategy should be formulated at Dutch and EU level that describes how resilience and adaptive capacity to climate related hazards and natural disasters are strengthened (SDG 13.1) and funded. This would be in line with the recommendation of a recent IOB evaluation on humanitarian aid, to integrate humanitarian aid more with structural interventions.³⁶

The way forward to 2030

- The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and the European Commission's DG ENVI should review their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, in order to meet the 1,5 degrees Celsius COP21 ambition. Dutch targets for renewables, energy efficiency and non-ETS emission reduction need to be updated for 2030, in line with INDC ambitions.
- The Dutch Ministries for Finance and Foreign Affairs should introduce a methodology to make explicit the carbon footprint of publicly supported and energy related transactions via Export Credit Agencies and International Financial institutions. Binding policy commitments should be introduced to annually decrease the carbon footprint of energy-related transactions by at least 10 per cent.
- The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs should strengthen its focus on decentralised access to energy to serve the needs of the poor and make it GESI-proof (gender and social inclusion), as a way to achieve SDG 7 and to reach the Dutch goal of access to energy for 50 million people by 2030, and should promote this approach internationally.
- The Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs; Finance; and Infrastructure and Environment should show leadership in looking for new sources of climate policy funding, within the EU and worldwide. Complementary to its call for a worldwide carbon pricing system, the Dutch government (Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment) should identify the European Emission Trading System (ETS) as a new source of funding at EU level. An EU roadmap is needed to ensure sufficient public climate finance, and a rebalancing of the expenses for mitigation and adaptation.
- The Dutch Ministers of Finance; Infrastructure and Environment; and for International Trade and Development Cooperation should promote an international consensus to count only the grant-equivalent of loans and guarantees as international climate finance, in order to increase climate finance transparency. The Netherlands should also promote transparency on current investments, so as to be able to support switching investments from fossil to green energy.
- The Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, together with European colleagues and the European Commission, should develop a strategy to ensure more spending is allocated to early response and resilience interventions, in order to avoid high levels of spending for emergency interventions after climate-related disasters.

chapter

8



Safe migration for sustainable development

Migration nowadays is increasingly framed as a security issue. This is reflected in political actions with increasingly restrictive immigration policies, which in turn feeds into increasing anti-immigration sentiments across the EU. However, a focus on the uncontrolled nature of irregular migration flows is not the only lens through which to look at migration.

Migration also offers a lot of opportunity for development. As the new Agenda 2030 emphasises, the links and intersections between migration and development are manifold, considering migrants as key development actors. Thus, when the goal is to strengthen the positive development aspects of migration, we need to counteract the one-sided security framing of migration and focus on a cross-cutting approach, highlighting the people-focused aspects of Agenda 2030 and the development potential of migrants.

Reaching this cross-cutting approach towards migration starts with analysing SDG 10.7, which aims to ‘facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’ and making it operational.¹ This

chapter will discuss EU policies on migration and development. It will highlight the importance of SDG 10.7 for the EU’s policies in order to achieve well-managed and safe migration that aims to maximise the development aspect of migration. It is essential to distinguish between ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’, terms that are being used interchangeably in the media spotlight of the current ‘refugee crisis’. Asylum is a long-standing human rights commitment and a legal obligation that EU governments made when signing the Refugee Convention in 1951.² Refugees are individuals that have sought asylum and are granted protection under the 1951 Convention. While refugees are also migrants as they cross international borders, the term ‘migrant’ in the current discourse mainly applies to labour or ‘economic’ migration.

SDGs in this chapter



4: Quality education



8: Decent work and economic growth



10: Reduced inequality

THE NEED TO FACILITATE MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) has been the overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy since 2005, and clearly reflects the relation between migration and development. It is composed of a complex arrangement of loosely linked policies, such as the Mobility Partnerships and the Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMMs), ranging from readmission agreements to visa policies, labour and student migration opportunities as well as development projects in the area of migration governance in countries of transit and origin.

In line with SDG 10.7 the first of the four priority areas of the GAMM is to enhance regular, or formal, migration and to facilitate mobility. However, whether migrants are welcome in the EU or not depends on whether the migrants can fill gaps in the labour market. 'Wanted' highly qualified migrants have easier access to regular migration routes towards the EU. But for less-qualified people regular migration opportunities are limited and mainly restricted to short-term migration schemes with strong pressure to return.³

Lower qualified migrants

This selective approach in favour of higher qualified labour migrants has resulted in restrictive immigration policies towards lower qualified migrants and refugees. Apart from the EU Directive on migrant seasonal workers that regulates the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, there are no further EU policy instruments that facilitate lower qualified immigration.⁴ The lack of opportunities to receive visas or claim asylum outside the EU, and the impact of carrier sanctions, underlie the reason why refugees have no options to travel through regular channels. Leaving lower qualified migrants and refugees no other option than to cross EU borders irregularly has led to

the increase of exploitation, human smuggling and other misery. Children in particular are extremely vulnerable to violence, abuse, exploitation and even death during migration.⁵ Therefore, it is essential to elaborate existing migration instruments to develop a legal framework that provides regular options for mobility for both high-skilled and low-skilled workers.

The EU should build upon existing migration instruments, such as the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, to develop a legal framework that provides regular options for mobility for both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. In addition the EU Mobility Partnerships could be used through the extension of temporary migration opportunities; to make a stronger connection between education, business, and investment opportunities.

Safe migration routes

Detection of irregular border-crossing along the EU's external borders has sharply increased since 2012⁶, from approximately 72.500 in 2012 to more than 1.8 million in 2015.⁷ The routes to Europe have become the world's most dangerous and deadliest: in 2015, an estimated 5.395 migrants⁸ lost their lives in the Mediterranean, of which approximately 30 per cent were children.⁹ Many more migrants are unaccounted for.

Increasingly European security interests, and sadly also political populism and fear, play an important role in EU immigration policies. However, in the current reality, the EU seems to be caught up in a vicious circle in which the increasing number of migrant deaths leads to calls to 'combat' smuggling and increase border patrolling, which forces migrants towards more dangerous routes, including the use of smugglers' services. This makes human smuggling an even more lucrative business.¹⁰ The increased numbers of migrants to Europe underlines the need to address the contradictions between the EU's security approach to migration and its obligations

in terms of respecting, promoting and protecting human rights, including the right to seek asylum from persecution.¹¹ The human trafficking and smuggling resulting from the restrictive EU migration policies has caused EU leaders to turn towards security measures to fight the so-called 'illegal immigrants', with fences and increased surveillance at external borders, and detention centres in front line member states.

In addressing these contradictions between the EU's security approach of migration, European consensus is considered an essential starting point. European consensus requires EU political leadership, which should lead to a forward-looking and comprehensive approach, based on solidarity¹², including the development of a new admission policy for lower qualified migrants.

Although in theory existing regular migration channels should be open to refugees, in reality these pathways are often blocked by practical, technical and political obstacles. Therefore, EU member states should hand out more humanitarian visas allowing refugees to spend their money on regular flights rather than to finance human smugglers.

EU-Turkey agreement

Safe migration routes to the EU, as well as within the EU, are a shared European responsibility that should be addressed jointly, to fulfil the obligations under our human rights treaties and to realise the ambitions set out in the SDGs. Firstly, the EU should increase its common coordination regarding the influx of refugees and migrants and improve the facilitation and guarantee of safe passage, including

adequate attention to counteracting the so-called 'waterbed' effect.¹³ For example, the EU-Turkey agreement of 18 March 2016¹⁴ aims to contribute to a safe migrant route between Turkey and EU member state Greece. As part of the agreement, all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. In return, for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.¹⁵

However, while this agreement contributes to create a 'safe passage' between Turkey and EU member state Greece, the agreement only applies to Syrian citizens. Migrants of other nationalities are excluded from this 'safe passage', regardless of their migration motives, and will be increasingly forced towards more dangerous routes. The rights that migrants will have in this agreement have been questioned; for example, migrants are detained in detention centres before being returned to Turkey.



International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies ©

TRQN Programme, IOM

Adri Zagers, IOM

How does TRQN contribute to the SDG Agenda?

Since 2006, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in the Netherlands has aimed to maximise the positive relationship between migration and development through the Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programme. The TRQN programme offers diasporas in the Netherlands the opportunity to contribute to reconstruction and capacity development in their country of origin, through physical and virtual transfer of knowledge, skills and attitudes. These social remittances are inherently connected to the new SDG Agenda, first of all, through linking the 'Global North' with the 'Global South' through the facilitation of safe and responsible mobility of people between both worlds. Secondly, the focus on the transfer of knowledge and expertise contributes to the development of key sectors and the establishment of sustainable links between global institutions, with migrants playing an essential instrumental role, in line with the universal recognition of being key development actors.

What opportunities do the SDGs offer the TRQN programme? What would be the added value of the SDGs?

It is much appreciated that migration has been incorporated in Agenda 2030. The Agenda 2030 'recognises the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth', while noting the 'multidimensional reality' of migration. TRQN builds on this idea and facilitates ways to support dissemination of social remittances by diaspora experts to contribute to the 2030 Agenda.

What is needed to make the SDGs a success?

In the TRQN target countries, ministries are supported to develop and implement a migration and diaspora policy. In this way, the programme raises awareness of the development potential of diasporas. Diasporas can play an important role in building sustainable bridges between 'North' and 'South', which contributes to making the SDGs a success story.

The Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programme of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is an inspiring example of the integral role migrants can play in sustainable development.

Safe third countries

Therefore, the EU should ensure that cooperation with non-EU countries on migration is human rights compliant. This is especially important in the EU's policy on returning refugees from EU territory to so-called safe third countries. In line with this, the development of safe and sustainable reception capacities in affected regions in third countries for asylum processing needs to be supported. The transit and assistance centres for migrants of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) serve as an example in this regard. Since 2014, the IOM has run four transit and assistance centres for migrants in the Saharan city of Agadez (Niger), one of the main migratory crossroads for irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa trying to reach Europe through Libya or Algeria. In these centres the IOM provides emergency and life-saving humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable stranded migrants.¹⁶

Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible routes for everybody on the move, with special focus on the most vulnerable groups, aims to contribute effectively to the accomplishment of the main goal of the SDGs, 'leaving no one behind'. It also emphasises the EU's commitment to achieve particular SDGs, like SDG 4, promoting life learning opportunities for all, SDG 8, promoting decent work for migrant women, or SDG 10, reducing inequalities within and among countries.


Promoting the development potential of refugees

The SDGs pledge to 'leave no one behind' (SDG 10) and therefore people on the move should be one of the target groups of the implementation agenda on both EU and member state level. In 2015, the EU received 1.26 million first time asylum applications. Discussions about reception dominate national debates. Short-lasting asylum procedures and access to housing, decent work and education should be fundamental basics in national reception policies. Immediate availability of language courses, training and education opportunities, job opportunities and thus income, will help prevent boredom and disputes. They will boost newcomers' integration into European societies, contribute to the development of asylum seekers and help fill vacancies in labour markets.

Education (SDG 4) should also be used in order to improve migrants' contribution to the host country, the country of origin and to the development of individual migrants and their children. By actively addressing the development potential of asylum seekers, migrants and their children, they can truly become development actors in their countries of origin as well as in their new home countries.

The way forward to 2030

- EU leaders should show political leadership and commitment in promoting and facilitating safe and legal routes toward EU territory as well as within the EU to meet their shared European responsibility and protect the human rights of all migrants, in particular of children.
- The European Commission's External Action Service (EEAS) and EU Ministries responsible for migration should ensure that cooperation with non-EU countries on migration is human rights compliant, especially regarding EU return policies.
- EU Ministries responsible for migration should hand out more humanitarian visas allowing refugees to spend their money on regular flights, rather than being a source of finance for human smugglers, and then to apply for asylum upon arrival.
- The European Commission's Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and the EU Ministries responsible for migration should elaborate existing migration instruments, such as the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, to develop a legal framework that provides regular mobility opportunities for both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. In addition the EU Mobility Partnerships can function as an instrument to provide temporary mobility opportunities between the EU and third countries.
- EU Ministries responsible for migration should ensure an adequate asylum process, with the ability to do paid work and receive (vocational) training, which aims to actively engage asylum seekers in the first stages of integration into EU societies. Furthermore, re-investment in diaspora engagement is essential in encouraging migrant's contribution to the development of their countries of origin.



chapter
9

Peaceful Societies: No security without development

For the first time in UN sustainable development discussions and debates, peace features as an important goal on the agenda. SDG 16 acknowledges that sustainable development is not possible without peace, good governance and access to justice for all.

Security and development have a significant interrelation. They are mutually reinforcing, and thus fulfil a key role in the 2030 Agenda. For instance, the rate of children leaving primary school in conflict affected countries reached fifty per cent in 2011, which accounts to 28.5 million children, showing the impact of unstable societies on one of the major goals of the Agenda 2030: education.¹

The EU is one of the world's most important actors in the support of peace building and state building in fragile and conflict affected countries. As one of the EU member states, the Netherlands has shown leadership in linking peace, security and development. For example, the Netherlands has been a strong proponent of the '3D approach'. In this approach defence, diplomacy and development, the three 'Ds', are combined to tackle security, governance and development in Dutch overseas missions.²

In response to the increased security threat in Europe, EU member states take measures to improve security policies at home. However, some of these measures have unintended negative consequences for security abroad, which in turn can have negative implications for development objectives.³ For example, the arms trade can encourage conflicts or human right violations in developing countries, and stricter Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing for Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations can have negative effects on migrants' remittances towards developing countries. Therefore EU policymakers always need to be aware of the potential for the promotion of European security interests to be at the expense of sustainable development, in order to achieve peaceful and inclusive societies at home and abroad.

SDGs in this chapter

 10: Reduced inequality

 17: Peace and justice

ARMS TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

SDG 16.1 aims to significantly reduce all forms of armed violence and related deaths everywhere and SDG 16.3 aims to reduce illicit financial and arms flows. It appears to be problematic that arms continue to pour into conflict zones, or are easily available to gangs, drugs traffickers and armed forces widely recognised to be committing human rights abuses. Therefore, strict implementation of arms export criteria is essential. Even though the issue of government-to-government arms export is not addressed explicitly in the targets under SDG 16, it is evident that responsible arms export, which meets agreed-upon criteria, is a prerequisite for promoting peaceful societies.

EU Common Position

Arms export policies of EU member states, such as the Netherlands, are based on the EU Common Position.⁴ The Common Position implies eight criteria that should be fulfilled before an arms export can take place. The Common Position aims to prevent arms ending up in conflict areas, in the hands of notorious human rights abusers or of states who allocate a disproportionate share of public money to their armed forces.

Nevertheless, EU member states account for over 25 per cent of the world's arms export⁵, or EUR 14 billion in 2014, partly due to a narrow interpretation of the EU's export control criteria.⁶ The Netherlands is in the top 15 global arms exporters, mainly selling warships, advanced military electronics, fighter aircraft components and surplus equipment from the armed forces. It not only exports to other EU member states, but also to numerous (lower) middle income countries. Many of the recipient countries have bad track records in terms of human rights or involvement in internal or regional conflicts, such as Egypt (EUR 85 million from 2005 till 2014), Morocco (EUR 610 million) and Turkmenistan (EUR 33 million).⁷

Arms Trade Treaty

Simultaneously, the Netherlands played a positive role in supporting strong reporting and transparency mechanisms under the global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in December 2014. The Treaty prohibits the export of weapons that can be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or which are likely to be used in connection with human rights violations. It also obliges countries to monitor their arms exports and to draw up reports on export licences they have issued. As one of the vice-chairs of the Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, the Netherlands played an active role in the negotiating process.⁸

This means that implementing the Arms Trade Treaty as well as the EU Common Position should be a seriously priority. However, in practice, economic interests often appear to be dominant in decision-making about arms exports. For example, the Dutch government acknowledges that Turkmenistan is one of the most repressive regimes in the world with an alarming human rights situation, but nonetheless the Netherlands has sold military equipment to the Turkmenistan coastguard.⁹ Even when such equipment may not directly contribute to human rights violations, the fact of trading arms implicitly legitimises the Turkmenistan regime.

In 2015, a Dutch company received an export permit to export radar and C3 communication systems, including the corresponding technology and system integration, to Egypt via France. Despite the fact that several human rights organisations have identified 'serious human rights violations' in Egypt as well as 'very volatile regional stability', the Dutch government holds the position that the export permit was justified. It said that the Egyptian navy, as recipient party, is not involved in human rights violations and has legitimate security needs.¹⁰ However, the government did not mention the role of Egypt in the Yemen war, its participation in the maritime blockade and the humanitarian consequences for the Yemen people.

In order to significantly reduce all forms of violence, a successful implementation of the ATT also requires leadership, exercising a truly restrictive arms export policy. It is important to take human rights criteria seriously in the arms trade. Due to the impact armed violence has on development, EU arms should not be acquired by regimes and groups who violate human rights.

SECURITY POLICIES AT HOME NEED TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL SOCIETIES ABROAD

In a globalised world the exchange of information, services, goods and people increases very fast. Globalisation also poses new security questions. At the moment there is a widespread sense of insecurity. National and EU governments endeavour to counteract the outbursts of international terrorism, for instance through the adjustment of EU passports or by hindering access to materials for weapons production.

However, some of the implemented security standards in the EU and its member states actually have a counter-effective impact on achieving peaceful and inclusive societies abroad. For example, in order to combat the financing of terrorist organisations, stricter Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing for Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations have been put in place.¹¹ These regulations increase the due diligence requirements for financial services. As a result financial transactions to 'suspected' countries and beneficiaries have become more difficult. This directly affects remittance flows, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and financing for development organisations, which in turn can have a strong negative impact on fragile states.¹² With remittances in particular, hindering these money flows can contribute to poverty, radicalisation and instability.¹³

Case: Barclays Bank

The EU and national governments focus strongly on money laundering and financing of terrorist networks, both from an economic and a security perspective. As a result of stricter regulations, banks in for instance the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United States and their correspondent banks world-wide have cut off their links with financial institutions in 'high-risk countries' such as Somalia, Yemen and Sudan.¹⁴ However, as the Dutch government acknowledges, AML/CFT regulations can be counter-effective in promoting peace and security.¹⁵

For example, Barclays' decision in 2013 to close the accounts of several small money transfer operators caused great concern in Somali diaspora communities in the UK,¹⁶ because remittance flows were significantly obstructed and money transfer costs increased.¹⁷ Also in the Netherlands, migrant and development organisations experience severe difficulties when transferring money. Sometimes, they are even unable to open bank accounts because banks have to do due diligence checks but can only rely on highly biased databases with very low validity and no crisis-checking.¹⁸ As a result, there has been an increase in the use of alternative means of transferring money, such as informal banking systems. These networks are in fact more prone to being used for money laundering, terrorism financing and other criminal purposes than formal systems.¹⁹ Remittances are of central importance for restoring stability and enhancing human security in post-conflict developing countries such as Somalia.²⁰ As extensive research has shown, remittances have a strong development potential, alongside Official Development Aid (ODA) and FDI flows.²¹ A revision of the rules could facilitate safe, transparent and legal flows of remittances, while allowing sufficient provision for national and international security concerns. In fact, the positive impact of remittance flows on development can contribute to peace and security.



International Justice Mission's work on access to justice

Lambert Wassink, IJM

How does your organisation contribute to SDG 16?

In working towards the new SDG 16 of promoting peace, establishing justice for all and creating a world where everyone can feel safe, the other SDGs will be given a greater chance to be truly meaningful to the poorest of the poor. 'Functioning justice systems are not a reality for billions of the world's poor yet are critical for safeguarding all other areas of development' said Gary Haugen, founder and CEO of IJM.

What is needed to make the SDGs a success?

According to IJM, the key to success in implementing the SDGs lies in adopting targets in country programs and reports, using the expertise and innovation of civil society partners, building successful cases and measuring impact. This should include, but not be limited to:

1. Focussing on approaches that have proven to be successful in strengthening justice systems;
2. Implementing multilevel interventions that include local, national and donor governments as well as national and international NGOs to ensure that all policy instruments are used to provide justice to the poor;

3. Measuring performance by starting projects with a baseline study and by measuring progress over time against agreed targets.

Who benefits from IJM's work on the SDGs?

Over the past years, IJM has published several studies that show significant progress in the fight against child sex trafficking. In both Cambodia and the Philippines child sex trafficking diminished dramatically after trained police units began arresting suspected traffickers and after courts started prosecuting them.

Years of collaboration between Cambodian and Philippine leaders, police, courts, social services and the NGO community have made a dramatic change for children in Cambodia and the Philippines. With support from international governments and dozens of respected organizations these justice systems are focused on combating the remaining prevalence of child sex trafficking. These programs can be used as a model for future work.

International Justice Mission (IJM) is a global team of lawyers, investigators, social workers and other professionals. IJM works to protect the poor from violence through 17 field offices throughout Africa, Latin America and Asia. IJM rescues victims of violence, sexual exploitation, slavery and oppression. By guiding victims all over the world through their justice systems, IJM builds relationships within the justice system, uncovers where it is broken and proves the system can work.

Case: UK-Somalia Safer Corridor Initiative



In order to counteract the negative effect of AML/CFT regulations, joint action by financial institutions, governments of sending countries and receiving countries is required. The EU has to bring together the different stakeholders and sectors involved in the remittance industry, including migrant organisations and financial institutions. Proportionate exemptions in anti-terrorism mechanisms should be made.²² A positive example is the UK-Somalia Safer Corridor Initiative, led by the British Banking Association. This initiative brings banks, government institutions and migrant communities together in order to provide guidance for banks and money transfer operators, support risk analysis and information sharing, and assist the development of a regulated financial sector in Somalia.²³ The initiative shows how remittances can be facilitated while also taking money laundering and terrorism financing concerns into account.²⁴ It is also important to revise AML/CFT regulations at EU level in order to make the legal requirements of banks clearer and more realistic and to facilitate reliable money transfer operators in developing countries.²⁵

The way forward to 2030

- The EU External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) should continue to exert strong peer pressure and work towards a truly restrictive implementation of the EU Common Position on arms exports by all member states, thus refraining from arms transfers to countries in conflict or notorious human rights violating regimes.
- The EU and its member states should implement an arms embargo against Egypt as recently called for by the European Parliament²⁶, and against Saudi Arabia for its violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen, as was also called for by a large majority of the European Parliament.²⁷
- The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs should lead by example and apply the highest possible standard in its arms export policy, including a halt to arms exports to all parties involved in the Yemen conflict.
- The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs should encourage other EU member states to make the application of the eight criteria of the EU Common Position more transparent.
- EU member states' Ministries of Finance and the European Commission's DG DEVCO should develop more initiatives to establish 'safe corridors' for remittances, inspired by the UK-Somalia Safer Corridor Initiative.
- The European Commission's DG DEVCO should serve as a focal point for bringing together the different stakeholders and sectors involved in the remittance industry.

chapter

10



Fight extreme inequality with taxes

In September 2015 the international community agreed that the world needs to fight extreme inequality (SDG 10). 'Evidence shows that, beyond a certain threshold, inequality harms growth and poverty reduction, the quality of relations in the public and political spheres and individuals' sense of fulfilment and self-worth'.¹ General Assembly of the United Nations, 21 October, 2015

Out-of-control inequality has resulted in a world in which sixty-two people own as much wealth as the poorest half of planet's population combined.² Had inequality not grown between 1990 and 2010, an extra 200 million people could have escaped poverty.³ According to the Dutch Minister for Trade and Development, 'the most powerful weapon against inequality is tax'.⁴

During the Financing for Development Summit in July 2015, world leaders recognised that strengthening the mobilisation and effective use of domestic resources, including improving tax revenue collection and fighting illicit flows and international tax avoidance, are critical in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Specific commitments were made, including to strengthen the capacity of tax administrations and to 'make sure that all companies, including multinationals, pay taxes to the governments of countries where economic activity occurs and value is created, in accordance with national and international laws and policies'.⁵

SDGs in this chapter



10: Reduced inequalities



17: Partnerships for the goals

According to UNCTAD, developing countries lose around USD 100 billion per year in revenues due to tax avoidance by multinational companies, almost enough to get every child into school four times over.⁶ Figures on tax losses due to corporate tax avoidance however are extremely hard to get because of a lack of transparency. In 2012 the Dutch Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations SOMO made a conservative estimate that developing countries have lost around EUR 460 million per year (average over 2009-2011) just as a result of the role of the Netherlands as tax (conduit) haven.⁷ Figures for other (corporate) tax havens are also hard to obtain since no full cost benefit analysis has taken place.

The race to the bottom

Despite complaints and/or concerns raised not just by tax justice advocates and experts, but also by authorities such as the US president, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the IMF, European countries such as the Netherlands, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Luxemburg are engaged in a harmful corporate tax race to the bottom. The Dutch Minister of Finance denies that the Netherlands is a corporate tax haven. At the same time, the Dutch government insists we need to ensure the Dutch fiscal climate remains 'competitive'.⁸ This while continued tax competition (ever lower tax rates, more tax loopholes, friendly advance tax rulings, secrecy or lax enforcement) increasingly allows multinationals to free-ride on the public goods paid for by others, and shifts the tax burden onto general citizens.⁹

While world leaders in July 2015 at the Financing for Development Summit agreed on the need to scale up international tax cooperation (to e.g. discuss regional approaches against harmful tax practices and incentives), developing countries lost their fight for a new intergovernmental global tax body in which they would obtain a stronger say. In close cooperation with the G20, the OECD continues to dominate the global tax agenda, and keeps issues relevant to developing countries off the table.

Within the context of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project the OECD has made some progress in fighting tax avoidance. For example, all OECD countries committed to including broad anti-abuse provisions in tax treaties. However the outcomes of other actions are very weak, and more generally, the announced measures are not enough to stop tax avoidance and do not address international tax competition.¹⁰ A more effective global approach against the race to the bottom is necessary, with a process that involves all developing countries on an equal footing right from the start, including in the design and agenda setting. To realise the SDGs and fight extreme inequality effectively, global cooperation

is needed and will require the establishment of a global tax body under the auspices of the United Nations as the most representative global institution.

Positive steps

For one of the European countries that is increasingly being criticised for its fiscal climate, the Netherlands has been making positive steps forward. The Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation has made positive contributions to the fight against international tax avoidance. Under her leadership the Netherlands has initiated the renegotiation of 23 tax treaties with developing countries to include anti-abuse provisions against tax avoidance.¹¹ Civil society organisations in Europe now urge other European member states to do the same. This is definitely a good start. However a recently released report indicates that despite this initiative the Dutch government still has seven treaties in place that are amongst the world's most restrictive for developing countries.¹² This clearly indicates that the Netherlands should conduct a full review of all its treaties with developing countries. The Netherlands should renegotiate restrictive treaties to ensure developing countries get fair taxation rights for developing countries.¹³

The Dutch Ministry of Finance has likewise made positive contributions, with commitments to improve transparency and information exchange, and recent announcements that they will consider measures against abuse by companies of Dutch cooperatives for tax avoidance purposes and may introduce new regulation of the Dutch trust industry.¹⁴ Tax transparency is essential for holding multinationals to account for their tax practices, and it is key for developing countries to be able to scrutinise the global tax arrangements of corporations operating in their territories. Currently the Dutch government is also working on the implementation of the anti-money laundering directive and it is very encouraging that the Netherlands is supporting a public register of beneficial ownership.¹⁵

Taking bigger steps

Despite taking steps in the right the direction, the Dutch government should show more leadership on this issue. The Dutch Finance Minister recently declared that the Netherlands is willing to clamp down on corporate tax avoidance during its EU presidency. However on the issue of public country-by-country reporting the Dutch government is choosing the slow road and has not yet started conducting due diligence on the potential for tax evasion in export credit insurances.¹⁶

On 27 January 2016, the European Commission presented its proposal for an EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. The EU directive covers various elements of the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package, including limitation of interest deductions, so-called hybrid mismatch rules (against entities without a tax residence) and Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules (against profits ending up in tax havens, which can be very effective against profit shifting, including from developing countries). However, stronger rules are needed to combat tax

avoidance in Europe and the 'Global South' and to subvert new tax avoidance schemes. The proposed rules will not stop profit shifting and will reinforce tax competition between EU countries. To make the CFC rules work, the tax rate threshold should be fixed, and the definition of CFC income should be as broad as possible. Unless the European Council, chaired by the Dutch EU presidency in the first half of 2016, manages to make some significant changes to the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance package, it will not succeed in ending the era of tax havens.¹⁷

The European Commission has shown great commitment not only to increase transparency and fight tax avoidance, but also to put an end to the race to the bottom in Europe by introducing a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). Further harmonisation is a precarious topic for many member states, but it is crucial to address it in order to stop the harmful corporate tax race. The Dutch government does not yet support further harmonisation within Europe, nor has it put the topic of corporate tax competition on the agenda of the OECD.



Addis Tax Initiative

Maaïke van Diepen, Tax Justice the Netherlands

1. How does the Addis Tax Initiative contribute to the SDGs?

In July 2015 world leaders came together to discuss the financing of the SDGs. Governments worldwide acknowledge that the increase of tax revenue is vital in order to bring about sustainable development. The Netherlands has played a leading role in getting (donor) governments to increase ODA and technical assistance for tax and fiscal management capacity, particularly to least developed countries, through the Addis tax initiative.¹⁹ More than 30 countries support this initiative to increase tax capacity in developing countries. According to the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation the initiative is a very effective approach to development, because what you spend is multiplied by a factor of 10 in tax revenues for developing countries.²⁰

2. What is the added value of the initiative?

Domestic resource mobilisation is a very important part of the financing of the new development agenda. However, developing countries face various challenges in increasing public revenues, such as reduced tariff revenues, weak administration, compliance issues and the use of artificial financial constructions.²¹ The countries subscribing to the Addis Tax Initiative are committed to stepping up technical cooperation. This includes boosting the Tax Inspectors Without Borders program from the OECD and

UNDP. In the initiative, countries also express their commitment towards policy coherency stating that 'all participants will ensure that relevant domestic tax policies reflect the joint objective of supporting improvements in domestic resource mobilization in partner countries and applying principles of transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and fairness'.²²



3. What is needed to make the SDGs a success?

In addition to capacity building, participating countries want to enable developing countries to adopt progress made on the international tax agenda, such as the BEPS project and automatic information exchange. In February 2016, the OECD introduced the 'Inclusive Framework', a working group open to all countries that want to participate in implementing the BEPS project. Civil society organisations support the development of an inclusive body, where all countries are at the table. However the 'Inclusive Framework' will have a limited agenda, limited flexibility and no future 'agenda setting' role. In order to participate in this (limited) future standard setting global body, developing countries have to commit to implementing a set of rules they had no part in creating and which are not suited to them. Therefore the EU and the Netherlands should promote the creation of a global tax body at the UN level, where all countries can participate equally and issues concerning developing countries are also on the agenda, including the global corporate tax rate.

The Addis Tax Initiative, which commits both donor and recipient countries to strongly support tax reform in developing countries, is one of the outcomes of the July 2015 conference in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on financing the new Agenda 2030.

The way forward to 2030

- The European Commission should ensure tax transparency. Only through mandatory public country-by-country reporting of tax and related data for multinationals, can progress be made towards ending the era of tax havens.
- European political leaders should lead the way towards a global approach against tax competition. We urge the Dutch government to support the adoption of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in Europe.
- The European Council should ensure effective rules are in place against profit shifting by multinationals to tax havens: the Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules proposed by the EC need to be strengthened.
- The Netherlands and the EU should take an active role in the international follow-up of the agreements made on Financing for Development (UNCTAD) and follow-up of the OECD BEPS project. In 2016, UNCTAD, the OECD and G20 countries will come together to design a more inclusive framework to support and monitor the implementation of the BEPS package. These processes should ensure that all developing countries can participate on an equal footing and ensure that further measures against the corporate tax race to the bottom are taken.
- The Netherlands should support the establishment of a global tax body under the auspices of the United Nations.
- The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs should conduct a full review of all its treaties with developing countries (on top of those already reviewed) and renegotiate treaties to ensure developing countries get fair taxation rights.¹⁸



Making it happen: Meaningful global partnerships to deliver the SDGs

The Sustainable Development Goals are ambitious and historic. The goals aim to eradicate, not only reduce, extreme poverty and hunger. They go beyond band aid solutions to development challenges because they employ a rights based approach, tackling the root causes of poverty and inequality. In doing, so, they have transformative potential.

Essentially a lever to deliver all of the SDGs, SDG 17 is focused on ‘Strengthening the means of implementation and revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development’. SDG 17 provides a set of policy instruments (targets) which are organised around five key themes: finance, technology, capacity building, trade and ‘systemic issues’. All of these are relevant to Dutch and EU development policy and the implementation of the SDGs. This chapter will zoom in first on the issue of finance and the role

of aid in particular. In the second part the role of partnerships, a prominent feature of Agenda 2030, is discussed.

SDGs in this chapter



10: Reduced inequalities



17: Partnerships for the goals

THE ROLE OF AID IN DELIVERING THE SDGs: WHY WE NEED IT

Official Development Assistance (ODA), also known as aid, is an important instrument in delivering sustainable development and the Agenda 2030 – especially for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and most marginalised people. A central role for aid in the post-2015 world is to ensure that ‘no one is left behind’. Everyone has the right to live free from poverty and deprivation. This vision can only be achieved through ending extreme poverty, tackling inequalities and political capture, realising human rights, building strong institutions and tackling climate change. Aid is the world’s largest source of concessional public finance and its role has been and should continue to be to contribute to the financing of exactly these objectives, which are at the heart of Agenda 2030.

Increasingly, aid gets diverted to finance other policy objectives such as in-donor refugee costs, domestic private sector or national security interests.¹ As result a smaller proportion of ODA is allocated to those countries and communities who need it most. In reality, aid is still larger than any other external source of development finance in 43 countries, most of them Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in sub-Saharan Africa. These countries are home to over 220 million people living on less than USD 1,25 a day. The share of aid going to Least Developed Countries has dropped slightly from 2013 to 2014.²

In 2015, the OECD announced that donors’ average net aid stood at just 0.30 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), a total of EUR 125.5 billion annually.³ This figure is in stark contrast to the actual financing needs of the SDGs. According to the UN, investments in infrastructure including education and transport to realise the SDGs will costs between EUR 4.4 and 6.2 trillion.⁴ The world has enough resources, but finding them requires political will and commitment to the Agenda 2030. Recognising this, EU member states including the Netherlands

renewed their commitment to allocating 0.7 per cent of member states’ GNI towards ODA, firstly at the EU Development Council in May 2015⁵, and secondly in the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action.⁶ This commitment is in line with the SDG 17 and its target 17.2 which captures the role of aid as a means of implementing Agenda 2030. However, it is deplorable the Netherlands together with other EU member states agreed to move this milestone by 15 years, to be achieved in 2030 instead of 2015.

Let aid do its job

Ultimately, the goal is for aid to put itself out of a job. To make this happen, aid must catalyse other forms of public finance, primarily domestic resource mobilisation (SDG 17.1), and help sustain them. The vast majority of extremely poor people live in countries where tax systems are weak and raise minimal public revenues domestically. Aid should support efforts to increase domestic revenue collection in order to improve the self-reliance of those countries with weak tax systems and minimal public revenues, and to reduce the dependency on aid. The Dutch government is also taking steps in this direction, by supporting reforms of taxation systems in developing countries.⁷

Civil society organisations and citizen’s voice are indispensable to the delivery of Agenda 2030.⁸ In particular, civil society plays a critical role in achieving the core human rights principle of the SDGs: ‘leave no one behind’. To fulfil its essential role in the development process, in particular in LDCs or countries with high levels of inequality, aid needs to advance the rights of citizens. Aid should increasingly be used to improve public accountability and support citizens’ and civil society’s efforts to hold their governments to account. Development should be the product of a compact between active citizens and effective states. Aid most often fails when it tries to substitute this relationship, rather than supporting and strengthening it.

Why we need to make aid more effective to deliver the SDGs

Aid will also put itself out of a job if it is provided effectively, using country systems, strengthening country ownership, focusing on results and promoting civil society. Aid effectiveness and efforts by both recipients and providers of development cooperation, organised under the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), need to be strengthened and given more legitimacy. Donors remain reluctant to fully invest in the success of local development institutions and leadership who could then sustain development independent of aid. Governments have agreed far-reaching aid effectiveness principles in Busan in 2011⁹ around country ownership, civil society space and monitoring to track the effective delivery of aid. These principles are fundamental to achieve the SDGs. Aid needs to do a better job of sustainably supporting people to raise themselves out of poverty and being completely transparent in how and where it aims to do so. The Netherlands has taken up a key leadership role in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.¹⁰ While the role of this Partnership in the Agenda 2030 has been acknowledged by EU member states in the Council Conclusions of May 2015, clear steps and leadership towards improving Dutch or EU aid effectiveness still have to materialise.

Furthermore, the increasing diversion of aid towards other financing objectives is a risk to the effectiveness of aid. If more and more aid gets allocated without reaching Least Developed Countries, the integrity of, and public support for, aid gets undermined. Aid cannot do its job if it is spent in donor countries to cover in-donor refugee costs, to finance the security needs of Europe or on subsidies for the domestic private sector. Diverting aid from its primary objective of promoting economic development and welfare is neither efficient nor effective for both developed and developing countries.

ENHANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WITH INCLUSIVE PARTNERSHIPS

The SDGs affirm the importance of global partnerships to achieve goals at the national and international level.¹¹ The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have shown that goals provide energy, commitment, resources, and timelines.¹² They give rise to partnerships that can create real change. Moreover, partnerships lie at the heart of most of the success stories in achieving the MDGs, such as getting children into school, slowing the rate of deforestation, and caring for people affected by HIV/AIDS and malaria. In this way, goal-based development constitutes a critical approach for solving extremely complex operational and investment challenges at global, regional, national, and local levels¹³ to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries.

A specific feature of the SDGs is that they are in many ways 'inclusive'. They were developed in an inclusive way by inviting everyone to fill in an online survey. They put inclusive development on the agenda by specifically requiring that no one and no issue will be left behind. The inclusive nature of the Sustainable Development Goals makes the implementation by all relevant partners straightforward.

The preamble of Agenda 2030 states: 'We are determined to mobilise the means required to implement this Agenda through a revitalised Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people'.¹⁴

Promoting inclusiveness

Inclusive partnership is an emerging form of cooperation, as well as a key strategy, which promotes sustainable growth that includes middle and lower income groups. In addition, promoting inclusiveness means improving the capacities of all humans through investments in education, health, social protection, as well as enhancing the people's access to markets so that everyone can participate in and benefit from economic growth.¹⁵ In line with this concept of 'inclusiveness', 'inclusive partnership' is literally a term that expands the scope of partnership to every development actor, such as donor agencies, governmental institutions, private companies and NGOs and even to funds and investors in order to maximise development effectiveness.¹⁶

Forming such an inclusive partnership is not to be underestimated. A Sustainable Development Goal is like a 'Wicked Problem'¹⁷ for which no one feels solely responsible; most SDGs represent problems that are beyond the scope of a single organisation or sector. They reflect the 'tragedy of the commons' since some stakeholders will not feel ownership about working on the goals and will free-ride along with others who do take the initiative.¹⁸ An inclusive agenda implies that the SDGs and their targets are in many ways connected to each other as the figure below shows.¹⁹ These connections entail that addressing one target of one SDG has consequences for several other SDGs. The MDGs already taught us that those consequences are not always positive. Implementers of a specific intervention would do well to analyse the effects of their interventions on other, related SDG targets. To do such an analysis requires you to share perspectives with other stakeholders that work on SDGs.

Steps towards an effective multi-stakeholder partnership

It is important to make the link between the nature of the problem, the responsibilities of the various partners in taking up this challenge and the most logical configuration of the partnership. Identifying partnership gaps therefore requires a proper understanding of the underlying dimensions of the problem addressed. The next steps can help stakeholders to set up such an inclusive partnership.

A) Analytical: understanding the 'wicked' nature of the problem:


1. Define the different dimensions of the problem;
2. Define the context in which the issue appears;
3. Analyse which actors are already taking up responsibilities and what they are doing.

B) Scoping: understanding what type of partnership is needed

1. Which stakeholders are part of the problem and/or part of the solution?
2. Define the optimal partnership constellation: which partners should be approached?
3. Bring these partners around the table and define a common goal and vision; also assess what crowding out effects can be anticipated.

C) Formation and configuration

1. Define the relevant resources for the partnership;
2. Negotiate on a proper partnership agreement and define good monitoring and evaluation terms;
3. Define the conditions for 'exit' e.g. when the envisioned impact is achieved, 'sufficient' crowding out is triggered, new partners are needed, or the problem changes over time.



Network analyses of the SDGs and their targets; Blanc 2015

Coalition of the needed

These analyses and implementations can best be done in partnerships. This partnership should not be similar to a meeting of organisations who were already acquainted with each other's work, the so-called coalitions of the willing. Instead, the partnerships should consist of all those partners that are needed to effectively address a goal: a coalition of the needed. It is important that such a dialogue between development actors involves new stakeholders. Unfortunately, existing development partnerships often become institutionalised and risk averse, thereby preventing newcomers from entering the bargaining area. A safe space for dialogue between these stakeholders is therefore of utmost importance, in which new and old stakeholders can safely consult their fellows and share dilemma's,

dreams, interests and actions.²⁰ In this way a truly inclusive partnership can be created in which real development impact can be reached.

Earlier we mentioned the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, which was established to secure inclusive partnerships for effective development. One of their initiatives is the 'Promoting Effective Partnering Facility', designed to invest in improving collaboration between different development actors in support of achieving the SDGs.²¹

Leaving no one behind is not simply a matter of inviting more people to the table, but also about truly welcoming these people and facilitating their contribution to the global partnership.



SDG Charter in the Netherlands

Adrian de Groot Ruiz (TruePrice) en Fokko Wientjes (DSM) about the SDG Charter in the Netherlands

What is, according to you, the added value of the SDGs?

The SDGs offer an agenda of opportunities for sustainable wealth for everybody. The Agenda 2030 brings together many different agendas and firms them up with harmonised, measurable goals which have been endorsed by all countries worldwide. They build on the Millennium Development Goals, but are more fundamental. They not only engage governments, but also other stakeholders including the private sector, civil society, the financial sector and academia. In doing so, they provide a unique possibility to identify new opportunities, which ask for new modes of collaboration.

How does the SDG charter contribute to the achievement of the SDGs? What does that look like in practice?

The SDG Charter has 80+ partners in the Netherlands who will contribute to the joint achievement of the SDGs. In order to achieve this goal, the Charter contributes in two ways. Firstly, the Charter facilitates the formation of SDG Solution

Partnerships. These partnerships will be constructed by different stakeholder groups and will contribute in a measurable way to the achievement of the SDGs. One partnership has been launched in the area of health (SDG 3), another focuses on human cities (SDG 11). Secondly, the Charter facilitates the formulation of a broadly supported national SDG agenda. This will enhance effective collaboration between Dutch stakeholders who are working on the SDGs.

What is needed to make the SDGs a real success?

The success of the SDGs depends on three conditions. In the first place, multi-stakeholder partnerships are needed to achieve the 17 SDGs and their 169 targets. Secondly, international cooperation is important, especially on SDGs that affect more than one country, such as SDG 12 on sustainable production and consumption. And finally, collaboration on impact measurement and innovation are crucial, in order to make sure that the greatest possible impact is achieved in the most effective manner.

The SDG Charter is a consortium of 80+ partners in the Netherlands and was signed in September 2014. The Charter intends to bring about cross-sector partnerships for the realisation of Agenda 2030.

The way forward to 2030

Delivering the Agenda 2030 is possible and aid, as the world's largest form of concessional public finance, can make a meaningful contribution to meeting the SDGs for the most marginalised people in Least Developed Countries.

- The Dutch government and the EU need to protect ODA from diversion by retaining its fundamental objective of poverty reduction, targeting the most marginalised people, supporting accountable institutions and improving governance to address poverty and inequality especially in LDCs and fragile contexts. If aid is allocated towards these objectives and in line with aid effectiveness principles, it stands a good chance of delivering value for money. The Millennium Development Goals are a case in point and provide useful lessons learnt.
- The Dutch government and the EU should acknowledge the specific role of aid vis-à-vis other development finance that is non-concessional in nature. Aid is concessional and therefore more likely to support the more thorny development issues that are recognised in Agenda 2030 as essential to a prosperous world. To deliver the SDGs, we need to let aid do its job so it can put itself out of the job.
- The Dutch government and the EU should invest in resources to promote safe spaces for dialogues in which all development actors come together to learn more about the different dimensions and interconnectedness of SDGs and to form real inclusive partnerships: coalitions of the needed instead of the willing.
- The Dutch government and the EU should support substantial research on how to monitor inclusiveness and partnership effectiveness and to find out who needs to be included, in which roles.

Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ADDA	Agency for Disability and Development in Africa
AMR	Anti-Microbial Resistance
AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing for Terrorism
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BEPS	Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
CAMM	Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility
CCCTB	Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
CFC	Controlled Foreign Corporation
COARM	Conventional Arms Exports
COP	United Nations Conference on Climate Change
COP21	United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Paris
CPI	Climate Policy Initiative
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DG AGRI	European Commission's Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
DG DEVCO	European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ENVI	European Commission's Directorate-General for the Environment
DG HOME	European Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG TRADE	European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade
DGGF	Dutch Good Growth Fund
DSM	Dutch States Mines
EEAS	European External Action Service
EAC	East African Community
ECAs	Export Credit Agencies
ECDD	Ethiopian Centre for Disability and Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
ETS	Emission Trading System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G20	Group of 20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, México, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, United States and European Union
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GESI	Gender Equity and Social Inclusion
GHSA	Global Health Security Agenda
GNI	Gross National Income
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GSP	General System of Preferences
GVCs	Global Value Chains
IAEG-SDG	Inter-Agency Expert Group on the Sustainable Development Goals Indicators
IDH	Sustainable Trade Initiative
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IHR	International Health Regulations
ILO-IOE	International Labour Organisation - International Organisation of Employers
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IOB	Dutch Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP	Intellectual Property
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PCSD	Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development
Rio+20	United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro
RSPO	Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil
RTRS	Round Table on Responsible Soy
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
TRIPS	Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TVETs	Technical Vocational Education and Training Institutions
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UPHLS	Umbrella for People with Disabilities in the Fight against HIV and AIDS
VNO-NCW	Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers
WBCSD	World Business Council on Sustainable Development
WHO	World Health Organisation
WRR	Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy
WTO	World Trade Organisation

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I

MAKING THE AGENDA 2030 A REALITY: THE KEY ROLE OF POLICY COHERENCE TO ACHIEVE DEVELOPMENT

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CHAPTER 2

READY TO CHANGE? EUROPEAN ACTORS AND THEIR CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE 2030 AGENDA

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CHAPTER 3 INCLUSION: NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US

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CHAPTER 4

BREAKING SILOS FOR SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE FOOD SECURITY

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CHAPTER 7 CLIMATE CHANGE: LET'S ACT TOGETHER AND LET'S ACT NOW

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Collaborating organisations



ecdpm

GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR
EDUCATION
THE NETHERLANDS

GREENPEACE



ICN

MCNV

terre des hommes 
stops child exploitation

Rutgers | For sexual and reproductive health and rights

 **SOS CHILDREN'S VILLAGES**
THE NETHERLANDS

THE
HUNGER
PROJECT

PARTOS 

tax justice.nl 

ZOA 
RELIEF | HOPE | RECOVERY

 **Aids Fonds** **STOP AIDS NOW!**

unicef 

 **THE GLOBAL GOALS**
For Sustainable Development
Charter



READYFORCHANGE?

Global Goals at home and abroad