Exactly one year ago, the heads of government of all 32 NATO allies signed an agreement to increase their defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP — the so-called Hague Pledge. Of that 5 per cent, 1.5 per cent is earmarked for ‘broader resilience’: critical infrastructure, digital security, and civil preparedness. Exactly how that 1.5 per cent will be allocated has not yet been decided — but the discussion on the matter has already begun. At a time when the ODA budget is under pressure and development organisations are struggling with dwindling resources, it is understandable that attention is turning to the substantial budgets allocated to defence.
Yet, in practice, this is already starting to cause friction. Last week, at CONCORD in Brussels, I attended a speech by someone who worked at NATO for many years and still acts as an adviser. His words were clear: within NATO, development cooperation is not considered as an instrument or a partner. Development cooperation is simply not on NATO’s radar – and this is evident: the new NATO standard does not include development cooperation as an instrument. In policy terms, ODA and defence budgets are admittedly becoming increasingly intertwined, but primarily on the terms set by Defence: development cooperation as a preventive measure against migration, terrorism or regional instability. Not as an autonomous mission focused on local needs.
There are also other voices from within, but these are, for the time being, individual opinions rather than institutional policy. Former General Middendorp described development cooperation and defence as “two sides of the same coin”, and former Defence Minister Ollongren emphasised the importance of structural investment in conflict prevention. Their convictions are sincere, but as long as these convictions do not find their way into NATO standards or the defence budget, little will change in practice. The risk, then, is that cooperation will develop nonetheless, but on the Ministry of Defence’s terms. This is precisely what organisations such as PAX and Oxfam Novib are warning against: he who pays the piper calls the tune. The experiences in Afghanistan, where humanitarian organisations operated under a military banner and lost their impartiality, serve as a warning that must not be forgotten.
The question is therefore not whether cooperation is possible, but under what conditions. The most feasible approach appears to be selective cooperation: focusing on specific areas where objectives genuinely overlap — conflict prevention, reconstruction — without entering into a comprehensive partnership. Cooperation with the Ministry of Defence is not a utopian ideal. However, it does require the development cooperation sector to be clear about what it contributes and what it does not compromise on.
At Partos, as part of the New Coalitions project, we intend to work in the coming period on establishing principles for a shared agenda at this interface, and we are exploring the possibilities of involving think tanks such as Clingendael. But to be honest: our network within the Ministry of Defence is limited. We are therefore making a specific appeal to our members: do you know anyone within the Ministry of Defence, the field of security studies or the NATO structure who is open to this dialogue? Does your organisation have any experience — positive or negative — of collaboration at this intersection? If so, please share your contact details with the project leader via sera@partos.nl. We need all this knowledge to build a concrete agenda that is more than just a wish list.
NB “In writing this blog, I have used AI (Claude, Anthropic). The AI critically analysed the draft text, made suggestions for improvements, and helped to edit and shorten the text. The substantive choices and the final text are my own.”